S. N. KAPOOR ( 1 ). Heard learned counsel for the parties. ( 2 ). In this case, the grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent is not covered by the definition of the term "workman". His submission is based on the statement made by the respondent. Statement of the respondent indicates following duties of the petitioner:- 1. The respondent was supposed to check the data fed and entered in the computer by other persons. 2. After checking, he was supposed to correct it in the floppy, 3. He was supposed to process data for the purpose of preparing a report. 4. The report so processed was supposed to form basis of future planning of the concern. ( 3 ). It is not disputed that the salary of the petitioner ranged between Rs. 1. 800. 00 to Rs. 2,0021- and ultimately Rs. 2. 400. 00. The learned Labour Court took the view that since no evidence had been adduced on behalf of the management to show that the work performed by the workman was in any way supervisory in nature and it has been testified by the workman that he was basically doing the basic work of a clerical nature under the supervision and control of his seniors. Simply because the workman was getting basic pay of Rs. 2,400. 00 per month would not exclude him from the definition of workman under Section 2 (s) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "act" for short) and answered the reference accordingly and accepted the statement of claims made by the petitioner. ( 4 ). The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vinayak is that the respondent was working in supervisory and managerial capacity, for he was supposed to check, process and submit a report for future planning. Consequently, he was not an ordinary skilled labour who would fall within the definition of the term "workman". He submits that the moment it is admitted that he prepared report which formed basis of the planning, he goes out of the purview of the term "workman", for he was performing supervisory as well as managerial duty of advising the management for future planning. On his own admission, data which was being processed by the petitioner would form basis of future planning of the management. ( 5 ). On his own admission, data which was being processed by the petitioner would form basis of future planning of the management. ( 5 ). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that simply because he was preparing report for the purpose of future planning, he would not fall within the definition of the term "workman". The learned counsel relies upon two judgments, namely, lloyds Bank Vs. Panna Lal Gupta. 1961 (1) LLJ 18 and Ved Prakash Gupta Vs. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. , 1984 Lab. I. C. 658 = AIR 1984 SC 914 . In Ved Prakash Gupta vs. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. (supra ). The term "workman" was considered by the supreme Court in the context of the phrase "managerial or administrative capacity". Before proceeding further, it would be desirable to reproduce definition of workman as given in clause (s) of Section 2 of the Act, which reads as under- (S) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment can be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950, (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. ]" ( 6 ). It would be apparent from the definition that the term "workman" includes any person, including apprentice in any industry to do any skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward. ]" ( 6 ). It would be apparent from the definition that the term "workman" includes any person, including apprentice in any industry to do any skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward. But this term "workman" specifically excludes by using the phrase "but does not include any person covered by the clause (i), (ii), (til) and (iv) as referred to hereinabove. Clause (iv) specifically provies that the term "workman" would not include any person "who being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred per mensem or exercises, either by nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. It may appear as if a skilled or technical person performing operational, clerical or supervisory work in ordinary course would not fall outside the definition of the term "workman" except in the circumstances as mentioned in clause (iv), namely, (a) where he draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred per mensem. This is one part. But In order to exclude, it is further required that either by nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, the person concerned performs mainly functions of managerial nature. ( 7 ). In case one goes by the term "supervisory work", checking entered data, correction in the floppy may amount to supervisory work and therefore, it Is likely that the respondent could be held to be beyond the purview of the term "workman". But before saying so, one has to refer to the judgment in Lloyds Bank Vs. Panna Lal Gupta (supra) where also similar supervisory work was being done by an employee of the following nature: (a) checking entries with vouchers in the specified books, (b) checking balances of the three specific ledgers, (c) checking entries in some specified subsidiary books with the vouchers, (d) checking impersonal and cash balance weekly, (e) checking contents of ordinary outgoing branch mail, (f) doing the work of reconciliation of the branch accounts with the other branches and preparing monthly branch reconciliation statements, (g) checking monthly reconciliation statements received from branches etc. , (h) checking the authority of the person passing the voucher in order to check whether the limit had been exceeded or the amount was within the limit, and (i) examining whether the amount was within the security limit and if there are mistakes taking them to the clerk concerned and the assistant concerned for correction. With reference to the above duties, the Supreme Court observed that it would be obvious that prima facie, though the work in the audit department was responsible and important, none of the items of work assigned to Mr. Garg disclosed any supervisory character of the duties assigned to him. In oral evidence, however, it was brought out that the clerk in the audit department had to check the authority of the person passing the voucher, and to check whether the amount was within the limited. . It was further observed that it would be legitimate to say that the work in that data department was important for the proper and efficient