J. N. DUBEY v. REGISTRAR, J. N. KRISHI VISHWAVIDYALAYA, JABALPUR
2002-03-14
DIPAK MISRA, U.N.SINGH
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Dipak Misra, J.—Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Clause of the Letters Patent the Appellant has called in question the defensibility of the order dated 8-12-2000 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court whereby he has given the stamp of approval to the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate authority. 2. The facts as have been exposited are that the Appellant was an Associate Professor in Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur (In short 'the Agriculture University') which was one of the five institutions recognised by the Indian Standard Institution (I.S.I.) for the purposes of carrying out tests/analysis. In connection with the said recognition, the University had assigned the work of testing to the Appellant under intimation to the I.S.I. Initially the amount was sent by I.S.I, in the name of the University but without disclosing this fact to the Respondent University, the Appellant communicated to I.S.I, that the cheque be issued in his personal name. Accordingly, the I.S.I, issued the cheque in his name and he without disclosing this fact even in the information required for Income Tax deductions, misappropriated the same. On these allegations, a departmental enquiry was conducted in which Dr. S.P. Singh was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry officer submitted a report returning a finding that the two charges levelled against were proved against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority, however, disagreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and issued a show cause notice to him against the punishment proposed and awarded the penalty as aforesaid. The appeal filed by the Petitioner against the said penalty did not meet with success. 3. Before the learned Single Judge it was contended that if the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, it was imperative on his part to communicate to the charged officer the reasons for disagreement and to permit him an opportunity to show cause against the same. Reliance was placed on the decision rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Sh. Kunj Behari Misra, . It was proponed before the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary authority sent a notice communicating the reasons and proposing penalty and hence, requirement of law had not been complied with. 4.
Reliance was placed on the decision rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Sh. Kunj Behari Misra, . It was proponed before the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary authority sent a notice communicating the reasons and proposing penalty and hence, requirement of law had not been complied with. 4. On behalf of the University it was urged before the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary authority had not agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and had passed a separate order communicating the reasons. 5. Learned Single Judge accepted the submission of the counsel for the University and came to hold that the requirement of issuing notice showing reasons for disagreement had duly been adhered to and complied with by the disciplinary authority and the penalty had been imposed only after considering the reply of the writ Petitioner. It is apposite to mention here that before the learned Single Judge it was proponed that the disciplinary authority Dr. D.K. Sharma himself had conducted the preliminary enquiry into the matter and had later on, disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer appointed by him and, therefore, principles of natural justice had not been followed in stricto sensu. Before the learned Single Judge, it was contended by the Respondent that no preliminary enquiry had ever been conducted and the assumption of the Petitioner was clearly unfounded. Taking note of such a fact, the learned Single Judge repelled the submission pyramided by the counsel for the Petitioner. 6. It is appropriate to state here that an application forming the subject matter of I.A. No. 2977/2001 has been filed for taking certain additional documents on record. There are three documents. The first one is dated 16-2-1984, wherein the Head of the Department Soil Science and Agricultural Chemistry had directed Dr. D.K. Sharma, Director of Extention as he was at the time to conduct an enquiry. The document Annexure-A/2 dated 23-7-1984 relates to the enquiry conducted by said Dr. D.K. Sharma. In absence of opposition the said documents are taken on record. 7. We have heard Miss Roshan Ara, Learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. P.N. Dubey, Learned Counsel for the Respondent. 8.
The document Annexure-A/2 dated 23-7-1984 relates to the enquiry conducted by said Dr. D.K. Sharma. In absence of opposition the said documents are taken on record. 7. We have heard Miss Roshan Ara, Learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. P.N. Dubey, Learned Counsel for the Respondent. 8. It is submitted by Miss Roshan Ara that had the documents been filed before the learned Single Judge there would have been a different opinion but unfortunately the same could not be filed at the relevant time. It is urged by her that the person who has imposed the penalty having disagreed with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, had conducted the preliminary enquiry and, therefore, the concept of bias cannot totally be ostracised. It is also urged by her that the justice should not be done but should also appear to have been done, but in the present case the said doctrine has been given a cruel burial. 9. Mr. P.N. Dubey, Learned Counsel for the Respondent has vehemently canvassed that there is no bar for disciplinary authority to conduct an enquiry and, therefore, no fault can be found with the order passed by him. Meeting the contention with regard to bias the Learned Counsel for the University submitted that mere disagreement with the report of the enquiry officer cannot be the bed rock to establish a bias when nothing else is borne out on record. The Learned Counsel also has feebly raised the contention relating to the doctrine of necessity. 10. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar we have carefully perused the additional documents on record. In document No. 1 dated 16-2-1984, the Head of Department of Soil Science and Agriculture Chemistry had written to the Petitioner as under: Dr. D.K. Sharma, Director of Extension has been asked to conduct an enquiry into the matter of Culture Testing for ISI which has been done by you. You are, therefore, requested to give a detailed account of the cultures tested by you and the fees charged latest by 17th Feb., so that the information can be placed before him. In Anneuxre A-1 which is a communication by Vice Chancellor to the Petitioner, in paragraph 3 it has been expressed as under: During the course of the preliminary enquiry conducted by Dr.
