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2002 DIGILAW 32 (HP)

THE KHADEEN COOPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL SERVICE v. AMARJIT SINGH BAWA

2002-02-25

K.C.SOOD

body2002
JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J. - This petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is directed against the order of versal passed by learned District Judge, Solan in C.M.A. No. 14-S/14 of 2000 of September 29, 2000. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy, necessary facts may be noticed: 3. Plaintiff Amarjit Singh Bawa was a tenant of a shop and godown comprised in Khasra No. 139/98 in Kasauli, District Solan. Defendant-Khadi Cooperative Agriculture Society is the owner of these premises. Defendant-Cooperative Society filed a petition under Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to "Eviction Act"). This petition was resisted by the plaintiff- respondent Amarjit Singh Bawa. Learned Collector, under the Eviction Act directed the eviction of the plaintiff on August 3, 1996. Dissatisfied, plaintiff carried an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh which was dismissed. Still aggrieved, plaintiff moved this Court under its writ jurisdiction. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court. Plaintiff, not reconciled, carried a Special Leave Petition before the Honble Supreme Court which too was dismissed on December 10, 1999. 4. Undeterred, the plaintiff filed a suit in the court of learned Sub Judge, Kasauli, camp Solan, for permanent injunction seeking to restrain the defendant-Society from taking possession of the premises in dispute pursuant to the orders of eviction passed by the Competent Authority under the Eviction Act. 5. The case of the plaintiff as disclosed in the plaint is: 6. Eviction of the plaintiff was directed by the Competent Authority on the grounds not pleaded by the defendant in the petition. The notice terminating the tenancy of the plaintiff was illegal. It is also pleaded that the defendant, during the pendency of the petition, received rupees 2700/- on account of rent w.e.f. May 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000 by draft. Thus, according to the plaintiff, the tenancy of the plaintiff stands renewed by the defendant and the orders of the Collector directing his eviction have become nonest against him and cannot be executed. It is on this plea that the defendant is sought to be restrained from executing the order of the Competent Authorities directing the eviction of the plaintiff from the premises in dispute. 7. It is on this plea that the defendant is sought to be restrained from executing the order of the Competent Authorities directing the eviction of the plaintiff from the premises in dispute. 7. The suit is contested on several grounds, including the maintainability of the suit and locus standi of the plaintiff to file such suit. It was pleaded that the plaintiff having failed up to the Honble Supreme Court of India, has filed the present suit mala fide just to retain his illegal possession. 8. Along with the suit, an application for the grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff on the grounds that the petition filed by the defendant-Society, under Section 4 of the Eviction Act, was passed on incorrect facts and the Competent Authority did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Eviction Act as the defendant-Society had waived their notice to quit, on which the eviction orders were based, by accepting the rent in the amount of rupees 2700/- from May 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000 and, therefore, the orders passed were illegal. 9. This application was resisted by the defendant-petitioner. The stand of the defendant-petitioner was that the suit was not maintainable and the order of eviction having been up-held by the Honble Supreme Court, cannot now be assailed by the present suit. On merits, it was pleaded that the tenancy was terminated by a valid notice under the Eviction Act and the order passed by the Competent Authority directing the eviction of the plaintiff was legal and valid. 10. Learned trial Judge by his orders dated July 1, 2000 dismissed the application of the plaintiff-respondent holding that mere acceptance of the amount of rent by the landlord from a tenant would not amount to renewal of the tenancy. He also took a view that under Section 10 of the Eviction Act, the Court was not competent to grant injunction against the orders passed by the Competent Authority. Dissatisfied, the plaintiff carried on appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge vide his impugned orders, allowed the appeal and restrained the defendant- Society from executing the orders of the Collector dated August 3, 1996 directing the eviction of the plaintiff from the premises in dispute. 11. Dissatisfied, the plaintiff carried on appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge vide his impugned orders, allowed the appeal and restrained the defendant- Society from executing the orders of the Collector dated August 3, 1996 directing the eviction of the plaintiff from the premises in dispute. 11. Aggrieved, the defendant-Society has filed the present revision petition. 12. I have heard Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Advocate instructed by Mr. Ajit Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. N.K. Sood, learned counsel for the plaintiff. 