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2002 DIGILAW 246 (MP)

Nagori Cement v. M. P. Electricity Board

2002-03-04

A.K.GOHIL, DEEPAK VERMA

body2002
ORDER 1. Heard Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel for appellant, on the question of admission. 2. This appeal, under clause X of the Letters Patent, has been preferred by unsuccessful petitioner of WP No.1015/01, decided on 25.6.2001, by learned Single Judge, whereby the appellant's petition has been dismissed. 3. Appellant had filed a writ petition, challenging the supplementary bill dated 7.5.2001, alongwith its covering letter for payment of Rs. 1,16,06,360/- for necessary directions against the respondents to make an enquiry as to who was responsible for disconnecting the electricity connection in violation of provisions of section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and then to take necessary action against the erring officials of the respondent-Board. 4. The respondents appeared before the learned Single Judge on caveat and submitted their reply. According to them, one Junior Engineer Shri Anil Mahajan has visited appellant's unit on 3.5.2001 and had found that some tampering in the meter was done by the present appellant. Initially, a Panchnama was accordingly prepared on 3.5.2001. On fulfledged inspection being done on 4.5.2001 it was found that certain seals of the meter were broken, yet the appellant factory was being run. A regular Panchnama was prepared on 4.5.2001. On the same date, a seizure Panchnama was also prepared. All these Panchnamas have been filed by the respondents herein and have been marked as Annexures R-l, R-2 and R-3. The electricity was, thereafter, disconnected from the appellant's Cement Industry on 4.5.2001 itself. Subsequently, on calculation being done, supplementary bill was sent to the appellant on 7.5.2001. According to respondents, the appellant had engaged itself in committing theft of electricity, therefore, they were justified in disconnecting the electricity to the appellant and for raising a supplementary bill, on the basis of previous record. They, therefore, contended that appellant is not entitled for any relief to be granted by the writ Court. 5. Learned Single Judge heard the parties at length, perused the record and, thereafter, came to the conclusion that in the matter of theft of electricity the jurisdiction of the Writ Court becomes foreign. It has further been contended that correctness of the demand, as has been made by the respondents, cannot be examined by the Writ Court. The Writ Court has also placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in 1996 JLJ 797 = (1996) 4 SCC 522 [M.P.E.B. v. Harsh Wood Products]. It has further been contended that correctness of the demand, as has been made by the respondents, cannot be examined by the Writ Court. The Writ Court has also placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in 1996 JLJ 797 = (1996) 4 SCC 522 [M.P.E.B. v. Harsh Wood Products]. Thus, the learned Single Judge has rejected the appellant's writ petition on merits. It is against this order the appellant is before us. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly contended that on 3.5.2001 some of the employees of the respondent-Board visited the appellant factory and had broken the seals themselves, for which a complaint was lodged by the appellant same very day. However, this ground cannot be accepted by us for the simple reason that Annexures R-l, R-2 and R-3 would show that no such complaint was made either by the authorised representative of the appellant or by Shri Dilip Nagori, Managing Director of the appellant in this regard. If the seals were broken by the employees of the Board on 3.5.2001, then appellant had as many as three occasions to register its grievance in this regard, which it could have done while Annexures R-l, R-2 and R-3 were being recorded in their presence and not having done so, it cannot be conceived by this Court that initially the seals were broken by the employees of the respondent-Board so as to make out a false case of committing theft by the appellant. Thus, this ground is hereby negatived. 7. Learned counsel, thereafter, submitted that a show cause notice should have been issued to the appellant, as contemplated under section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act. It was also contended that a perusal of the supplementary bill and the covering letter do not show or reflect the basis for arriving at a particular amount, which has been raised by the respondents against the present appellant, is the amount due and outstanding. It was also contended that without show cause notice of supplementary bill electricity should not have been discontinued. 8. After having heard the learned counsel on these two grounds also we find no merit and substance. It was a clear cut case of theft, which had been committed by the appellant. It was also contended that without show cause notice of supplementary bill electricity should not have been discontinued. 8. After having heard the learned counsel on these two grounds also we find no merit and substance. It was a clear cut case of theft, which had been committed by the appellant. This is manifestly clear from Annexures R-l, R-2 and R-3, which have been prepared by the Board in presence of the representative of the appellant or in presence of the Managing Director of the appellant. In the given facts and circumstances wherein prima facie a case of theft was made out, it was not necessary for the respondents to have resorted to demand notice and then have served a supplementary bill and only on refusal of the appellant to pay the same to disconnect the same. This would have given further time to the appellant to continue in its nefarious activity. Certainly that is not the mandate of the Act. The supplementary bill and the covering letter served on the appellant would show the details, on the basis of which the amount under the bill has been claimed. If the appellant felt aggrieved by the said amount, then it had the remedy of approaching the Board and asking for clarification. 9. The respondents have also contended in their reply that the appellant has a remedy or referring a dispute to the Review Committee constituted in accordance with the procedure laid down by Board's notification dated 20.12.1999 (Annexure R-8). The further details of the circulars under which the appellant could have raised the dispute before the Review Committee have been mentioned in the said reply. Thus, in this appeal we find no merit and substance. If the appellant so desires it can resort to the remedy as has been submitted by the respondents in their reply. No case for interference is made out. The LPA is, accordingly, dismissed summarily.