JUDGMENT C. R. PAL. J. — In these Criminal Misc. Cases the petitioner who is an accused in T. R. Case No. 41 of 1992, T.R. Case No. 132 of 1999, T.R. Case No. 133 of 1999, T. R. Case No. 134 of 1999 and T. R. Case No. 135 of 2000 has challenged the order dated 26.8.2000 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhuba¬neswar framing charge against the petitioner for the alleged offences under Section 5 (2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Sections 409, 468, 471 and 477-A, I.P.C. All the Criminal Misc. Cases are taken up together and heard analogously as they arise out of a common order passed in the aforementioned Trial Cases arising out of Cuttack Vigi¬lance P.S. Case No. 42 of 1987 and the contention raised are also same. 2. The facts of the cases giving rise to these petitions may be stated as follows : The petitioner was serving as a Primary School Teacher and was attached to the S.I. of Schools, Baramba East Circle within Baramba Block from 18.8.1970 to assist him in preparing bills, maintaining acquittance rolls and to deposit the amount of Provi¬dent Funds of the teachers. It is alleged that during his incum¬bency as the attached teacher of the office of the S.I. he pre¬pared false and fictitious bills and misappropriated a sum of Rs. 18,723.30 by forging the signatures of the payees concerned. He also committed double drawal in the name of fictitious persons. All these transactions were detected during the normal audit in the year 1979-80. On further audit it was detected that he misappropriated Rs. 41, 974.98 during the period 1971-81. It is alleged that in total he misappropriated a sum of Rs. 60,698.28 during the year 1972-73 to 1980-81. On the basis of the audit report an explanation was called for from the concerned S.I., of Schools and this petitioner deposited the entire amount in four instalments vide money receipts dated 3.8.80, 10.12.80, 10.2.81 and 27.2.81 before submission of any explanation. After the detection was made, the petitioner was put under suspension with effect from 22.4.86 and was subsequently reinstated pursuant to the order dated 22.12.88 passed by this Court in O.J.C. No. 2881 of 1988. The petitioner thereafter continued in his service till his retirement on superannuation on 5.1.93. After the detection was made, the petitioner was put under suspension with effect from 22.4.86 and was subsequently reinstated pursuant to the order dated 22.12.88 passed by this Court in O.J.C. No. 2881 of 1988. The petitioner thereafter continued in his service till his retirement on superannuation on 5.1.93. On the basis of the detection made, F.I.R. was lodged on 27.11.87 and Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 42 of 1987 was registered for the offence under Sections 409, 468 471, 477-A of the I.P.C. and under Sec¬tion 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corrup¬tion Act, 1947. In the vigilance case registered against the petitioner charge-sheet was submitted on 31.3.91 on completion of investigation for the alleged offences under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and under Sections 409, 468, 471, 477-A, I.P.C. After receiving the charge-sheet, the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhuba¬neswar split up the cases into five cases keeping in view the provisions of Section 219, Cr.P.C. The learned Special Judge after hearing both the sides and on perusal of the police papers, charged the petitioner for the above offences. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Special Judge, the petitioner has filed the Criminal Misc. Cases to quash the same. 3. The learned counsel of the petitioner challenged the impugned order mainly on the ground that the petitioner was not a public servant either on the dates of commission of the alleged offences or on the date of registration of the case and as such, the proceedings against him are misconceived and are liable to be quashed. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner does not come within the definition of public servant defined under Section 21, I.P.C. as it stood at the time when Section 21 I.P.C. was incorporated to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. It is notified that the “Twelfth” clause of Section 21, I.P.C. was introduced to Section 21, I.P.C. by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 and was later substituted by virtue of the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964. It is notified that the “Twelfth” clause of Section 21, I.P.C. was introduced to Section 21, I.P.C. by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 and was later substituted by virtue of the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964. According to the substituted provision, every person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the perform¬ance of any public duty by the Government and any person in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956) is a public servant. Therefore, a question arises as to whether the said clause is applicable to the case of the petitioner. According to the learned counsel of the petitioner, since the word “Public servant” has not been expressly defined in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, such a definition amounts to legislation by incorporation and therefore, any subsequent amendment, addition or alteration in the Indian Penal Code would not at all affect the incorporated provision in the Prevention of Corruption Act. In this context, it may be stated that it is a well established principle that where a subsequent Act incorpo¬rates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provision becomes an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. However, there are exceptions to the above princi¬ple and the principle will not apply : (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemen¬tal to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act if not imported into the subsequent Act it would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act. The Apex Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1835 has held that the I.P.C. and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 are supplemental to each other and as such, has further laid down that the Prevention of Corruption Act being a statute supplemental to the Penal Code the Amendment in the definition of Section 21 of the Penal Code would have to be read into Section 2 of the Prevention of Corrup¬tion Act, 1947 because once the definition of Section 21 of the Penal Code was incorporated it had to be imported into the other Act and considered pari pasu the Penal Code. Here in the instant case, the petitioner was attached to the office of the S.I. to assist him in preparing bills, maintaining acquittance rolls and to deposit the Provident Funds amount of the teachers. It is also his admitted case that he was receiving his salary from the Block Office. Thus he was in the service of the Government and was performing the public duty for a remuneration. The contention of the learned counsel that the definition introduced by Act 40 of 1964 cannot be made applicable to the petitioner as by the date the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 came into force the said definition in the I.P.C. was not there cannot be accepted in view of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case cited above. The case law reported in 1974 Cuttack Law Reports (Crimi¬nal) 545 Binayak Das v. State of Orissa is also not applicable as in the said reported case the petitioner was a teacher of a pri¬vate High School which was receiving Government aid, whereas the present petitioner is in the service of the Government and was receiving his salary from the Government through the Block Of¬fice. In this context, it may also be mentioned here that the submission that the non-Government Primary School Teachers of the State were declared to be Government servants by notification dated 26th September, 1989 cannot be of any help to the petition¬er as he was in service and on the pay of Government prior to that notification and as it is also not his case that he was a teacher of any aided or private school. 4. 4. The second contention of the learned counsel of the petitioner is that since it is alleged that the money was misap¬propriated during the year 1972 to 1981, the F.I.R. was lodged on 27.11.87, charge-sheet was submitted on 31.3.91 and the petition¬er has retired from service in the meantime, the continuance of the proceedings against him amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. The learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner was discharging a public duty and was receiving payment for the same during his incumbency as an attached teacher to the office of the S.I. of Schools. The irreg¬ularities and the misappropriation committed by the petitioner was detected during the normal audit held in the year 1979-80. After the detection was made, further audit was conducted and the concerned S.I. of Schools was asked to submit his explanation for the irregularities. Before submission of any explanation this petitioner deposited the defalcated amount in four instalments. The F.I.R. was lodged thereafter on 27.11.87 and the case was registered. On the completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted on 31.3.91. It appears that the time taken to complete the investigation and to submit charge-sheet is little more than three years. The offences alleged being serious in nature having great impact on the society, the delay of little more than three years in submission of charge-sheet cannot be a ground to quash the proceeding. It may also be mentioned here that no period is fixed by the legislature for taking cognizance of the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The offences alleged are also punishable with imprisonment for seven years. Therefore, on the ground of delay in filing charge-sheet or taking cognizance in the instant case, the proceeding cannot be quashed. Accordingly, the Criminal Misc. Cases are dismissed. Misc. Cases dismissed.