Judgment :- M.R. Hariharan Nair, J. The third respondent was a sub staff in the Canara Bank in its Tripunithara branch. One Radhakrishnan, who was an account holder of the bank alleged that on 17.4.1984, while he was returning from his office, the third respondent assaulted him at about 4.30 P.M. while near Eroor Puthiya road bus stop and that the incident of assault he also lost his savings bank account pass book, a sum of Rs.400/-and some important keys. The third respondent was consequently arrested on 19.4.1984 based on Crime No. 70 of 1984 registered on the basis of the F.I.statement given by Radhakrishnan. The matter was reported to the Employer/the petitioner bank. He was placed under suspension w.e.f. 2.5.1984. The matter was subsequently patched up with the complainant and consequently the third respondent was not included as an accused in the charge sheet laid by the police. However, the other participants in the occurrence were charge sheeted and in the due course the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam allowed the application for compounding the offence in the complaint filed before him and acquitted all the accused under Sec 320 (8) of the Cr P C. In the meantime disciplinary action had been initiated against the third respondent. As per Ext. P5 order dt. 6.7.1984 the suspension was revoked and the third respondent was directed to report for duty at the Kothamangalam branch. He refused to do so and filed O.P. No. 6167 of 1984 before this Court. Ultimately the Original Petition was disposed of on 17.7.1984 holding that it is for the petitioner (present third respondent) to decide whether he should opt to obey the transfer order to continue under suspension. The Original Petition was dismissed with the said observation . Thereafter he joined duty at Kothamangalam on 11.6.1985. The disciplinary proceedings reached its logical end and it was finally ordered as per Ext. P6 that punishment of 'warning' as per Chapter XI Regulation 4 Clause (a) of the Canara Bank Service Code be imposed on the third respondent. It was further directed that the period of suspension from 2.5.1984 to 11.6.1985 shall not be treated as period spent on duty and hence would not be reckoned for any purpose whatsoever. The aforesaid punishment was taken up by the Union before the Central Labour Court. It was further directed that the period of suspension from 2.5.1984 to 11.6.1985 shall not be treated as period spent on duty and hence would not be reckoned for any purpose whatsoever. The aforesaid punishment was taken up by the Union before the Central Labour Court. The question referred to was the following : "Keeping in view, the exclusion of the names of Sri. Radhakrishnan from the charge framed by the police and also considering the deposition of the complainant during the enquiry proceedings and his letter dt. 22.4.1986, whether the action of the management of Canara Bank, in issuing a warning letter to Shri. Radhakrishnan, sub-staff of Canara Bank, Tripunithura branch, confirming his suspension period from 2.5.1984 to 11.6.1985 and not paying full wages for the said period is justified ? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled ?" 2. In Ext. P3 award passed by the said court, which is impugned herein, the Tribunal upheld the validity of the domestic enquiry held against the third respondent and the findings entered by the Enquiry Officer. They were held as legal and valid. However, after entering the said findings the Labour court proceeded to consider the validity of the punishment and it was ultimately held that the punishment of warning was proper. It was further held that the punishment of treating the period of suspension from 2.5.84 to 11.6.85 as not spent on duty is set aside. The Management was directed to treat the said period as period spent on duty and to pay full wages to the third respondent for the said period. It is the last of these directions i.e., to treat the period as spent on duty and to pay full wages, that is impugned in the Original Petition. 3. Mr. M.C. Sen, who appeared for the petitioner, submitted that Ext. P3 award suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record, which falls within the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to be corrected. It was further submitted that the impact of Ext. 3. Mr. M.C. Sen, who appeared for the petitioner, submitted that Ext. P3 award suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record, which falls within the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to be corrected. It was further submitted that the impact of Ext. P3 would be that the third respondent would not be affected in any manner in so far as what is left is only a warning and that the Labour Court erred in interfering with the discretion available to the Management with regard to the manner in which the period of suspension should be treated. 4. Yet another submission was that the sustenance of the directions of the Labour Court would convey a wrong message to the employees of the Bank that period of suspension could always be treated as period spent on duty with all monetary benefits. 5. The learned counsel for the third respondent submits that in view of the manner in which the reference was made to the labour Court, the directions given with regard to the treating of the suspension period as period on duty with entitlement for salary and other benefits was well justified. Referring to Regulations 23 and 21 of Ext. P8 Regulations it was further submitted that irrespective of whether the prosecution was initiated by the employer or by a third party, in the case of acquittal, the Management will have no discretion to treat the period of suspension as without entitlement for pay and allowances and that viewed from this perspective Ext. P3 is fully justified. 