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2002 DIGILAW 291 (CAL)

Om Credit (P) Limited v. State of West Bengal

2002-04-30

PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE

body2002
Judgment P.C. Ghose, J. This application has been filed inter alia for declaration that the orders all dated 21st December, 2000 passed by the Hearing Officer-VI fixing the valuation for the periods 4/1990-91, 2/1995-96, 4/1996-97 and 4/2000-01 are void and illegal and further a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to hear out the representation dated 19th January, 2001 and 5th February, 2001 filed by the petitioners and to pass fresh orders in accordance with law and further injunction restraining the respondents and each one of them from taking any action pursuant to and in terms of the order passed by the Hearing Officer-VI fixing the valuation for the periods from 4/1990-91, 2/1995-96, 4/1996-97 and 4/2000-01 till the disposal of the writ application. 2. Directions were given in the matter for filing of the affidavits, which have been filed by the respondents. 3. During the pendency of the said writ application the petitioner filed an application [being am Credit (P) Ltd. vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation] before this Hon'ble Court. In the said application the petitioner has prayed for an order of injunction restraining the respondent from giving any effect or further effect to the notice bearing Nos. DIS/TW/2 and TW/505/2001-2002 both dated 19th February, 2002 and further order of injunction restraining the respondents from sealing off the tube well at the premises No. 32, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the said premises') and a further order of injunction restraining the respondent No.1 from demanding the alleged consolidated rate to the tune of Rs.2,19,45,364/-. Affidavits were also exchanged in that application and directions were given that the main writ application to be heard along with the said application. Hence by consent of the parties, main writ application and that application have also heard together. 4. The petitioner No.1 is the owner of the said premises. The petitioners after demolition of the existing structure developed the said premises in phased manner on the basis of the plan sanctioned by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the CMC). The petitioner duly received the hearing notice for the proposed re-valuation in respect of the said premises in question for the period of 2nd quarter, 1986-87 and general revision from 4th quarter, 1990-91. 5. The petitioner duly received the hearing notice for the proposed re-valuation in respect of the said premises in question for the period of 2nd quarter, 1986-87 and general revision from 4th quarter, 1990-91. 5. The petitioners filed objection before the Hearing Officer by their letter dated 9th August, 1996 and the hearing took place on 9th August, 1996 before the Hearing Officer-VI. From time to time the matter was adjourned. At the time of such adjournment on 5th March, 1997 it was intimated to the petitioner that further date will be communicated afterwards/later on. Thereafter, the said notices of hearing all dated 6th April, 2000 were received by the petitioner for the periods from 4/1990-91, 2/1995-96 and from 4/1996-97 and the valuation proposed was for Rs.3,85,020/-, Rs.68,70,810/- and Rs.70,76,010/- respectively. The hearing was fixed on 20th April, 2000. From time to time, the matter was adjourned and ultimately hearing took place on 21st December, 2000. 6. According to the petitioner, the Deputy Municipal Commissioner (REVHQ), CMC, in February, 2000 cancelled the valuation proposed in the notice issued by the CMC earlier for the self-same period for which hearing took place in May and August, 1996 before the then Hearing Officer-VI. According to the petitioner the said order of cancellation of the proposed valuation was not furnished to the petitioner by the CMC for the respondent authorities produced the basis of change in proposed valuation. As a result whereof the petitioner could not place their objection before the said Hearing Officer-VI properly. The Hearing Officer-VI finalised the valuation without giving a hearing to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, legal opinion was sought by the earlier Hearing Officer-VI from the Law Department in respect of the period what would be the valuation when the old building partly demolished and the said fact was not placed before the Hearing Officer-VI inspite thereof the Hearing Officer-VI passed the said order dated 21st December, 2000. In these circumstances, representations were filed before the authorities on 19th January, 2001 and 5th February, 2001 by the petitioner. On 21st December, 2000 the Hearing Officer handed over the computerised notice of demand and rate cards to the representatives of the petitioner. 7. Mr. In these circumstances, representations were filed before the authorities on 19th January, 2001 and 5th February, 2001 by the petitioner. On 21st December, 2000 the Hearing Officer handed over the computerised notice of demand and rate cards to the representatives of the petitioner. 