JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Judge, Una in Civil Appeal No. 166/94 (93), dated 23.5.1994, whereby the appeal of the present appellants was dismissed and as a consequence of it, the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Court No. 2, Una in Civil Suit No. 582/83 RBT No. 299/1988, dated 26.12.1992, has been upheld. 2. This appeal was admitted on 15.7.1997. However, substantial question(s) of law were not framed on which it was admitted. This case further came up for consideration before this Court and the following order was passed on 24.9.2002:— "This appeal was admitted on 15.7.1997 without specifically mentioning as to on what substantial questions of law it has been admitted. After going through the file of this appeal, it is felt that questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 at page-6 of the paper book are the substantial questions of law which need to be gone into in this appeal. In this behalf, learned Counsel for the parties stated that since these are purely questions of law, as such, they do not want the appeal to be adjourned. They further stated that the matter may be heard on these questions and decided in accordance with law. In view of the aforesaid stand taken by learned Counsel for the parties, the appeal is not admitted and it as been finally heard. Judgment reserved." In terms of the above order, this appeal was heard on the following two substantial questions of law:— "1. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide as to whether a particular property is evacuee property or not? 2. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit in view of the bar created by Section 46 of the Evacuee Property Act?" 3. In order to succeed in this appeal, learned Counsel for the appellants was required to show that the property which was subject matter of the suit was declared "evacuee property" as per provisions of Section 7-A on or before 7th May, 1954, under The Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". In order to succeed in this appeal, learned Counsel for the appellants was required to show that the property which was subject matter of the suit was declared "evacuee property" as per provisions of Section 7-A on or before 7th May, 1954, under The Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". In case the appellants are able to establish this fact on the basis of its evidence, oral as well as documentary, learned Counsel for the respondents fairly stated that there is no escape except to allow the appeal, otherwise this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 4. In this behalf, it may be appropriate to point out that substantial questions of law on which this appeal was heard are inter-related and thus the same are being dealt with by this Court together. 5. Brief facts of the case are that respondents No. 1 to 2 were the plaintiffs before the trial Court, whereas the appellants as well as proforma respondents were the defendants. Parties hereinafter in this judgment shall be referred to as "the plaintiffs" and "the defendants". 6. A suit was filed by the plaintiffs, wherein the present appellants were arrayed as defendants No.l and 2 and proforma respondents as defendants No. 3 to 5. According to the plaintiffs, defendants No. 3 to 5 were unheard of for the last more than seven years and as such, they were presumed to be dead in law. And plaintiffs are the only successors and the reversioners of these defendants and also being the owners in possession of the suit land as detailed in the plaint, defendants No. 1 and 2 have no right or interest in the same. While seeking declaration, a prayer was made for restraining defendants No. 1 and 2 from interfering in their (plaintiffs) possession. With a view to support their plea, it was further averred that defendant No. 3 was the owner of the suit land who left the village alongwith his sons i.e. defendants No. 4 and 5 about 35 years ago and thereafter they have not been heard of by their relations or other persons despite best efforts having been made in this behalf. They might have died during the riots at the time of partition in 1947. They might have died during the riots at the time of partition in 1947. Further case of the plaintiffs was that the suit land was never declared evacuee property nor it could have been so declared under law. Despite this, defendants No. 1 and 2 were threatening through their subordinates. About five months before filing of the suit, threats were being extended. Hence, notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was issued and subsequently suit was filed, because claim of the plaintiffs was not conceded by the official respondents. 7. When put to notice, defendants No. 1 and 2 contested and resisted the suit of the plaintiffs. According to them, suit was not maintainable in the form it was filed, plaintiffs had no locus standi to maintain it as also Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Sections 46/47 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and Section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. On merits of the case, it was pleaded that defendants No. 3 to 5 have migrated to Pakistan and the suit property being evacuee, as such, it had vested in the custodian under Section 8 of the Act. Thus, the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the suit land was denied. 8. Record of the trial Court shows that defendants No. 3 to 5 were set ex-parte because they did not appear despite having been served through publication. 9. In their replication filed by the plaintiffs to the written statement of defendants No. 1 and 2, facts set out in the plaint were reiterated and those which were contrary, were denied. 