13. At the out set, Mr. N.K. Sood, urged that this court will not interfere, in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with the orders passed in appeal by the learned District Judge in the absence of any jurisdictional error. 14. It is true that this Court will be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nevertheless, as observed by this Court in Parveen Kumar and others (Civil Revision No. 325 of 2000 decided on 29.5.2001), the High Court will be within its supervisory jurisdiction to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure if it is shown that the Appellate Court acted, in exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity in passing the orders and if such orders are allowed to stand, it will cause failure of justice or irreparable injury to the party aggrieved. 15. Perusal of the impugned orders of learned District Judge shows that he passed the order without looking into the facts and circumstances of the case and thus acted with material irregularity and against the established principles of law. 16. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners disputed the maintainability of the suit in view of the provisions of the Eviction Act. The Scheme of the Eviction Act shows that an appeal is maintainable from the order of the Collector made in respect of any public premises under Sections 5 or 7 of the Act to the Commissioner. Section 10 of the Act attaches finality to the orders passed by the Collector or Commissioner under the Act and provides that such order shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or the execution proceedings. Section 10 of the Act attaches finality to the orders passed by the Collector or Commissioner under the Act and provides that such order shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or the execution proceedings. It specifically mandates : "No injunction shall be granted by any court or other Authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance to any power conferred by or under this Act." 17. Section 10 of the Act reads :- 10. Finality of orders. - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Collector or Commissioner under this Act, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act." 18. Section 15oftheEvictionActbarsthejurisdictionoftheCivilCourts to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of the eviction of any person who js in unauthorized occupation of any public premises. Section 15 may be reproduced for convenience: "15. Bar of jurisdiction. - No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorized occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of Section 7 or the damages payable under sub-section (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the State Government, corporate authority or a local body as given in sub-clause (i) of clause (e) of Section 2 under sub-section (5) of Section 9 of any portion of such rent, damages or costs." 19. A combined reading of Section 10 and 15 of the Eviction Act shows that suit of the plaintiff, prima facie, was not maintainable. Learned Sub Judge was right in holding that temporary injunction, in the facts and circumstances of the case, could not be allowed. 20. Mr. N.K. Sood, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff strenuously urged that the acceptance of the rent of Rs. 2700/- for the period from May 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000 would amount to renewal of the tenancy of the plaintiff. I am afraid; the contention is fallacious and cannot be accepted. 20. Mr. N.K. Sood, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff strenuously urged that the acceptance of the rent of Rs. 2700/- for the period from May 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000 would amount to renewal of the tenancy of the plaintiff. I am afraid; the contention is fallacious and cannot be accepted. Firstly, mere acceptance of rent does not renew the lease or tenancy unless it is shown that there was an intention of the parties to renew such tenancy. The plaintiff in his plaint merely asserted that defendant-Society having accepted (he rent from May 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000 has renewed the tenancy of the plaintiff. Secondly, Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Counsel submitted that rupees 2700/- were received by the petitioner-Society, without prejudice to its right in view of the orders made by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1913 of 1996. 21. It appears, a Division Bench of this Court on February 24, 1997 directed that dis-possession of the plaintiff-respondent shall be stayed subject to plaintiff-respondent making payment of the rent including up to date arrears to the defendant-Society on the basis of the rent which was agreed to be paid previously. Such payment, it was clarified, would be without prejudice to the contentions raised in the writ petition. Thus, the rent was accepted by the defendant-Society in terms of the orders of this Court dated February 24, 1997. It is preposterous on the part of the plaintiff-respondent to allege that receipt of rent by the defendant-Society renewed the tenancy of the plaintiff-respondent in spite orders of eviction passed by the Competent Authority under the Eviction Act. It is now well settled that acceptance of rent by the landlord, after notice to quit, would not amount to waiver of the notice or renewal of the lease. Reference may be made to Bank of Rajasthan v. M/s. Sarin and Company, 2000(1) RCR 299, Ramjilal v. Gulabrao, AIR 1979 Bombay 44, and Purohit Lakshmanchandji v. VetcheSree Ramchandra Murty, AIR 1976 A.P. 428. 