7. Mr. Anindya Mitra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the hearing was adjourned on the ground that under section 180(2)(V) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) sought an opinion from the Legal Department of the CMC. Without ascertaining the legal opinion of the CMC, the Hearing Officer-VI passed an order on 21st December, 2000. According to him, the case involved intermediate assessment and also general re-valuation under sections 179 and 180 of the said Act. All the notices issued on 6th April, 2000 and are stated to be under sections 184(3) and 184(4). He further contended that the requirement of law under the said sections 184(3) & (4) has not been complied with. Therefore, the same notice is bad and illegal. Hearing of objection, according to him, is under section 188 of the said Act. 8. He further contended that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, 1987 provides that a copy of the order of determination of objection shall be given or sent by hand or by registered post in the person filing an objection. Section 188(3) expressly provides for supply of a copy of the order within 30 days. According to him, until the said order is supplied no effect can be given in respect thereof. Without serving the order on the petitioner, issue of the rate cards and rate bills demanding the amount on the basis of the order of assessment is without authority of law. He submitted that the order cannot be given effect to until it is communicated to the petitioner and he relied upon the judgments reported in AIR 1977 SC 626 (State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Balbir Singh Etc. Etc.), AIR 1978 SC 1109 (B.J. Shelat vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.), 73 CWN 340 (Bibhuti Bhusan Bag and Anr. vs. I.J. Rao and Ors.) and AIR 1970 SC 214 (State of Punjab vs. Khemi Ram). Therefore, no demand can be raised by the CMC. 9. vs. Balbir Singh Etc. Etc.), AIR 1978 SC 1109 (B.J. Shelat vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.), 73 CWN 340 (Bibhuti Bhusan Bag and Anr. vs. I.J. Rao and Ors.) and AIR 1970 SC 214 (State of Punjab vs. Khemi Ram). Therefore, no demand can be raised by the CMC. 9. He further contended that if any order is passed without any reason the same has to be set aside and he relied upon a judgment reported in AIR 1995 Cal. 26 (Surendra Enterprises P. Ltd. vs. C.M.C. & Ors.). He further contended that alternative remedy is not at all available to the petitioner because the order of the Hearing Officer-VI has not yet been supplied. Appeal can be filed only against the order of the Hearing Officer. Appeal has to be accompanied with a copy of the order of the Hearing Officer and he drew my attention to section 189(5) and Rule 10(3) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules and according to him, therefore, the petitioner cannot file any appeal. 10. He further contended that the assessment in this case for a continuous period of 11 years. The total amount claimed is more than Rs.1.43 crores. He further contended that when alternative remedy is much onerous, the writ Court should exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner. In support of such contention he relied upon the judgment reported in 2001 (9) SCC 275 (J.M. Baxi & Co., Gujarat vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi), AIR 1954 SC 403 (Himmatlal Harilal Mehta vs. State of Madhya Pradesh) and AIR 1964 SC 1419 (Thansingh Nathmal & Ors. vs. The Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and Ors.). 11. Mr. Mitra also contended that the notice was issued to the petitioner on 19th February, 2002 to show cause why legal action under sections 248 and 610 of the said Act will not be applicable to the petitioners. Thereafter, on 19th February, 2002 the CMC issued a notice intimating the petitioner that if the petitioner failed to pay arrear Municipal Tax within three days from the date of the letter, deep tube well of the said premises is liable to be sealed off under section 269 read with sections 248 and 275(1) (aa) and on 25th February, 2002 the CMC's Officers sealed off the deep tube well and took off the valve. According to Mr. According to Mr. Mitra, the same steps were taken only to frustrate legal proceedings which is pending before this Hon'ble Court. According to the petitioner, the CMC has no power under the said Act or Rules to seal off deep tube well and even if deep tube well has been sank without any prior permission under section 248 of the said Act. 12. According to him the consequence of violation of section 248 is provided under section 610 of the said Act which is fine. No imprisonment is provided. No power of sealing off deep tube well has been conferred under the said Act. 13. He further contended that the CMC has no power to send his men to seal off tube well. The only action can be taken by the CMC to impose penalty/fine. He further contended that the Municipal water connection may be disconnected, but there is authority to seal off the deep tube well by the CMC. He further contended that the sinking of deep tube well without prior permission and construction of building without prior permission are placed on the same pedestal by the authorities. Tube well has not been equated with building by the Legislature. According to him, this has been done by the authority only to frustrate the Court proceedings. He further contended that in view of the order passed by this Hon'ble Court on 25th February, 2002 a sum of Rs.10 lakhs has been paid by the petitioner and the seal was taken off by the Municipal Authorities. 