10. Trial Court after framing the following issues, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs:— "1. Whether defendants 3 to 5 are unheard and unseen for the last more than 7 years, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are the reversioners of defendants 3 to 5 and have the right to succeed the estate of defendant Nos. 3 to 5? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land as reversioners of defendants 3 to 5? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 6. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land as reversioners of defendants 3 to 5? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 6. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? OPD 6-A. Whether the suit property is evacuee property as alleged? OPD 7. Relief." 11. When this decree was challenged in appeal by defendants No. 1 and 2, the same was upheld by the first appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal. 12. Learned Assistant Advocate General submitted by referring to documents on the file of the trial Court as well as the statements of DWs that Devi Chand defendant No. 3 alongwith his two sons defendants No. 4 and 5 having migrated to Pakistan, stood duly established. Great emphasis was laid by him on the decision given by the Collector, Land Ceiling in case No. 197/74, decided on 3.7.1981, titled State v. Devi Chand and others. Copy of the judgment is Ext. D-2. He has also placed reliance on communication from Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Una addressed to the Collector, Land Ceiling, Una on the subject concerning the land to the extent of 834-17 Kanals in the name of Devi Chand who migrated to Pakistan during the partition of the country. With a view to advance case of the defendants, reference was also made to Ex. D-9 and to the statements of all the DWs. 13. On the other hand, all these pleas have been controverted by learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. He submitted that statements of all the DWs as well as documentary evidence produced by defendants No. 1 and 2 are of least significance and do not in any manner improve their case. According to him in order to succeed, first and foremost as well as the only fact that was required to be proved was that the property was evacuee property and had been declared as such under the Act, that too before 7th May, 1954. It was only thereafter that such property would vest in the custodian. 14. According to him in order to succeed, first and foremost as well as the only fact that was required to be proved was that the property was evacuee property and had been declared as such under the Act, that too before 7th May, 1954. It was only thereafter that such property would vest in the custodian. 14. When a reference is made to the provisions of law i.e. the Act, custodian is to hold an inquiry in the manner prescribed, by giving hearing to the persons interested and after such inquiry as the circumstances of the case permit, to pass the order declaring the property to be "evacuee property". In addition to this, under Section 7-A of the Act, no property could be declared as evacuee property on or after 7th May, 1954. Once the conditions enumerated in Sections 7 and 7-A are fulfilled, it is only thereafter that any property so declared as "evacuee property" shall be deemed to have vested in the custodian of the State. For ready reference, provisions of Sections 7, 7-A and* 8 of the Act are extracted hereinbelow:— "7. Notification of evacuee property.—(1) Where the Custodian is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of this Act, he may after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persons interested, and after holding such inquiry into the matter as the circumstances of the case permit, pass an order declaring any such property to be evacuee property. (1-A)Where during the pendency of any proceeding under sub-section (1) for declaring any property to be evacuee property any person interested in the property dies, the proceeding shall, unless the Custodian otherwise directs, be continued and disposed of as if such person were alive. (2) Where a notice has been issued under sub-section (1) in respect of any property, such property shall, pending the determination of the question whether it is evacuee property or otherwise, be incapable of being transferred or charged in any way, except with the leave of the Custodian and no person shall be capable of taking any benefit from such transfer or charge except with such leave. (3) The Custodian shall, from time to time, notify, either by publication in the Official Gazette or in such other manner as may be prescribed, all properties declared by him to be evacuee properties under sub-section (1). 7-A. Property not to be declared evacuee property on or after 7th May, 1954.— Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no property shall be declared to be evacuee property on or after the 7th day of May, 1954: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to— (a) any property in respect of which proceedings are pending on the 7th day of May, 1954 for declaring such property to be evacuee property; and (b) the property of any person who, on account of the setting up of the Dominations of India and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances had left on or after the 1st day of March, 1947, any place now forming part of India, and who on the 7th day of May, 1954 was resident in Pakistan: Provided further that no notice under Section 7 for declaring any property to be evacuee property with reference to clause (b) of the proceeding proviso shall be issued after the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954. 8. Vesting of evacuee property in the Custodian.