1. J.C Sehgal, who figures as a petitioners in civil Revision 231/2001 and as a respondent in Civil Revision 4/2002, through his counsel submits that the well know principle of law that the executing court is not supposed to go behind the decree would not be aplicable to the facts of this case. It is submitted that, no-doubt the executing court is supposed to execute the degree as it stands and it cannot question its correctness, nor can it alter the relief granted by the degree, nor can the executing court amend the degree nevertheless, as indicated above, it is submitted that present is a case where an exception is supposed to be carved out. With a view to examine this aspect of the matter, would be apt to notice few facts: 2. D.D. Abrol, petitioner in Civil Revision 4/2002, who is oppossing the point of view put across by J.C Sehgal and (here-in-after referred to as the degree holder) filed a suit for possession under the Jammu and Kashmir Right of Prior Purchase Act Svt 1993 (1936 A.D). In this suit, it was pleaded that the owned a house situated at Mohalla mast Garh, Jammu. The defendants therein namely Ved Pal Gupta and Ishwas Dass, owned a house and a piece of open land contiguous to the house of the plaintiff degree holder. The boundaries of this house were indicated in para 1 of the plaint. In para 2 of the plaint, it was submitted that all the parnalas of the house flow towards the land of the defendant No 2 since the construction of the house of the plaintiff and as the house of defendant No 2 is contiguous to the house of plaintiff,, as such plaintiff has a vested right of pre-emption in the house alongwith the open land was sold without notice to the plaintiff. It was stated that he was ready and willing to pay the price offered by the defendant No1. It was this suit which was decreed. It was stated that he was ready and willing to pay the price offered by the defendant No1. It was this suit which was decreed. In para 2 of the judgement, the trial court noticed that the plaintiff had stated that defendant No 1 and 2 owned a house and a vacant piece of land in the same locality which is contiguous to the house of the plaintiff and that all the parnalas of his house flow towards the land of defendant No 2 Since the construction of his house and his house is also ontinguous to the house of dedendants. It was on this basis, a decree for pre-emption was claimed. The evidence which came on the record was taken note of. PW1 Amar Nath, PW2, Pardeep Kumar and PW3 Mast Ram stated that the water of the parnalas of the plaintiff flows through the compound of the suit house, PW4 Pritam Singh, stated that infront of plaintiff house there is a vacant land and plaintiff has his passage through that vacant piece of land. It was further stated by him that the water of parnalas of the Plaintiff™s house falls at the back of plaintiff house in the suit land. 3. The plaintiff appeared in the witness box. He stated that he has a passage through the house of the defendant. In addition to it, was stated that the water of the parnalas of his house passes through the house of the defendant. According to him, the paranalas had been fitted since long i.e before the sale was executed. It was stated by him that his passage would be blocked and water course of the parnalas of his house would also be resultantly blocked. This witness was cross examined. In cross examination it was stated that the kitchen wall of the plaintiff and the defendant is joint between the parties. Taking note of this evidence, the suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed. The fact that the suit property was found to be in the vicinity of the house of plaintiff and the water of the parnala fitted in the roof passed through the defendant™s house was fully proved, such was the conclusion drawn in para 9 of judgement passed by the trial court and the suit was accordingly decreed on 13th DEc 84. Armed with the decree, the decree holder sought execution. this was resisted. Armed with the decree, the decree holder sought execution. this was resisted. The executing court was of the opinion that no case was made out for not going ahead with the execution proceedings. When execution was taken, the decree holder took possession of the land which was vacant. So far as the house in question is concerned, it was found to be locked. The trial court gave appropriate directions with a view to break open the locks and executed the warrant of possessions. This order passed on 13th Nov™ 2001 is the subject matter of challenge in civil Revision 231/2001. 4. As to how J.C. Sehgal claimed the property may now be examined. According to J.C. Sehgal Ved Paul who had purchased the house had raised construction on the spot and had sold the suit property to one Shashi Kant on 19th May™78. This Shashi Kant is said to have sold the property to one Raj Kumar, who was tenant in the suit Property. This was vide sale deed dt. Ist July™81. JC Sehgal is said to have purchased this property from aforesaid Raj Kumar. It is in this manner, JC Sehgal is claiming the property. It is submitted by him that an object in was taken that a subsequent purchaser would not be bound by the decree. According to him, Raj Kumar from who he purchased the property had filed a suit against Devi Dass. He had taken a plea that the decree passed by the trial court o 13th Dec™84 be declared null and void as it is not executable. The