D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition the following prayers have been made:a) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to show cause as to why the copy of the certified standing order, as claimed by the Company should not be supplied to the petitioner; b) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding upon the respondents to withdraw and/or rescind and/or cancel the existing Private Service Rules entirely inconsistent with the model standing orders; c) A writ in the nature of Certiorari directing the respondents to transmit and/or produce, the certified standing order if any before this Hon'ble Court. ( 2 ) IN the pleadings the writ petitioners have alleged that though standing orders have since been framed for the working journalists under the Working Journalists and Other newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service)and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1955 but no standing order, which is mandatory under the industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, have been framed for the non-journalists employees, viz: the petitioners. A writ petition no. 23030 (W) of 1998 was moved by one aroni Mukhopadhyay, a suspended employee of the respondent, The said petition was disposed of by this Court on January 12, 1999 by directing the respondents to hand over a copy of the standing order in terms of the prayer made in the said writ petition. An appeal being mat No. 209 of 1999 against the said decision was filed by said Aroni Mukhopadhyay. The said appeal was disposed of by the Division bench on March 25, 1999 as not maintainable on the ground that rights of the parties to the lis was not determined by the said order. It is now alleged that the standing order which has since been handed over by the respondents lacks many essential ingredients and does not conform to the model standing order. The copy of the standing order appears to be a true copy but not a certified standing order. At best it is a private service rules which is being lodged for being certified as certified standing order under the provisions of the 1946 Act. ( 3 ) THE respondents State had filed an affidavit of facts. The copy of the standing order appears to be a true copy but not a certified standing order. At best it is a private service rules which is being lodged for being certified as certified standing order under the provisions of the 1946 Act. ( 3 ) THE respondents State had filed an affidavit of facts. In the said affidavit the said respondent has disclosed the "in spite of best efforts made in the office, nothing could be traced in the matter of a certified standing orders for Non-Journalists Employees of the statesman Ltd. , if any, in this office" that "no draft Standing Orders for the Non-Journalists employees of the Statesman Ltd. , was submitted by the said company for certification after coming into force of the Working journalists and Other Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) as it appears from the records available in this office. " The state Government had disputed the alleged standing order to be a certified one. ( 4 ) THE respondent State had also filed an affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in-opposition of the Statesman Ltd. In the said affidavit again it was repeated that "no copy of the certified standing order for Non-Journalists workmen, if there be any, is still traceable now. Annexures A, B, C, D and E referred to in the said affidavit are also not traceable. " ( 5 ) IN this background the Statesman Ltd. had asserted that the alleged copy of the certified standing order is a certified true copy of the certified standing order. It is further alleged that the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have not come out with an assertive statement that there was no certified standing order nor it had categorically denied the assertion made by the respondent No. 4. It, in effect, had evaded a direct answer or categorical denial. However, the learned counsel for the Statesman Ltd. had taken a point with regard to the maintainability of this writ petition on two fold grounds. First relates to the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The second relates to the ground that the Statesman Ltd. is not a State and as such writ does not lie. ( 6 ) THIS contention has since been resisted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. First relates to the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The second relates to the ground that the Statesman Ltd. is not a State and as such writ does not lie. ( 6 ) THIS contention has since been resisted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. According to him since maintenance of certified standing order is a statutory obligation, therefore, an infraction of statutory liability would make even a private organisation or individual amenable to writ jurisdiction. The ground of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar. Since in the present case no decision of facts are necessary, therefore, existence of alternative remedy will not stand in the way. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State supported the petitioner and adopted his submission. ( 8 ) I have heard the respective counsel for the parties at length. Original true copy of the certified standing order was produced in Court. Xerox copy thereof has since been furnished which is kept with the record. A perusal of the original true copy of the certified standing order shows that it was certified to be a true copy by the certifying officer on November 10, 2000. The said copy also contains another seal certifying the same to be a certified standing order by the certifying order under Section 5 (3)of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 on 3rd day of October, 1959. It seems that the State has taken a very peculiar stand. It had disowned its own document. But it has not categorically denied that it was not a certified true copy of the certified standing order. It has neither asserted that the said true copy is a forged one. The eertified true copy was issued only on november 10, 2000, The writ petition was affirmed on September 7, 2000. It has also purported to disown its own letters and receipt contained in annexures B, C, D to the affidavit affirmed on behalf of the respondent No. 4, The statesman Ltd. on December 8,2000. ( 9 ) BE that as it may we may not go into this question at this stage in view of the fact that a point with regard to the maintainability has been raised. Let us now examine the question of maintainability as raised on behalf of the respondent No. 4 and resisted on behalf of the petitioner. ( 9 ) BE that as it may we may not go into this question at this stage in view of the fact that a point with regard to the maintainability has been raised. Let us now examine the question of maintainability as raised on behalf of the respondent No. 4 and resisted on behalf of the petitioner. The Industrial Employment, (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 1946 Act') prescribed in Section 3 for submission of a draft standing