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2002 DIGILAW 251 (HP)

INSURANCE COMPANY v. JAI PIDI EDUCATED UNEMPLOYED SOCIETY LTD.

2002-09-04

ONKAR CHAND THAKUR, PREM CHAUHAN, SURINDER SARUP

body2002
ORDER ORAL Justice Surinder Sarup (Retd.). President: - This appeal is directed against the order of the District Forum, Shimla, dated 1.6.2000 as a result of which the appellant has been ordered to pay Rs. 2,93,000/- to the respondent with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint alongwith litigation expenses of Rs. 500/-. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and we have gone through the record. The case arises out of repudiation of a claim for indemnification of the respondent by the appellant due to the damage caused to the insured vehicle of the respondent as a result of it being involved in an accident on 17.7.1998. There is no dispute between the parties that on the said date the vehicle was duly insured with the appellant. The contention being now raised before us, which was also raised before the learned Forum below, is that the fitness certificate of the vehicle, in question, had expired as far back as 5.11.1996 whereas it was involved in an accident on 17.7.1998. Therefore, there was a breach of the terms and conditions of the Insurance policy as contained therein as also violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with the relevant rules made thereunder. 3. In the context of the above broad argument, the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that there has been a breach of contract between the parties because of non disclosure by the respondent to the appellant that the vehicle, in question, was not having a valid fitness certificate at the relevant time. In support of his submission, he has cited a cases of Kashiram Yadav and another v. Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. & others, 1989 ACJ. 1078 (SC), Mahanth Singh v. U Ba Yi, A.I.R. 1939 Privy Council 110, Gordhandas pursottam Sonawala v. Natvarlal Chandulal & Co., A.I.R. 1952 Bombay 349, and Sardar Ishwar Singh, Truck Owner and another, V. Himachal Puri and others, AIR 1990 M.P. 282. He has placed reliance on these authorities in support of his above arguments. 4. & others, 1989 ACJ. 1078 (SC), Mahanth Singh v. U Ba Yi, A.I.R. 1939 Privy Council 110, Gordhandas pursottam Sonawala v. Natvarlal Chandulal & Co., A.I.R. 1952 Bombay 349, and Sardar Ishwar Singh, Truck Owner and another, V. Himachal Puri and others, AIR 1990 M.P. 282. He has placed reliance on these authorities in support of his above arguments. 4. We, however, find from a perusal of the impugned order that reference has been made therein to rule 39 of the rules framed by the state of Himachal Pradesh under the rule making power vested in it by the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, being the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1991. The said rule has been reproduced in extenso in the impugned order vide para-6 thereof. In para-7, the finding has been record that the Registration Certificate issued to the Mini Bus of the complainant shall not be deemed to be automatically cancelled on account of failure of the complainant to renew the same after 5.11.1986. The cancellation, suspension and renewal of certificate of fitness is a matter between the Registering authority and the owner of the concerned Motor Vehicle, and the Insurance company does not come into the picture. We find it difficult to dis-agree with this reasoning recorded b y the learned Forum below in the impugned order. We are also in complete agreement with the further finding recorded therein that when the insurance company i.e. the appellant had accepted the premium from the complainant/respondent even after the date of expiry of fitness certificate on 5.11.1986, it does not behave the appellant to wriggle out of its liability to indemnify the otherwise just claim of the respondent. 5. Elaborating on the above further, we have no hesitation in holding that if the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before us and referred to above is accepted, then the very object, scope and purpose for which the consumer protection law has been enacted would be defeated on such technicality. Since we are governed by the provisions of the said consumer protection law, we are clearly of the view that by accepting the premium for insurance of the concerned vehicle even after 5,11,1996, the appellant made itself liable for any such claim for indemnification as raised by the respondent in the present case. Since we are governed by the provisions of the said consumer protection law, we are clearly of the view that by accepting the premium for insurance of the concerned vehicle even after 5,11,1996, the appellant made itself liable for any such claim for indemnification as raised by the respondent in the present case. Moreover, it is the statutory duty of the functionaries of the insurance company under the law to verify all the relevant factors as well as fitness of the vehicle which it sought to be insured before issuing an insurance policy and before accepting the premium therefore. In view of these reasons, the authorities cited on behalf of the appellant by its learned counsel and referred to above are clearly not applicable to the facts of the present case. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and is dismissed.