JUDGMENT : - The present appeal has been preferred by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and its officers against the order dated April 1, 2002 passed by the Trial Court in WPT/204/02 whereby the Trial Court granted a mandatory order directing the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to restore the supply of water to the hotel of the writ petitioner without putting the petitioner on any terms although such water supply was disconnected by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation in exercise of its power under section 275 (1) (aa) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act for alleged non-payment of rates and taxes. 2. The writ petition was moved by the writ petitioner not challenging the aforesaid power of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation in to disconnect such supply of water if rates and taxes remain unpaid. 3. The writ petition was moved on the contention that no rates and taxes is admittedly due to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and therefore, such power could not have been used by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. 4. Admittedly, on the basis of the proposal of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation the Government of West Bengal issued a Notification dated 7th June, 2000 announcing an incentive scheme of waiver of interest and penalty for the purpose of encouraging the rate payers of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to clear their outstanding dues of property tax on the terms and conditions contained in the said notification. (Annexure P 13 to the writ petition, page 93 of the Paper Book). The time within which the said rate payers were invited to pay, which will enable them to obtain such exemption to a certain percentage of the interest and penalty, was 31st March, 2002. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court admittedly such period was extended till 30th April, 2002. 5. It is not disputed that the writ petitioner applied under the said Incentive Scheme for exemption from payment of interest and penalty within time. 6. It will appear from the representation and/or application made by the writ petitioner to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation on 29th August, 2001 praying for such exemption, that such prayer was made, inter alia, on the contention that there was no arrear of taxes. 6. It will appear from the representation and/or application made by the writ petitioner to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation on 29th August, 2001 praying for such exemption, that such prayer was made, inter alia, on the contention that there was no arrear of taxes. It was stated in the said representation itself, inter alia, that for the period from 3rd quarter of 1984-85 to 1st quarter of 1991-92 a writ petition was moved against the enhancement of rates and taxes, but the writ petition was dismissed. Against the same an appeal was preferred which is still pending. In such pending appeal being APOT 754 of 1999 the Appeal Court directed the writ petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,23,54,109/- being the rates and taxes for the entire period under appeal, subject to the result of the appeal and such amount was deposited, the Appeal Court further directed that no action for recovery will be taken by the Corporation. It was the further contention of the writ petitioner in the said representation that for the period of 2nd quarter 1991-92 although no consolidated rate bills were being sent by the Corporation they went on paying taxes at the existing valuation and thereafter they filed an appeal before the Assessment Tribunal relating to the rate bill issued for the period of 2nd quarter 1991-92 to 4th quarter 1998-99 and such appeal was filed after depositing the entire amount as is required to be done under the Act and thereafter since 3rd quarter 1998-99 the Corporation is sending bills in accordance with the enhanced valuation which are being paid without prejudice to their rights and contentions. 7. It is contended no amount therefore is due. 8. A prayer was made that under the said Scheme even if any interest and penalty is payable, the same may be waived under the said Amnesty Scheme. 9. It appears to us that despite such representation the Corporation disputes that all such amounts have been paid and made a claim under such Amnesty Scheme that a sum of Rs. 4,47,55,722.08P. is payable. Such claim was made after waiving an amount of Rs. 2,73,27,030/- towards interest and penalty. 10. Thereafter further correspondence was exchanged between the parties in which the writ petitioner reiterated its stand that no rates and taxes is due and the Corporation claiming that its calculation is correct and such amount is due. 11. 4,47,55,722.08P. is payable. Such claim was made after waiving an amount of Rs. 2,73,27,030/- towards interest and penalty. 