14. Mr. Das Adhikary, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent (CMC) submitted that admittedly the petitioner is the owner of the said premises. The notices were issued on 6th April, 2000 for the quarters mentioned therein proposing the valuation which also mentioned on the said notices. According to him, the petitioner has followed delatory tactics so that the valuation could not be fixed early. The petitioner did not file any objection against the proposed valuation from April, 2000 to December 21, 2000. On 21st December, 2000 the said valuation cases were heard before the Hearing Officer and the petitioners were represented through their learned advocate and lastly the matter was placed by the learned Advocate and once again time was prayed. The petitioner did not file any objection against the proposed valuation from April, 2000 to December 21, 2000. On 21st December, 2000 the said valuation cases were heard before the Hearing Officer and the petitioners were represented through their learned advocate and lastly the matter was placed by the learned Advocate and once again time was prayed. Such prayer was not allowed by the Hearing Officer and for the 4th quarter of 1990-91 the Hearing Officer retained the old valuation. Pursuant to the direction of the Court the original documents were placed before this Court. He further drew my attention to the said original records therefrom it appears that on 25th April, 2000, 20th May, 2000 the hearing was adjourned. On 27th July, 2000 the petitioner's representative was directed to appear with proper authority, objection and the relevant documents. The petitioners were granted such time as a last chance. On 21st August, 2000 petitioner's authorised representative appeared and stated the staff who deals with the matter was injured and none else can attend the hearing. The prayed for two months but the hearing was fixed on 28th September, 2000: The matter was again adjourned on that date till 30th November, 2000 and hearing was fixed on 31st November, 2000. Again the matter was adjourned on the ground of the petitioner till 14th December, 2000. On 14th December, 2000 learned Advocate again prayed for direction and gave undertaking before the officer in question and time was granted as a last chance till 21st December, 2000. He further drew my attention to the records and submitted that learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners argued about a previous notice and submitted that without getting the order of cancellation of proposed valuation notice, he cannot make out any defence and he also prayed for the basis of the valuation. The proposed valuation was produced again to enable him to prepare a defence and thereafter, the matter was placed by the said learned Advocate for the petitioner and the Hearing Officer after considering the materials placed before him having been pleased to retain the old valuation for 4th quarter 1990-91 passed an order. The proposed valuation was produced again to enable him to prepare a defence and thereafter, the matter was placed by the said learned Advocate for the petitioner and the Hearing Officer after considering the materials placed before him having been pleased to retain the old valuation for 4th quarter 1990-91 passed an order. On the same date the said Hearing Officer after hearing the parties and after considering the rent paid by Global Trust Bank Limited as disclosed in the-Bank's letter including the Service Charges, the Hearing Officer determined the annual valuation on 21st December, 2000 from 2nd quarter of 1995-96. He further drew my attention to the said document to show that the reasoned order was passed by the Hearing Officer for the said quarter and he produced the said order and submitted that the reasoned order has been passed by the said Hearing Officer in respect of the said assessment. Hearing Officer also determined the valuation for the 4th quarter of 1996-97, after hearing the parties the Hearing Officer-VI passed a reasoned order and he further drew my attention to the said order passed by the said Hearing Officer from the said quarter. 15. He further contended that several opportunities were granted to the petitioner and it was the intention of the petitioner only to delay the proceedings if possible. Ultimately, on 21st December the Hearing Officer after giving them hearing passed the said reasoned order. Mr. Das Adhikary further contended that at the time of moving the application the point of maintainability was taken by him and by an order dated 20th February, 2001 the same order of maintainability was kept open by this court as a preliminary point. 