P.G. AGARWAL, J- Heard Mr T.C. Khetri, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr K.K. Mahanta, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In this second appeal arising out of the judgment and decree dated 22.8.1994 passed by the Assistant District Judge, Sonitpur, Tezpur in Title Appeal No. 20/1993, the following substantial questions of law were formulated:- i) As to whether in the facts of the circumstances of the case the learned Assistant District Judge was right in law in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have suppressed material facts. ii) As to whether the learned Assistant District Judge was right in law in coming to the conclusion that the suit is barred by limitation. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the appellant as plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 86/88 stating inter-alia that the land described in Schedule-A to the plaint belonged to the father of the plaintiff and defendants and thereafter, there has been an amicable settlement amongst the three brothers of which they were given one third share, that is, 11 lechas of land as described in Schedule-B to the plaint and hereinafter referred as the suit land. The settlement was arrived at in the year 1984, that is, 22.12.84. On 7.11.85 the Municipal Board restrained the parties from raising any construction. The case of the plaintiff is that on 13.11.88 the defendant demolished the latrine situated over the suit land which led to the filing of first information report at the Police Station. The plaintiff prayed for declaration of right and interest based on his possessory title and prohibitory injunction. Defendant No. 2 Sri Dharma Ram Baishya filed written statement admitting the broad facts of the case and stating that he is no way involved with the suit land. The contesting respondent defendant No. 1 also admitted the statement of 1984 and the fact that 11 lechas of land fell into his share. Restraint by Municipal Board from raising any construction was also no disputed. However, the respondent defendant Karma Ram Baishya denied the allegation of demolition. The trial Court framed as many as six issues which are quoted below:- 1) Is there any cause of action of the suit? 2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3) Whether the suit is bad for suppression of material facts? 4) Whether the suit is bad for non joinder and mis joinder of parties? The trial Court framed as many as six issues which are quoted below:- 1) Is there any cause of action of the suit? 2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3) Whether the suit is bad for suppression of material facts? 4) Whether the suit is bad for non joinder and mis joinder of parties? 5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for his right title interest over the suit land described in the Schedule B of the plaint with consequential reliefs of prohibiting and mandatory injunctions against the defendants? 6) To what relief or reliefs are the parties entitled to? 4. Thereafter vide order dated 31.3.1993 the suit was decreed as prayed for. The respondent Karma Ram Baishya thereupon filed Title Appeal No. 20 of 1993 and the first appellate Court deiced issue No. 2 and 3 against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal. 5. Issue Nos. 1,2 and 3 read as follows:- 1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3. Whether the suit is bad for suppression of material facts? 6. Issue Nos. 1 and 3 were taken up together by the appellate Court and it was held that "from the discussions above, I hold that there is cause of action for the suit" which goes to show that issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the plaintiff; but the issue No. 3 was decided against the plaintiff appellant. There is no dispute at the Bar that in the plaint, the plaintiff has not mentioned the exact date of demolition. At two places in the plaint portion the date has been kept blank and it is mentioned as -11-88. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the date was required to be filled up after checking with the FIR but due to inadvertence, the same could not be filled up; but on that count, the plaint cannot be thrown out. The appellate Court held: "Non-mentioning of the date prejudicially affects the appellant in as rnuch as he had been deprived to make his defence according to it". Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in exercise of jurisdiction u/s 100, CPC, this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence. The appellate Court held: "Non-mentioning of the date prejudicially affects the appellant in as rnuch as he had been deprived to make his defence according to it". Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in exercise of jurisdiction u/s 100, CPC, this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence. In support of his submission, learned counsel has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Kumar Agarwal and another-Vs-Thawar Das, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 303 . There is no dispute regarding the limited scope of interference u/s 100, CPC, and in the present case, the finding of the Court below that the date of the demolition was not mentioned in the plaint need not be reappreciated. The question here is for the alleged fault for non-mentioning of the date, any adverse presumption can be drawn? Mr Mahanta has further submitted that if two conclusions can be arrived upon, two views are permissible and can be given effect to. If the first appellate Court has accepted the first view, the second appellate Court is not empowered to substantiate its own view. Learned counsel has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam-Vs-Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 722 , wherein the Apex Court observed as follows:- "5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last Court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial Court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position of the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence." 7. When the plaintiff was cross examined, he has categorically submitted that he has not filed the certified copy of the FIR, which was however true and as submitted by Mr Khetri it is seen that the copy of the FIR was annexed alongwith the plaint itself and this fact has been mentioned in the list of documents dated 19.11.88. In the copy of the FIR, it is seen that the alleged incident took place on 13.11.88 and the FIR was lodged on 15.11.88. It may be mentioned here that the plaint was filed on 18.11.88 and 19.11.88, that is, within a week of the alleged incident. However, the plaintiff while deposing before the Court gave the date as 13.12.88 and 15.12.88 instead of 13.11.88 and 15.11.88. This mistake on the part of the plaintiff also is apparent as because as there can not be any question of cause of action taking place after the suit was filed. The appellate Court could have verified the matter on the materials available on record itself. 8. The question that arises for consideration now is whether the failure of the plaintiff to fill up the date only (the month and year is mentioned) in the plaint is fatal, as held by the appellate Court or not. The appellant has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh-Vs-Ganpat Lal and another, reported in (1996) 1SCC243, wherein the Apex Court observed that mentioning of the wrong date when cause of action arose is not fatal and the plaintiff can not be nonsuited on that count. The appellant has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh-Vs-Ganpat Lal and another, reported in (1996) 1SCC243, wherein the Apex Court observed that mentioning of the wrong date when cause of action arose is not fatal and the plaintiff can not be nonsuited on that count. In a latter decision in the case of Syed Dastagir-Vs-T.R. Gopalkrishna Setty, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 337 , the Apex Court held that wherever there are two possible interpretations, the one that subserves ends of justice should be accepted and the one which defeats justice should be rejected. The plaintiff would not have gained by non-mentioning the date of the demolition and by stating the month and year only when he had himself filed the copy of the FIR alongwith the plaint. 9. In view of the above, it is held that this is not a case of suppression of material fact and the issue was wrongly decided by the appellate Court. As regards the question of limitation, the trial Court did not consider the matter stating that this has not been placed. But the appellate Court held that this being a case of declaration of possessory right, Article 58 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the facts of the present case. If the suit was filed on 19.11.88, the appellate Court calculated the period of three years from 22.12.84, the date on which the amicable settlement took place between the parties. Admittedly, that was the starting point of the cause of action and the appellate Court has come to the specific finding that after the amicable settlement, they were possessing their shares of the land without any intervention. Thus, the cause of action arose when the defendants tried to demolish the latrine in the month of November, 1988 only. The date has been found to be 13.11.88 as per the copy of the FIR and the suit was filed within six days of the said cause of action. Calculation of the period of three years from 22.12.84 was not called for and it is held that the suit is not barred by limitation. 10. In view of the above, substantial questions of law as stated above, are answered in favour of the appellant/ plaintiff. 11. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. Calculation of the period of three years from 22.12.84 was not called for and it is held that the suit is not barred by limitation. 10. In view of the above, substantial questions of law as stated above, are answered in favour of the appellant/ plaintiff. 11. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is restored. There is no order as to costs.