Judgment T. Chatterjee, J. The Customs Department under the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India, New Delhi was established for the purpose of prevention and detection of smuggling all over India and its affairs are on going process to prevent unlawful activities throughout this country. The activities of the Customs Department are also to earn revenue for the Government of India and for that purpose regular manpower namely, preventive officers and examiners are needed to fulfil the object for which Customs Department has been established. It appears as per existing recruitment rules there are two cadres-one is technical cadre and the other is non-technical cadre. The technical cadre consists of only Data Entry Operators and the non-technical cadre consists of Upper Division Clerks, Tax Assistants and Stenographers. It is also an admitted fact that there are separate promotional avenues in so far as the technical and non-technical cadres are concerned and accordingly, from different cadre, promotions are being made from feeder post to the promotional post. However, the Central Government on principle accepted restructuring proposed by the "Central Board of Excise and Customs" and opined that the same should be implemented within a period of six months from the date of the order and thereby prohibited all appointments and promotions. Accordingly, by a notification issued on 19th of July, 2001 the Central Government on principle accepted the restructuring proposed by the 'Central Board of Excise and Customs'. Neither of the parties before us has challenged the said notification. According to the writ petitioners this notification has not yet come into force. On the other hand the petitioners before the Central Administrative Tribunal have contended that in view of such notification, the question of promotion or otherwise cannot arise at all. By a subsequent order issued by the Central Government dated 10th of September, 2001, all sorts of appointments and/or promotions in the concerned Department were completely prohibited. Therefore, according to the petitioners, in view of this prohibition, no promotion could be given in the Customs Department of the Government of India. However, as there was considerable delay in effecting restructuring in terms of the order of the Central Government dated 19th of July, 2001, the writ petitioners approached the Central Government as they were facing problems in the performance of their multifarious jobs and in reaching the desired goal of the department. However, as there was considerable delay in effecting restructuring in terms of the order of the Central Government dated 19th of July, 2001, the writ petitioners approached the Central Government as they were facing problems in the performance of their multifarious jobs and in reaching the desired goal of the department. According to the writ petitioners, the existing senior employees were retiring from their service gradually but in their place, in view of aforesaid ban no one could be recruited and/or promoted. After considering several representations filed before the Central Government and after realising the difficulties faced by the branches of the Customs and Central Excise Department through out India, the Central Government reviewed the ban and after reviewing the pros and cons of the matter all owed the Customs Department to give promotion by an order dated 3rd January, 2002. From a perusal of the said order dated 3rd of January, 2002 issued by the Central Government it appears to us that by the said order the Central Government has lifted the ban regarding promotion for Group-'B' and 'C' posts in the Customs Department of the Government of India. After releasing the ban, the writ petitioners decided to give promotion to the eligible candidates in Group-'B' and Group-'C' in the Customs Department. Accordingly, a departmental promotional committee (in short "DPC") was constituted by the Customs Department at Calcutta in terms of the Customs Recruitment Rules, 1979 to fill up the vacancies of preventive officers/examiners on ad hoc basis. Finally the DPC selected 20 candidates for the post of preventive officers and three candidates for the posts of examiners on ad hoc basis. Challenging the aforesaid order passed on 6th of March, 2002, the respondent No.1, Calcutta Customs Computer Staff Association has filed an application under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (in short 'Tribunal') challenging the order of ad hoc promotion. An application for injunction was filed by the respondent No.1 praying for not giving effect to the aforesaid order of promotion made on ad hoc basis. By the impugned order the Tribunal has granted an interim order to the effect that the writ petitioners shall not take any further action in respect of promotion of the persons selected by them for such promotion on ad hoc basis until further orders. By the impugned order the Tribunal has granted an interim order to the effect that the writ petitioners shall not take any further action in respect of promotion of the persons selected by them for such promotion on ad hoc basis until further orders. The Tribunal also directed the writ petitioners to file affidavit-in-opposition within four weeks from the date of passing of the impugned order and reply if any was directed to be filed within two weeks thereafter. Feeling aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal granting interim order in the manner indicated above until further orders, the writ petitioners have come up to this Court by way of moving a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which was heard in presence of the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. We have heard Mr. Lakhmi Gupta, the learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioners and Mr. P.K. Munshi the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.1, Calcutta Customs Computer Staff Association who are the applicants before the Tribunal where the application under section 19 of the Tribunal is now pending. 3. Before we proceed further, a preliminary objection as to the entertainability of this writ petition by us at an interim stage was raised by Mr. Munshi appearing on behalf of the Calcutta Customs Computer Staff Association. Therefore, before we go into the merits we are to consider whether a writ petition can be moved against an interim order passed by the Tribunul under the Act. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261 , the Apex Court of our country in paragraph 93 observed as follows:- "93. Before moving on to other aspects we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However in discharging this duty they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have under our constitutional set-up been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only suppelementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. Their function in this respect is only suppelementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will however continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except as mentioned where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. (emphasis supplied) 4. Mr. Munshi appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 submitted before us that since the impugned order passed by the Tribunal was in the nature of an interim order of injunction, the writ petition cannot be held to be maintainable in law as it is not a 'decision' which would come within the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra). On the other hand Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has submitted that the writ petition is maintainable against an order either granting or refusing to grant interim order and, therefore, the writ petition is maintainable in law against such an order. In our view, the preliminary objection as raised by Mr. Munshi is devoid of any merit. Gupta appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has submitted that the writ petition is maintainable against an order either granting or refusing to grant interim order and, therefore, the writ petition is maintainable in law against such an order. In our view, the preliminary objection as raised by Mr. Munshi is devoid of any merit. In the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, as noted hearinearlier, the Supreme Court has used the words decision of Tribunals who are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes but that would be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of respective High Courts in India. Since the Supreme Court in that decision has used the word 'decision', let us now consider what should be the literal meaning of the word 'decision'. In Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition 'decision' has been given the following meaning: "A determination arrived at after consideration of facts and in legal context law. A popular rather than technical or legal word: a comprehensive term having no fixed legal meaning. It may be employed as referring to ministerial acts as well as to those that are judicial or of a judicial character. A determination of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. A judgment or decree pronounced by a court in settlement of a controversy submitted to it and by way of authoritative answer to the questions raised before it. The term is broad enough to cover both final judgments and interlocutory orders. And although sometimes limited to the sense of judgment the term is at other times understood as meaning simply the first step leading to a judgment: or as an order for judgment. The word may also include various rulings as well as orders. 'Decision' is not necessarily synonymous with 'opinion'. A decision of the Court is its judgment: the opinion is the reasons even for that judgment or the expression of the views of the Judge. But the two words are sometimes used interchangeably." (Emphasis supplied) 5. From a plain reading of the aforesaid meaning of the word 'decision' as given in Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition which clearly says that 'decision' includes interlocutory orders, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. But the two words are sometimes used interchangeably." (Emphasis supplied) 5. From a plain reading of the aforesaid meaning of the word 'decision' as given in Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition which clearly says that 'decision' includes interlocutory orders, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Munshi that since the order challenged in the writ application was in the nature of an interim order the writ petition cannot be held to be maintainable in law against such an order. In Wharton's Law Lexicon 14th Edition 'decision' has been said also to be a "judgment". In Wharton's Law Lexicon it has also been clearly stated that the several species of judgments are either interlocutory given in the course of a cause, upon some plea, proceeding, or default, which is only intermediate, and does not finally determine or complete the action. Such being the meaning given by Wharton's Law Lexicon 14th Edition of the word 'decision' we hold that even an interlocutory order comes within 'decision' as made by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra). Therefore, we hold that the writ petition is maintainable in law and the preliminary objection as raised by Mr. Munshi is hereby rejected. 6. Let us now consider the matter on merits. The question therefore, needs to be decided is whether the Tribunal was justified in the facts and circumstances of this case to grant an interim order of injunction until it passed a final order. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was not justified in passing the order, which is impugned before us. It is true that by a memorandum dated 19th of July, 2001 the Central Government approved the restructuring of Customs and Central Excise Department, and it is also true that on the basis of that memorandum a notification was issued by the Central Government on 10th of September, 2001 deciding that the holding of DPC of Group-'B' and Group-'C' posts may be frozen and no DPC may be held for Group-'B' and 'C' till the distribution of posts under various level is completed and instructions are issued by the board in this regard. Relying on this ban the respondent No.1 challenges the order of the writ petitioner for promotion of the persons whom they have selected for such promotion. Relying on this ban the respondent No.1 challenges the order of the writ petitioner for promotion of the persons whom they have selected for such promotion. According to respondent No.1, in view of the said ban, the question of promotion cannot arise at all. In our view, the submission of Mr. Munshi on this question at a first glance looks to be attractive but on a careful consideration of the memorandum dated 19th of July, 2001 and also the subsequent letter of the Central Government we are unable to hold that the ban imposed by the letter dated 10th September, 2001 would be applicable in the facts of this case. The restructuring of Customs and Central Excise Department as noted in the memorandum dated 19th of July, 2001 would in fact only indicate that the Central Government has approved the restructuring of Customs and Central Excise Department but