objection taken was that so far as Raj Kumar is concerned, he has no right independent of the right possessed by his predecessor Ved Paul, and he would be bound by the decree. The limited issue was decided against DD Abrol. A revision petition was filed in this Court. This was dismissed. It is accordingly submitted that the decree in question can be challenged and JC Sehgal would not be bound by the same. With a view to sustain this argument, it is submitted that section 15 of the Right of prior purchase gives a right of prior purchase in the owners of property contiguous to the property sold. This is so mentioned in section 15 (Sixthly). It is submitted that this clause was struck down and in place a new clause came to be substituted inter-on. This is so mentioned in section 15 (Sixthly). It is submitted that this clause was struck down and in place a new clause came to be substituted inter-on. 5. Section 15 of the aforesaid Act as it originally stood and as it now exists is being reproduced below:- 15 Persons in whom right of prior purchase vests in urban immovable property the right of prior purchase in respect of urban immovable property shall vest. Firstly- In the co-shares of such property if any ; Secondly- Where the sale is of the site of the building or other structure, in the owners of such building or structure; Thirdly- Where the sale is of property having a stair case common to other properties, in the owners, of such properties; Fourthly- Where the sale is of property having a common outer entrance with other properties, in the owners of such properties; Fifthly- Where the sale is of a servient property in the owners of the dominant property, and vice versa; Sixthly- In the owners of property contiguous to the proper sold. (Presently existing) 15- persons in whom right of prior purchase vests in urban immovable property- The right of prior purchase in respect of urban immovable property shall vest, Firstly- In the co-shares of such property, if any; Secondly - Where the sale is of the site of the building or other structure, in the owners of such building or structure; Thirdly- Where the sale is of property having a stair case common to other properties, in the owners of such properties; Fourthly- Where the sale is of property having a common outer entrance with other properties, in the owners of such properties; Fifthly- Where the sale is of a servient property, in the owners of the dominant property and vice versa; Sixthly- In the tenant occupant thereof. It be seen that the case of the decree holder was based on clause (fifthly) of section 15. This confers a right of prior purchase where a sale is of a servient property, in the owners of the dominant property and vice versa. It was by virtue of this clause, the suit based on right of prior purchase was decreed. It be seen that the case of the decree holder was based on clause (fifthly) of section 15. This confers a right of prior purchase where a sale is of a servient property, in the owners of the dominant property and vice versa. It was by virtue of this clause, the suit based on right of prior purchase was decreed. It was observed that as the water of the parnalas of the house of plaintiff flows through the house which was sold and as the flow of water and right to use the vacant land is likely to be obstructed, therefore, this would bring into the concept of dominant and servient ownership. Therefore, to say that after amendment, the right which stood in the decree holder came to an end and JC Sehgal can take all legal pleas with a view to defeat is an argument which cannot be accepted. 6. The learned counsel appearing for respondents in Civil Revision 4/2002 submits that a person seeking to enforce a right of prior purchase or right of pre-emption must demonstrate till a decree is passed and executed that his right still survives. It is submitted that jas JC Sehgal purchased the property from Raj Kumar, therefore, he would be deemed to have improved his right and he can validity take a plea that the decree should not be executed. 7. There is no dispute with the above proposition but this is a case where decree was passed by taking note of the rights conferred under section 15 (fifthly). This right continues to be there. Therefore to say that by purchasing the property from a defendant of Raj Kumar JC Sehgal has improved his right is an argument which cannot be accepted. 8. There is yet another factor which cannot be ignored. Raj Kumar may have improved his status to fall under clause ˜fifthly™ noticed above. This improvement was personal to him. J.C.Sehgal who has purchased the property would not fall under above referred clause. J.C Sehgal would be hit by the very argument raised by him. The rights of DD Abrol, as per argument of Sh J.C Sehgal came under eolipse. This eolipse came to an end when Raj Kumar sold the property to a person who does not fall in any of the categories mentioned in Section 15. 9. J.C Sehgal would be hit by the very argument raised by him. The rights of DD Abrol, as per argument of Sh J.C Sehgal came under eolipse. This eolipse came to an end when Raj Kumar sold the property to a person who does not fall in any of the categories mentioned in Section 15. 9. In view of the above , there is no merit in the Revision petition preferred by J.C Sehgal and the same is dismissed. 