functining of the bank, but it would be idle to elevate that work to the status of officers who supervise the work of everybody concerned with the bank s establishment. It was further observed that: ". . . Dealing with such disputes industrial courts generally considered the essence of the matter and did not attach undue importance to the designation of the employees or the name assigned to the class to which they belonged. It was always a matter of determining what the primary duties of an employee were-did he do clerical or manual work; if the answer was in the affirmative, he was a workman; were his duties of a supervisory nature; if the answer was in the affirmative, he was not a workman. ( 8 ). In considering the latter aspect of the problem industrial adjudication generally took the view that the supervisor or officer should occupy a position of command or decision and should be authorized to act in certain matters within the limits of his authority without the sanction of the manager or other supervisors. " The Supreme Court further observed with reference to the case of checking inspectors that "the checking inspectors had to check the conductors and drivers and to verify if they were doing their duties properly. In that behalf he had to send his dally check report to the office. " The Supreme Court further observed with reference to the case of checking inspectors that "the checking inspectors had to check the conductors and drivers and to verify if they were doing their duties properly. In that behalf he had to send his dally check report to the office. It was urged on behalf of checking inspector that he was not in absolute control of any group of workers and that the report which he made had to be submitted to his superiors for final orders. It was held that the geneeral nature of the duties indicated that the checking inspector belonged to the cadre of the supervisory staff. " Further with reference to the term "an officer" reference was made to the Burmah- shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. , Madras Vs. their employees [1995-I LLJ 21] and the observation made in that case was quoted herein this case to the following effect:- "to be an officer", it was held, "an employee must occupy a position of command and direction and should be authorized to act without the sanction of the manager or other supervisors. The name or the designation of the employee is not a determining test. " ( 9 ). After considering the above judgments, the Supreme Court observed that "having regard to the nature of the duties and functions assigned to the three employees by the appellant, would it be reasonably possible to hold that they are supervisors under C1. 9 of para 164 (b) of the award? In our opinion the answer to this question must be in the negative. " ( 10 ). In Ved Prakash Gupta v. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. (supra) again in para-12 the term "workman" in relation to expression "managerial or administrative capacity", came to be considered. In that case substantial part of the work of the employee consisted of looking after the security of the factory and its property by deputing the watchmen working under him to work at the factory gate or sending them to watch-towers or around the factory or to accompany visitors to the factory and making entries in the visitors register as regards the visitors and in the concerned registers as regards materials entering or going out of the premises of the factory. In the absence of any written directions specifying his duties the employee also did other items of work such as signing identity cards of workmen, issuing some small items of stores like torch-cells etc. , to his subordinate watchmen, which can be got from the stores even under the signatures of watchman and filling up application forms of other workmen and counter-signing them or recommending advances and loans or for promotion of his subordinates. However, he had no power to appoint or dismiss any workman or order any enquiry against any workman. In para 12, the following relevant observations were made:- "12. . . . In these circumstances we hold that the substantial duty of the appellant was only of a Security Inspector at the gate of the factory premises and that it was neither managerial nor supervisory in nature in the sense in which those terms are understood in industrial law. In the light of evidence and the legal position referred to above we are of the position that the finding of the Labour Court that the appellant is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act is perverse and could not he supported. " ( 11 ). From the above two judgments, it appears that in order to fall within the supervisory capacity in the context in which the term supervisor has been used in the Act, it is necessary that the person concerned should have some disciplinary authority over and above his subordinates to initiate some disciplinary action without making a reference to his own seniors and bosses. If seen in this light, there is nothing on record to show that any authority was assigned to the respondent to issue a memo or a warning or an authority to recommend or to withhold promotion of his subordinate, leave aside the question of discretion to suspend, appoint or remove any person working under him. If the term supervisor is understood in this context in the Industrial Disputes Act, then its meaning has been raised to a very high pedestal as compared to the meaning of the term supervisor in ordinary parlance. Consequently, it does not appear that the learned Labour Court has committed any error in rejecting the contention of the petitioner that the respondent was not a "workman". ( 12 ). Consequently, it does not appear that the learned Labour Court has committed any error in rejecting the contention of the petitioner that the respondent was not a "workman". ( 12 ). Even if for the sake of arguments one accepts the proposition that the two views arepossible and the case of the respondent is covered by the exclusion clause (4), this Court is not supposed to substitute its own views in place of the views taken by the learned Labour court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 13 ). In the aforementioned circumstances, I do not think that there is any force in this petition and it is accordingly dismissed. The amount, which has been deposited, may be released to respondent No. 2. ( 14 ). However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, parties are left to bear their own costs.