order for certification within 6 months. Section 5 prescribed the procedure how the certification is to be made. In sub-section (1) the certifying officer is required to forward a copy of the draft to the trade union requiring objection to be submitted within 15 days' of receipt of the notice. Sub-section (2) prescribes modification addition if necessary after hearing the representative of the workmen and the employer. Sub-section (3) provides for certification of the draft standing order thereupon by the certifying officer and to forward authenticated copy of the certified standing order to the employer and the trade union. Section 6 provides for appeal by the employer or any of the workmen or trade union if aggrieved by the order of the certifying officer passed under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 5. The decision or appeal shall be final. Once a standing order is certified, the certifying officer is required to file the same in a register in terms of Section ( 10 ) THE said Section 8 further provides for furnishing certified copy to any person applying, therefor, on payment of prescribed fee. Section 10 prescribed the duration of the certified standing order. Section 12-A prescribes that so long standing order is not certified the model standing order provided under the 1946 Act shall be deemed to be adopted in the establishment. Section 13 provides for penalty for infraction of Section 3 or Section 10 of the said Act. Section 13-A requires a reference to the Labour Courts constituted under Industrial Disputes Act, if any, question arises as to the application or interpretation of a standing order certified under the 1946 Act. ( 11 ) THUS, it appears that the 1946 Act is a complete code in itself. Section 13-A requires a reference to the Labour Courts constituted under Industrial Disputes Act, if any, question arises as to the application or interpretation of a standing order certified under the 1946 Act. ( 11 ) THUS, it appears that the 1946 Act is a complete code in itself. In this case the respondent have alleged that the standing order was certified as is apparent from the certified true copy thereof, which shows to have been certified under Section 5 (3) on October 3, 1959. The said true copy was issued as late as on November 10, 2000. Since the said respondent has not come with definite assertion that the certified true copy and the annexures b,c,d and E being the receipts and letters annexed with the affidavit of the respondent no. 4 affirmed on July 23, 2001 are forged and in the absence of any categorical denial of the said documents that those are not the certified copies of letters etc. , it is not possible for the court to brush aside the presumption of the certification in terms of Section 114 (e) read with Sections 76, 77, 78 and 79 of the Evidence act. Under Section 79 of the Evidence Act the court shall presume a certified copy, purported to be duly certified by any officer of the Central or of a State Government duly authorised, is substantially in form and purported to be executed in the manner directed by law, to be genuine and shall also presume that any officer who signed or certified, has done so in its official character which he claims in such a paper. Such presumption continues until the contrary is shown or proved. It is not contended that the officer or that he was not duly authorised. The presumption of genuineness under Section 79 of Evidence Act is permissible only if the certified copy was executed substantially in the form and manner provided by law, Bhinka v, Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 . In the present case it is also not alleged that the document was not in form and was not executed in the manner provided in law. It may also be noted that in Section 79 of the Evidence act the expression used is "shall presume". Whereas the expression "may presume" has been used in Section 4 and Sections 86, 87, 88, 89 and 90 of Evidence Act. It may also be noted that in Section 79 of the Evidence act the expression used is "shall presume". Whereas the expression "may presume" has been used in Section 4 and Sections 86, 87, 88, 89 and 90 of Evidence Act. Even then it is subject to the Maxim mina rite essee acta. The presumption drawn in such a case is primafacie and not conclusive. It may be shown to be incorrect. Though it is alleged that the document is incorrect in the affidavit, it has not been shown to be incorrect. Material produced on behalf of the State are not sufficient to rebut the presumption of genuineness in the present case. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, I do not propose to decide the question conclusively since only on affidavits a writ petition is decided. Therefore, i do not want to foreclose the rebuttability of the presumption at this stage where there is no scope for adducing evidence. No amount of affidavit can be sufficient without adequate proof to rebut such presumption. In any event in the present case the affidavits as observed earlier do not appear to be assertive. Even if the affidavit would have been assertive without adequate proof no amount of affidavit could alter the situation and rebut the presumption of genuineness unless adequate proof is furnished. In the circumstances this point is left open to be decided in appropriate case, if there be any. ( 13 ) FOR our present purpose we may now proceed with the presumption of the genuineness of this document issued by the certifying officer and it is determined including the receipts. However, this finding will not affect the jurisdiction of any Tribunal or labour Court, if such question arises before it, to determine the same, in accordance with law and in such a case such Labour Court or tribunal shall not be influenced by the observations made in this case. ( 14 ) SECTION 8 of the 1946 Act requires filing of the certified standing order by the certifying officer in a register and also furnishing of copy of any person applying, therefor on payment of prescribed fee. ( 14 ) SECTION 8 of the 1946 Act requires filing of the certified standing order by the certifying officer in a register and also furnishing of copy of any person applying, therefor on payment of prescribed fee. Thus when a certified true copy is furnished upon an application then it is to be presumed in terms of Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act that the official act has been duly performed and that the copy is a copy of the certified standing order filed in the register in terms of Section 8. The state has not produced the register viz. , the particular register for the month of October or november, 1959 when it was expected to be filed in the register, nor it had explained the granting of certified true copy on November 10, 2000 by the certifying officer. ( 15 ) SECTION 10 of the 1946 Act provides in sub-section (2) that an employer or workmen or a trade union may apply to the certifying officer to have the standing orders modified on the ground that it does not contain the required provisions either by agreement or otherwise. In any event it is open to an aggrieved person to apply for modification even if not agreed by the other party. In such event the provision of sections 5 and 6 would be similarly attracted. If there is no certified standing order then Section 12-A of 1946 Act would be attracted. Then the relations would be governed by the model standing order provided in 1946 Act. In case of any dispute or difference with regard to applications or interpretations of the standing order, the question may be referred to the Labour court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by reason of Section 12-A of the 1946 Act. ( 16 ) THUS it appears that there are adequate remedies provided in the 1946 Act itself. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above the writ jurisdiction will not be able to grant adequate relief or remedy to the petitioner in this case. ( 16 ) THUS it appears that there are adequate remedies provided in the 1946 Act itself. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above the writ jurisdiction will not be able to grant adequate relief or remedy to the petitioner in this case. The question is dependent on the existence of the certified standing order in respect of which presumption as to genuineness is available under Section 79 read with Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act which is rebuttable through adequate evidence, but which cannot be gone into or undertaken in exercise of writ jurisdiction to determine a disputed question of fact particularly when there is no material present before the Court and the presumption of genuineness cannot be rebutted. ( 17 ) THE second schedule appended to the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in item Nos. 1 and 2 provides for remedy before the Labour court. Under the said item the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders or the applications and interpretation of standing orders can be referred to and undertaken by the Labour court. In third schedule of the 1947 Act some of the remedies or reliefs which are mentioned in the pleadings can be asked for or had before the Industrial Tribunal. ( 18 ) THUS, it appears that there is an alternative remedy which is adequate and the remedy by way of writ proceedings does not seem to be adequate and as such on the ground of alternative remedy this writ petition appears to be not maintainable. ( 19 ) THE ground of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar. It is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is the discretion to be exercised judiciously and judicially by a Court as to whether it should invoke writ jurisdiction despite the existence of alternative remedy. In the present case the facts are against exercising such discretion. ( 20 ) THE second ground on which the writ petition has been assailed to be not maintainable is that the Statesman Ltd. is not a State within the meaning of Article 12. Admittedly, the statesman Ltd. is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. In the present case the facts are against exercising such discretion. ( 20 ) THE second ground on which the writ petition has been assailed to be not maintainable is that the Statesman Ltd. is not a State within the meaning of Article 12. Admittedly, the statesman Ltd. is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. None of the ingredients, which an authority is supposed to possess in order to attain the status of a State within the meaning of Article 12, is present so far as the Statesman Ltd. is concerned. Neither the situation nor any of the activities carried on by the Statesman Ltd. be construed to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. It does not discharge any statutory liability towards its employees in order to render it an instrumentality or agency of the State. All individuals, societies, companies, organisations, establishments, undertakings are subject to certain law. When it relates to the relations of employer and employee it is governed by various labour and industrial legislations. This legislation casts certain liabilities to be observed under the respective statute. These observations in such liabilities arising out of such statutes does not make an organisation or establishment an instrumentality or agency. Applying the tests as laid down in Ramanna dayaram Shetty v. International Airport authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 : 1979 (3) SCC 489 : 1979-II-LLJ-217, it appears that the Statesman Ltd. cannot be construed to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India as instrumentality and agency of the State. Neither in the pleadings nor in course of the argument any material or ingredient has been placed before this Court to enable it to come to a conclusion that the Statesman Ltd. is an instrumentality and agency and as such a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. ( 21 ) THE allegations made in the pleadings are all against the Statesman Ltd. No allegation has been made as against any of the State respondents being respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Reliefs that have been claimed are all against the Statesman Ltd. No relief has been claimed as against any of the State authorities. The prayer is for supplying a copy of the certified standing order and for cancellation of the private service Rules. Thus the prayers are directed against the Statesman ltd. 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Reliefs that have been claimed are all against the Statesman Ltd. No relief has been claimed as against any of the State authorities. The prayer is for supplying a copy of the certified standing order and for cancellation of the private service Rules. Thus the prayers are directed against the Statesman ltd. only. These reliefs can be had within the scope of the 1946 Act. At the same time in any earlier proceedings by one of the employees Sri aroni Mukhopadhyay copy of the certified standing order was furnished. Even though some of the Government Officials have been made parties, the relief sought for, as is apparent from the prayer quoted above, are directed against a company which is neither an instrumentality nor an agency of the State. ( 22 ) THUS for all these foregoing reasons and the Statesman Ltd. not being a State within the meaning of Article 12, the writ petition cannot be maintained. Neither any allegation nor any relief has been made or prayed for as against the said authorities being the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3. ( 23 ) IN the circumstances the writ petition cannot lie despite the presence of the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 as parties to the proceeding. ( 24 ) IN the circumstances it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. All points are kept open to be agitated in appropriate proceeding, if occasion so arise. ( 25 ) IN the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed on both the grounds of alternative remedy as well as maintainability against the respondent No. 4 as discussed above. ( 26 ) THERE will however be no cost. ( 27 ) XEROX certified copy, if applied for, be given to the parties within 7 days, on usual terms.