—(1) Any property declared to be evacuee property under Section 7 shall be deemed to have vested in the Custodian for the State— (a) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of Section 2, from the date on which he leaves or left any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India; (b) in the case of property of an evacuee as defined in sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of Section 2, from the 15th day of August, 1947; and (c) in the case of any other property, from the date of the notice given under sub-section (1) of Section 7 in respect thereof. (2) Where immediately before the commencement of this Act, any property in a State had vested as evacuee property in any person exercising the powers of Custodian under any law repealed hereby the property shall, on the commencement of this Act, be deemed to be evacuee property declared as such within the meaning of this Act and shall be deemed to have vested in the Custodian appointed or deemed to have been appointed for the State under this Act, and shall continue to so vest: Provided that where at the commencement of this Act there is pending before the High Court, the Custodian or any other authority for or in any State any proceeding under Section 8 or Section 30 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XII of 1949), or under any other corresponding law repealed by the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (XXVII of 1949), then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, such proceeding shall be disposed of as if the definitions of evacuee property and evacuee contained in Section 2 of this Act had become applicable thereto. (2-A)Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (2), all property which under any law repealed hereby purports to have vested as evacuee property in any person exercising the powers of Custodian in any State shall, notwithstanding any defect in or the invalidity of, such law or any judgment, decree or order of any court, be deemed for all purposes to have validly vested in that person, as if the provisions of such law had been enacted by Parliament and such property shall, on the commencement of this Act, be declared to have been evacuee property declared as such within the meaning of this Act and accordingly, any order made or other action taken by the Custodian or, any other authority in relation to such property shall be deemed to have been validly and lawfully made or taken. (3) Where any property in a State belonging to a joint stock company had vested in any person exercising the powers of a Custodian under any law previously in force, then nothing contained in clause (f) of Section 2 shall affect the operation of sub-section (2), but the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the Custodian shall be divested of any such property in such manner and after such period as may be specified in the notification. (4) Where after any evacuee property has vested in the Custodian any person is in possession thereof, he shall be deemed to be holding it on behalf of the Custodian and shall on demand surrender possession of it to the Custodian or to any other person duly authorised by him in this behalf." 15. When a reference is made to the documentary evidence, there is nothing on record to even remotely suggest that any declaration made by the custodian under Section 7 of the Act that too before 7th May, 1954. This is the factual position in this case. As such, there is no question of the suit property being vested in the custodian. 16. In Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab and others v. Jafran Begum, AIR 1968 SC 169, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held as under: (9) Under Section 7 the Custodian has to determine whether certain property is or is not evacuee property. To determine that he is to find out whether a particular person is or is not an evacuee. Having found that, he is to find whether the property in dispute belongs to that person. If he comes to the conclusion that the property belongs to that person, he declares the property to be evacuee property. Now there is nothing in Section 7 which shows that the Custodian cannot enter into all questions whether of fact or of law in deciding whether certain property belongs to an evacuee. There is no reason to hold that under Section 7 the Custodian cannot decide what are called complicated questions questions of law or questions of title. It is difficult to see how the Custodian can avoid deciding a question of title if it is raised before him in proceedings under Section 7. There is no reason to hold that under Section 7 the Custodian cannot decide what are called complicated questions questions of law or questions of title. It is difficult to see how the Custodian can avoid deciding a question of title if it is raised before him in proceedings under Section 7. Nor do we find it possible to make a distinction between questions of fact and questions of law that may arise before the Custodian under Section 7. If he has the power to decide questions of fact, which the learned Judges in the order under appeal seem to concede, we do not see why he should not have the power of deciding questions of law also. Further if the learned Judges in the order under appeal are correct in saying that if a question of title rests on simple allegation of fact it can be finally determined by the Custodian, we cannot see on what reasoning it can be said that where a question of title depends on a question of law it cannot be finally decided under Section 7 by the Custodian. His power under Section 7 is to decide whether certain property is evacuee property or not and there is nothing in Section 7 which restricts that power to deciding only