JUDGMENT P. K. PATRA, J. — In this application under Section 115 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order dated 19.11.2001 passed by the District Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berham¬pur in M.J.C.No. 16 of 2001 refusing to allow the prayer of the petitioner under Section 24, CPC to transfer Title Appeal No. 7 of 2000 pending before Shri A.C. Patnaik, Second Addl. District Judge, Berhampur to the Court of the District Judge or any other Court of Additional District Judge at Berhampur and to allow his prayer for transfer of the said Title Appeal to any other Court. 2. The petitioner along with his parents (pro form a oppo¬site party Nos. 7 and 8) was a plaintiff in Title Suit No. 58 of 1996 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Berhampur in which they had prayed for declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit property and for perma¬nent injunction. The suit was decreed in part. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the petitioner preferred Title Appeal No. 53 of 1999 in the Court of the District Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berhampur which was transferred to the file of the Second Addl. District Judge, Berhampur and re-numbered as Title Appeal 7 of 2000. During the course of argument in the appeal, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 24, CPC before the District Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berhampur praying for transfer of the said appeal to the file of the District Judge or any other Additional District Judge at Berhampur alleging that he would not get fair justice from the said Second Addl. District Judge in view of certain adverse orders passed against him while disposing of certain applications. The learned District Judge rejected the said prayer of the petitioner, vide his order dated 19.11.2001 holding that the petitioner failed to substantiate his apprehension of not getting fair justice at the hands of the said Second Addl. District Judge. 3. Mr. Manoj Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. R. K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite parties were heard at length. 4. Mr. Misra strenuously urged for allowing the prayer of the petitioner for transfer of the Title Appeal from the file of the Second Addl. District Judge, Berhampur to the file of the District Judge or any other Addl. R. K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the opposite parties were heard at length. 4. Mr. Misra strenuously urged for allowing the prayer of the petitioner for transfer of the Title Appeal from the file of the Second Addl. District Judge, Berhampur to the file of the District Judge or any other Addl. District Judge available at Berhampur contending that the conduct of the learned Second Addl. District Judge clearly revealed a bias against the petitioner with a view to dispose of the matter hastily before his retirement on superannuation on 31.1.2002. Mr. Mohanty opposed with vehe¬mence the contention of Mr. Misra contending that mere passing of adverse orders on the petitions filed by the petitioner will not reveal prejudicial mind of the Judge and that the petitioner intentionally prolonged the proceeding to harass the opposite parties. 5. Mr. Misra placed reliance on the following decisions in support of his contention : In the case reported in 1965 (1) Cri L J 639, Vol. 70 CN 193 = AIR 1965 SC 720 (Hazara Singh Gill v. The State of Punjab), the petitioner prayed for transfer of two criminal cases pending against him in the Court of a Magistrate, First Class, Amritsar to a Court outside the State of Punjab apprehending that he would not get fair justice from the said Court which was under the Executive pressure of the State, there being no separation of Judiciary from Executive. He made serious allegations against the Government of Punjab and others in his affidavit and there was no specific denial on the part of the State of Punjab and others. The Apex Court was of the opinion that the petitioner had by his affidavit made out sufficient circumstances from which it could be inferred that he did entertain and entertained reasonably an apprehension that he would not get justice in the said cases and, therefore, directed that the two cases be transferred to Saharan¬pur district to be tried by a Magistrate to be chosen by the District Magistrate of Saharanpur in accordance with law. In the case reported in AIR 1990 SC 113 (Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Ramakrishna Hegde), the Apex Court held as follows: “The cardinal principle for the exercise of power under Section 25 is that the ends of justice demand the transfer of the suit, appeal or other proceeding. In the case reported in AIR 1990 SC 113 (Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Ramakrishna Hegde), the Apex Court held as follows: “The cardinal principle for the exercise of power under Section 25 is that the ends of justice demand the transfer of the suit, appeal or other proceeding. The question of expedience would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but the paramount consideration for the exercise of power must be to meet the ends of justice. It is true that if more than one Court has jurisdiction under the Code to try the suit, the plaintiff as dominus litis has a right to choose the Court and the defendant cannot demand that the suit be tried in any particular Court convenient to him. The mere convenience of the parties or any one of them may not be enough for the exercise of power but it must also be shown that trial in the chosen forum will result in denial of justice. Cases are not unknown where a party seeking justice chooses a forum most inconvenient to the adversary with a view to depriving that party of a fair trial. The Parliament has, there¬fore, invested Supreme Court with the discretion to transfer the case from one Court to another if that is considered expedient to meet the ends of justice. Words of wide amplitude for the ends of justice, have been advisedly used to leave the matter to the discretion of the Apex Court as it is not possible to conceive of all situations requiring or justifying the exercise of power. But the paramount consideration must be to see that justice according to law is done, if for achieving that objective the transfer of the case is imperative, there should be no hesitation to transfer the case even if it is likely to cause some inconvenience to the plaintiff.” In the case reported in (1992) 2 SCC 676 (Pushpa Devi Saraf and another v. Jai Narain Parasrampuria and others), the facts and circumstances are similar to the facts and circumstances of the present case, inasmuch as the prayer for transfer of the suit in that case was based on the allegations made against the Additional District Judge impugning his fairness, independence and impartial¬ity and the prayer was rejected by the District Judge as well as the High Court. It was held by the Apex Court that though in the facts and circumstances of the case, the allegations in the transfer petition were not sufficient to warrant order of trans¬fer, the Additional District Judge being unduly affected by the allegations, it was expedient to direct the District Judge to transfer the suit to another Court in the interest of the Addi¬tional District Judge himself. The above decision of the Supreme Court is fully applicable to the present cases, inasmuch as seri¬ous allegations have been levelled against the learned Additional District Judge regarding his impartiality and fairness and his imminent retirement from service on superannuation at the end of this month. 6. Though the learned District Judge has correctly held that mere passing of adverse orders by the learned Addl. District Judge against the petitioner will not be sufficient ground to transfer the appeal from his file to another Court, he has failed to appreciate the case of the petitioner challenging the imparti¬ality and fairness of the learned Addl. District Judge. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the decisions of the Apex Court as well as the imminent retirement of Shri A. C. Patnaik, Second Addl. District Judge on superannuation by the end of this month, it will be expedient in the interest of justice as well as in the interest of the presid¬ing officer himself who is bound to have been affected by the allegations levelled against him, to direct transfer of the Title Appeal from his file. The revision petition is bound to be al¬lowed. 8. In the result, the revision is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The learned District Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berhampur is directed to transfer Title Appeal No. 7 of 2000 from the file of the Second Addl. District Judge, Berhampur to his file and to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. There shall be no order as to costs. Revision allowed.