Judgment ARUN MADAN, J. ( 1 ) THE case of the petitioner, briefly, stated, is that consequent upon a reference made by the state Government to the Labour Court, it gave its Award dated September 30, 2000 in favour of respondent No. 1 workman, by which it was directed that the respondent be reinstated in service of the Forest Department of the State of Rajasthan with continuity in service and also with full back wages. ( 2 ) REFERENCE was made by the State government to the Labour Court in the following terms:"whether the Forest Extension Officer, social Forestry, Malpura, District Tonk was justified in terminating the services of workman Shravan Kumar son of Shri Ram lai Sharma, cattle guard on November 1, 1998 and if not then what relief can be given to the workman?" ( 3 ) THE workman submitted a claim statement indicating that he was given assignment by the non-petitioners with effect from May 1, 1986 as a daily wage worker and continued to work till his date of removal from service i. e. on January 1, 1998. It was also stated that prior to his termination, the workman had completed more than 240 days of service and hence, there has been violation of the provisions of Section 25-F, G and H of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the act ). It was also prayed that the workman was entitled for reinstatement with continuity of service and also payment of back wages. ( 4 ) THE petitioner filed a reply to the claim statement contending inter alia that the claim made by the workman was without any basis, contained disputed questions of fact, since the workman had not completed 240 days of requisite service and was on temporary assignment and since he performed the work on the scheme sponsored by the Central government and the State Government he was not entitled to claim continuity in service or for any other benefits. It was also stated that the management had not terminated his services but he was given a temporary assignment in the rural Employment Programme and also under national Social Forestry Programme. It was also stated that there has been no violation of the provisions of Section 25-F, G and H of the act and that he was not entitled to receive any benefit as desired. It was also stated that there has been no violation of the provisions of Section 25-F, G and H of the act and that he was not entitled to receive any benefit as desired. The respondent had also taken the stand before the Labour Court to the effect that one Shri Vishnu Chand Sharma, a. C. F. , Tonk had submitted wherein he had deposed on oath that the workman had worked only for 116 days in the year 1986, for 164 days in the year 1987 and for 222 days in the year 1988 and for 64 days in the year 1989. The labour Court gave the Award in favour of the workman directing his reinstatement with continuity of service and also directed payment of 50% of back wages. ( 5 ) IT is under the aforesaid circumstances that the Award dated September 30, 2001 has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground inter alia that the assignment given to the workman was purely temporary and was under the Scheme sponsored by the Central and the state Governments, which does not entitle the workman to invoke the jurisdiction of the labour Court under Section 25-F of the Act. In this regard, it has been contended that if the provisions of the Act are given liberal interpretation by the Courts or the Tribunals then the very purpose of giving appointment under the Schemes would stand frustrated and the concerned authorities/employers would hesitate in taking up any scheme for implementation as it would result into liability of the employer of maintaining/continuing of temporary workman even in those cases where the workman has not completed 240 days in service. ( 6 ) WITH regard to the petitioners contention of having not completed 240 days in a year, it has been contended by the petitioners counsel that he is not entitled to be given any benefit of the provisions of the Act since the workman had left the work of his own accord for which the concerned authorities cannot be made responsible for any acts of commission/omission of the workman. Moreover, the workman had not proved that he had continuously worked for more than 240 days nor there was any such proof on record to disbelieve the assertions of the petitioner, hence the award deserves to be quashed and set aside. Moreover, the workman had not proved that he had continuously worked for more than 240 days nor there was any such proof on record to disbelieve the assertions of the petitioner, hence the award deserves to be quashed and set aside. ( 7 ) IN reply to the show cause notice, a detailed reply has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 in which it has been contended inter alia that the petitioner has not come with clean hands as is apparent from document Annexure-4, a perusal of which shows that the workman had discharged his duties for more than 240 days in the preceding one year from the date of his termination as per section 25-B of the Act, as per which the period was to be counted from November, 1987 to october 1988. ( 8 ) DURING the course of hearing, it has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the reason for termination was that he was employed for the particular financial year which had ended notwithstanding the respondent having continuously worked for the period May 1, 1986 to the date of his termination i. e. November 1, 1988. Hence further extension was not possible. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent further contended that the State Government is required to act as a model employer and is expected to act fairly and reasonably despite admitted fact of violation of the provisions of sections 25-F and 25-H of the Act read with rules 77 and 78 of the Rules of 1947, the writ petition has been filed on surmises and conjectures. ( 10 ) IT has further been contended by the workman that even as per the cross examination of the witnesses produced in evidence before the Labour Court, they have admitted that the respondent had completed 240 days of service and it was not disputed that the work was not available with them and his juniors have been recruited in place of workman in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F, G and H of the act. In my view the Labour Court has dealt with the issues in detail and had examined all the documentary evidence on record and has passed a detailed reasoned and speaking order and hence its well reasoned findings are not open to challenge. In my view the Labour Court has dealt with the issues in detail and had examined all the documentary evidence on record and has passed a detailed reasoned and speaking order and hence its well reasoned findings are not open to challenge. ( 11 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and also examined their rival contentions and perused the material available on the record. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has not been able to controvert the contention of the respondent on this count that the alternative schemes are not available with them and rather in the cross examination of the witnesses, it has been admitted that work was available with the government-respondent and persons junior to the respondent-workman, were recruited, I need not go into all the details as that would entail further appreciation of evidence, which is not the province of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution. ( 13 ) FROM the evidence on record, it is borne out that the respondent had continuously worked for more than 240 days i. e. with effect from November 1, 1987 to November 1, 1988 = 240 days. This fact is borne out from para 7 of the affidavit of the petitioner, which contains admission of an authorised official of the petitioner-department. As a result of the above discussion, the following facts emerged for consideration. (i) As regards the availability of work, the petitioner-department has not been able to successfully controvert/deny the above position. (ii) persons junior to the respondent workman have been retained in service. (iii) the department has also expressed its readiness and willingness to take the workman back on duty. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contentions: (1) Rajasthan Rajya Pathya Pustakmandal jaipur v. Industrial Tribunal and Others 1989 (1) RLR 644, and (2) State of Gujarat and Others v. RN. Paraar,2001-I-LLJ-1118 (SC ). ( 14 ) IN RRPMs case (supra), the clinching question which arose for consideration before the learned Division Bench of this Court was, whether consequent upon the withdrawal of the termination order of the petitioners service, which was made earlier to the passing of the award passed in favour of the workman could cease to be operative? ( 15 ) THE Division Bench answered the reference against the employer. ( 15 ) THE Division Bench answered the reference against the employer. The Division bench further observed that merely because the workman had discharged his duties for a particular period in compliance of a particular order, would not create any estoppel against him as he was not estopped from challenging the termination of his services. It was further observed that it was not at all necessary for the workman to challenge the validity of the fresh appointment order by which he was appointed again for a fixed period for the reason that it does not create any estoppel against him for challenging termination of his services. ( 16 ) IN State of Gujarat and Ors. case (supra)the question, which arose for consideration before the Apex Court was whether a particular establishment or part of it wherein an appointment has been made is an industry or not, it would be for the person concerned who claims the same to be an industry, to give positive facts for coming to the conclusion that it constitutes "an industry". Ordinarily, a department of the Government cannot be held to be an industry and rather it is a part of the sovereign function. ( 17 ) IT was further observed that there has not been an iota of assertion to the effect that though, no doubt, it has been contended that the order of dismissal is vitiated for non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act. In the absence of any assertion by the petitioner in the writ petition indicating the nature of duty discharged by the petitioner as well as the job of the establishment where he had been recruited, the High Court wholly erred in law in applying the principles enunciated in the judgment of this Court in Jagannath Maruti kondhare, AIR 1996 SC 2898 : 1996 (2) SCC 293 : 1996-I-LLJ-U23 to hold that the Forest department could be held to be "an industry". ( 18 ) THE ratio of the above decisions, in my considered opinion is not attracted to this case since there has not been an iota of assertion on behalf of the respondents that the nature of duties discharged by respondent-workman as well as the job of the establishment where he was recruited is not an industry and no stand has been taken at this stage that the authorised department is not an industry and therefore, the provisions of industrial Disputes Act, are not attracted to the instant case. From the perusal of the evidence recorded by the Labour Court, no such assertion has been made by the department in this regard and hence in my view in absence of any such assertion either in the writ petition indicating the nature of duties discharged by the respondentworkman or the job of the establishment, where he had been recruited, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner department is not an industry and therefore, provisions of the Act are not applicable to the respondent-workman. Moreover, in State of Gujarat case (supra), the judgment in the matter was pronounced by the Apex Court on january 31, 2001, whereas Award passed by the labour Court is of September 30, 2000, i. e. prior to the pronouncement of the Judgment, hence, it cannot have retrospective application to the matters decided earlier. ( 19 ) CONTRARILY, Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the ratio of following decisions: rajasthan and Ors. , 1995 (3) WLC (Raj) 719, (3) Chhiddi Singh v. Judge, Labour Court, jaipur and Another, 1993 (3) NLC (Raj) 54; (4) Gulab Powerloom Factory v. Industrial tribunal 1996-IH-LLJ (Suppl)-1166 (Raj), (5) RSRTC v. Gopal Singh and Another, 1999-III-LLJ (Suppl)-and10 (Raj-FB); (6)ashok Kumar and Ors. v. Sitaram, 2001 (2 uj (SC) 1069, (7) Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan, AIR 1991 SC 471 : 1991 (1) SCC 588 : 1991-I-LLJ-29. ( 20 ) I have examined the ratio of decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent and in my view they are not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the instant case and i do not find any justification for taking a contrary view in this regard. ( 21 ) IN view of what I have discussed herein above, I do not find justifiable reason to interfere with the well reasoned findings recorded by the Labour Court. ( 21 ) IN view of what I have discussed herein above, I do not find justifiable reason to interfere with the well reasoned findings recorded by the Labour Court. No illegality can be attributed to the Labour Court in its impugned award dated September 30, 2000. ( 22 ) THE findings of the Labour Court in the Award dated September 30, 2000 are upheld. The respondent-workman will be entitled to claim only 50% of back wages from the date of his termination i. e. January 1, 1988 till reinstatement excluding the period April 1, 1989 to June 15, 1989 for which the respondent-workman had not furnished any evidence to the Labour Court regarding his having not been gainfully employed elsewhere as so held by the Labour Court in its Award. The State Government is directed to comply with the above directions within a period of (ninety) days from today. ( 23 ) AS a result of the above discussion, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. .