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2002 DIGILAW 309 (ORI)

A. Laxmi Dora v. Narasingha Dora

2002-05-16

M.PAPANNA, PRADIPTA RAY

body2002
JUDGMENT M. PAPANNA, J. — The wife knocks of the door of this Court by carrying the present appeal against Rourkela Family Court’s judgment passed in Civil Proceedings No. 167/97 dissolving her marriage with her husband by a decree of divorce. 2. The husband, who was the petitioner before the Family Court, is respondent No. 1 and the wife, who was respondent No. 1 in the said Court, is the appellant whereas the Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela who was respondent No. 2 in the said Court is respondent No. 2 herein. 3. The husband’s case is very simple. In 1973 the husband and the wife were bound by marriage tie, but they were not blessed with any issue out of their wedlock. The husband, being a Boiler Operator in Rourkela Steel Plant, the Steel Authority of India Ltd. allotted in his favour a quarter No. FFC/26 in Sector-8 and the couple was residing therein. He has alleged that his wife was mis-spending his entire salary on her relations, who were staying with her in the said quarter and his objections were of no avail. She not only misbehaved with him but also treated him cruelly by avoiding sexual cohabitation with him thereby denying him his normal conjugal rights. At last, she in collusion with her rela¬tions drove him out from his quarter in June 1991. Her claim for maintenance in O.S.No. 26/92 was allowed by the Family Court with a direction to pay her a monthly maintenance of Rs. 500/- which he has been paying accordingly. Above all,owing to her unautho¬rised occupation of the aforesaid quarter, he is required to pay market rent for the same with effect from 16.2.1993, thereby suffering heavy loss. Finding no other way out and after all efforts made for their reunion ended in smoke, he sought for dissolution of their marriage by a decree of divorce in the aforesaid Civil Proceedings. 4. The wife contested the proceeding by putting in her written statement of defence denying the husband’s allegations of mis-spending of his salary on her relations. She also denied to have misbehaved with him or treated him cruelly in any manner whatsoever. Making counter allegations against him, she stated that under influence of country liquor he was physically assault¬ing her regularly. The wife contested the proceeding by putting in her written statement of defence denying the husband’s allegations of mis-spending of his salary on her relations. She also denied to have misbehaved with him or treated him cruelly in any manner whatsoever. Making counter allegations against him, she stated that under influence of country liquor he was physically assault¬ing her regularly. Moreover, most often than not, he was not coming to her for leading conjugal life and instead he was stay¬ing outside home at his sweet will and pleasure. He totally stopped coming to her once for all, after he got another quarter allotted in his name. Above all, she alleged leading of an adul¬terous life by her husband keeping a concubine whom he married later on. She has contended that the husband is not entitled to a decree of divorce. 5. The Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela respondent No. 2, has filed a written statement and pleaded that this being a matrimonial dispute between the couple it is not a necessary party to the above proceedings. That apart, as the wife is not entitled to occupy the quarter in question, the employer has cancelled the allotment order in respect of the said quarter as per provisions of the House Allotment Rules of the Company. 6. The learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela, framed the following three issues on the pleadings of the parties - (i) Whether respondent No. 1 deserted the petitioner in June, 1991 ? (ii) Whether there is any conjugal relationship between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 since about five years ? (iii) To what relief, the parties are entitled ? 7. The husband adduced evidence both oral and documentary by examining two witnesses including himself as P.W.1 and by producing two documents Exts. 1 and 2 series in support of his case. 8. The wife on the other hand, pressed into service evidence of four witnesses including herself as D.W.1 in support of her stand. 9. The learned Judge, Family Court, having believed ver¬sions of the wife that the husband was assaulting her regularly in a state of intoxication, which he held to be cruelty towards her, came to hold that the husband is not entitled to the relief of divorce under Section 13 (1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 9. The learned Judge, Family Court, having believed ver¬sions of the wife that the husband was assaulting her regularly in a state of intoxication, which he held to be cruelty towards her, came to hold that the husband is not entitled to the relief of divorce under Section 13 (1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, by the by, having blamed both of them for showing cruel¬ty to each other and in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, when they are living apart from each other and cohabi¬tation between them having been not resumed for more than the statutory period, he passed the impugned decree of divorce dis¬solving their marriage with a direction to the husband to pay a sum Rs. 700/- per month towards her maintenance from the date of decree by modifying the earlier order of maintenance passed in O.S.No. 26 of 1992. 10. The wife questioned the legality and propriety of the judgment and decree in the present appeal particularly when the findings on which the impugned judgment is based, having been not well founded. That apart, the quantum of maintenance as fixed by the learned Judge, is not only adequate for her maintenance in these hard days of rising price and higher cost of living but also it is quite disproportionate to the income of her husband, who is drawing not less than Rs. 12,000/- per month as Boiler Operator in Rourkela Steel Plant. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the husband, on the other hand, supported the judgment and decree impugned before us. However, in course of hearing of the appeal, the appellant wife, who appeared in person before us, expressed her unwillingness to join the society of the husband. The learned counsel appearing on her behalf also submitted on instruction that it is no possible for the wife to unite with her husband for leading conjugal life as he has married for the second time. An affidavit to that effect filed by the wife also indicates her intention not to join the company of her husband for the reasons stated above. She is also agreeable for a decree of divorce if she is paid a sum of Rs. 2,00.000/- at a time towards her permanent alimony within time stipulated. An affidavit to that effect filed by the wife also indicates her intention not to join the company of her husband for the reasons stated above. She is also agreeable for a decree of divorce if she is paid a sum of Rs. 2,00.000/- at a time towards her permanent alimony within time stipulated. In such a case,she is also agreeable to vacate the quarter, which is now under her occupation, to which the learned counsel appearing for the husband did not object and instead he has submitted that the husband is ready and willing to pay one time alimony as determined by this Court. He has emphasised that the wife should vacate the quarter for occupation of which the husband is being compelled to pay rent at the market rate. 12. The judgment of the Family Court is totally confusing. the Family Court has disbelieved the allegations of cruelty against the wife and held that the husband was assaulting wife off and on in a state of intoxication. At the same time the Family Court suddenly recorded a finding that the husband and the wife both have “contributed equally to the exertion of cruelty to each other”. The aforesaid two findings are totally inconsistent with each other. Moreover, factually also we do not find any basis for holding the wife guilty of cruelty to the husband. The said finding against the wife appears to be totally erroneous and the same is to be set aside. The Family Court has refused to grant a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. But strangely enough it has granted a decree of divorce on the ground of deser¬tion as mentioned in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. When the Court below has found that the husband was assaulting the wife in inebriated conditions there cannot be any finding of desertion against the wife. A spouse cannot be said to have deserted the other spouse if circumstances have compelled the former to live away from the latter. In the present case the wife is admittedly living in the quarter of the husband and it is her allegation that the husband is not coming home and has taken a separate quarter to avoid her company. Once the Family Court has held that the husband is guilty of ill-treatment, it cannot hold the wife guilty of desertion. In the present case the wife is admittedly living in the quarter of the husband and it is her allegation that the husband is not coming home and has taken a separate quarter to avoid her company. Once the Family Court has held that the husband is guilty of ill-treatment, it cannot hold the wife guilty of desertion. On the basis of the materials on record, the finding relating to desertion against the wife is unsustainable. 13. It appears from the certified copy of the judgment that a decree for divorce has been granted also on the ground con¬tained in Section 13(1A)(2)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The petition for divorce has been filed by the husband and as such there is no question of granting a decree on any ground mentioned under Section 13 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act which can be invoked only by the wife. It appears to us that the said section might have been mentioned incorrectly in the judgment and proba¬bly the Family Court wanted to refer to Section 13 (1A)(ii). Even assuming that the Family Court actually meant Section 13(1A)(ii) it has totally failed to apply its mind to the provisions of the aforesaid sub-section. Section 13(1A)(ii) is applicable only to cases where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed and there has been no restitution of conjugal rights for a period of one year or more after passing of such decree for restitution of conjugal rights. In the present case, there is no decree for restitution of conjugal rights for the purpose of invoking the ground as mentioned in Section 13 (1A)(ii). Accord¬ingly, we are unable to accept the grounds on which the decree of divorce has been granted by the Family Court. 14. However, in course of hearing before this Court the appellant-wife has filed an affidavit stating that the husband has already married another woman and is living with her and that it is no longer possible for her to resume conjugal relationship and to live with the husband. In her affidavit she has stated that she has no objection to a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of relationship if suitable alimony for her maintenance is arranged. She has also expressed her willing¬ness to vacate the husband’s quarter, if one time permanent alimony as determined by the Court is paid to her. 15. In her affidavit she has stated that she has no objection to a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of relationship if suitable alimony for her maintenance is arranged. She has also expressed her willing¬ness to vacate the husband’s quarter, if one time permanent alimony as determined by the Court is paid to her. 15. We have noticed the bitterness in the relationship between the husband and the wife. Both have made serious allega¬tions against each other. When the wife has stated on oath that resumption of conjugal relationship between them is no longer possible, we are of the opinion that the martial tie has snapped permanently and it will be of no use in dragging on an emotional¬ly dead relationship. When both the spouses expressly admit that the relationship is emotionally dead, doctrine of ‘irretrievable breakdown’ can be invoked for putting a legal end to the rela¬tionship. So although we do not accept the grounds on which the Family Court granted a decree for divorce, we grant a decree of divorce by invoking the doctrine of irretrievable breakdown on the condition that the husband will pay one time permanent alimo¬ny as determined by this Court. 16. For the reasons aforesaid,we grant a decree dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 on the condition that the husband will deposit an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) as one time permanent alimony in the Family Court, Rourkela, within a period of two months from today. This decree will be effective only after the husband deposits the aforesaid permanent alimony in full. The appellant-wife will vacate the quarter which is now being occupied by her within a period of one month from the date of deposit of the alimony. The appellant-wife will not be permitted to withdraw. the one-time permanent alimony unless she informs the Family Court with necessary document that she has vacated and handed over the peaceful possession of the quarter either to the husband or to the Steel Authority of India. The judgment and decree of the Family Court are modified as mentioned hereinabove. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. PRADIPTA RAY, J. I agree. Appeal disposed of.