V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are nine in number claim to be absolute owners and possessors of small extents of house sites situated and comprised in Sy. Nos. 24/9 and 24/20, of Madhavadharam, Visakhapatnam, since a long time. They alleged that, having purchased the house-sites in question for a valuable consideration from the original owners under registered sale deeds during the period 1983 and 1989, are in possession thereof since then. They also allege that they were given permission under Section 26 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short the Act ), for purchasing the land in question. It is alleged that on 1-11-1995, the officials of the 1st respondent-Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority (for short the VUDA ), came over to their sites and tried to dispossess them high-handedly, and therefore, they filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in trying to dispossess them from the house-sites comprised in the above survey numbers, as illegal and arbitrary. ( 2 ) ON 9-11-1995, while admitting the writ petition, this Court granted interim directions in W. P. M. P. No. 31038 of 1995, directing the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from the land in question. This Court that no further construction shall be made by the petitioners in the said land. The 1st respondent filed an application in W. V. M. P. No. 2764 of 2001, accompanied by a counter-affidavit seeking to vacate the interim orders granted by this Court on 9-11-1995. Though W. V. M. P. is listed before me, with the consent of the learned counsel for both the parties, the writ petition itself was heard finally. ( 3 ) THE 2nd respondent-Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam, in his counter-affidavit stated that one Smt. M. Arundathi Jyothi filed a copy of the Notification issued under Section 20 (1) of the Act relating to Sy. No. 24/9, part of Madhavadhara, and clearance under Section 26 of the Act was given for selling the land admeasuring 145 Sq. yds. in favour of M/s. S. Jeevan Kumar, M. Indavadana, M. Prabhavathi, M. Sugna, K. Gunsinaidu, B. Parvatheswara Rao and V. Kalavathi. The petitioners purchased the property from Smt. Arundathi, Jyothi comprised in Sy. No. 24/9, but they have occupied land in Sy. yds. in favour of M/s. S. Jeevan Kumar, M. Indavadana, M. Prabhavathi, M. Sugna, K. Gunsinaidu, B. Parvatheswara Rao and V. Kalavathi. The petitioners purchased the property from Smt. Arundathi, Jyothi comprised in Sy. No. 24/9, but they have occupied land in Sy. No. 24/10a relating to one Smt. R. Janakamma, declarant in C. C. No. 3032 of 1976 (Declarant under the Act ). The vendors, therefore, misled the petitioners. The surplus land in Sy. No. 24/10a vested in the Government by reason of declaration under Section 10 (3) of the Act, which was published in the Gazette on 5-3-1986. The excess land of 2547 Sq. mts. in Sy. No. 24/10a was handed over to the 1st respondent-VUDA on 20-7-1994, pending further orders from the State Level Allotment Committee, Government of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioners are not in occupation of the land in question. The property sold to them by the vendors is different from the one that is covered by the Clearance Certificate given under Section 26 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE Secretary to 1st respondent-VUDA also filed counter-affidavit on the same lines. It is also averred that the petitioners purchased the land without verifying the title of the land and the antecedents of their vendor. When VUDA commenced the development of the land for public purpose, they filed this writ petition and obtained interim orders. ( 5 ) THERE is serious dispute as to whether the 2nd respondent granted clearance for selling the land covered by Sy. No. 24/10a to Smt. M. Arundhati Jyothi under Section 26 of the Act, and whether the petitioners were mislead by their vendor. The 1st and 2nd respondents in their counters have categorically stated that the land in Sy. No. 24/10a belonged to one Smt. R. Janakamma, who filed declaration under Section 26 of the Act in C. C. No. 3032 of 1976. In the said case, Smt. R. Janakamma, was declared surplus holder of urban land in an extent of 2547 Sq. mts. After publication of the declaration under Section 10 (3) of the Act in the Gazette, the land is now vested in the Government without any encumbrance. It was allotted and handed over to VUDA. When they took up development schemes, the petitioners filed the writ petition. mts. After publication of the declaration under Section 10 (3) of the Act in the Gazette, the land is now vested in the Government without any encumbrance. It was allotted and handed over to VUDA. When they took up development schemes, the petitioners filed the writ petition. The petitioners claim that they are in possession of the property, but the 1st and 2nd respondents categorically stated that since 1994, VUDA alone is in possession of the property and development schemes are being taken up. ( 6 ) IN the above scenario of disputed question of fact, it would be unsafe for this Court to venture to determine the questions of fact. Further, the petitioners have set up title in themselves claiming through Smt. M. Arundhati Jyothi. The disputes raised in this writ petition can only be resolved by a civil Court in a properly laid suit. If the petitioners have any enforceable right, their only remedy is to approach the compete civil Court having jurisdiction for writ proceedings are not the appropriate remedy for declaration of title. This aspect of the matter was considered by the apex Court in a catena of decisions. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh1, the apex Court held:. . . we are of the opinion, that the writ petition was misconceived insofar as it asked for, in effect, a declaration of writ petitioner s title to the said plot. It is evident from the facts stated hereinabove that the title of the writ petitioner is very much in dispute. Disputed question relating to title cannot be satisfactorily gone into or adjudicated in a writ petition. ( 7 ) IN Parvatibai Subhanrao Nalawade v. Anwarali Hasanali Makani2, while considering a Rent Control matter, the apex Court held:. . . BEFORE closing this judgment we would like to emphasize that in cases relating to immovable properties which are governed by the ordinary civil law, the High Court should not exercise its special jurisdiction under the Constitution unless the circumstances are exceptional. . . ( 8 ) IN Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria3, while considering a dispute between two private persons relating to immovable property, the apex Court observed that the High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available, and held:. . . . . ( 8 ) IN Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria3, while considering a dispute between two private persons relating to immovable property, the apex Court observed that the High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available, and held:. . . IT has repeatedly been held by this Court as also by various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged. And in such a case, the Court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned. If the real grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law including the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or applicable available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants by their judgment under appeal. ( 9 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is devoid of merits, and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.