JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This revision arises in some peculiar circumstances viz. that the petitioner had filed a suit for perpetual injunction against one Kanhaiya Lal way back on 21.12.81 alleging inter-alia that the plaintiff owns the property purchased by him by registered sale deed dated 10.6.1902, and since then he is continuing in possession. The plaintiff also pleaded the facts about devolution of right, title, and interest of the plaintiff. With these pleadings, it was contended that there is a lane situated in the north of the plaintiff's house. This lane is the bone of contention, inasmuch its this lane is situated in the back side of the defendant's house, wherein it is apprehended by the plaintiff, that the defendant would raise construction, and has opened some windows, whereas this lane has a public utility, and every one has a right to pass and re-pass through it. The defendant Kanhaiya Lal filed his written statement on 19.5.82. Thereafter the issues were framed on 16.11.90. The parties went to trial, and the plaintiff completed his evidence. As transpires from the order sheets of the learned trial court that the plaintiff's evidence was closed on 2.7.96. 3. It is in this sequence that on 8.7.96 the defendant Kanhaiya Lal expired, and application was submitted for substitution of his legal representatives, which was ordered on 6.11.96, whereby the learned trial court also ordered/permitted the plaintiff to make consequential amendments in the plaint, as mentioned in para 3 of the application. The plaintiff was permitted to submit the consequential amended plaint within 14 days. The same was filed on 6.12.96. 4. The facts relating to the problem arising in this revision start from this point of time inasmuch as on 17.1.97 the legal representatives purportedly filed a fresh written statement, purporting to file written statement to the amended plaint, and after filing of this written statement dated 17.1.97, the learned trial court on 18.3.97 framed two additional issues, as issue No. 4A and 4B. Thereafter the case was fixed for defendant's evidence, and when the defendant (legal representative) Mahendra Kumar, D.W.1 was being examined, wanted to exhibit certain documents an objection was raised on the side of the plaintiff, whereupon the statement was reserved. 5. Thereafter the case was fixed for defendant's evidence, and when the defendant (legal representative) Mahendra Kumar, D.W.1 was being examined, wanted to exhibit certain documents an objection was raised on the side of the plaintiff, whereupon the statement was reserved. 5. Then comprehending the totality of the circumstances, at this stage, the plaintiff filed the present application purportedly under Order 22 Rule 4 read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code on 19.9.97, contending that the written statement filed by the legal representatives on 17.1.97 incorporates entirely new facts, and wrong facts, and thus the legal representatives are now attempting to take up a new stand, different from the one taken by the original defendant, and it was contended that the legal representatives are not entitled to take a different stand, but can only contest the suit by taking the pleadings only, as are appropriate to their character as legal representatives. With this contention it was prayed that the amended written statement be struck off the record, and the legal representatives be directed to keep their stand within the limit to which they are entitled. A reply to this application was filed on 14.10.97, inter-alia contending that the copy of the fresh written statement was already given to the counsel for the plaintiff, thereafter, after a number of adjournments additional issues were struck, and all this was done in the presence of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, but no objection at all was raised. Likewise the action of the learned trial court in framing additional issues was also not assailed by filing ally appeal or revision etc. It was then contended that it was during the examination of D.W.1 that an irrelevant objection was raised on the side of the plaintiff, to the effect that the documents produced with the fresh written statement cannot be allowed to proved by the legal representatives, and it is at this stage that the present application has been filed. It was also contended that the documents filed by the legal representatives relate to the disputed site itself. With this it was prayed that the application of the plaintiff dated 19.9.97 be dismissed. 6. It was also contended that the documents filed by the legal representatives relate to the disputed site itself. With this it was prayed that the application of the plaintiff dated 19.9.97 be dismissed. 6. The learned trial Court by the impugned order dated 8.10.99 has dismissed file petitioners' application, solely on the ground that after filing of the fresh written statement, despite attending the Court on numerous dates of hearing no objection was raised, nor the order framing additional issue was assailed. 7. Assailing the impugned order it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, on the authority or provisions of Order 22 Rule 4(2) and the following judgments : (i) Yashwantrao Sabnis v. Balchandrarao, AIR 1952 MB 207; (ii) J.C. Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan Tandon, AIR 1972 SC 2526 ; (iii) Rameshwarlal v. Rughnath Das, 1976 W.L.N. (U.C.) 387; (iv) Vidyawati v. Man Mohan, 1995 (3) R.R.R. 504 : AIR 1995 SC 1653 ; (v) Gajraj v. Sudha & Ors., 1999 AIR SCW 4910 that it is established legal position that where any party dies and his legal representatives are brought on record they are to join the litigation as legal representatives, and from that stage itself, and are to continue the litigation in a manner appropriate to their character as legal representatives. It is contended that it is not open to the legal representatives to take any fresh pleading, which may be new to them, or which may not be appropriate to their character as legal representative, or may be inconsistent as compared to the pleading, already taken by the deceased party. It is contended that since the combined reading of the two written statements makes it clear that in the written statement dated 17.1.97 a wholly inconsistent stand has been taken by the legal representatives, and issues have been framed on that basis, the written statement dated 17.1.97 is required to be struck off from the record, and the additional issues framed on 8.3.97 are also required to be deleted. Assailing the reasoning of the learned trial court, it is contended that there could be no estoppel against law, when the legal representatives are not entitled to file written statement. True it is that it could be objected at that time itself, but then simply because it was not objected at that stage, the plaintiff cannot be estopped from objecting even at this stage. True it is that it could be objected at that time itself, but then simply because it was not objected at that stage, the plaintiff cannot be estopped from objecting even at this stage. It is also contended that the plaintiff could even assail this entire action of the learned trial court, in accepting the fresh written statement, framing of additional issues, and recording of the evidence on those issues, if necessary in appeal also, and in that event no estoppel would have been attracted against him, in such circumstances if it is assailed at this stage no estoppel could be attracted. 