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2002 DIGILAW 3 (KER)

Chappati Narayanan v. V. V. Koran

2002-01-03

K.S.RADHAKRISHNAN, M.RAMACHANDRAN

body2002
Judgment :- Radhakrishnan, J This appeal is of the year 1992, Notice was issued on 13.7.1992. Even after the period of ten years process is not complete. Notice to first respondent returned stating expired. This was notified as early as on 1.3. 2000. No steps have been taken by the appellant to implead the legal representatives of the first respondent. Petitions for impleadement, setting aside abatement and to condone the delay were filed on 27.9. 2001. Notice was issued by this court. Process is not complete on those petitions as well. Notice to additional third respondent returned unserved stating 'expired'. Later C.M.P. No 441 of 2002 was filed by the appellant on 17.1.2002 to record legal representatives of additional third respondent. Fact remains that even after ten years appeal is not made ripe for hearing. 2. When the matter cam up for hearing on defect, we examined the merits of the case. 3. This appeal was preferred against the order in I.A. No. 2080 of 1991 in an un-numbered Claim Petition on the file of the M.A.C. Tribunal, Thalassery. I.A. No 2080 of 1991 was preferred before the Tribunal to condone the delay of 9 years and one month in filing the petition for compensation. When the application came up for hearing on 29.7.1991 the Tribunal passed the following order: "The accident happened on 15.12. 1981 and the claim petition ought to have been filed on 15.6.1982. But the same was filed on 11.7.1991 only, i.e. after the expiry of 9 years and one month. Hence this petition filed under sec. 16 (3) of the M.V. Act is not maintainable and is dismissed. The claim petition is rejected." The present appeal has been filed against the order passed rejecting the application to condone the delay in filing the petition before the Tribunal. Though process is not complete in the appeal itself, we hard counsel on either side since this is a long pending matter. Contention was raised by the counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the application on the ground of delay. He placed reliance on the decision in Dhannanlal v. D.P. Vijayavargiya (1996 (4) SCC 652) and contended that since Parliament has taken away the period fixed for filing the petition claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition. He placed reliance on the decision in Dhannanlal v. D.P. Vijayavargiya (1996 (4) SCC 652) and contended that since Parliament has taken away the period fixed for filing the petition claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition. Counsel submitted that since application for condonation of delay was pending consideration under the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 1994 came into force the same ought to have been entertained. 5. We will examine the question as to whether decision of the apex court referred to above would be applicable to the facts of the present case. In this case the accident occurred on 15 .12.1981 when Motor Vehicles Act 1939 was in force. Relevant provision which was in force at that time was sub-section (3) of Section 110-A, which reads as follows: (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Provided that the claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Sub-Section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, which reads as follows: "No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. If such application was not made within six months from the date of occurrence of the accident, the Tribunal had no power to entertain the application after the expiry of six months but not less than twelve months. The application was accordingly rejected by the Tribunal by order dated 29.7.1971. Therefore, the Tribunal could not have entertained the application on the basis of the law which was in force. 6. The present appeal was preferred against the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay. Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was later omitted by Section 53 of Act, 54 of 1994 on 14.11.1994. Therefore, the Tribunal could not have entertained the application on the basis of the law which was in force. 6. The present appeal was preferred against the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay. Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was later omitted by Section 53 of Act, 54 of 1994 on 14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending Act is that with effect from 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claim petitions before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. We are of the view the above mentioned amendment could not be made applicable to this case. As far as Dhannalal's case (1996 (4) SCC 652) is concerned , we may indicate that was a case where accident occurred on 4.12.1990 and claim petition was preferred on 7.12.1991 with petition for condonation of delay. The Tribunal by order dated 18.11.1993 condoned the delay in filing the application . Validity of the said order was challenged before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court reversed the order of the Tribunal and the same was taken up before the apex court. The apex court held that since the petition was pending claimant is entitled to get the benefit of the amended provision. 7. A Division Bench of this court has followed Dhannalal's case, supra, in a different context in Balakrishnan v. Union of India (2001 (1) KLT 404), where the court considered the scope of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and held that though the application field beyond the time was dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation, petitioner is entitled to have his application considered by the Tribunal afresh. It was a case where the application was preferred under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 unlike in this case where the application was filed under the 1939 Act. We are of the view the principle laid down in Balakrishnan's case (2001 (1) KLT 404) cannot be applied in this case to hold that application preferred under the 1939 Act on the ground of delay can be condoned at this distance of time. 8. We may indicate as far as this case is concerned, the law in force at the relevant time was 1939 Act and the relevant provision was Section 110(3). 8. We may indicate as far as this case is concerned, the law in force at the relevant time was 1939 Act and the relevant provision was Section 110(3). Going by the provision contained in the above section, claimant should have filed the application within six months from the date of occurrence of the accident. Further six months time was also given to the Tribunal to entertain the application if the claimant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application. For the first time he preferred application only in 1991. Section 166(3) of the new Act was introduced with effect from 1.7.1989 and the application was preferred after the introduction of sub-section (3) of Section 166. Accident occurred during the period when sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of 1939 Act was in force. Therefore, the dictum laid down by the apex court in the decision referred to above would not be applicable to this case. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal lacks merits and it is accordingly dismissed.