Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 276 (PNJ)

Bal Mukand Aggarwal v. State Of Punjab

2002-03-07

JAWAHAR LAL GUPTA, N.K.SUD

body2002
Judgment JAWAHAR LAL GUPTA, J. 1. Is the Notification dated 20/09/2000 by which the petitioner was ordered to be removed from the office of President of the Municipal Council, Mandi Gobindgarh violative of the provisions of Sec. 22 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911? This is the short question that arises for consideration in this case. The petitioner prays that this Notification be quashed. 2. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. 3. Mr. S. P. Jain, Learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the Municipal Councillors had never made any request to the State Government for the petitioners removal from the office of President. Thus, the Government could not have proceeded under Sec. 22. In any event, the impugned order was passed mechanically. The contentions raised by the petitioner with regard to the validity of the meeting were not considered. Thus, the impugned Notification is vitiated. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by the counsel for the respondents. 4. A meeting of the Municipal Council. Mandi Gobindgarh was held on 31/05/1999. The motion of no confidence against the petitioner was unanimously passed. This resolution was forwarded to the State Government on 4/05/1999. A copy of this letter is at Annexure P-8 with the writ petition. Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 19/05/1999 was issued by the Principal Secretary, Local Government Department, Punjab, to the petitioner. He was called upon to explain as to why an order of his removal as envisaged under Sec. 22 of the Act be not passed. It appears that the District Attorney had given an opinion that the show-cause notice may be withdrawn. Feeling that the State Government may retrace its steps, 14 Municipal Councillors had approached this Court through Civil Writ Petition No. 6039 of 1999 (reported in 2000 (1) Recent Civil Reports 371). It was contended on their behalf that the Government was deliberately delaying action in pursuance to the show cause notice under political pressure. 5. A Division Bench of this Court had directed the issuance of notice to the respondents including the present petitioner. Written statements were filed. Ultimately, the Bench had framed the following two issues (2000 (1) Recent Civil Reports 371, Para 7) :- "(1) Whether the so-called adjournment of the meeting convened for consideration of motion of no confidence was factually justified and legally correct? Written statements were filed. Ultimately, the Bench had framed the following two issues (2000 (1) Recent Civil Reports 371, Para 7) :- "(1) Whether the so-called adjournment of the meeting convened for consideration of motion of no confidence was factually justified and legally correct? (2) Whether the resolution Annexure P-3 dated 3-5-1999 was validly passed and, therefore, respondent No. 3 will be deemed to have been suspended in accordance with the first proviso to Sec. 22 of the Act?" 5 On a detailed consideration of the matter, the Bench had allowed the writ petition with the following observations :- "On the basis of above discussion, we hold that the motion of no confidence was validly passed by the requisite number of the Municipal Councillors and, therefore, by virtue of deeming clause contained in Sec. 22 of the Act, respondent No. 3 will have to be treated as suspended. The official respondents are directed to take appropriate steps in this direction. They are also given liberty to take further proceedings in accordance with law." 6 A perusal of the above clearly shows that the Bench had given a firm finding that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been suspended in terms of Sec. 22 of the Act. 7. Mr. Jain contends that there being no resolution requesting the State Government for the removal of the petitioner, the action cannot fall within the mischief of the provision. 7. Mr. Jain contends that there being no resolution requesting the State Government for the removal of the petitioner, the action cannot fall within the mischief of the provision. Section 22 provides as under :- "Resignation or removal of President and Vice-President - Whenever a President or Vice-President vacates his seat or tenders in writing to the committee his resignation of his office, he shall vacate his office; and any president or vice-president may be removed from office by the State Government on the ground of abuse of his powers of or habitual failure to perform his duties or in pursuance of a resolution requesting his removal passed by two-thirds of the members of the committee: Provided that if a resolution requesting the removal of the President or the Vice-President is passed by two-thirds of the members of the committee the President or as the case may be the Vice-President shall be deemed to be under suspension immediately after such resolution is passed : Provided further that before the State Government notifies his removal, the reason for his proposed removal shall be communicated to him by means of a registered letter in which he shall be called upon to tender within twenty-one days an explanation in writing and if no such explanation is received in the office of the appropriate Secretary to Government within twenty one days of the despatch of the said registered letter, the State Government may proceed to notify his removal." 8 A perusal of the above provision shows that the State Government is competent to order the removal of President on account of various reasons including the "resolution requesting his removal passed by two-thirds of the members of the committee". Still further, it is also clear that in pursuance to such a resolution, the President is "deemed to be under suspension immediately after such resolution is passed". The Bench while deciding C.W.P. No. 6039 of 1999 (reported in 2000 (1) Rec Civ R 371) has recorded a firm finding that the petitioner is to be deemed to have been placed under suspension in terms of Sec. 22. Thus, the resolution passed in the meeting held on 3/05/1999, according to the Bench, conforms to the requirements of Sec. 22. This decision having been delivered by the Court in a dispute between the parties, shall bind the petitioner. 9. Thus, the resolution passed in the meeting held on 3/05/1999, according to the Bench, conforms to the requirements of Sec. 22. This decision having been delivered by the Court in a dispute between the parties, shall bind the petitioner. 9. Another fact which deserves mention is that the decision of the Division Bench has the imprimatur of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Mr. Jain learned counsel for the petitioner has very fairly stated that the Special Leave Petition was dismissed in limine. Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the argument based on Sec. 22 is not open to the petitioner, has to be sustained. 10. Mr. Jain contends that a copy of the resolution is at Annexure P-6 with the writ petition. There is no request for the petitioners removal. Thus, it could not form the basis of an order of removal. 11. We are unable to accept this contention. Firstly, the plain words of the resolution clearly indicate that the Members did not have any confidence in the petitioner. In any case, it was a defence open to the petitioner when the issue regarding the deemed suspension under Sec. 22 was being examined. Even if the petitioner did not raise the available defence, he shall be debarred from re-agitating the matter in the present case. 12. Mr. Jain contends that the authority has passed the order mechanically. 13. The contention is untenable. It may only be observed that the Division Bench had categorically found that the meeting held on 3/05/1999 had been validly held. The requisite number of Members had voted against the petitioner. He was to be deemed to be under suspension after the passing of the resolution. The State Government had been directed to take appropriate steps under Sec. 22. It did so. Thus, it is apparent that the order passed by the Government was in conformity with the findings recorded by the Division Bench in Civil Writ Petition No. 6039 of 1999. The Government cannot be said to have acted mechanically. 14. Mr. Jain contends that the contentions raised by the petitioner with regard to the validity of the meeting held on 3/05/1999 had not been considered. This matter had been concluded by the judgment of the Division Bench. The State Government could not have reopened the issue so as to record a fresh finding. 15. Mr. 14. Mr. Jain contends that the contentions raised by the petitioner with regard to the validity of the meeting held on 3/05/1999 had not been considered. This matter had been concluded by the judgment of the Division Bench. The State Government could not have reopened the issue so as to record a fresh finding. 15. Mr. Jain contends that the meeting was vitiated as there was no secret ballot at the meeting. This point cannot be raised at this stage in view of the findings already recorded by the Division Bench. 16. No other point has been raised. 17. In view of the above, we find no merit in this writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.