V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) THESE two writ petitions can be conveniently disposed of by a common order. The petitioner in WP No. 32472 of 1998 is the son of the petitioner in WP No. 31064 of 1998. Both of them were shown as accused in CC Nos. 530 and 531 of 1998 respectively on the file of the Court of V Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad filed under Sections 38 (1) and 38 (4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 ("the Act" for brevity) read with Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioners, therefore, challenge the notices issued to them by the 1st respondent on 21-9-1996 as illegal and unjustified besides being arbitrary. They prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus to set aside the notice dated 21-9-1996 and stay all proceedings in CC Nos. 530 of 531 and 1998. ( 2 ) THE facts are not disputed. The petitioner in WP No. 31064 of 1998, Sri Pratap Reddy and his brother, P. Narasimha Reddy owned large extents of agricultural land in Kukatpally village, Ranga Reddy District. The petitioner appears to have sold major portion of the agricultural land prior to coming into force of the Act. After coming into force of the Act, the petitioner also sold that land in Survey Nos. 180, 197 to 200 to M/s. Bhagyanagar Co-operative Housing Limited under registered sale-deed dated 28-9-1980. The Hyderabad Master Plan was notified by Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, as approved by the Government, on 29-9-1980, from which date, the lands owned by petitioners came to be included in the master plan and the land used was shown as agricultural lands. ( 3 ) IT appears that on 15-7-1987, the first respondent called upon Mr. Pratap Reddy to file a statement in Form No. 1 under Section 6 (1) of the Act in relation to the land in various survey numbers. On considering the representation filed by the petitioner dated 27-8-1987, the Special Officer in proceedings No. Fl/6492/84 held that the sales effected by the petitioner prior to the extension of master plan to Kukatpally area were valid and that insofar as the other lands are concerned, the petitioner is bound to file a statement under Section 15 of the Act. On considering the representation filed by the petitioner dated 27-8-1987, the Special Officer in proceedings No. Fl/6492/84 held that the sales effected by the petitioner prior to the extension of master plan to Kukatpally area were valid and that insofar as the other lands are concerned, the petitioner is bound to file a statement under Section 15 of the Act. The 1st respondent followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2465 . ( 4 ) THE first respondent again issued a notice on 21-9-1996 under Section 6 (2) of the Act requiring the petitioner to file a statement under Section 15 of the Act in Form IV on or before 5-10-1996. According to the petitioners, such statement was filed on 10-10-1996 and the same is pending with the 1st respondent and that no orders are passed thereafter. While the things stood thus, the first respondent filed criminal complaints on the file of the Court of the V Metropolitan Magistrate being CC No. 530 of 1998 and CC No. 531 of 1998 inter alia alleging that the petitioners were required to file a statement under Section 6 (2)/15 of the Act and failure thereof attracts the offence under Section 38 of the Act. Assailing the notice as well as the action in filing the criminal complaint, the writ petitions are filed. ( 5 ) THE first respondent filed a detailed counter-affidavit justifying the issue of notice and also criminal action. In a nutshell it is stated that even assuming that the land held by the petitioners became urban land after 29/09/1980 when the master plan was extended, the petitioners were under obligation to file a statement under Section 6 (1)/15 of the Act and failure thereof is a proper justification to initiate criminal action against the petitioners, ( 6 ) SRI N. Subba Reddy, the learned senior Counsel, submits that by reason of the sale of the land much prior to coming into force of the Act as well as before coming into force of the master plan, insofar as the land demised under the registered sale-deeds in concerned, the petitioners cannot be said to be holders of urban vacant land. He, however, concedes that insofar as the land held by the petitioners as on 29-9-1980, if the same is in excess of the celling limit, the petitioners are required to file a statement either in Form-I of Form-IV. As the petitioners have already filed such statement or filed explanation on 10-10-1996 pursuant to a notice issued by the 1st respondent on 21-9-1996, the provisions of Section 38 are not attracted. The learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on an unreported judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in P. Narasimha Reddy v. Special Officer and Competent Authority, Hyderabad and Anr. , WP No. 30804/98, dated 28-8-2001, and the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Komaraiah and