In Anneuxre A-1 which is a communication by Vice Chancellor to the Petitioner, in paragraph 3 it has been expressed as under: During the course of the preliminary enquiry conducted by Dr. D.K. Sharma, Director of Extension Services, it has been observed that 54 samples have been received and tested by you during the period 1978 to March, 1984. You have not submitted correct information in regard to the number of samples received and tested, in spite of the fact that you were clearly asked for the same. 11. The core question that falls for determination is whether the aforesaid fact situation ex rigore juris, shows any kind of bias. The concept of bias has many a facet. It need not be actually proved but there must be something to show that there had been a fact situation which indicates bias. In this context we may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In the aforesaid case their Lordships referred to the decision rendered in the case of Suresh Koshy George Vs. University of Kerala and Others, and held in paragraph 13 as under: The scope of the principles of natural justice as explained by the English Courts was adopted by this Court in a large number of cases. See New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., and Nagendra Nath Bora and Another Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Others, After so holding in paragraph 15 their Lordships expressed the view in the following terms. 15. It is unfortunate that Naqishbund was appointed as one of the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be expected to know his officers thoroughly, their weakness as well as their strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for selection to the All India Service is entitled to great weight. But then under the circumstances it was improper to have included Naqishbund as a member of the selection board. He was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause.
But then under the circumstances it was improper to have included Naqishbund as a member of the selection board. He was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney-General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. It was in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge. Naturally he was also interested in safeguarding his position while preparing the list of selected candidates. 12. In this context we may also refer to the two Judge Bench decision rendered in the case of J. Mohapatra and Co. and Another Vs. State of Orissa and Another, , wherein the Lordships referred to the decision in the case of A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and held in paragraph 11 reads as under: 11. It hardly requires any argument to show that a person who has written a book which is submitted for selection, either by himself or by his publisher, is interested in the matter of selection. Authors get their books published by publishers or may themselves publish them.
It hardly requires any argument to show that a person who has written a book which is submitted for selection, either by himself or by his publisher, is interested in the matter of selection. Authors get their books published by publishers or may themselves publish them. In either cases, they stand to benefit financially. In the first case, by getting royalty from publishers and in the second case, by making profits on the sale of books if the amount realized exceeds the cost of publication, or, if the sales are not to that extent, by reducing the cost incurred in the publication of the book. The Appellants have filed statements showing the financial benefit which accrued to those members of the Assessment Sub-Committee whose books were selected. To give one instance from these statements, in the case of Assessment Sub-Committee who was a Government official and whose books were selected, books of the aggregate value of Rs. 4,000 were purchased in the year 1980, of the aggregate value of Rs. 6,500 in the year 1981, and of the aggregate value of Rs. 72,500 in the year 1982. It was contended in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents that the amount of royalty received by these member-authors was not much. This fact is immaterial. The amount of royalty depends on the agreement between the author and the publisher as also upon the sale price of the book. The fact, however, remains that by the books being selected and purchased for distribution to school and college libraries the sales of those books had gone up and correspondingly the royalty received by the author-members also went up and such author-members thus received financial benefit. It is no answer to say that an author-member is only one of the members of the Assessment Sub-Committee and that the ultimate decision rests with the State Government which may reject any book out of the list of approved books. A similar argument was rejected by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, The State Government would normally be guided by the list approved by the Assessment Sub-Committee.
A similar argument was rejected by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, The State Government would normally be guided by the list approved by the Assessment Sub-Committee. Further, to say that such author-member is only one of the members of the Assessment Sub-Committee is to overlook the fact that the author-member can subtly influence the minds of the other members against selecting books by other authors in preference to his own. It can also be that books by some of the other members may also have been submitted for selection and there can be between them a quid pro quo or, in other words, you see that my book is selected and in return I will do the same for you. In either case, when a book of an author-member comes up for consideration, the other members would feel themselves embarrassed in frankly discussing its merits. Such author-member may also be a person holding a high official position whom the other members may not want to displease. It can be that the other members may not be influenced by the fact that the book which they are considering for approval was written by one of their members. Whether they were so influenced or not is, however, a matter impossible to determine. It is not, therefore, the actual bias in favour of the author-member that is material but the possibility of such bias. All these considerations require that an author-member should not be a member of any such committee or sub-committee. 13. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law there remains no scintilla of doubt that the disciplinary authority has had a role to play. We may not be understood to have stated that a disciplinary authority cannot conduct an enquiry and impose the penalty. What we have stated here is that the disciplinary authority had conducted a preliminary enquiry in a different capacity and thereafter when regular enquiry was held and by that time the person who had conducted the preliminary enquiry and become the disciplinary authority by holding of the office and disagreed with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, in our considered view the concept of bias cannot be totally ruled out. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that the fundamental principle is that law is wedded to justice.
We cannot be oblivious of the fact that the fundamental principle is that law is wedded to justice. In the instant case, if we allow ourselves to say so, justice does not appear to have been done. Hence, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We must repeat at the cost of repetition possibly the learned Single Judge would have taken a different view had these documents been produced before him. As the said documents were not produced he had recorded a finding that no preliminary enquiry was conducted by the authority at any stage. 14. Resultantly, the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and as a necessary corollary the order of punishment imposed on the Petitioner is quashed. However, leave is granted to the University to proceed against the Appellant in accordance with law. It has been informed to us by Mr. Dubey, Learned Counsel that the new Vice-Chancellor has been appointed and he is the disciplinary authority. Hence, we direct, that he shall consider the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer and proceed from that stage in accordance with law. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of order passed today. 15. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed