JUDGMENT P.C. Agarwal, J. 1. This is a second appeal by the defendant. 2. Laxminarayan (the appellant-defendant) and late Ramdas (since deceased whose legal representatives are respondents No. (i) to (vii) here) were real brothers. Khasra No. 9/1, area 7.20 acres of village Shodalpur and Khasra No. 66/1, area 4.84 acres of village Behra Kheri (to be called as suit land) are entered in their joint names in revenue papers. Land Khasra No. 64, area 3.30 acres and land Khasra No. 63, area 3.70 acres situate in Behragaon were sold on 1-4-1961 in joint names of both the brothers vide Ex. D.5 and Ex. P. 2. Late Ramdas had applied for partition of the suit lands in revenue Courts which was contested by the appellant and question as to title was raised by the appellant. 3. As per plaint, suit lands are still joint lands in which both the brothers have equal shares and should have divided between them. Thus, a civil suit for declaration of 1/2 share and separate possession after partition. 4. On the other hand, Laxminarayan (the appellant) claimed that both the brothers had already partitioned orally in year 1954. It is claimed that in such partition late Ramdas had got 7.00 acres of land of village Behra Kheri and 4.81 acres of lands of Behrakheri with half share and family movables. Laxminarayan (the appellant) got 5.27 acres of village Mayli and 7.21 acres of land of village Shodalpur. It is claimed that both the brothers continued in possession of their respective lands since then. It was claimed that after such partition Laxminarayan (appellant) sold Khasra No. 30/3, area 5.27 acres of village Mayli on 8-5-1957 to Biharilal while 7.00 acres of land of village Behragaon was sold by late Ramdas in year 1967-68. These sales were individual and were not joint. Land 7.21 acres situate in village Shodalpur is exclusive property of Laxminarayan (the appellant) while land 4.81 acres situate in Behrakheri belongs to late Ramdas alone. House falling in share of Laxminarayan (the appellant) was purchased by late Ramdas on 27-3-1970. Laxminarayan (the appellant) got constructed a house. Late Ramdas negotiated for purchase of the same for Rs. 1300/- and paid Rs. 400/- as advance but did not respect such an agreement later. House falling in share of Laxminarayan (the appellant) was purchased by late Ramdas on 27-3-1970. Laxminarayan (the appellant) got constructed a house. Late Ramdas negotiated for purchase of the same for Rs. 1300/- and paid Rs. 400/- as advance but did not respect such an agreement later. It is claimed that late Ramdas had indulged in false prosecutions against Laxminarayan (appellant) and thus their relations had become strained and thus a false suit has been filed. 5. Trial Court held that suit lands belonged to both the brothers equally. He disbelieved the story of partition in the year 1954 or that Laxminarayan (appellant) was in exclusive possession of 7.21 acres of land of village Shodalpur since 1954 or that suit was barred by limitation and thus a preliminary decree for partition was granted in favour of late Ramdas. The learned first Appellate Court, dismissed the appeal holding that there was no partition of suit lands in 1954 while admitting the possibility of partial partition. 6. On 20-9-1990 this second appeal was admitted on following substantial question of law: Whether the finding of the Courts below that there was no earlier partition between the parties is supported by evidence on record? 7. I have heard the advocate of appellant and have perused the records and judgments of both the Courts below and proceed to decide the question. 8. Both the Courts below have concurrently disbelieved the story of partition in the year 1954. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below can only be interfered when either vital evidence which could have led to a different conclusion was omitted or when inadmissible evidence was relied upon which if omitted would have led to a different conclusion. Ishwar Das Jain vs. Sohanlal, AIR 2000 SC 426 or where misreading of evidence by Appellate Court would have led to a miscarriage of justice or its findings is based on no evidence and thus perverse. Rohini Prasad vs. Kastoor Chand, AIR 2000 SC 1284. In case where there is some evidence for the findings Thimaiah vs. Ningamma, (2000) 7 SCC 409 or the finding was plausible Govind Das vs. Kanhiyalal, (2000) 9 SCC 219 . Such concurrent finding of fact has to be upheld even if erroneous. 9. In the present case, concurrent finding of learned both the Courts below is based on two very important circumstances. Such concurrent finding of fact has to be upheld even if erroneous. 9. In the present case, concurrent finding of learned both the Courts below is based on two very important circumstances. Firstly that both the disputed khasra numbers are jointly recorded in name of both the brothers in revenue record and secondly that both the brothers had joined in execution of sale deeds Ex. P.2 or Ex. D.5 dated 10-4-1961 i.e. after the alleged date of partition in 1954. Even Rayath Bari Bahi Ex. D.3 in respect of land in Sodalpur happens to be in joint names. Both the Courts below did not rely upon Ex. D.4. A panchnama on plain paper purported to have been written on 15-7-1979. Ram Das (PW. 1) in para 4 had admitted that his signatures were obtained on blank paper. Laxmi Narain (DW. 1) has not tried to prove that there had been any such panchayat. 10. Though, Laxminarain (DW. 1) had tried to prove a partition in year 1954, Shiv Narain (DW. 2) and Ram Prasad (DW. 3) had tried to support the same. Their statements were recorded on 23-2-1981 and according to both of them date of alleged partition was 20-25 years before which did not match with partition in 1954. There had been no written document. There was no mutation in revenue record. Even after such alleged partition, both the brothers had joined in sales of land on 10-4-1961 vide Ex. P.2 and P.3. Their name appeared jointly in khasra panchsala for the year 1974-75 to 1977-78 and in kist band khatoni for the year 1977. Though, of course by a lapse of time, there was no love lost between two brothers. Criminal prosecution were also there of Laxmi narain the appellant, yet on evidence on record the concurrent finding recorded by courts below that suit lands remained joint in revenue record is unassailable. 11. It is true that parental house was divided between the brothers. Both brothers were residing separately in respective portions of the house allotted to them. Laxmi Narain the appellant had sold his share of house to the respondents vide Ex. D.1 on 27-3-1970. Both the brothers had sold some lands separately and had purchased some lands in their individual names. All these circumstances were not conclusive. Both brothers were residing separately in respective portions of the house allotted to them. Laxmi Narain the appellant had sold his share of house to the respondents vide Ex. D.1 on 27-3-1970. Both the brothers had sold some lands separately and had purchased some lands in their individual names. All these circumstances were not conclusive. Mulla in his principles of Hindu Law vide section 328 admit a possibility of partial partition either in respect of property or in respect of persons making it. In Lilawati vs. Paras Ram, AIR 1977 HP (1) such possibility is accepted. Though of course in such cases normal presumption is that all the property was divided and the party alleging that some of the property in the exclusive possession of one of the brothers is joint and is liable to be partitioned has to prove his case. Tejraj and others vs. Mohanlal and others, AIR 1955 Raj 157. 12. As the suit land still continued to be jointly entered in revenue papers there being no partition by metes and bounds and the status of brothers being that of tenant in common if not joint tenants there is no warrant to dismiss the civil suit for declaration of half share or partition. Mehtarin vs. Munga Bai 1985 MPWN 304 is distinguishable on facts as there is no evidence that there has been a general partition between the parties. Of course the partial partition between the brothers has changed the status of jointness and has changed them into tenants in common, as an effect of Girjanandini Devi vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 , Bhagwan Dayal vs. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287 and P.G. Hari Haran v. Padril, AIR 1994 Ker 36 , yet partition by metes and bounds is necessary even in cases where status of co-owner is that of tenants-in-common instead of being joint tenants, as such there is no scope for interference in the judgment and decree granted by the courts below. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 13. This second appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs. Advocate's fees as per schedule.