10. Thereafter further correspondence was exchanged between the parties in which the writ petitioner reiterated its stand that no rates and taxes is due and the Corporation claiming that its calculation is correct and such amount is due. 11. Ultimately, on 27th March, 2002 a notice was issued calling upon the writ petitioner to pay such amount within 31st March, 2002 clearly intimating the writ petitioner that in default of the same they will disconnect the water supply and in fact by the time the writ petition was moved such disconnection was made. 12. It appears to us that before the Trial Court the writ petitioner prayed for a mandatory interim order for restoration of such supply of water. The Trial Court by the impugned order not only granted such interim order directing restoration of water supply but such order was also passed without putting the appellant on terms viz., directing payment of the amount claimed being of the view that the dispute between the parties is not a dispute of non-payment but a dispute of mathematical calculation. Since the appeal has been preferred against the aforesaid order granting such unconditional interim order, in the present appeal we are really required to decide the question that notwithstanding the fact that the dispute between the parties involves a matter of revenue, whether the Trial Court could have granted such unconditional injunction. 13. Before going into the merits of the appeal it is pertinent to record in this connection that at the stage of hearing of the application for stay before us, the writ petitioner prayed for interim order before us asking for restoration of water supply without which the hotel cannot be run, on any terms to be determined by the Court whereupon we directed such restoration on payment of a sum of Rs. 2 crores by the writ petitioner to the Corporation subject to further orders to be passed in the appeal for payment and subject to further condition. The circumstances under which such order was passed and the terms of which such order was made have been discussed by us in detail in our order dated 5th April, 2002, which we do not find necessary to repeat here. 14. Mr. P.K.Roy, learned Sr. The circumstances under which such order was passed and the terms of which such order was made have been discussed by us in detail in our order dated 5th April, 2002, which we do not find necessary to repeat here. 14. Mr. P.K.Roy, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation assailed the impugned order appealed against mainly on the ground that since the matter involves revenue, the Trial Court could not have granted such interim order or at least an unconditional interim order. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Siliguri Municipality reported in AIR 1984 SC 653 , in the case of Dunlop India Ltd. reported in AIR 1985 SC 330 and Union Territory of Pondicherry vs. P.V. Suresh, reported in 1994 (2) SCC 70 , it has been submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again held in no uncertain terms that no injunction can be granted where matter of revenue is involved, except in exceptional cases. Therefore, it has been submitted in any event injunction could not be granted without directing payment of the entire claim by the respondent. Although the learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation has also addressed us on merits and also produced certain calculation before the Court for the purpose of showing how arrears of rates and taxes have been calculated, we are not inclined to go into such question in detail or to refer to the same in details since we are of the view that it is not necessary for us really to go into the merits of the case at this stage and also in view of the fact that it has been held in the Hon'ble Supreme Court that even if a prima facie case is made out, that also would not warrant grant of injunction in a case where revenue matter is involved. 15. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has also addressed us in details for the purpose of contending that such interim order was called for and the same comes within the exception as it will appear not only there is no arrear of rates and taxes but the same has been admitted by the respondent. 16. Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has also addressed us in details for the purpose of contending that such interim order was called for and the same comes within the exception as it will appear not only there is no arrear of rates and taxes but the same has been admitted by the respondent. 16. We have been taken through the relevant orders passed in the aforesaid appeal arising out of the writ petition in which rates and taxes for a particular quarters are now under consideration of the Court and where such an interim order was passed and also through particulars of the said municipal appeal filed after the deposit of the entire amount of rates and taxes at the enhanced rate. 17. We have also been taken through various provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 viz., including sections 186, 189, 190, 197, 215, 216 and 217 for the purpose of satisfying as how a demand is raised by the Corporation and on the rates and taxes became due and from what point of time. It was also contended that all rates and taxes have been paid even at the enhanced rate after preferring such municipal appeal and during the pendency of mandamus appeal notwithstanding the fact certain bills were not even properly presented in terms of the Act and nothing became due and payable legally. 18. We are however not inclined to go into such matter any further or to refer the same in details. In our opinion in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision there is no scope for a Court to grant injunction relating to demand for revenue and if an exceptional case warrants grant of injunction, the same can only be done putting the petitioner on terms. . 