6. A perusal of Ext. P3 shows that it suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record. The disciplinary proceedings initiated was for imposition of punishment for gross misconduct coming within the scope of Regulation 4. It is Regulation 6 which deals with minor misconduct. It so happens that the punishment of warning appears both under Regulation 4 as also in Regulation 6. It is submitted that the punishment imposed in the present case is under Regulation 4 and the Labour Court has also accepted this position. Warning is the smallest punishment that could be imposed for delinquency coming under Regulation 4 and the highest punishment appears to be dismissal from service. Neither under Regulation 4 nor under Regulation 6, withholding of pay during suspension period appears a punishment. Warning is the smallest punishment that could be imposed for delinquency coming under Regulation 4 and the highest punishment appears to be dismissal from service. Neither under Regulation 4 nor under Regulation 6, withholding of pay during suspension period appears a punishment. In fact no provision in Ext. P8 regulation mentions that denial of pay and allowances during suspension period would amount to a punishment under it. However, it is mentioned in paragraph VII of Ext. P3 award as follows : "The punishment of treating the period of suspension from 2.5.1984 to 11.6.1985 as not spent on duty is set aside." It is obvious that the Labour Court has proceeded on the assumption that a direction that the period of suspension would not be treated as period spent on duty amounts to a punishment. It is obviously incorrect and the labour Court has committed an error in coming to the above conclusion. It is based on the said finding that the Labour Court has further proceeded to interfere with the direction in the order of reinstatement as to the manner in which the said period should be treated. That apart, it is held in para IV of Ext. P3 that the punishment imposed on the workman is only a minor punishment. Here again an error is committed . As already mentioned, the proceedings initiated and the punishment imposed were all under Regulation 4 dealing with gross misconduct. The consideration of the punishment imposed in the case as one for minor punishment and dealing with the matter on that basis also is an obvious error apparent on the face of the record. Yet another observation in Para V of Ext. P3 is that the direction that the period of suspension would not be treated as period spent on duty would amount to break of service and that there is no provision in the regulation to impose a punishment of imposition of break of service and hence there was scope for interfering with the orders of the Management. 7. Mr. Sen is correct in his submission that a direction with regard to the manner in which the period of suspension should be treated is not a part of the provisions relating to punishment at all and that there is vast discretion available to the employer to give directions in that regard. 7. Mr. Sen is correct in his submission that a direction with regard to the manner in which the period of suspension should be treated is not a part of the provisions relating to punishment at all and that there is vast discretion available to the employer to give directions in that regard. Regulation 12(3) enables the Management, in cases were some punishment other than dismissal is imposed, to direct that the whole or part of the period of suspension be treated as spent on duty and the employee given the corresponding portion of his salary and emoluments. In view of Regulation 12(3) and the fact that the punishment imposed in the case is one other than dismissal, it is obvious that the Management had full discretion to prescribe the manner in which the period of suspension i.e. period from 2.5.1984 to 11.6.1985, should be treated. This is especially so because here is a case where in spite of Ext. P5 order passed on 16.7.1984 the third respondent took his own time to join duty in the new place of appointment and he could not give any satisfactory explanation as to why he should be paid for during the period from 16.7.1984 to 11.6.1985, during which period he refused to work for reasons best known to him. 8. During hearing the learned counsel for the third respondent placed reliance on Regulation 21(3)(b) of Ext. P8 to contend that in the absence of any punishment imposed by the Criminal court the management has no discretion to deny pay and allowances during the period of suspension. To appreciate the correctness of this contention it is necessary to quote here Regulation 21(2)(a), 21(3)(b) and 21(6), which read as follows : 21(2)(a) : If in the opinion of the Deputy General Manager of Circle Office/International Division/Inspection Department/The Asst. General Manager of Personnel Wing, Head Office, any employee of the Bank has committed an offence, unless the employee be otherwise prosecuted, the Deputy General Manager of Circle Office/International Division /Inspection Department/The Asst. General Manager of Personnel Wing, Head Office, any employee of the Bank has committed an offence, unless the employee be otherwise prosecuted, the Deputy General Manager of Circle Office/International Division /Inspection Department/The Asst. General Manager of Personnel wing, Head Office, may either himself take steps to prosecute the employee or get him prosecuted or direct any officer of the Bank, competent to enquire into any misconduct of the said employee to take steps to prosecute the employee or get him prosecuted." 21(3)(b) : If the employee is acquitted, it shall be open to the Deputy General Manager of Circle Office/International Division/Inspection Department/The Asst. General Manager of Personnel Wing, Head Office, to proceed against him under the provisions set out herein above regarding misconducts. If after enquiry it is decided not to continue the employee in service, he shall be liable only for termination of service with three month's pay and allowances in lieu of notice; and shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to full pay and allowances minus such subsistence allowance as he has drawn and all other privileges for the period of suspension. 