16. He further contended that it is settled principle of law that when the special statute contained an efficacious alternative remedy writ court should not exercise the discretionary power to judicial review. When the determination of annual valuation of a property involved disputed question off acts such as location, area, occupancy, construction, amenities, rent realised from tenants, sub-tenants etc. In support of such contention he relied upon the following judgments:- AIR 1992 SC 2279 (Shyam Kishore & Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr.). AIR 1985 SC 330 (Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandannagar, W.B. vs. Dunlop India Limited & Ors.). AIR 1983 SC 603 (Titagar Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. In support of such contention he relied upon the following judgments:- AIR 1992 SC 2279 (Shyam Kishore & Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr.). AIR 1985 SC 330 (Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandannagar, W.B. vs. Dunlop India Limited & Ors.). AIR 1983 SC 603 (Titagar Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. vs. State of Orissa & Anr.) AIR 1995 SC 333 (State of Goa & Ors. vs. M/s. A.H. Jaffar & Sons.) AIR 1997 Del. 325 (M/s. Shoes East Ltd. vs. Allahabad Bank) 1998(1) CHN 492 (Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors. vs. Bela Bestos India Pvt. Limited). 17. He further submitted that the same principle will be applicable in the instant case and further 'Assessment Tribunal' has its power to take evidence and to make an enquiry into the matter under the Taxation Rules, 1987 framed under the said Act. He further relied upon the following judgments reported in 1996(10) SCC 702 (State of U.P. & Anr. vs. T.P. Srivastava) and 1997 Lab. IC 3116 (Iftikhar Ahmed Siddiqui vs. U.P. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow & Ors.) and contended that if a delinquent avoiding to file reply by deploying deletroy tactics, he thereby foregoes his right to submit reply. In this case, the petitioner did not file any objection nor laid any evidence in respect of the proposed valuation. He also relied upon the judgment reported in 1998 (1) CHN 492 [Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Bela Bestos (I) Pvt. Ltd.]. 18. He further contended that the instant writ application involved disputed question of facts which cannot be gone into in this jurisdiction and relied upon a judgment reported in AIR 1973 Cal. 488 (Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Abdul Halim Gajnabi Molla & Ors.). Accordingly to Mr. Das Adhikary, the valuation for each quarter is separate and independent one which has already been decided by our court in a judgment reported in 81 CWN 437 (Puspalata Mondal vs. Corporation of Calcutta). We also relied upon another judgment reported in 1998 (6) SCC 381 (Govt. Servant Co-operative House Bldg. Society Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.) and submitted that the actual rent is a good guide to decide the annual valuation which has already been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We also relied upon another judgment reported in 1998 (6) SCC 381 (Govt. Servant Co-operative House Bldg. Society Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.) and submitted that the actual rent is a good guide to decide the annual valuation which has already been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He further contended that the total outstanding lying unpaid till 25th February, 2002 is Rs.2,21,93,037/- and deposit again against such demand lying with the Municipal Authorities is Rs.11,82,488/- in a suspense account. Accordingly, he submitted that the main writ application should be dismissed. 19. So far the application filed by the petitioner praying for injunction against the notices issued by the CMC both dated 19th February, 2000 Mr. Das Adhikary submitted that the said deep tube well was not sunk with prior permission of the CMC, which is contrary to the provision of section 248, of the said Act. Show cause notice was issued by the authorities. No reply was received and there is no violation of the provisions of section 269 which gives right to the authorities to seal off the tube well when there is sufficient provision for supplying filtered water in the Municipal Area and therefore, the sealing off the tube well was not illegal on the part of the said authority. He further drew my attention to section 275(1)(aa) of the said Act and submitted that there is no illegality in respect of the action of the respondents under the said Act. He further contended that the bills were duly served upon the petitioners and subsequent demands have never been paid by the petitioners till date. Under these circumstances, the said application should be dismissed. He further drew my attention to a document dated 6th February, 2001 and submitted that the petitioner was duly replied by a letter dated 6th February, 2001 which has suppressed from this Court. 20. After considering the facts and circumstances of this case and after analysing the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the parties, it appears that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government Servant Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. and Ors. 20. After considering the facts and circumstances of this case and after analysing the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the parties, it appears that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government Servant Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1998) 6 SCC 381 , held that the annual rent actually received by the landlord, in the absence of any special circumstances, would be a good guide to decide the rent which the landlord might reasonably expect to receive from a hypothetical tenant. Since the premises in the present case are not controlled by any rent control legislation, the annual rent received by the landlord is what a willing lessee, uninfluenced by other circumstances, would pay to a willing lessee uninfluenced by other circumstances, would pay to a willing lessor. Hence, actual annual rent, in these circumstances, can be taken as the annual rateable value of the property for the assessment of the property tax. The Municipal Corporation is, therefore, entitled to receive the rateable value of the properties which have been freed from rent control on the basis of annual rent actually received unless the owner satisfies the Municipal Corporation the there are other considerations which have affected the quantum of rent. 21. In Puspalata Mondal and Anr. vs. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in 81 CWN 437, this Hon'ble Court held that where a premises is actually let out and the actual rent at which premises can be reasonably expected to be let the basis of assessment of annual value under section 168(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951. In such a case, the actual rent which is realised must be basis of assessment. 22. In such a case, the actual rent which is realised must be basis of assessment. 22. In J.M. Baxi & Co., Gujarat vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi and Anr., reported in (2001) 9 SCC 275 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that normally, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 when adequate alternative remedy is available, but in the special facts of that case when the demand was raised and the same had been challenged on the ground that it was barred by time and where the demand is nearly of 46 lakhs of rupees which have to be deposited before any appeal can be filed, in that situation the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction and determined the questions which were raised in the writ petition on merits. 23. In Shyam Kishore & Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. reported in AIR 1992 SC 2279 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "......Departmental instructions may not always be followed and the report to Articles 226 and 227 should not discourage when there is an alternative remedy, more satisfactory solution is available on the terms of the statute itself. The construction of the section approved by u& above vests with the appeal otherwise than by way of final disposal even if the disputed tax is not paid. It enables the authority to exercise a judicial discretion to allow the payment of the disputed tax even after the appeal is filed but, no doubt, before the appeal is taken up for actual hearing. The interpretation will greatly ameliorate the genuine grievances of, and hardships faced by, the asses sees may be not able to acquire an absolute stay of the recovery of the tax until the dispute is reserved, he will certainly be able to get breathing time to pay the same where his case deserves it...." 24. In Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors. vs. Bela Bestos India Pvt. Limited., reported in 1998(1) CHN 492 , the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has specifically held that the writ petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy, and the petitioners should avail the statutory alternative remedy by preferring an appeal before the Municipal Assessment Tribunal as contemplated under sub-section (6) of section 189 of the CMC Act. 25. 25. In Iftikhar Ahmed Siddiqui vs. U.P. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow & Ors., reported in 1997 Lab. I.C. 3116, where the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court came to the conclusion that the writ jurisdiction is not meant for a party who is not diligent at the first available opportunity to protect its interest. Petitioners cannot be permitted to use the writ jurisdiction to remedy his own faults. 26. In the instant case the petitioner failed to substantiate their case before the authorities since the documents and/or affidavits were not placed at the time of the hearing before the Hearing Officer and therefore, cannot come in my opinion before the writ court and pray for an order to reopen the said issue at this stage. 27. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandannagar, W.B. vs. Dunlop India Limited & Ors., reported in AIR 1985 SC 330 , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instances where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution and further Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided for by the statute. 28. In the instant case the very basis of such situation is not present to grant any order in this writ jurisdiction. 