Anr. , 2002 (1) DT (AP) 19. He also relied on the relevant observations made by the three-Judge Bench in the decision reported in State of A. P. v. N. Audikesava Reddy, (2002) 1 SCC 227 = AIR 2002 SC 5 . ( 7 ) THE learned Government Pleader, Mr. G. Vijaya Kumar reiterated the submissions as urged in the counter-affidavit filed by the 1st respondent. ( 8 ) IN Atia Mohammadi Begum s case (supra), a Two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that when the land was not vacant land on the date of the commencement of the Act, the authorities cannot convert the land into vacant land by their unilateral act by including it in the Master Plan for a purpose other than agriculture. However, a Three-Judge Bench reconsidered the correctness of Atia Mohammadi Begum s case (supra) in Audikesava Reddy s case (supra ). The ratio in Atia Mohammadi Begum s case was held to be not correct. The Supreme Court also considered the question as to what would be the "date of the commencement of the Act" as explained under Section 6 of the Act in relation to the land which became urban land by reason of extension of master plan. It was held:". . . . . . . . . . . . The Supreme Court also considered the question as to what would be the "date of the commencement of the Act" as explained under Section 6 of the Act in relation to the land which became urban land by reason of extension of master plan. It was held:". . . . . . . . . . . . FURTHER, the Explanation to Section 6 (1), as noticed above, very significantly provides that every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act shall file a statement before the competent authority and "the commencement of the Act" under Clause (ii) would be when the land becomes vacant for any reasons whatsoever. Therefore, the date of commencement of the Act in a case where the land, which was not vacant earlier, would be the date on which such land becomes vacant land. It, thus, contemplates a situation of land, not being vacant becoming vacant due to preparation of a master plan subsequent to 17-2-1976. ( 9 ) WHERE a particular land is not an urban vacant land for the purpose of the Act and by reason of extension of master plan, such land is converted into vacant land by an Act of the State as laid down by the Supreme Court in relation to such converted land, the date of commencement for the purpose of the Act would be the date when the master plan is notified or the date when such notified master plan is extended as per Section 2 (h) of the Act. In such a case, the authorities under the Act, cannot reckon 17/02/1976 as the date of commencement and initiate action against the owners of the land either under Section 6 (2) compelling them to file statement in Form No. 1 or compelling the owners to file a statement in Form No. IV under Section 15 as on the date of original commencement of the Act. ( 10 ) THE Division Bench of this Court in Komaraiah s case (supra) has considered this aspect of the matter and held:"if a master plan is published at a later date, as in the present case, the land covered by such a master plan would become vacant and thereby get attracted by the provisions of the Act only with effect from the date on which the master plan is published. In fact, the Hon ble Supreme Court in Audikesava Reddy s case placed heavy reliance on this provision to arrive at a conclusion that the Act does not preclude the possibility of a land, which was not vacant at the time of commencement of the Act becoming vacant at a later stage. "in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it must be held that the notice issued by the 1st respondent on 29-1-1996 insofar as the same compels the petitioners to file a statement in relation to the lands owned by them as on 17-2-1976 cannot be sustained. As held by Gopal Reddy, J. in P. Narasimha Reddy s case (supra), it is always open to the first respondent to require the petitioners to file a statement in relation to their ownership of the land as on 29-9-1980, the date on which the master plan was extended. To that extent, the petitioners cannot have any grievance. Further, as on today, there is no valid determination by the competent authority, the first respondent herein, and in the absence of any such determination, the provisions of Section 38 are not attracted. Be it noted that as per Section 38, if any person who is under legal obligation fails to file a statement, then only he would be attracting offence under the said Section. In this case, until the law was settled by the Supreme Court on 6-11-2001 when three-Judge Bench decided Audikesava Reddy s case (supra), it cannot be said that the petitioners were under obligation to file a statement under the Act. In that view of the matter, petitioners cannot be prosecuted. They may file proper applications before the criminal Court praying for discharge under Section 257 of the Code of Criminal procedure. ( 11 ) THE writ petitions are, therefore, disposed of with the above direction and observations. There shall be no order as to costs.