8. Controverting the submissions, it is contended by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners that he has not taken any inconsistent plea, and that the pleadings taken in the fresh written statement are relating to the disputed property itself, and relating to the dispute itself, and are only explanatory to the stand already taken in the written statement. Since the additional issues have already been framed, which have not been assailed by the plaintiffs, rather the issues were framed in the presence of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, now at this stage it is no open to the plaintiff to ask the learned trial court to strike off the written statement dated 17.1.97. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. I have also closely gone through the aforesaid judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The principle deducable from these judgments is that the legal representatives can take up the litigation at the stage at which it was left when the original defendant died, and to continue it, and that it is not open to the legal representatives to assert their own individual right or take up defence which is personal to them or assert a hostile title to the suit. Likewise in Rameshwar Lal's case (supra) it has also been held that the defendant cannot take up a plea contrary to the one taken by the deceased defendant. 10. A proper comprehension of these principles, make at least one thing is clear that the legal representatives cannot take up a defence which is personal to them, and/or which was not available to the deceased defendant, unless, they get themselves impleaded as party defendant in their individual capacity, and not as legal representatives. 10. A proper comprehension of these principles, make at least one thing is clear that the legal representatives cannot take up a defence which is personal to them, and/or which was not available to the deceased defendant, unless, they get themselves impleaded as party defendant in their individual capacity, and not as legal representatives. But then a combined look at the two written statements shows that this is not the eventuality here, inasmuch as though the plea sought to be taken in the written statement of 17.1.97 is about the title to the land in question as contra-distinguished from the plea taken in the original written statement, being about the land being an open 'Chowk'. But then the fact remains that the defences sought to be taken is not the one which is personal to them, and which was not available to the original defendant. 11. Still the matter does not end here, inasmuch as may be that the defence sought to be taken by the legal representatives, might have been available to the deceased defendant, and might not have been taken by him, for reasons best known to him, or for circumstances beyond his control. The question is as to whether the event of the death of the defendant, and L.Rs. coming on record, by itself can be allowed to constitute circumstance to enable the legal representatives to take up a fresh defence, which might be inconsistent with the defences already taken, or which might be new, as a result of the wisdom having dawned upon the legal representatives, or may be inconsistent with the defence already taken by the deceased defendant ? 12. In my humble view carrying the principles propounded in the above cases to its logical conclusion, the answer has to be in the negative. Inasmuch as, the principle is that the legal representatives cannot take up a defence which is individual to them, and/or which was not open to the deceased defendant, and they have to take up the litigation from the stage at which they are impleaded which obviously means that they are bound by the pleadings already taken. Likewise in view of the language of Order 22 Rule 4(2), they have to defend the litigation in a manner appropriate to their character as legal representatives of the deceased defendant. Likewise in view of the language of Order 22 Rule 4(2), they have to defend the litigation in a manner appropriate to their character as legal representatives of the deceased defendant. In that view of the matter, as a necessary corollary, by mere event of death of the defendant, the legal representatives do not ipso facto become entitled to file a written statement afresh, much less take any pleading inconsistent to the pleading already taken, or additional defence, or the like. 13. I make it clear that I do not mean to say that after the legal representatives are impleaded, what other ways and means are available to them to retrace from the pleading already taken, or to take inconsistent pleading, or to get out of the admissions made by the deceased, and so on. Presently, I am called upon to answer the only question as to whether by mere incident of having come on record as legal representatives, the legal representatives become entitled to take up such inconsistent, or further defences, or are entitled only to continue the litigation from the stage at which they are impleaded, and to continue it by taking requisite steps like leading evidence etc. as the stage of the case may require, and keeping themselves within the bounds as enacted by Order 22 Rule 4(2) which reads as under : "(2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant." 14. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside, and the plaintiff's application dated 19.9.97 stands allowed. The defendant's written statement filed on 17.1.97 is ordered to be struck off the record, and as obvious consequence the additional issues framed on 8.3.97 stands deleted. Parties are left to bear their own costs. 15. The record of the learned trial court be returned forthwith. Since the suit is of the year 1981, and has already remained pending for more than two decades, the learned trial court is directed to expeditiously complete the trial, preferably within a period of six months from today.Petition allowed.