19. In the case of Siliguri Municipality (supra) the Supreme Court held that the High Court should not as a rule in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India grant any stay of recovery of tax save under very exceptional circumstances. The grant of stay should be an exception and not a rule. . 19. In the case of Siliguri Municipality (supra) the Supreme Court held that the High Court should not as a rule in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India grant any stay of recovery of tax save under very exceptional circumstances. The grant of stay should be an exception and not a rule. It was further held by the Supreme Court that the main purpose for passing an interim order is to evolve an workable formula or a workable arrangement to the extent called for by the demands of the situation keeping in mind the presumption regarding the constitutionality of the Legislation and the vulnerability of the challenge only in order that no irreparable injury is occasioned. The Court has therefore to strike a delicate balance after considering the pros and cons of the matter lest larger public interest is not jeopardized and institutional embarrassment is eschewed. In the said case the grant of stay by the High Court under Article 226 and the matter of recovery to graded consolidated rate of annual value in terms of amended provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act was deprecated by the Supreme Court. 20. In this connection it will be worthwhile to quote a portion of the said judgment hereinbelow: "It is needless to stress that a levy or impost does not become bad as soon as a writ petition is instituted in order to assail the validity of the levy. So also there is no warrant for presuming the levy to be bad at the very threshold of the proceeding. The only consideration at that juncture is to ensure that no prejudice is occasioned to the rate payers in case they ultimately succeed at the conclusion of the proceedings. This object can be attained by requiring the body or authority levying the impost to give an undertaking to refund or adjust against future dues, the levy of tax or rate of a part thereof, as the case may be, in the event of the entire levy or a part thereof being ultimately held to be invalid by the Court without obliging the tax-payers to institute a civil suit in order to claim the amount already recovered from them. On the other hand, the Court cannot be unmindful of the need to protect the authority levying the tax, for, at that stage the Court has to proceed on the hypothesis that the challenge mayor may not succeed. The Court has to show awareness of the fact that in a case like the present a municipality cannot function or meet its functional obligations if its source of revenue is blocked by an interim order restraining the municipality from recovering the taxes as per the impugned provision. And that the municipality has to maintain essential civic services like water supply, street lighting and public streets etc. apart from running public institutions like schools, dispensaries, libraries etc. What is more, supplies have to be purchased and salaries have to be paid. The grant of an interlocutory order of this nature would paralyze the administration and dislocate the entire working of the municipality. It seems that these serious ramifications of the matter was lost sight of while making the impugned order". 21. It may be noted from such observations of the Supreme Court that in the matter of consideration whether stay should be granted or not where revenue is involved, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no warrant for presuming the levy to be bad at the very threshold of the proceedings and the only consideration at that juncture is to ensure that no prejudice is occasioned to the rate payers in case they ultimately succeed at the conclusion of the proceedings which can be secured by requiring the body or authority levying the impost to give an undertaking to refund or adjust against future dues. 22. Same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court once again in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors. (supra), where the Supreme Court really followed its earlier decision in the case of Siliguri Municipality. 23. In the aforesaid case of Dunlop India, the revenue in the form of Central Excise Duty was involved and the Supreme Court held that granting of interim order restraining the excise authorities from levy and collection of excise duty merely on furnishing bank guarantees by the Company was held unjustified. It was held that even assuming that the Company had established a prima facie case it was not sufficient justification for granting interim order. It was held that even assuming that the Company had established a prima facie case it was not sufficient justification for granting interim order. Also Governments are not run on mere Bank Guarantees and very often some courts act as if furnishing a Bank Guarantee would meet the ends of justice. No Government business or for that matter no business of any kind can be run on mere Bank Guarantee. Liquid cash is necessary for running of a Government as indeed any other enterprise, but where matters of public revenue are concerned, it is of utmost importance to realise that interim orders ought not to be granted merely because a prima facie case has been shown. More is required is that the balance of convenience must be clearly in favour of the making of an interim order and there should not be the slightest indication of a likelihood of prejudice to the public interest. 24. It thus appears to us that in the case of Dunlop India Ltd. the Supreme Court has also pointed out that in the matter of granting of an interim order the mere fact that the petitioner has satisfied the Court that it has got a prima facie case, will not be the reason for granting of such an interim order. 25. In the case of Union Territory of Pondicherry vs. P.V. Suresh & Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court has again observed that passing of an interim order is not and cannot be a matter of course nor a matte of charity. In the matters touching public revenue the Courts ought to be more cautious. For better or worse, the Courts have come to acquire a veto over the public exchequer. Such power should be exercised with good amount of self-restraint and with a sense of responsibility. The power is coupled with accountability-accountability to the Constitution, to the laws of the land and above all to ourselves. The Court must apply its mind to the facts of the case and must also envisage the implications and consequences of the order it proposes to make. This is so even at the ad interim stage when the respondent is not represented. 26. The Court must apply its mind to the facts of the case and must also envisage the implications and consequences of the order it proposes to make. This is so even at the ad interim stage when the respondent is not represented. 26. Keeping in mind all those propositions which have been laid down by the Supreme Court, if we now examine the order of the Trial Court, we cannot but hold that the manner in which the unconditional interim order has been granted by the Trial Court, is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 27. It is not even clear from the order why such an unusual step had to be taken by the Trial Court. We do not find anywhere from the order that the Court was even satisfied as to the prima facie case. But assuming that the observations of the Trial Court that it is not a matter of non-payment but merely an accounting means that the writ petitioner has got a prima facie case, even then, in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions, granting of an interim order without directing the writ petitioner-respondent to pay the entire amount at the first instance, was not in our view, justified. 28. Even to decide whether the amount has been paid or not or it is admitted by the Corporation that it is not due, or whether the claim of the amount which has been made by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation is frivolous or actually the amount has been paid or there has been illegal appropriation of the amount which has been deposited by the writ petitioner respondent in the Municipal Appeal or that because of the injunction passed in the Mandamus Appeal recovery could be made or at all, or steps which has been taken by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation will come within the meaning of recovery, it will be necessary for the court to go into the merits of such questions examining the pleadings, the affidavits and the records. 29. It is worth mentioning here that in the case of Siliguri Municipality the very challenge of the writ petitioner was that the Municipality has no jurisdiction to realise the tax constitutionally not valid and yet the Supreme Court was because the amendment was/of the view that in the matter of revenue there cannot be grant of any injunction. 30. 29. It is worth mentioning here that in the case of Siliguri Municipality the very challenge of the writ petitioner was that the Municipality has no jurisdiction to realise the tax constitutionally not valid and yet the Supreme Court was because the amendment was/of the view that in the matter of revenue there cannot be grant of any injunction. 30. Whether such amount is really due or not or it is admitted by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation that it is not due or that the claim of the Corporation is frivolous, as pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner respondent hereinbefore, can only be decided, in our view, when the Court decides the merit of the case and disposes of the entire matter. Even to have a prima facie view of the matter the court will be required to examine the writ petition and the affidavits. But even making out a prima facie case alone will not warrant grant of injunction in revenue matter. 31. We also do not find any indication from the order of the Trial Court that even if it is merely a matter of accounting and not of non-payment, how despite such clear pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court, such injunction could have been granted in favour of the writ petitioner respondent directing restoration of water supply without payment of the entire amount, as claimed by the Corporation in the impugned notice. 32. For the reasons as aforesaid, this appeal is liable to succeed. 33. It may be recorded in this connection, however, that on 26th April, 2002, in course of hearing, the writ petitioner respondent has paid in Court to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation a sum of Rs., 34,25,380.37p. Because of such payment as aforesaid, in addition to the payment of the sum of Rs. 2 crores, which was paid on the previous occasion, it appears to us that the entire amount which has been claimed by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation under the said Scheme after waiving the penalty and interest, has been paid by the writ petitioner respondent. 