GHULAM MOHAMMED, J. ( 1 ) ( 2 ) THE writ petition has been filed questioning the Award dated 5. 11. 1993 in i. D. No. 194/1993. published on 2. 6. 1994, as illegal and unjustified to the extent of not granting continuity of service, back wages and other consequential benefits. ( 3 ) IT is stated that twenty workmen concerned in the dispute were terminated from service with effect from 22. 6. 1978. All those workmen were working as Work inspectors, Pump Operators, Helpers etc. The termination effected by the respondents was in violation of provisions of the industrial Disputes Act, as the workmen were not given one month notice pay as well as retrenchment compensation. The petitioners therefore, raised Industrial Dispute questioning the termination of several workmen, including twenty workmen by letter dated 19. 7. 1978 followed by another letter dated 8. 8. 1978. Subsequently, some of the workmen were taken back to service. However, the respondents refused to reinstate these twenty workmen. Thereafter, the government issued G. O. Rt. No. 22 dated 5. 1. 1989 referring the dispute to the Labour court, Hyderabad. ( 4 ) BASED on the reference, the dispute was taken up by the Labour Court, hyderabad and on its transfer the dispute was renumbered as I. D. No. 194/1993 on the file of the Additional Industrial Tribunal- cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad. The Tribunal after conducting elaborate enquiry passed an Award dated 5. 11,1993 holding that the petitioners shall be reinstated into service without back wages and continuity of service and be absorbed in any department under the control of the engineer-in-Chief, Government of Andhra pradesh. ( 5 ) THE above Award was published in the Gazette by the Government vide its g. O. Rt. No. 1332 dated 2. 6. 1994. As the respondents delayed the re-instatement, the petitioners filed WP No. 8491 of 1995 for implementation of the Award and the same was allowed. ( 6 ) THE petitioners slate that the Labour court having found that the termination order is illegal, and unjustified, should have granted continuity of service and back wages. It is also averred that when juniors to these workmen are continuously working and are even regularised, there is no justification to deprive them of the benefits of continuous service and back wages. It is also averred that when juniors to these workmen are continuously working and are even regularised, there is no justification to deprive them of the benefits of continuous service and back wages. ( 7 ) BEFORE the Labour Court it is contended by the respondents that the petitioners did not work continuously for 240 days, and, hence provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, are not attracted. ( 8 ) THE Labour Court held that the annexure to the petition shows the date of joining of the petitioners into service, which was not controverted by the respondents by filing the attendance and wage registers to show the length of continuous service of the petitioners, and came to conclusion that they were in continuous service from the dates given in the annexure. It is also held that it is not the case of the respondents that they were paid one month s notice pay and retrenchment compensation, hence, their retrenchment being contrary to Section 25-F of the Act, is illegal and liable to set aside, nevertheless, there is long delay on the part of the petitioners in moving for conciliation. The Labour Court directed that the petitioners shall be reinstated into service without work wages and continuity of service and be absorbed in any department under the control of the Engineer-in-Chief, Government of a. P. ( 9 ) SRI B. G. Ravindra Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that when once retrenchment is found to be illegal and is set aside the consequences are that the petitioners are entitled for back wages and continuity of service with all attendant benefits. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that burden lies on the management to plead and prove that the employee has been gainfully employed and in the absence of such stand taken by the management, the labour Court ought to have granted the relief prayed for by the petitioners. Learned Counsel relying on Section 25 (7) of the Act, contended that the petitioners are entitled to consequential benefits. This issue however, was not pleaded before the labour Court. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the following decisions. (1) Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd. , (1981) 3 SCC 225 . (2) Gammon Indian Limited v. Niranjan dass, (1984) 1 SCC 509 . This issue however, was not pleaded before the labour Court. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the following decisions. (1) Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd. , (1981) 3 SCC 225 . (2) Gammon Indian Limited v. Niranjan dass, (1984) 1 SCC 509 . (3) Hindustan Tin Works v. Its Employees, air 1979 SC 75 . (4) Narotam Chopra v. Presiding Officer, labour Court, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 97. (5) E. I. D. Parry (India) Ltd. v. Labour court, 1991 (5) ALT 161. (6) Shambhu Nath Goel v. Bank of baroda and others, 1986 (5) LJ 135 esc. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in Mohan lai s case (supra) observed that in case of illegal termination of service, worker is deemed to be continuing in service and is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. ( 12 ) IN Gammon Indian Limited s case (supra) it was observed that:-"labour and Services-Industrial Disputes act, 1947 - Sections 2 (00) and 25-F - termination of service not falling within exceptions (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2 (00) amounts to retrenchment - Termination on ground of reduction in volume of business, held, amounted to retrenchment - One month s notice of such tennination cannot be treated as notice under Section 25-F (a) - in absence of compliance with prerequisites of Section 25-F, the retrenchment bringing about the termination would be ab initio void - Hence, continuance in service with full back wages along with all benefits, interest etc, ordered -Relief-Constitution of india, Article 136. " ( 13 ) IN Hindustan Tin Works s case (supra) it was held as follows:"ordinarily, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated either by dismissal, discharge or retrenchment will be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. " ( 14 ) IN Narotam Chopra v case (supra) it was held as follows: "it is now well settled that if the services of an employee are terminated in violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, the order of termination is rendered ab initio void and the employee would be entitled to continuity of service along with his backwages, see Gammon India ltd v. Niranjan Dass, (1984) 1 SCC 509 . ( 15 ) IN E. I. D. Parry (India) s case (supra) it was held as under:". . . . IT is not a term of the settlement that the provisions of the Act need not be complied with if the employer resorts to retrenchment of the employees. Therefore compliance with section 25-N (lxb) of the Act cannot be said to have been dispensed with under the settlement. Compliance of that condition is necessary both under the settlement as well under Section 25-N (l) (b) of the Act. Admittedly this condition has not been complied with. Therefore, having regard to the provisions of sub-section (7), the purported retrenchment of respondents 2 to 4 in violation of Section 25-N (l) (b) has to be held illegal from the date notices of retrenchment were given to them and they shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in fore as if no notice had been given to them. " ( 16 ) IN Shambhu Nath Gael s case (supra) it was held as follows:"the