21(6) : If after steps have been taken to prosecute the employee under clause (2) of this Regulation he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the employee may be dealt with as if he has committed an act of misconduct as defined in this chapter provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or comes to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution, the employee may be proceeded against under the provisions of sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of this Regulation but he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to full salary and allowances minus such subsistence allowance as he has drawn and to all other privileges for such period. If after enquiry it is decided not to continue the employee in service, he shall be liable only to termination with 3 months pay and allowances in lieu of notice." It is clear from a perusal of the above provisions that the reference in Regulation 21(2)(a) is to a prosecution initiated by the Management. If after enquiry it is decided not to continue the employee in service, he shall be liable only to termination with 3 months pay and allowances in lieu of notice." It is clear from a perusal of the above provisions that the reference in Regulation 21(2)(a) is to a prosecution initiated by the Management. In the instant case there was no compliant filed by the Head of Office or other officer of the petitioner bank. On the other hand, the criminal case was registered based on the information given by the victim of the assault. It cannot also be stated that Regulation 21(3)(b) would apply to the third respondent because he was never tried or acquitted. It is his admitted case that as stated in Ext. P1 claim statement the third respondent himself patched up the matter with the victim on 1.10.1984 pursuant to which he was not included in the police charge at all. The acquittal of the accused based on eventual composition of the offence did not pertain to the third respondent at all because at no stage after commencement of trial the third respondent was an accused in that case. Regulation 21(6) contemplates only to cases where the disciplinary proceedings are initiated after taking steps for prosecution by the Management . Obviously Regulation 21(6) also therefore does not apply to the facts of this case. 9. It was argued by the learned counsel for the third respondent that under Regulation 23 it is not obligatory on the part of the bank to take steps to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted if the offence committed by him is not in the course of his employment in the bank unless it is obligatory so to do under the provisions of any law and that if in such a case an employee is actually prosecuted by the authority competent to prosecute him then the provisions of Regulations 21 and 22 would apply as if the bank had taken steps to prosecute the employee. In the instant case, the occurrence was outside the premises of the bank. It was conceded during the hearing that the offence alleged against the third respondent in the first information given by the victim was one involving moral turpitude . In the instant case, the occurrence was outside the premises of the bank. It was conceded during the hearing that the offence alleged against the third respondent in the first information given by the victim was one involving moral turpitude . The offence cannot be said to be totally unconnected with the bank in so far as the victim was an account holder of the bank and in the course of attack the pass book of the victim was also lost. The victim had also brought the matter to the notice of the Management. Regulation 23 will not apply to the third respondent because there was in fact no prosecution. A prosecution commences with the framing of charges. In the instant case the final report filed by the police before the court did not mention the name of the third respondent as an accused and there was no allegation made against him. In that perspective he was never prosecuted and for that reason Regulation 23, which, in turn, makes Regulations 21 and 22 applicable against the management and the employee, does not apply to the facts of the present case. 10. In view of the manifest errors apparent on the face of the record, which have already been mentioned, and in view of the decision in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others (AIR 1964 S.C. 477), Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Their employees (AIR 1964 S.C. 339) and in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri. S.B. Bhatt and anr. AIR 1961 S.C. 970), I am of the view that this court would be justified in correcting the errors which have crept in Ext. P3. 11. Towards the end of the argument advanced before me learned counsel for the third respondent submitted that many years have passed by after the occurrence, that the third respondent is about to retire from service and that sustenance of directions contained in Ext. P6 order would affect the third respondent very badly in so far as the period would not be taken as period of service and there would be break of service. It is useful to quote the exact direction contained in Ext. P6 order would affect the third respondent very badly in so far as the period would not be taken as period of service and there would be break of service. It is useful to quote the exact direction contained in Ext. P6 here : "The period of suspension from 2.5.1984 to 11.6.1985 shall not be treated as one spent on duty and hence will not be reckoned for any purpose whatsoever." The mention of the words 'for any purpose whatsoever' can be interpreted to mean that it would be a void or vacuum in the service of the third respondent. In fact the regulations do not contemplate such a situation and the discretion available to the Management under Regulation 21(6) is only to fix the salary and allowances that should be payable to the employee. In these circumstances I am of the view that it can be made clear that Ext. P6 order would be read to mean that the third respondent would not be entitled to pay and allowances for the period from 2.5.1984 to 11.6.2985, except the subsistence allowance, which is already paid to him and the said period would not however be taken as a period of break in service. Ext. P3 is set aside to the extent it directs payment of full wages to the workman for the period of suspension. The original petition is allowed as above.