29. In Jaginder Singh & Ors. vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors., reported in 1997 (2) CHN 403 , where His Lordship after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked against the order of the Hearing Officer for the simple reason that the Act is a special statute and unless provision for appeal under section 189 of the Act against such order of the Hearing Officer. The power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power in nature and accordingly, the same shall not be invoked in the facts and circumstances of this case. 30. The power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power in nature and accordingly, the same shall not be invoked in the facts and circumstances of this case. 30. In my opinion, I am of the view that the petitioner has come before this court avoiding the appeal only to by-pass the said provision of law for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of section 189(6) since under the said provision no appeal shall lie unless the rate is paid on the basis of the valuation determined under section 188 of the said Act. Therefore, the remedy, in my opinion, is only by way of an appeal and not invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 31. In Naresh Nath Mookherjee vs. C.M.C., reported in 2001(1) CHN 705 , the court also decided the question that whether the court can resile from the condition laid down in section 189(6) of the said Act on certain situation and the Court came to the conclusion that the expression used in sub-section (6) is clear and unambiguous and further held that the deposit to maintain an appeal is mandatory and such deposit is to be continued till the appeal is decided. Therefore, in my opinion there appears to be no scope for taking a different view of the statutory provisions contained therein. 32. After analysing the judgments hereinbefore and further perusing the records and the orders passed by the said Hearing Officer-VI, in my opinion, the said Hearing Officer after giving a hearing to the petitioner's representative and after taking into consideration of the submissions made on their behalf, passed a reasoned order. It further appears from the said order dated 21st December, 2000 that a chance was given to the petitioner to produce the document and for evidence in respect of the commencement of demolition and the actual time taken for the same. But even on that day the petitioner failed to produce any evidence in support of their objection and accordingly such prayer was rejected by the Hearing Officer. It further appears from the records that on several occasions time was granted by the Hearing Officer-VI to the petitioners to file their case properly. But even on that day the petitioner failed to produce any evidence in support of their objection and accordingly such prayer was rejected by the Hearing Officer. It further appears from the records that on several occasions time was granted by the Hearing Officer-VI to the petitioners to file their case properly. Without availing such chance, in my opinion, the petitioners have only adopted deletory tactics to delay the matter so that finally the assessment cannot be made in respect of the said property for the said quarters by the C.M.C. It further appears that on the basis of the records and the documents which were also produced by the Departments before the Hearing Officer-VI, the Hearing Officer came to the conclusion and retained such valuation. Therefore, in my opinion, the said orders which were passed by the said Hearing Officer-VI, are all with reasons and cannot be set aside in this writ jurisdiction. I am also of the same view that if there is any disputed question of facts a writ court shall not interfere in the matter. In this case the petitioners also duly signed the said order-sheet as it is evident from the records and which is also admitted by the petitioners in their petition and they duly received the demand notice and the valuation (which is also not denied) and therefore, at this stage the ground which tried to be made out by the petitioner that the order was not supplied to them for preferring an appeal cannot be accepted at all by me. The petitioner did not applied for the Certified Copy of the said order and could not prefer an appeal before the Tribunal. The petitioner did not take any steps whatsoever in respect thereof and also did not pay the amount. In my opinion, accordingly the respondent authorities has power to take steps until the said order has not been set aside by a competent court of law and they have taken steps in the matter accordingly which cannot be questioned at all at this stage by this court. In my opinion, on these facts this application cannot be entertained and is hereby dismissed. However, if the petitioners file any appeal before the Tribunal, these observations will not stand in the way to decide the appeal by this Tribunal. 33. In my opinion, on these facts this application cannot be entertained and is hereby dismissed. However, if the petitioners file any appeal before the Tribunal, these observations will not stand in the way to decide the appeal by this Tribunal. 33. So far the petition which has been filed in the main writ application, in my opinion, after considering the facts the respondent authorities has acted reasonably and after giving them a show cause notice and thereafter duly took steps in accordance with the provisions of law and in my opinion such action on the part of the respondent authorities cannot be said to be an unreasonable action and therefore, the action taken by the said respondent authorities in my opinion is within the purview of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and accordingly, the said application is also dismissed and the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to take steps in accordance with law. Writ application dismissed.