N.S. Singh, J.— Heard Mr J. Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, and Mr B.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr A.C. Sarma and Ms. T. Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiff. 2. The judgment and decree dated 4.11.1995 passed by the first appellate Court, namely, Assistant District Judge, No. 1, Guwahati, in Title Appeal No. 43 of 1993 thus affirming the judgment and decree dated 16.8.1993 passed by the learned Sadar Munsiff, No. 1, in Title Suit No. 287 of 1987 is the subject matter under challenge in this second appeal under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code. 3. The facts of the case in a short compass are as follows: The plaintiff, Apurba Ram Barooah, instituted a title suit being Title Suit No. 287 of 1987 as against the present appellants, defendants in the original title suit, before the trial Court for a decree for recovery of khas possession of the suit land described in Schedule-B to the plaint, for a decree for recovery of Rs. 150/- being arrears of rent, and other reliefs, by contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff/ respondent, Apurba Ram Barooah, was the full and absolute owner of a plot of land measuring 4 kathas and 1 lecha covered by CS Dag No. 1870, KP Patta No. 27 of Mouza-Guwahati, District-Kamrup, which was more fully described in Schedule-A to the plaint, and the said land was originally belonged to his father late Kamakhya Ram Barooah who transferred the said land to the plaintiff by a Registered Deed of Gift, and that being the position, the plaintiff became the full and absolute owner of the said land in Schedule-A to the plaint, and in the meantime, late Debi Lal Pradhan, predecessor-in-interest of defendants/appellants had been allowed by the late father of the plaintiff to occupy 2 kathas 15 lechas of Schedule-A land with specific boundary which was more fully described in Schedule-B, (hereinafter referred to as "the suit land") as a tenant-at-will on the condition that the said Debi Lal Pradhan was to pay a lump-sum rent @ Rs.50/- per year to the plaintiff's father. After the death of said Debi Lal Pradhan, his sons, Umananda Pradhan and Surya Kumar Pradhan continued the tenancy of the suit land, and after the death of Umananda Pradhan, defendant Nos. After the death of said Debi Lal Pradhan, his sons, Umananda Pradhan and Surya Kumar Pradhan continued the tenancy of the suit land, and after the death of Umananda Pradhan, defendant Nos. 2 to 6 being the legal heirs and representatives continued to posses the suit land along with defendant No. 1, Surya Kumar Pradhan, on the same terms and conditions of the tenancy and they attorned to the plaintiff. But the defendants/appellants did not pay the rent to the plaintiff for the last 5 years inspite of repeated request and demands by the plaintiff, and in the meantime, the defendants appellants without the knowledge of the plaintiff constructed 3 temporary thatched houses over the suit land. In this situation, the plaintiff requested the defendants to quit and vacate the suit land as the same was required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation, and as the defendants did not vacate the suit land, a notice was served upon them on 10.8.1987 and the defendants duly received the said notice on 18.8.1987. Despite the said notice, the defendants did not vacate the suit land and having no alternative the plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 287 of 1987 seeking the relief as highlighted above. The case of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendants by contending, inter alia, that late Debi Lal Pradhan, father of defendant No. 1, improved the suit land in the year 1942 and constructed residential houses over the Government Khas Land and occupied the same, and the plea so far taken by the plaintiff that the defendants were tenant-at-will and non-payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff was out and out false. According to the defendants, the predecessor of the plaintiff, late Kamakhya Ram Barooah came to the suit land and asked late Debi Lal Pradhan to get the suit land vacated, but Debi Lal Pradhan turned a deaf ear and continued to possess the suit land described in Schedule-B to the plaintiff, and after the death of said Debi Lal Pradhan, family settlement and arrangements were made between his two sons and defendants-2 to 6 thereby demolishing the houses constructed by late Debilal Pradhan, thus improving the land at the cost of Rs. 15,0007- and constructing permanent dwelling houses with Holding No. 9 in the name of Umananda Pradhan (since deceased) one of the sons of late Debilal Pradhan. 15,0007- and constructing permanent dwelling houses with Holding No. 9 in the name of Umananda Pradhan (since deceased) one of the sons of late Debilal Pradhan. It was also the case of the defendants that their right, title and interest over the suit land described in Schedule-B had been perfected by adverse possession and the suit was barred by limitation, particularly, the suit was hit by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 4. Learned trial Court below decided the title suit thus decreeing the same in favour of the plaintiff and giving khas possession of the suit to and in favour of the plaintiff with the direction to the defendants, their men, agents, servants, etc. to demolish the houses standing over the suit land. However, the relief sought for by the plaintiff for a decree for Rs. 1507-was rejected. Considering however the nature of the case, the learned trial Court below granted a compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,0007- to and in favour of the defendants for demolition of their constructions standing over the suit land. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court below, the defendants preferred first appeal before the first appellate Court which was also dismissed by the first appellate Court under Title Appeal No. 43 of 1997 vide judgment and decree dated 4.11.1995 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Being dissatisfied with the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, the defendants/ appellants preferred this second appeal. 5. At the time of admission of this second appeal, this Court formulated the following substantial question of law for just determination of real points in controversy between the parties. "As to whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act?" 6. At the hearing, certain substantial questions of law have been raised by Mr J. Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, pertaining to maintainability of the suit as well as the provisions of law laid down under Section 11 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short/'the Act, 1955"). At the hearing, certain substantial questions of law have been raised by Mr J. Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, pertaining to maintainability of the suit as well as the provisions of law laid down under Section 11 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short/'the Act, 1955"). Mr Das argued that the question of non-payment of rent never arose in the instant case as the defendants .were not the tenants or the tenant-at-will of the plaintiff and there was no arrears of rent as the defendants became the full and absolute owner of the suit land by adverse possession. Apart from that the plaintiff did not file the suit within the statutory period of 12 years as required under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title should be brought within the period of limitation of 12 years when the possession of the defendants became adverse to the plaintiff. Learned counsel went on to contend that since the year 1940, the predecessor-in-interest of the deceased and his successors, namely, the defendants have been in actual and physical possession of the suit land Therefore, the suit was barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and on this ground alone, the trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit. But, both the trail Court as well as the first appellate Court erred in law while passing the impugned judgments and decrees inamsuch as both the .Courts below had mis-appreciated the provisions of Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The main thrust of argument so far advanced by Mr Das is that the defendants had specifically made their pleading on adverse possession, but the trail Court utterly did not frame this specific issue on adverse possession as required under Order 14, CPC, and apart from that the Gift Deed was a void deed in terms of Section 125 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as there was no evidence on record for establishing the factum of delivery of possession of the suit land by the late father of the plaintiff to the defendants, and this aspect was also ignored by both the Courts below. Learned counsel further went on to contend that despite the finding of the Courts below that the plaintiff evidently could produce no receipt/document to prove payment of rent, the Courts below held that the defendants were tenants of the plaintiff and both the Courts below relied upon the proceedings of a criminal case being 62(m)/ 1984 where the defendant No. 6, Smt. Bishnumaya Pradhan (Devi) and some others were involved and on the basis of that proceedings, both the Courts below wrongly held that the predecessor of the plaintiff was the owner of the suit land. The defendants did not admit the record of Criminal Case No. 62(m)/84 (Ext. 7) which was also not admitted by defendant No. 6, Smti. Bishnumaya Devi, nor did the plaintiff ever make any pleading on the same, and, therefore, there was no semblance of payment of rent, and on this count alone the impugned judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below deserve to be set aside and quashed. 7. In reply, Mr B.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ respondents, submitted that the plaintiff had proved his title and ownership over the suit land and exhibited the related land records i.e., Patta-Ext/3, which established the factum of recording of the name of the plaintiff as owner of the suit land. Learned senior counsel went on to contend that the Gift Deed executed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the land in question had been proved and marked Ext-1, and the said Gift Deed was duly registered in accordance with law. Learned senior counsel also argued that if the pleading of the defendants that they were not the tenant under the plaintiff is to be accepted in that event the defendants/appellants cannot invoke the provisions of Sections 5 and 11 of the Act, 195 5. Apart from that the defendants had utterly failed to prove their case of adverse possession. 8. Now this Court is to see and examine as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. In other words, whether the suit was hit by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether the impugned judgments and decrees suffer from irregularity, impropriety or illegality. 9. 8. Now this Court is to see and examine as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. In other words, whether the suit was hit by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether the impugned judgments and decrees suffer from irregularity, impropriety or illegality. 9. For determination of the points in controversy between the parties, learned trial Court framed as many as 9 issues, which are relevant in the instant case and, accordingly, they are quoted hereinbelow: "(1) Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? (2) Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? (3) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? (4) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (5) Whether defendants are protected under Section 5 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955? (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of khas possession of the suit land? (7) What reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to under the law and equity? Additional Issue (8) Whether the suit is properly valued and proper Court Fee has been paid? (9) Whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties." 10. I have perused the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, and a perusal of the said judgments and decrees shows that both the Courts below held that defendants/ appellants were tenants. It is well-settled that a finding on the issue of tenancy is a finding of fact. As both the courts below made this concurrent finding, this Court while exercising its power under Section 100, CPC, is not in a position to interfere with such concurrent finding of fact and, accordingly, this finding is hereby affirmed. 