10. So far as Revision petition filed by the decree holder is concerned, this arises under following circumstances: 11. Against order dated 13th Nov™2001, which stood challenged in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was preferred before the Second Additional District Judge, Jammu, by the aforesaid J.C Sehgal. An interim order has been passed in the said Appeal directing the parties to maintain status quo. This order was passed on 17th Nov™2001, For facility of reference, this order is being reproduced below:- Alongwith this appeal, the appellant has also filed an application for staying the execution of decree dated 13.12.1994 passed by sub-Judge, Jammu ina pre-emption suit titled Devi Dass Vs Ved Pal and anr. Application is supported by an affidavit. I have considered the exparte arguments advanced by the appellant applicant™s counsel and have gone through the record available on the file and have come to the conclusion that in my opinion the applicant appellant deserved interim relief at this stage. As such notice be issued to the other side for filing objections. It is ordered that the execution proceedings titled Devi Dass Vs Ved Pal and anr. Pending before the sub- Judge, Jammu are stayed till further orders the record of the execution proceedings as well as the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen be also sent for. Put up on 5.12.2001. 12. It is the above order which is challenged by DD Abrol. 13. As order passed by the trial court on 13th Nov™2001 is being sustained in the Revision Petition Preferred by J.C Sehgal, therefore, it would not be apt to give further life to the order passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Jammu,on 17th Nov™2001. The said order shall accordingly stand vacated and the executing court would proceed ahead with the execution. 14. The said order shall accordingly stand vacated and the executing court would proceed ahead with the execution. 14. Before parting with this judgement, it would be apt to mention that this case was shown in the cause list published on 4th Oct™2002. In that list, it was indicated that the judgement is going to be pronounced on 10th Oct™2002. Notwithstanding this factor, the appellate court has proceeded to pass an order dt. 4th Oct™2002. The interim order passed on 17th Nov™ 2001 which was the subject matter of challenge in Civil Revision 4/2002 has been made absolute. It is urged that as order dt. 17th Nov™2001 does not survive and it has merged with the appellate order, therefore, the Revision petition preferred by Sh DD Abrol should be dismissed as having been rendered infructuous. The order so passed has been made available on the life. This is being retained as part of record. 15. The learned counsel appearing for J.C Sehgal was asked to indicated as on what basis order dt. 4th Oct™2002 is sought to be sustained. It is urged: i) That order dt. 4th Oct™2002 has not been challenged by petitioner in Civil Revision 4/2002, therefore unless and until this order is challenged by any party, this Court should not take notice of the same; ii) That the order passed by the trial court is being supported on the basis of what has been said by that court on 4th Oct™2002 and also on the basis of what was urged in support of arguments which were put across with a view to sustaininterim order dt. 17th Nov;2001. 17th Nov;2001. It is submitted that on merits the issue arises and the issue is that Sh JC Sehgal has a better right as compared to DD Abrol and therefore, he can also defeat decree of pre-emption by taking please taken in the petition and noticed in the order dt 4th Oct™2002 passed by the trial court; iii) That the decree passed is ultimately going to operate against the petitioner JC Sehgal when he is not a party; iv) That changes have been made in the property by JC Sehgal as also by his predecessor after the decree of preemption was passed in favour of DD Abrol and whatever right existed ceases to exist on account of the change in the property; v) That balance of convenience lies in favour of JC Sehgal I am of the opinion that once interim order dt 17th Nov 2001 was challenged in this court and when the judgement was reserved, then the parties should have brought to the notice of the trial court regarding the litigation pending in this court. However, without commenting on this controversy, so far as the above aspect of the matter is concerned , to say that once a subordinate court whose interim order is subject matter of challenge decides a matter finaly and that should deprive this court from pronouncing upon the correctness of proceedings is an argument which cannot be sustained. By this process, a subordinate court cannot be given a handle to put the superior court in a position which disenables it from pronoucement upon the validity or correctness of an order. So far as other points which have been raised are concerned , these have been dealt with while dealing with the contentions put across by the parties. The correctness of this order could be examined in the exercise of power conferred under Article 227 read with sec 104 of the state constitution. This has been so examined. 16. This plea as such is found to be without merit and is regarded. 17. The net result is that the petition preferred by JC Sehgal is dismissed and that preferred by DD Abrol succeeds and both the petitions are disposed of in the manner indicated above. The order passed by the trial court on 4th Oct 2002 shall not be given effect to.