M. P. CHINNAPPA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri K. Appa Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri C. H. Jadhav, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case may be summarised as follows :the respondent herein filed a complaint under Section 200, Cr. P. C. against the petitioners for the alleged offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act on the allegation that in the business transactions, the petitioners were due certain amount and the second petitioner issued a cheque on behalf of the first petitioner-company bearing No. 885572, dt. 12-11-99 drawn on United Western Bank Ltd. , Hubli for a sum of Rs. 6,29,369/ -. When the respondent presented the cheque for realisation to the Vysya Bank, Gadag Branch, it was reported on 27-11-99 with an endorsement 'insufficient funds'. On information being received on 29-12-1999, the respondent issued a notice on 11-1-2000 which was replied by the second petitioner on 31-1-2000. However, notice issued to the 3rd petitioner was not claimed. Even after the expiry of the statutory period since the petitioners have failed to pay the amount, the complaint came to be lodged. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and registered a case in C. C. No. 318/2000 and issued process to the petitioners. The petitioners questioned the said order before the learned Sessions Judge, Gadag in Crl. R. P. No. 105/2000. By order dt. 25-6-2001, the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the revision petition. Hence, the petitioners approached this Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 3 ) THE petitioner questioned the order passed by the Court on three counts. Firstly, the complaint was not presented by the complainant but the same was presented by the advocate in the absence of the complainant, therefore, the very receipt of the complaint itself is invalid and the entire proceedings is liable to be quashed. Secondly, he submitted that Accused No. 3 is merely a Director and his presence as an accused person is unnecessary and therefore, the complaint is liable to be quashed insofar as Accused No. 3 is concerned. Thirdly, he submitted that from the perusal of the complaint no cause of action is stated, therefore the same is liable to be quashed. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent fully supported the impugned order. Thirdly, he submitted that from the perusal of the complaint no cause of action is stated, therefore the same is liable to be quashed. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent fully supported the impugned order. Coming to the first point that whether the complaint presented by the advocate is valid or whether it is liable to be quashed, the learned counsel has drawn my attention to the Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Abhoyeswari v. Kishori Mohan, AIR 1914 Cal 479 wherein it is held that the words "at once" in Sec. 200, Cr. P. C. indicate that ordinarily a complaint must be presented in person. A complaint should never be accepted which is not signed by the complainant and is not preferred by a person duly authorised to prefer that specific complaint. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submitted that the word "at once" has been deleted in 1973 Cr. P. C. as amended in 1973 which clearly shows that the complaint presented by the advocate would be due compliance required by Sec. 200, Cr. P. C. While emphasizing his argument, he has also drawn my attention to the Judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in Rajan George v. State of Kerala, (1999) 1 Crimes 519 wherein the Kerala High Court has held that the Court was not disabled from taking cognizance of the offence when complaint was filed by a Pleader in absence of a complainant. The Court could have not been in a position to take cognizance only on the day complaint was presented. ( 6 ) ALLAHABAD High Court in a Judgment between Baldev Das v. The State, 1952 Cri LJ 1711 : ( AIR 1952 All 937 ) held that the complainant should have either personally presented the complaint before the City Magistrate or should have engaged a lawyer to perform the duty of presenting the complaint in person. ( 7 ) FURTHER, in 1985 Cri LJ NOC 73, Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that presence of complainant, not always essential. ( 8 ) GUJARAT High Court in Anil G. Shah v. I. J. Chittaranjan Co. , 1998 Cri LJ 3870 held that dishonour of cheque in regard to complaint need not be lodged by payee personally, complaint filed by power of attorney of payee is legal. ( 8 ) GUJARAT High Court in Anil G. Shah v. I. J. Chittaranjan Co. , 1998 Cri LJ 3870 held that dishonour of cheque in regard to complaint need not be lodged by payee personally, complaint filed by power of attorney of payee is legal. (1994) 1 Crimes 395 (Kerala), Hamsa v. Ibhrahim, (1994) 1 Crimes 820 (Madras), M/s. Ruby Leather Exports v. K. Venu Rep. Vandana Chemicals Etc. , also of the same view. ( 9 ) AT this stage, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the advocate acts as an agent by filing the vakalath. In that case, admittedly vakalath was filed by the advocate when he presented the complaint. Therefore, the complaint presented