11. Apart from the above, this Court is to go more depth into the issue of adverse possession as pleaded and raised by the defendants/appellants. Though there was no specific issue on adverse possession as raised and claimed by the defendants/ appellants, there is no doubt that issue No. 4 speaks about it, that is, "whether the suit is barred by limitation". I have perused the evidence so far adduced by the parties concerned. Though there was no specific issue on adverse possession as raised and claimed by the defendants/ appellants, there is no doubt that issue No. 4 speaks about it, that is, "whether the suit is barred by limitation". I have perused the evidence so far adduced by the parties concerned. In the instant case, the plaintiff examined 3 witnesses and the defendants also examined 3 witnesses, and the defendants pleaded about their long occupation and possession of the suit land since the time of their predecessor and continuance of their possession by stating that they had constructed dwelling houses initially that houses and thereafter houses with semi-pucca floor and wall. The defendants have been claiming that they have constructed those houses over the Government Khas land and not over the land of the plaintiff or his predecessor. That apart, the defendants have been claiming adverse possession in the instant case as against the plaintiff and not against the State Government which is evident from their own evidence. Now a question arises as to whether such evidence so far available on record is suffice for proving a case of adverse possession or not. 12. It is well-settled that a person or party who claims adverse possession is to prove adverse possession for prescriptive period and adverse possession must commence with the wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner at some particular point of time and it should be a hostile possession under a claim of colour of title, actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for the required period of time giving an indefeasible right of possession or ownership to the possessor by the operation of the limitation of actions. In the instant case, the defendants appellants have been claiming adverse possession by contending that their right, title and interest over the land has been preferred by the prescriptive period as required under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and apart from that they have been making allegations and statement that since 1940 their predecessor and they have been in occupation of the suit land. Now a further question arises that if the defendants became the absolute owner of the suit land on the basis of the prescriptive period, in other words, by adverse possession, why they have remained silent and why they have not made any endeavour or attempt to enter their names in the related land records, i.e. records of right, as owner thereof on the basis of their claim of adverse possession. There is no iota of evidence to establish the fact that the defendants appellants had ever approached the authority concerned for recording of their names as owner of the suit land in the records of right maintained by the Revenue Authority, and how long they will continue their wrongful possession over the land of others without any right, title or interest, and the defendants were quite aware of the fact that the plaintiffs name was recorded in the records of right as owner of the suit land and that the defendants never made any hostile declaration as against the plaintiff at any point of time, and this hostile declaration was made only after the plaintiff instituted the suit before the trial Court. One should not be confused with the words 'adverse possession' as it has not only been held by the Apex Court but by this Court also. It is a matter of good common sense that if a person or party takes the plea of adverse possession he must have possession and the party must prove it in accordance with law. In the instant case, a mere statement that the defendants and their predecessor have been in possession of the suit land would not constitute the theory of adverse possession as the defendants were quite aware of the fact that the plaintiffs name was recorded as owner of the suit land in the related records of right in the year 1986. According to me, the patta (document marked Ext-3) still holds its value and field in the eye of law as the said patta is not yet cancelled by the competent authority, and there is presumptive value that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land. It made this observation keeping in view of the settled law that mere recording of name in records of right does not constitute the ownership of a person over a land, but it shall have the presumptive value of ownership. It made this observation keeping in view of the settled law that mere recording of name in records of right does not constitute the ownership of a person over a land, but it shall have the presumptive value of ownership. But, in the instant case, the plaintiff had proved the said patta (Ext.3) and, therefore, it would be deemed that the plaintiff has proved his ownership over the land in question. I am also of the view that the pleadings and evidence so far made by the defendants/appellants with regard to adverse possession has no equities in their favour as they have failed to prove all facts necessary to establish their pleading of adverse possession. Further, the defendants/appellants have been trying to defeat the right of the true owner, i.e. the plaintiff. I made this observation keeping in view the decision of the Apex Court rendered in D.R. Mahesh Chandra Sharma-Vs-Raj Kumar Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 869 . Apart from the existence of issue No. 4 as discussed above, parties had led all evidence pertaining to adverse possession, particularly, by the defendants/ appellants, and the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and, therefore, it cannot be said that the absence of specific issue, namely, "adverse possession" is fatal in the instant case. I made this observation, keeping in view the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Nedunuri Kameswaramma - Vs-Sampati Subba Rao, AIR 1963 SC 884 . 13. Coming to the observations and findings made by both the Courts below on the related issues framed, I am of the view that both the Courts below had dealt with the related issues exhaustively, and gave reasoned findings on them and, as such, no interference with the same is called for. However, the reasonable compensation awarded by the learned Courts below under the impugned judgments and decrees is disproportionate. This is my view. Therefore, such compensation should be enhanced. Accordingly, the reasonable compensation of Rs. 15,000/- as awarded by the Courts below is enhanced to the tune of Rs. 75,000/- which shall be paid by the plaintiff (respondent herein this appeal) within a period of two months from today failing which the related decree of the Court shall not be executed. 14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to enhancement of the reasonable compensation from Rs. 15,000/- to Rs.75,000/- as observed above. 75,000/- which shall be paid by the plaintiff (respondent herein this appeal) within a period of two months from today failing which the related decree of the Court shall not be executed. 14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to enhancement of the reasonable compensation from Rs. 15,000/- to Rs.75,000/- as observed above. Considering, however, the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs a throughout.