from a careful examination of the aforesaid memorandum we are clearly of the opinion that although approval was given for restructuring of Customs and Central Excise Department but implementation of the same has not been done by issuance of the aforesaid memorandum. It appears further from the memorandum that although in the said memorandum it has been clearly stated that the formation wise distribution of posts on different levels will be notified separately but it is an admitted fact even today that such notification has not yet been issued by the Central Government. That being the position, on a careful reading of the memorandum in detail we are therefore of the view that although the Central Government has approved the restructuring of Customs and Central Excise Department but such restructuring has not yet been implemented by the Central Government. That apart, the Tribunal has failed to take into consideration another memorandum issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue on 3rd of January, 2002 where it has been made clear by the Government of India that the panel prepared by the DPC may be given effect to and resultant vacancies in the feeder cadre may also be filled up. It would be proper on our part to lift the portion on which reliance can be placed strongly by us from the aforesaid memorandum dated 3rd January, 2002 which runs as under:- "The matter has been considered by the Board and it has been decided that where ever the DPC have already been held the panel prepared by the DPCs may be given effect and the resultant vacancies in the feeder cadre may also be filled up. Where the DPCs have not been held the DPCs may be held on the basis of pre-revised strength i.e. the strength existing before the cadre restructuring and the resultant vacancies may be filled up. (Emphasis supplied). 7. From a careful reading of paragraph 2 of this aforesaid letter dated 3rd January, 2002 there is no doubt in our mind, that whatever ban that was imposed by the Central Government after issuance of the memorandum dated 19th of July, 2001 and also the memorandum dated 10th of September, 2001 has been relaxed by the Central Government as it is evident from paragraph 2 of the same that permission has been granted to the writ petitioners to give effect to the panel prepared by the DPCs and to fill up the resultant vacancies in the feeder cadre. It is unfortunate that though this memorandum and/or the letter dated 3rd January, 2002 was before the Tribunal but while granting interim order, the Tribunal however had not considered the same. Accordingly, we are of the view, that the Tribunal was not justified in the facts and circumstances in passing the interim order of injunction until further orders. That apart, we are also of the view that the order impugned in this writ application has virtually allowed the application filed by the respondent No.1 before the Tribunal at the interlocutory stage without giving any opportunity to the writ petitioners to file their affidavit justifying their action. That apart, we are also of the view that the order impugned in this writ application has virtually allowed the application filed by the respondent No.1 before the Tribunal at the interlocutory stage without giving any opportunity to the writ petitioners to file their affidavit justifying their action. In any view of the matter, we are also of the view that in the facts and circumstances the balance of convenience and inconvenience was also in favour of the writ petitioners, because the Tribunal had not at all taken into consideration the fact that there would be complete dead lock in the Customs Department, which was constituted for the purpose of, stopping smuggling and for realising revenue for the Government of India and without recovery of such revenue the Government cannot run. Before we part with this judgment we may take into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan Public Service Commission vs. Chahan Ram and Anr., 1998 SCC (L & S) 1075, which was relieds on by Munshi for the respondent No. 1. In our view, this decision of the Supreme Court cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case, in view of our discussions made hereinabove to the effect that by issuing the memorandum dated 19th of July, 2001 by the Central Government it cannot be said that the said memorandum by which restructuring has only been approved in the Customs and Central Excise Department but implementation of such restructuring has not yet been done. That apart, in the present case, as noted hereinearlier, by the memorandum dated 3rd January, 2002 permission has been granted by the Central Government to fill up the vacancies by promoting persons working under the Customs Department in Group 'B' and 'C' cadre of posts. Therefore, the principles laid down in Rajasthan Public Service Commission's case (supra) cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case. Before we conclude we may also keep it on record that the promotional avenue of the different categories of the parties in the concerned Department are totally different. Therefore, there was also no reason for the Tribunal to grant any interim order during the pendency of the petition filed under section 19 of the Act. 8. Before we conclude we may also keep it on record that the promotional avenue of the different categories of the parties in the concerned Department are totally different. Therefore, there was also no reason for the Tribunal to grant any interim order during the pendency of the petition filed under section 19 of the Act. 8. For the reasons aforesaid we set aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and request the Tribunal to dispose of the application filed before them on merits and in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order. It is needless to say that in the event the petition filed by the respondent No.1 before the Tribunal succeeds in that case, the promotions that would be given during the pendency of the petition before the Tribunal would automatically stand set aside. However, we direct that any promotion that may be given during the pendency of the petition before the Tribunal would abide by the decision of the petition by the Tribunal. 9. For the reasons aforesaid the writ petition is allowed. 10. In view of the judgment passed by us today the applications for addition of parties have become infructuous. Accordingly they are also disposed of. 11. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, as payment of usual requisites, within seven days. 12. There will be no order as to costs. Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J.: I agree. Writ petition allowed.