22. Mr. N.K. Sood then contended that after the filing of this revision petition, the plaintiff entered into a settlement with the defendant-Society through its President and it was agreed to between the parties that the present revision petition would be withdrawn by the petitioner-Society. 22. Mr. N.K. Sood then contended that after the filing of this revision petition, the plaintiff entered into a settlement with the defendant-Society through its President and it was agreed to between the parties that the present revision petition would be withdrawn by the petitioner-Society. As per settlement, the rent of the premises in dispute was enhanced to rupees 375/- per month and the plaintiff-respondent by a Bankers pay order dated January 11, 2001, remitted rupees 4500/- as rent of the premises in dispute from May 1, 2000 to April 30, 2001. This amount was credited to the account of the petitioner-Society on 15.1.2001. Mr. Sood contended that in view of the settlement of the dispute between the parties, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 23. Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner-Society urged that no settlement of any kind took place between the parties as claimed by the respondent-plaintiff. As the revision petition was pending in this Court, there was no occasion for any such settlement. According to Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, forwarding letter as alleged by the plaintiff-respondent along with the Bankers Pay order for Rs. 4500/- was never received by the President of the petitioner-Society. The defendant-Society state in their reply, "the respondent-applicant in connivance or collusion with the concerned employee of the courier has forged the signatures of the President of the Society on the receipt annexed as Annexure R2. The correctness, authenticity and genuineness of Annexure R2 is seriously disputed." On enquiries made by the petitioner-Society, it was revealed that one Chint Ram Sharma on January 15,2000 deposited pay order No. 64786 dated 11.1.2001 in the account of the petitioner-Society with Jogindera Central Cooperative Bank Parwanoo Branch towards agricultural loan due to the Society. It was further submitted that plaintiff-respondent was in arrears of use and occupation charges to the extent of Rs. 4525/-as on August 31, 1994 and use and occupation charges at the rate of Rs. 225/- up to April 20, 2000 comes to Rs. 18,000/-. The total amount recoverable from the respondent up to April 30, 2001 was Rs. 22,725/- out of which only Rs. 2700/- were remitted by the plaintiff-respondent to the petitioner-Society in terms of the orders of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1913 of 1996. 225/- up to April 20, 2000 comes to Rs. 18,000/-. The total amount recoverable from the respondent up to April 30, 2001 was Rs. 22,725/- out of which only Rs. 2700/- were remitted by the plaintiff-respondent to the petitioner-Society in terms of the orders of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1913 of 1996. In these circumstances, there was no occasion for the petitioner- Society to have agreed for the withdrawal of the revision petition. 24. There is force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Had there been such an agreement as the plaintiff- respondent would have us believe, such an agreement would have been recorded before the learned trial Court. The certificate of the Branch Manager of Jogindera Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Parnwanoo Manager of Jogindera Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Parwanoo Branch dated September 3, 2001 (Annexure P-l) shows that Rs. 4500/- were deposited in the loan account of Khadeen Cooperative Agricultural Society Purla by cheque No. 647987. Presently, there is nothing on the record, except the self-serving assertion of the plaintiff-respondent, to show that there was a settlement between him and the Society through its President and tenancy was renewed. 25. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff had neither a prima facie case nor balance of convenience is in his favour. The maintainability of the suit is open to doubt. In any event of the matter, the defendant-Society could not have been restrained from executing the orders of eviction passed against the plaintiff-respondent by the Competent Authority as affirmed in appeal and by this Court in its writ jurisdiction particularly in view of Section 10 of the Eviction Act. Learned District Judge gravely erred and exercised his jurisdiction with material irregularity in reversing the well reasoned orders of learned trial Court dismissing the application of the plaintiff for restraining the defendant-Society from executing the orders of eviction against the plaintiff passed by the Collector under the Eviction Act. 26. In result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order of learned District Judge is set-aside and that of learned trial Court are restored. CWP No. 392 of 2001 27. In view of the disposal of the revision petition, no order. 28. 26. In result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order of learned District Judge is set-aside and that of learned trial Court are restored. CWP No. 392 of 2001 27. In view of the disposal of the revision petition, no order. 28. Any observations made herein above shall not be construed to be any reflection on the merits of the case which shall be decided on its own merit by the learned trial Court. The parties are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 13.3.2002.