34. In fact it appears to us that the aforesaid sum which was paid on 26th April, 2002, viz., Rs. 2,34,25,381.37p is really little more than the amount which was demanded by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation by the impugned notice dated 27th March, 2002. 34. In fact it appears to us that the aforesaid sum which was paid on 26th April, 2002, viz., Rs. 2,34,25,381.37p is really little more than the amount which was demanded by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation by the impugned notice dated 27th March, 2002. It, however, appears to us that such amount has been paid as during the pendency of this appeal, by a letter dated April 12, 2002, the Chief Municipal Engineer (Water Supply) informed the writ petitioner respondent that the outstanding amount under the said Interest Waiver Scheme is now Rs. 2,34,25,381.37p. 35. Although for the reasons as stated above, we are of the view that the Trial Court could not have granted such interim order in the manner aforesaid without directing payment of the entire amount as claimed by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, since we directed restoration of water supply on payment of a sum of Rs. 2 crores and in view of the fact that now the entire balance amount has been paid which has been claimed under the said Interest Waiver Scheme, the interim order passed by us directing restoration of water supply is hereby confirmed. 36. The Trial Court will now hear out the writ petition itself on merits. 37. At this juncture Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the writ petitioner respondent submits that they might be given an opportunity to file a supplementary affidavit in view of the fact that the writ petition was moved in a hurry and many other relevant facts are required to be incorporated in the writ petition. Such prayer is allowed. Let supplementary affidavit be filed in connection with the said writ petition by 13th May, 2002, a copy of which may be served upon the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. 38. It also appears to us that in view of the pendency of the present appeal before us no affidavit was filed by the respondents before the trial court and, therefore, a prayer has been made for extension of time to file the affidavit-in opposition. Let affidavit-in-opposition to the writ petition as also the supplementary affidavit be filed by 17th May, 2002; reply by 24th May, 2002. We also request the learned Trial Court to hear out the main writ petition expeditiously subject to its other pre-occupation. 39. We have already directed by our order dated 5th April, 2002 that the deposit of the sum of Rs. We also request the learned Trial Court to hear out the main writ petition expeditiously subject to its other pre-occupation. 39. We have already directed by our order dated 5th April, 2002 that the deposit of the sum of Rs. 2 crores which was made by the writ petitioner under the order of the Court, will be subject to the result of the writ petition and in the event ultimately it is found at the time of disposal of the writ petition that such amount was not payable to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, Calcutta Municipal Corporation will be liable to refund or adjust the same with interest at the rate the Corporation itself charges in respect of arrear bills. 40. Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the writ petitioner respondent submits that a similar protection should also be given in respect of the deposit which has been made on 26th April, 2002 and instead of directing adjustment of the amount there should be direction for refund of the entire amount with interest in the event the writ petitioner respondent succeeds and it is found that no amount is payable by the writ petitioner respondent. 41. We are, however, at this stage not inclined to direct that there should be a refund. 42. In our view, the same 'should be decided by the Trial Court itself while disposing of the writ petition, in the event the Trial Court comes to the conclusion that no such amount was in arrear, as claimed by the writ petitioner and the demand in respect thereof of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation was frivolous and not even tenable in view of the pendency of the Municipal Appeal and the Mandamus Appeal. 43. We make it clear that the entire amount which has been paid by the writ petitioner respondent in Court towards amount claimed under such Interest Waiver Scheme, shall be subject to the result of the writ petition and in the event the writ petition succeeds and it is found by the Trial Court that no amount was payable to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation will be liable to refund or adjust the same with future bills with interest at the rate the Corporation itself charges in respect of arrear bills. 44. 44. We further make it clear that at the time of disposal of the writ petition, if the writ petitioner respondent succeeds, they will be entitled to claim refund of such amount with interest instead of adjustment and if such claim is made, the same shall also be decided by the Trial Court. 45. With such observations as aforesaid the appeal stand disposed of. 46. There shall be no order as to costs. 47. All parties to act on a xeroxed certified copy of this judgment. Appeal disposed of with observations.