employees are to plead and prove that the workman had been gainfully employed during the intervening period. The workman is not expected to plead or prove the negative. The blame for not framing an issue on the question whether or not the workman was gainfully employed in the intervening period cannot be laid on the Tribunal. " ( 17 ) ON the other hand, learned government pleader appearing for the respondents contended that in the absence of any pleadings to that effect, this Court cannot take the cognizance of the facts and circumstances and this Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction cannot grant the benefits which were not granted by the labour Court. In support of his contentions he relied on decisions reported in U. P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan, air 1980 SC 840 , wherein it was held as under:"further contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that even if the dismissal of the respondent was wrongful, the High court could only quash the same, but it could not in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution give the further direction that the employee should be reinstated in service with full back wages. It is maintained that in giving this further direction, the High court had overleaped the bounds of its jurisdiction. It is maintained that in giving this further direction, the High court had overleaped the bounds of its jurisdiction. There appears to be force in this contention. It must be remembered that in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in a supervisory capacity and not as an appellate Tribunal. It does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed to base its conclusion, it simply demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. In other words, the offending order or the impugned illegal proceeding is quashed and put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of the writ petitioner. Thus, in matters of employment, while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution, over the orders and quasi- judicial proceedings of an administrative authority - not being a proceeding under the industrial/labour law before an Industrial/ labour Law before an Industrial/labour tribunal-culminating in dismissal of the employee, the High Court should ordinarily, in the event of the dismissal being found illegal, simply quash the same and should not further give a positive direction for payment to the employee full back wages (although as a consequence of the annulment of the dismissal, the position as it obtained immediately before the dismissal is restored), such peculiar powers can properly be exercised in a case where the impugned adjudication or award has been given by an industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. The inslant case is not one under Industrial/labour law. The respondent-employee never raised any industrial dispute, nor invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the industrial Tribunal. He directly moved the high Court for the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution for challenging the order of dismissal primarily on the ground that it was violative of the principles of natural justice which required that his public employment should not be terminated without giving him a due opportunity to defend himself and to rebut the charges against him. Furthermore, whether a workman or employee of a statutory authority should be reinstated in public employment with or without full back wages, is a question of fact depending on evidence to be produced before the tribunal. Furthermore, whether a workman or employee of a statutory authority should be reinstated in public employment with or without full back wages, is a question of fact depending on evidence to be produced before the tribunal. If after the termination of his employment the workman/employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, that is one of the important factors to be considered in determining whether or not the reinstatement should be with full back wages and with continuity of employment. For these two fold reasons, we are of the opinion that the high Court was in error in directing payment to the employee full back wages. For the foregoing reasons while upholding the judgment of the High Court with regard to the quashing of the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of its being invalid, we delete the direction for payment to the respondent full back wages. Excepting this modification, the appeal is dismissed. " ( 18 ) A Division Bench of this Court in apsrtc v. Yellaiah, 1997 (2) ALD 664 (DB), considering judgment reported in b. Bikshapathy v. Depot Manager, apsrtc, 1974 (2) APILJ329, has held as under:"the above view of the Court in bikshapathy s case is not in conflict with the view taken by the Court in the cases of Arya kanya Vidyala High School Society (W. A. No. f 185 of 1996) and Kum. Gunavati (W. A. No. 1194 of 1996 ). The principle, it appears, is unexceptionable that the Court shall be slow in granting back wages and unless facls are sufficiently clear to show that the concerned employee was not gainfully employed elsewhere after his removal from service and there are no other reasons to deny the back wages to him, the Court shall exercise the refrain of self imposed limitation upon its jurisdiction to grant back wages on inadequate informations. "it was further held by the Division Bench of this Court, considering various decisions of this Court and also of the Apex Court including the decision reported in Vijay narayan s case (supra), as under:"in the inslant case, the Tribunal, on the evidence before it, taken the view that back wages should not be granted. "it was further held by the Division Bench of this Court, considering various decisions of this Court and also of the Apex Court including the decision reported in Vijay narayan s case (supra), as under:"in the inslant case, the Tribunal, on the evidence before it, taken the view that back wages should not be granted. There is nothing shown in the judgment of the learned single judge which has been over-looked by the labour Court/tribunal and thus there is nothing to justify the direction, except a general observation in the impugned order, that since reinstatement has been ordered all consequential benefits should be granted, which shall include the back wages. We have, by now, a plethora of decisions which decided one way or the other on the peculiar facls of the cases whether back wages should be granted or not. A learned single Judge of this Court in M premanandum v. Regional Manger. SBI 1996 (2) ALD 360 has taken into consideration several judgments on the question of the Court ordering for payment of back wages. What is noticeable, however, in the said case is that when once Ihe order of termination is set aside as ab initio void, it should be followed by a declaration that the concerned employee continued in sendee and would be entitled to all consequential benefits if, however, it is held that it is void because some facets of natural justice or procedure are not followed, the Court in such cases would consider whether to order back wages depending upon the facts of the case. For the reasons a fore-mentioned, we are inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment to the extent of the direction of payment of back wages and set aside the same. . . " ( 19 ) FOLLOWING the judgment of the supreme Court in Vijay Narayan s case (supra) and also the Division Bench of this Court in. V. Yellaiah s case (supra), i am not inclined to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner exercising the supervisory jurisdiction. The writ petition is meritless and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.