questions of fact. There can in our opinion be no escape from the conclusion that under Section 7 when deciding whether certain property is evacuee property or not, the Custodian has to decide all questions, whether of fact or law, whether simple or complicated, which arise therein. That power cannot be denied on the ground that the Custodian, which term for these purposes includes the Deputy Custodian or the Assistant-Custodian may not be an experienced judicial officer and therefore may not be in a position to decide questions of title. His decision is not final and is open to appeal under Section 24 and to revision under Section 27. If he makes a mistake the two higher authorities who, we are told, have always been recruited from experienced judicial officers can correct him. His decision is not final and is open to appeal under Section 24 and to revision under Section 27. If he makes a mistake the two higher authorities who, we are told, have always been recruited from experienced judicial officers can correct him. It is after the matter has been decided under Section 7 and Section 24 if an appeal is filed and under Section 27 if a revision is filed, that Section 28 gives finality to orders of the authorities mentioned therein and lays down that such orders shall not be called in question in any Court by way of appeal or revision or in any original suit application or execution proceeding. As we have already said, the legislature was not satisfied by merely conferring finality on such orders; it went further and expressly barred the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts under Section 46 to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not evacuee property. These words are very wide and clear and bar the courts from entertaining or adjudicating upon any such question. Where therefore the question whether certain properties are evacuee properties has been decided under Section 7 etc., whether that decision is based on issues of fact or issues of law, jurisdiction of courts is clearly barred under Section 46(a). It is difficult to see how a distinction can be drawn between decisions under Section 7 based on questions of fact and decisions based on questions of law. The decision is made final whether based on issues of law or of fact by Section 28 and Section 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts in matters which are decided under Section 7 whatever may be the basis of decision, whether issues of fact or of law and whether simple or complicated. (10) It may be added that the only question to be decided under Section 7 is whether the property is evacuee property or not and the jurisdiction of the Custodian to decide this question does not depend upon any finding on a collateral fact. (10) It may be added that the only question to be decided under Section 7 is whether the property is evacuee property or not and the jurisdiction of the Custodian to decide this question does not depend upon any finding on a collateral fact. Therefore there is no scope for the application of that line of cases where it has been held that where the jurisdiction of a tribunal of limited jurisdiction depends upon first finding certain state of facts, it cannot give itself jurisdiction on a wrong finding of that state of fact. Here under Section 7 the Custodian has to decide whether certain property is or is not evacuee property and his jurisdiction does not depend upon any collateral fact being decided as a condition precedent to his assuming jurisdiction. In these circumstances, Section 46 is a complete bar to the jurisdiction of civil or revenue courts in any matter which can be decided under Section 7. This conclusion is reinforced by the provision contained in Section 4(1) of the Act which provides that the Act overrides other laws and would thus override Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on a combined reading of Sections 4, 28 and 46. But as we have said already, Section 46 or Section 28 cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, for that is a power conferred on the High Court under the Constitution." 17. Similarly in the case of Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra and others, AIR 1980 SC 1206, while dealing with the provisions of Sections 7, 7-A and 8 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 as well as the provisions of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, it was held as under:— . "29. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 46 postulate that at the time when the question whether or not a property is evacuee property comes for adjudication, the power of the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act of 1950 to determine that question is subsisting. "29. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 46 postulate that at the time when the question whether or not a property is evacuee property comes for adjudication, the power of the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act of 1950 to determine that question is subsisting. That is to say, if at the point of time when the question arises, the power of the authorities constituted under this Act to adjudicate that question stands terminated or extinguished by the operation of Section 7-A of 1954, none of the Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 46 will bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine that question, which had not been decided by the Custodian during the period he had the power to determine it. 30. Section 28 has no application to the facts of the instant case because no order made by any of the authorities mentioned in that Section is being called in question. Section 46, also, does not come in the way because no proceedings under Section 7 of the 1950 Act to declare the suit house an evacuee property were taken by the Custodian against Qazi Abdul Rashid. No notification under subsection (3) of Section 7 published in the Official Gazette has been placed on record. Nor was it shown that any proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Act to declare it evacuee property were pending on May 7, 1954, and the question of saving those proceedings under the Proviso to Section 7-A does not arise. 31. Qazi Abdul Rashid was throughout a resident of India till 1963 and was personally managing the suit house and collecting rent of it from the tenant. After May 7, 1954, therefore, the Custodian had no jurisdiction under the 1950 Act to declare the suit house as evacuee property. The jurisdiction of the courts below to go into this question was thus barred by anything in Sections 28 and 46 of the 1950 Act. 32. * * * * 33. * * * * . 34. * * * * 35. * * * * 36. *. * * * 37 * * * * 38. * * * * 39. 32. * * * * 33. * * * * . 34. * * * * 35. * * * * 36. *. * * * 37 * * * * 38. * * * * 39. It will be seen that Section 27 is not attracted because the plaintiff who filed the original suit and is now coming before us by way of appeal, is not questioning the finality of the order of the sale alleged to have been made by the managing officer. It is the defendant-respondents who were resisting the plaintiffs claim on the ground that the sale is a nullity. It could not be made under this Act of 1954, for the reason that it was never declared evacuee property under Section 7 of the Act and thus never formed part of the compensation pool. The words "under this Act" occurring in Section 27sare significant. They show that those orders which are not made by any officer or authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act in excess of jurisdiction, can be called in question in the civil court. It may be noted that the language of Section 27 is not as wide as that of Section 46 of the 1950 Act." 18. Looking to the evidence on record of this case, as well as keeping in view the fact that there was no evidence on the file to prove that any order was passed declaring the suit property to be the "evacuee property", there is no question of vesting of the same in the custodian so as to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court as was urged by learned Assistant Advocate General. According to him/order passed by Collector Land Ceiling clearly establishes the claim of defendants No.l and 2. This is an argument raised simply to be rejected. 19. Land Ceiling Act, 1972 came into force w.e.f. 26.1.1971, though enacted lateron i.e. much after coming into force of the Act. Thus, the Collector Land Ceiling could not have gone into and dealt with any question under the Act. In this behalf, reliance placed by learned Assistant Advocate General on the order of the Collector Land Ceiling, is misconceived and wholly untenable. Reason being that in case the property had vested in custodian as was urged by Mr. Thus, the Collector Land Ceiling could not have gone into and dealt with any question under the Act. In this behalf, reliance placed by learned Assistant Advocate General on the order of the Collector Land Ceiling, is misconceived and wholly untenable. Reason being that in case the property had vested in custodian as was urged by Mr. Sharma and which is the case of defendants No. 1 and 2, then it was the property of the Union of India and in such a situation, there is no question of its having been dealt with it under the H.P. Land Ceiling Act, 1972. Thus the reliance placed on Ex. D-2 negatives the case of defendants No.l and 2. 20. Even when a reference is made to the oral and documentary evidence to which reference was also made by learned Counsel for the parties, it cannot be said that the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below are not possible at 11. Similarly, the impugned judgment cannot be termed to be perverse so as to call for interference in this second appeal. 21. Whether the property was declared as evacuee prior to 7.5.1954 is purely a question of law that was required to be proved by leading congent and reliable Evidence. There is no evidence to this effect produced by the defendants No. 1 and 2 on record. Best evidence of these facts was order of authorities under Sections 7 and 7-A of the Act. Even if he assumed for the sake of argument that defendants No, 3 to 5 had migrated to Pakistan, even then defendants No. 1 and 2-appellants were further required to establish that the property left by defendants No. 3 to 5 had in fact been dealt with after their such migration under law by passing orders under the Act. Such evidence is completely lacking in this case. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the findings recorded by the Courts below are pure findings of fact which call for no interference. I have no hesitation in further holding that even if again it is presumed for the sake of argument, that the findings of the Courts below are erroneous, still those do not call for any interference in second appeal. 23. No other submission is made in support of the aforesaid two substantial questions o£ law. 24. I have no hesitation in further holding that even if again it is presumed for the sake of argument, that the findings of the Courts below are erroneous, still those do not call for any interference in second appeal. 23. No other submission is made in support of the aforesaid two substantial questions o£ law. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, both the above noted substantial questions of law are decided against defendants No. 1 and 2 appellants and as a consequence of it, the present appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.