ORDER : The writ petition is filed for a writ, order or direction particularly in the nature of writ of certiorari to call for the records in M.P.No.41 of 1994 on the file of the respondent No.2-Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal and quash the order dated 14-3-1996 as illegal, without jurisdiction, contrary to the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and to pass such other suitable orders. 2. The 1st respondent in the writ petition filed M.P.No.41 of 1994 on the file of the 2nd respondent under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to in short as 'the Act'-) seeking the relief that he is entitled to receive the same monetary benefit mentioned in the statement annexed and for such other suitable orders. The 2nd respondent herein, by an order dated 14-3-1986, had granted the relief stating that the 1st respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as 'the workman'-) is entitled to the amount of difference of wages for the period he worked as per the records from 16-1-1989 to 31-3-1994 on par with work charged employees. As can be seen from the impugned award, on behalf of the workman W.W.1 was examined and Exs.W1 and W2 - the letter of the Assistant Engineer, Parkal section permitting to engage labour on NMR basis and the memo permitting to engage labour also were marked. M.W.1 and M.W.2 also had been examined. A finding had been recorded that there is no difference of work between this workman and the work charged employees on regular pay and hence there cannot be any discrimination in the case of payment of wages. It was also recorded that no contra material was placed before the court to show that the workman had not worked during the period claimed by him from 16-1-1989 to 31-3-1994 and after recording such findings ultimately the relief as specified supra was granted in favour of the workman. The management, aggrieved by the same, had filed the present writ petition questioning the said award. 3. Sri Ranga Rao, the learned Government Pleader for Transport, had mainly contended that the impugned award is a cryptic award and had not recorded any reasons for making such an award. The management, aggrieved by the same, had filed the present writ petition questioning the said award. 3. Sri Ranga Rao, the learned Government Pleader for Transport, had mainly contended that the impugned award is a cryptic award and had not recorded any reasons for making such an award. The learned counsel had also submitted that the burden is on the workman to satisfy that he had worked during the relevant period and the relief cannot be granted on the ground that no material was placed by the management. The learned counsel had also submitted that the gang mazdoors appointed for a particular purpose cannot be equated with the work charged employees engaged on regular basis. The learned counsel also submitted that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work cannot be invoked in such a case since the recruitment is different and the duties also are different. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on State of Rajasthan v. Kunj Ram. 4. On the contrary, Sri Sridhar Rao, the learned counsel representing the contesting respondent-workman had contended that several of the contentions raised in the present writ petition had not been raised before the 2nd respondent and for the first time such contentions cannot be permitted to be raised. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to the evidence recorded i.e., W.W.1, M.W.1 and M.W.2 and also certain admissions made by the witnesses of the management relating to the working of the workman during the relevant period. The learned counsel also had submitted that though the order is not an elaborate order the crucial question being whether the gang mazdoors and the work charged employees discharge the same functions and duties, had been considered and decided. In the light of the evidence let in by the management and the admissions made by M.W.1 and M.W.2 relating to the nature of duties and the nature of work, it being a finding of fact the writ court need not interfere with such a finding recorded by the 2nd respondent in this regard. In the light of the evidence let in by the management and the admissions made by M.W.1 and M.W.2 relating to the nature of duties and the nature of work, it being a finding of fact the writ court need not interfere with such a finding recorded by the 2nd respondent in this regard. The learned counsel also and placed reliance on Article 39 (d) of the Constitution of India dealing with equal pay for equal work for both men and women and also the decisions in Ranbir v. Union of India, 1982 AIR SC 879, Ramachandra v. Union of India, 1984 AIR SC 541, Commissioner, Tirupathi Municipality v. M.Srinivasulu, 1995 (3) ALT 26 Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., 1993 AIR SC 2178, HMT Ltd. v. M.Chandrasekhar, 1996 L.I.C 1368 Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, 1987 AIR SC 2049, Jaipal v. State of Haryana, 1988 AIR SC 1504 and an unreported judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1705 of 1995, dated 21-9-2000. 5. Heard both the counsel and also perused the material available on record. As can be seen from the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, several grounds had been raised. But, however, these grounds had not been raised in the counter filed by the management in M.P.No.41 of 1994. As can be seen from the counter the main allegation is that the workman herein was taken only on temporary basis and merely because he was engaged on daily wage it does not confer any statutory right so as to claim difference of wages on par with the work charged employees on regular pay scales. In fact the same question is again vehemently argued even by the learned Government Pleader for Transport in the present writ petition and in this regard the learned counsel placed strong reliance on Kunj Ram's case(1 supra). The apex court while dealing with this aspect at pages 350 and 351 had observed: A work charged establishment as pointed out by this court in Jaswant Singh v. Union of India [ (1979) 4 SCC 440 ] broadly means an establishment of which the existence, including the wages and allowances of the staff, are chargeable to works. The pay and allowances of the employees who are born on work charged establishment are generally shown as a separate sub-head of the estimated cost of the works. The pay and allowances of the employees who are born on work charged establishment are generally shown as a separate sub-head of the estimated cost of the works. The work charged employees are engaged on a temporary basis and their appointments are made for the execution of a specified work. From the very nature of their employment, their services automatically came to an end on the completion of the works for the sole purpose of which they are employed. Thus a work charged establishment is materially and qualitatively different from a regular establishment. A work charged establishment thus differs from a regular establishment which is permanent in nature. Setting up and continuance of a work charged establishment is dependant upon the government undertaking a project or a scheme or a work and availability of funds for executing it. So far as employees engaged on work charged establishments are concerned, not only their recruitment and service conditions but the nature of work and duties to be performed by them are not the same as those of the employees of the regular establishment. A regular establishment and a work charged establishment are two seperate types of establishments and the persons employed on those establishment thus form two separate and distinct classes. For that reason, if a separate set of rules are framed for the persons engaged on the work charged establishment and the general rules applicable to persons working in the regular establishment are not made applicable to them, it cannot be said that they are treated in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner by the government. It is well settled that the government has the power to frame different rules for different classes of employees. We, therefore, reject the contention raised on behalf of the appellant in civil appeal No.653 of 1993 that clauses (g), (h) and (i) of rule RSR are violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and uphold the view taken by the High Court. 6. In the said decision the Apex Court had clearly observed that the work charged employees are engaged on temporary basis and their appointments are made for execution of a specified work and from the very nature of their employment their services automatically come to an end on the completion of the work for the sole purpose for which they are employed. No doubt, in the facts and circumstances of the case the Apex Court had arrived at such a conclusion. In Unni Krishnan's case (5 supra) the apex court had held that for recognizing a right as fundamental right it is not necessary that the right in question is expressly provided as fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution of India and new rights can be read into and inferred from the rights stated in Part III of the Constitution. In Bhagwan Dass's case(7 supra) it was held that for persons doing similar work equal pay cannot be denied on the ground that the mode of recruitment was different. The doctrine of "equal work-equal pay' was well explained in Jaipal's case (8 supra). The learned counsel representing the workman had placed strong reliance on HMT Ltd.'s case (6 supra), the decision of a Division Bench of this Court wherein at page 1370 it was observed: Keeping in view the above, we are inclined to direct that the appellant has a duty to pay to the writ petitioner-respondents such amounts of wages/emoluments/salary, which it is paying to others who are engaged by it for work of same skill and responsibility as it is entrusted to the writ petitioner-respondents. Writ petitioner-respondents have brought to the notice of the court the wage structure under which for the same kind of work others are paid a particular scale of pay. There is no reasons, although an attempt is sought to be made by the appellants to dispute, since there is no material to the contrary not to accept the assertion of the writ petitioner-respondents in this case and to grant the relief to the extent that they must receive pay from the due date equal to the pay of those who are engaged for work similar scale and responsibility. 7. The same view was expressed by a learned Judge of this Court in M. Srinivasulu's case (4 supra) and also in an unreported judgment of this Court in writ petition No. 1705 of 1995, dated 21-9-2000. 8. 7. The same view was expressed by a learned Judge of this Court in M. Srinivasulu's case (4 supra) and also in an unreported judgment of this Court in writ petition No. 1705 of 1995, dated 21-9-2000. 8. On appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case, while granting the relief the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, Warangal and recorded a finding that the nature of the work of this gang mazdoor and work charged employees is one and the same and hence the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked and it is a finding of fact. Apart from this aspect the evidence of W.W.1 and also the evidence of M.W.1 and M.W.2 is available on record. Though the evidence was not discussed in detail by the 2nd respondent, findings had been recorded why the relief is being granted and these findings being findings of fact I do not find any illegality or legal infirmity so as to interfere with the impugned award. Hence the writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the writ petition is dismissed but, however, in the facts and circumstances of the case without costs.