by the advocate is not a bar; on the other hand it is a proper presentation of the complaint. The Court also has not rejected the same; on the other hand, he had received the complaint and posted the case for recording the sworn statement of the complainant. That means to say that on that date itself he has taken cognizance of the offence. ( 10 ) IN addition to that the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of M. P. v. S. P. Mathur, 1970 Cri LJ 922 held that it would not be proper to dismiss the complaint sent by post on the ground that it was not validly presented. That means to say even when the complaint is sent through post, the same can be received by the Court and the Court can act on it. Therefore, the first contention of the petitioner that it is improper presentation of the complaint and the same is liable to be quashed on that ground itself is unsustainable. ( 11 ) IT is no doubt true that the first petitioner is a company wherein the second and third petitioners are the Managing Director and Director respectively. Needless to say that unless there is specific allegation, all the Directors need not be arrayed as accused persons. In support of that argument, the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in ILR 2002 Kant 1026 wherein it is held that proceedings cannot be quashed because the question that has to be examined is whether Directors are also responsible to repay the loan and that is purely a matter of evidence. In support of that argument, the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in ILR 2002 Kant 1026 wherein it is held that proceedings cannot be quashed because the question that has to be examined is whether Directors are also responsible to repay the loan and that is purely a matter of evidence. ( 12 ) IT is necessary to refer to the complaint to find out as to whether any allegation made against the third petitioner to hold that he is also a necessary party in this proceedings. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to the allegations contained in para 2 wherein it is specifically stated that accused Nos. 2 and 3 approached the complainant and requested to make financial help and by taking into consideration the business of accused No. 1, the complainant made financial help at the first instance in the year 1995-96 to accused No. 1-Company. In para 4 also, it is mentioned that thereafter only accused Nos. 2 and 3 managed the affairs of the company. In para 5 it is also stated that accused Nos. 2 and 3 went on promising to pay back the credit outstanding in the name of accused No. 1-Company and ultimately, accused No. 2 issued a cheque on behalf of the first petitioner with the knowledge of the third petitioner bearing No. 855572, dt. 12-11-1999, that cheque was dishonoured. The complainant had issued notice to accused Nos. 2 and 3 on 11-1-2000. The accused No. 3 did not claim the notice and he had also not sent any reply. The accused No. 3-Ramesh Gandhi is the third petitioner in this case. Therefore, prima facie there are materials to show the involvement of the third petitioner in this transaction. At this stage it cannot be said that arraying him as an accused person is improper or illegal. Therefore, this argument is also unsustainable. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioners however, submitted that from the perusal of the complaint, the cause of action is not mentioned and on that count also the complaint is liable to be quashed. This argument though appears to be reasonable, if reference is made to the sworn statement, it is clear that the complainant has specifically stated that the second petitioner admittedly sent a reply on 2-2-2000 but he has not paid the amount. This argument though appears to be reasonable, if reference is made to the sworn statement, it is clear that the complainant has specifically stated that the second petitioner admittedly sent a reply on 2-2-2000 but he has not paid the amount. Further all the documents viz. , cheque, notice, reply notice, etc. , on which the respondent has relied on have been made available before the Court, therefore, there cannot be any difficulty for the Court to find out as to when cause of action arose in this case. This is a technical ground raised by the petitioners which can be clarified or established by the parties only at the trial and it is a settled law that the complaint cannot be dismissed on technical ground. Therefore, it is too early for any Court to hold that the complaint does not have cause of action; on the other hand, it can be clarified undisputedly by the parties at the time of trial. In a decision reported in (1999) 7 SCC 510 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3762 ) it is held that strict interpretation would give handle to the trickster - drawer of the cheque. Therefore, prima facie it is clear that the impugned order does not call for interference. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, viewed from any angle, I do not find any merit in this petition. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. However, liberty is reserved to both the parties to raise all these contentions at the trial. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .