JUDGMENT : Arun Kumar Goel, J. We propose to dispose of both these writ petitions by this common judgment as those are based on similar grounds. Only difference in these two cases is, that in Civil Writ Petition No. 421 of 2002, Petitioner has challenged allotment of liquor vends in the District of Sirmaur in favour of Respondents No. 3 and 4; whereas in case of Civil Writ Petition No. 522 of 2002, challenge made by the Petitioner is to allotment of liquor vends of Sirmaur, Shimla as well as Kinnaur Districts also in favour of Respondents No. 3 and 4. 2. At the time of hearing, Shri M.S. Chandel, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner in both these cases submitted that: Auctions in respect of Sirmaur District were held on 22.3.2002. Highest bids were subject to final approval by the appropriate authority. This authorised licensee to whom licence was to be granted to deal with sale of liquor during the period 1.4.2002 to 31.3.2003. This was as per Announcements Excise Auctions 2002-2003 (Annexure P-1), Punjab Excise Act, 1914 as applicable to this State, and H.P. Liquor Licence Rules, 1986. Notice Annexure P-2 was issued and sealed tenders were invited regarding the vends as detailed in it. Other conditions were also mentioned in this Annexure. He further submitted that negotiations were held on 31st March, 2002 and as a result of which, except for Paonta unit of Sirmaur District, all other units were allotted to Respondent No. 3. In this writ petition, it is further case of the Petitioner that since bids of the Petitioner were higher, therefore, condition regarding the cash deposit was invoked and he was required to deposit the cash amount as envisaged under the H.P. Liquors Licence Rules, 1986 and the Announcements Excise Auction 2002-2003. Such deposit was made by the Petitioner at the time of auction. 3. With a view to support this submission, learned Counsel for the Petitioner pointed out that in case of Dadahu unit against last year's bid of Rs. 56,00,000, his client's bid was Rs. 73,60,000. Similarly regarding Rajgarh unit, against last year's bid of Rs. 68,00,000, it was Rs. 90,10,000. Thus, according to him, there was substantial increase in both units i.e. 31% in case of former and 32% in case of latter. Because condition of cash deposit was invoked, therefore, in case of Dadahu unit, Petitioner deposited Rs. 73,60,000. Similarly regarding Rajgarh unit, against last year's bid of Rs. 68,00,000, it was Rs. 90,10,000. Thus, according to him, there was substantial increase in both units i.e. 31% in case of former and 32% in case of latter. Because condition of cash deposit was invoked, therefore, in case of Dadahu unit, Petitioner deposited Rs. 18,40,000, and in case of Rajgarh unit he deposited Rs. 22,52,000. It was in addition to the sums that he had deposited for becoming eligible to participate in the bids which took place on 22.3.2002 as per Announcement and H.P. Liquor Licence Rules, 1986. 4. Bids in respect of both these units as stated on behalf of Petitioner being the highest, were not disputed by Respondents No. 1 and 2. 5. As already noted, and as per Clause 1(ii) and Clause (2) of Chapter-I, Announcements Excise Auctions 2002-2003, highest bids were subject to confirmation by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh. For ready reference, both these clauses are extracted hereinbelow: 1. (i) * * * * 1. (ii) Notwithstanding anything else contained to the contrary in these Announcements and Tender Document (Annexure-A), the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, reserves the right to sell all or any of the licences by auction or by private contract or by allotment or by calling tenders or by negotiations or by draw of lots or by any other arrangement (including combination of the foregoing modes), which he may consider expedient in the interest of revenue. For this purpose, the mode of grant of these licence may be changed by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, whenever necessary before the actual grant of the licence. The Excise and Taxation Commissioner may also modify the procedure given in these conditions to give effect to the such mode of grant of licence after determining licence fee in such manner as he may deem fit. 2. The highest bids in auction/tender shall be subject to confirmation by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, who reserves the right to reject any bid without assigning the reasons for doing so. 6. Petitioner further claims that his as well as the case of Anr. bidder, both were sent for approval to appropriate authority. He also admits that he participated in the tender on 28.3.2002 in response to Annexure P-2. Per him, his offers were Rs. 1,50,24,000 for Nahan unit and Rs. 6. Petitioner further claims that his as well as the case of Anr. bidder, both were sent for approval to appropriate authority. He also admits that he participated in the tender on 28.3.2002 in response to Annexure P-2. Per him, his offers were Rs. 1,50,24,000 for Nahan unit and Rs. 2,00,24,000 for Paonta unit. When negotiations were held on 30.3.2002, Petitioner alleges that he offered Rs. 2,90,00,000 for Paonta unit. His offer for the entire Sirmaur District was Rs. 7,44,00,000. Whereas Respondent No. 4 had offered Rs. 2,77,77,777 only, for Paonta unit and it has been allotted to the said Respondent. 7. In the aforesaid background, Petitioner makes a grievance that so far allotment of Paonta unit in Sirmaur District in favour of Respondent No. 4 for Rs. 2,77,77,777 is concerned, it has caused substantial loss of more than Rs. 12,00,000 to the revenue. Prima facie, if this position is factually correct, then there is great force in the submission urged on behalf of the Petitioner. 8. Similarly, Respondent No. 3 was granted rest of the liquor vends of the Sirmaur District for Rs. 4,77,00,000. While challenging grant of such licences to Respondent No. 3, it was forcefully urged by Mr. Chandel that this Respondent never participated in auction nor ever submitted any tender in response to Annexure P-2. Similarly, he also did not participate in the negotiations held on 30.3.2002. In this background, it was further submitted that he was high jacked into the arena by Respondents No. 1 and 2. Regarding this fact, Petitioner alleges that he came to know only on 1.4.2002. While challenging the procedure adopted by Respondent No. 2 in case of Respondent No. 3, Mr. Chandel further urged that condition of cash deposit was done away with in his case. If it was so intended, Respondent No. 2 ought to have uniformaly applied the same qua the Petitioner by at least informing him. This is a clear cut case of discrimination. Except Respondent No. 4, there was no other person who made offer on 30.3.2002. 9. All these pleas on behalf of the Petitioner have been controverted by learned Advocate General on behalf of Respondents No. 1 and 2, by Shri Sanjiv Kuthiala on behalf of Respondent No. 3 and by Ms. Jyostna Rewal Dua on behalf of Respondent No. 4. 10. 9. All these pleas on behalf of the Petitioner have been controverted by learned Advocate General on behalf of Respondents No. 1 and 2, by Shri Sanjiv Kuthiala on behalf of Respondent No. 3 and by Ms. Jyostna Rewal Dua on behalf of Respondent No. 4. 10. According to learned Advocate General, Petitioner cannot be granted any relief, even if this Court comes to the conclusion that his grievance is well founded. Per him, action of Respondents cannot be said to be demonstrably arbitrary as it meets the test of fair play and natural justice. Besides this, he also pointed out that no animus/prejudice/mala fide is attributed to the official Respondents against the Petitioners. At best per him, the plea is of favouritism having been shown by official Respondents to private Respondents. On this sole plea, Petitioner is not entitled to file this writ petition. Emphasis was laid by him on terms of Excise Announcements, 2002-2003. Admittedly these have not been challenged. Alternatively, he urged that if what is urged by the Petitioner is accepted to be correct for the sake of argument, still he is not entitled to any relief in this writ petition. 11. He also submitted that the Petitioner has no fundamental right to carry on liquor business which is the exclusive prerogative of the State Government. As such, scope of judicial review is limited to examine the reasonableness of the action of the Respondents. Public interest has to be kept in view to ensure that the interest of the revenue of the State does not suffer. There is no question of Respondent No. 3 being highjacked as alleged. Per him, the plea of bid of the Petitioner for Paonta unit being the highest and still not accepted has no merit. Reason being that prior to it, vend in question was allotted after it was approved in favour of Respondent No. 4 of which fact Petitioner was well aware. There is an over-all increase of revenue in Sirmaur District. He placed reliance on the communications sent by the Petitioner showing his inability to increase his bids as detailed in Annexures R-E and R-F. 12. In this connection, he also submitted that Respondent No. 3 had offered the bid of Rs. 7,60,00,000 for the entire Sirmaur District. But by that time, Paonta unit was approved in favour of Respondent No. 3. In this connection, he also submitted that Respondent No. 3 had offered the bid of Rs. 7,60,00,000 for the entire Sirmaur District. But by that time, Paonta unit was approved in favour of Respondent No. 3. As such, for remaining vends, his bid for Rs. 4.77 crore was accepted. 13. Learned Counsel for the private Respondents also adopted the submissions urged on behalf of official Respondents. 14. In civil writ petition No. 522 of 2002, Petitioner had given his bids for Sarahan unit in Sirmaur District, as well as Recong Peo and Sungra units in Kinnaur Districts. According to him, for Sarahan unit, his bid was Rs. 97,70,000 as against the last year's bid of Rs. 77,25,000. Petitioner claims that he was subjected to cash deposit condition which he did by depositing Rs. 19,54,000. 15. Similarly, for Recong Peo his bid was Rs. 92, 50,000 against the last year's bid of Rs. 85, 00,000 and cash condition was invoked in this case also and needful was done by the Petitioner by depositing Rs. 4, 62,500. Regarding Sungra unit, his bid was Rs. 60, 44,000 against last year's bid of Rs. 49, 00,000. Again on cash condition being invoked, he deposited Rs. 9,66,600. In this writ petition, Respondent No. 3 has been given Sarahan unit in Sirmaur District and Respondent No. 4 has been given the entire Kinnaur District plus Shimla-I and Shimla-II units. 16. Mr. Chandel pointed out that his client was never given intimation regarding the holding of negotiations either on 30.3.2002 or 31.3.2002 for any of these vends. Except this plea, other submissions on behalf of the Petitioner remained the same as in case of Civil Writ Petition No. 491 of 2002. 17. So far Sirmaur District is concerned, the first and foremost question that needs consideration is whether the offer of the Petitioner for Paonta unit as claimed by him was made by him before the confirmation of the offer of Respondent No. 4 or after it. 18. With a view to ascertain factual position, learned Advocate General was directed to produce the record. What transpires from contemporaneous official record is that so far offer made by Respondent No. 4 for Paonta unit for Rs. 2, 77, 77,777 is concerned, it was approved by the competent authority on 30.3.2002. 18. With a view to ascertain factual position, learned Advocate General was directed to produce the record. What transpires from contemporaneous official record is that so far offer made by Respondent No. 4 for Paonta unit for Rs. 2, 77, 77,777 is concerned, it was approved by the competent authority on 30.3.2002. In this behalf, it may be noted that it was not disputed on behalf of the Petitioner that he made his offer regarding Paonta unit of Rs. 2,90,00,000 vide Annexure R-K. It was received on 30.3.2002. There is an endorsement made on it, "Received at 11.40 p.m. after announcement of result". (Emphasis supplied) 19. This document is there on the record produced by Respondents No. 1 and 2. It also speaks of offer of Rs. 7, 44, 00,000 for entire Sirmaur District. Thus, on the basis of contemporaneous official record and keeping in view the above facts, we are satisfied that offer of Rs. 2,90,00,000 for Paonta unit given by the Petitioner was only after the same had been confirmed in favour of Respondent No. 4. 20. On the question of loss of revenue alleged by the Petitioner, it may also be noted that admittedly Respondents No. 1 and 2 allotted rest of the Sirmaur District to Respondent No. 3 for Rs. 4, 77, 00,000, minus Paonta unit. Paonta unit was given for Rs. 2, 77, 77,777. Thus, in all Rs. 7, 54, 77,775 was earned as revenue for the entire Sirmaur District. Petitioner's offer was Rs. 7, 44, 00,000. It may also be noted that auction took place on 22.3.2002 when for Rajgarh, Sarahan and Dadahu units bids were there. Those indicated upward trend. Regarding Paonta and Nahan units, no bids were received. Taking the bids of Rajgarh, Sarahan and Dadahu units as per auction dated 22.3.2002 and tenders received on 28. 3.2002, the total offer was Rs. 6, 62, 24,000. When this is compared with the total amount offered by Respondents No. 3 and 4, there was increase of Rs. 92, 13,777 in this District. That being so, the plea urged on behalf of the Petitioner that there is loss of revenue so far Paonta unit is concerned, in our considered view, is without any merit and is hereby rejected. 21. Regarding Paonta unit, it may be observed that offer of the Petitioner was Rs. 92, 13,777 in this District. That being so, the plea urged on behalf of the Petitioner that there is loss of revenue so far Paonta unit is concerned, in our considered view, is without any merit and is hereby rejected. 21. Regarding Paonta unit, it may be observed that offer of the Petitioner was Rs. 2, 75, 00,000 and he has stated that he cannot offer anything more than this. Vide Annexure R-E, Petitioner's offer dated 30.3.2002 regarding Nahan and Kala Amb was Rs. 1,55,00,000. In this connection, he had stated that he cannot offer anything more. Annexure R-G clearly shows that bid in case of Respondent No. 4 had been approved on 30.3.2002. Here the endorsement made on Annexure R-K assumes significance. 22. We have noticed that Civil Writ Petition No. 491 of 2002 was filed in this case on 11.4.2002. Record of the Excise Department shows that Petitioner had applied for refund of the amounts deposited by him at the auctions, as early as on 6.4.2002. This, in our view, suggests that he had no interest left in the vends in question when he filed the writ petition. Again, there are proceedings recorded by the Committee of three members consisting of Respondent No. 2 and two other officers, wherein there is a clear cut mention of the fact that the Petitioner was asked to increase his offer, which he declined. It was in this background that on refusal of the Petitioner to increase his offer that the vends in question were allotted. 23. So far plea of highjacking of Respondent No. 3 by Respondents No. 1 and 2, as noted hereinabove is concerned, it is also without any substance. 24. Admittedly, offer of this Respondent for the entire Sirmaur District was of Rs. 7, 60, 00,000. This is evident from Annexure R-H collectively. These are cash orders alongwith valuation report of the property of Palvinder Singh, son of Balbir Singh. When a reference is made to the cash orders, they all pertain to dates much before the date of auction. At least, this indicates one thing that the plea of highjacking cannot be accepted on its face value. These are cash orders alongwith valuation report of the property of Palvinder Singh, son of Balbir Singh. When a reference is made to the cash orders, they all pertain to dates much before the date of auction. At least, this indicates one thing that the plea of highjacking cannot be accepted on its face value. Moreover, nothing was brought to our notice that there was any prohibition for a person like this Respondent being ineligible to participate in negotiations despite his having not given either bids in open auction or submitted tenders in response to Annexure P-2. 25. Suffice it to say in this behalf that when Petitioner had given his final offer of Rs. 7,44,00,000 for the entire Sirmaur District, as such, it cannot be said that by accepting the offers of Respondents No. 3 and 4, interest of the State or its revenue has suffered in any manner. 26. Straneous effort was made by Mr. Chandel by submitting that condition of cash deposit was invoked in case of his client, whereas this was not the case, so far Respondents No. 3 and 4 are concerned. This question need not detain us any further. Reason being that the Excise Announcements as referred to hereinabove were relating to auction-cum-tender of excise licence for retail vends etc. How the negotiations were to be held, power had been left to the discretion of the competent authority by the State Government. The whole intention appears to be to protect the interest of the State's revenue by getting maximum. 27. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that this cannot be the correct position in law. According to him, had his client been informed about the cash condition being not applicable at the time of negotiations on 30.3.2002 or 31.3.2002, then in such a situation there was every likelihood of the bid being enhanced by him. Keeping in view the time factor that vends were to be made functional with effect from 1.4.2002 and time was running out. As after 12.00 midnight on 31.3.2002 new licensees were to be there, so matter did not brook any delay. Malice or bias is not the ground for challenging the allotment of vends in favour of Respondents No. 3 and 4 in both the writ petitions. Only ground is of favouritism. In our view, interest of the State has not been prejudiced. Malice or bias is not the ground for challenging the allotment of vends in favour of Respondents No. 3 and 4 in both the writ petitions. Only ground is of favouritism. In our view, interest of the State has not been prejudiced. As such, this plea is hereby rejected. 28. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that Respondent No. 2 while holding negotiations should have video taped the entire proceedings of what transpired on 30.3.2002. With a view to ascertain the factual position, instructions issued by the Government were called for from Respondents No. 1 and 2. File has been produced. So far particular instruction regarding the video taping of the proceedings is concerned, it only speaks of the needful being done in case of auction. File further shows that this was aimed at to remove the grievance of the bidders that either they were not allowed to bid or they did not participate at all. Thus, this plea has also to be rejected. 29. In case of Civil Writ Petition No. 522 of 2002, we find that offer of Respondent No. 3 was accepted for Sarahan unit of Sirmaur District besides other units, whereas in case of Respondent No. 4, its offer was accepted for Shimla-I and Shimla-II units and entire Kinnaur District. Admittedly, Petitioner makes no grievance regarding Shimla District. 30. When a reference is made to Clause 1(ii) of Chapter-I of the Announcements, supra, coupled with Rule 34 of the Himachal Pradesh Liquor Licence Rules, 1986, Respondent No. 2 had the authority in law to re-grouping the vends in question. Purpose sought to be achieved was to have the best price and thus to protect the interest of the revenue of the State. Respondent No. 4 gave his highest bid for Shimla District i.e. Shimla-I and Shimla-II units combined with Kinnaur District. Same was accepted. 31. So far authority of Respondent No. 2 regarding re-grouping is concerned, what was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rishi Pal and Co. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 3797 of 1995, and is relevant for these cases is extracted herein below: The Contractor filed the writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the rejection of his bid and for consequential reliefs. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 3797 of 1995, and is relevant for these cases is extracted herein below: The Contractor filed the writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the rejection of his bid and for consequential reliefs. The High Court came to the conclusion that the Financial Commissioner had no power to re-group the vends and also that the proposed negotiations for the Rampur Busheshair unit had not received due publicity. Since, by efflux of time, the High Court could grant no effective relief, it is awarded "just and fair compensation" to the Contractor in the sum of Rs. 1 lac. The relevant Rule reads thus: 34(a) The Financial Commissioner reserved the right to grant all or any of the licences mentioned in Rule-I, other than the licences granted on fixed fee, assessed fee or both, by auction or by negotiation or by private contract or by allotment or by calling tenders or by any other arrangement which he may consider expedient. (b) The Financial Commissioner further reserves the right to change the mode of granting the licences mentioned in clause (a) of this rule, prior to the grant of such licences in a Financial Year, and by an order in writing on record. The rule entitles the Financial Commissioner to grant licences by the modes of auction, negotiations, private contract, allotment, tenders and any other arrangement or mode which he considers expedient. It also entitles the Financial Commissioner, by order in writing, to change the mode of granting the licence prior to its grant for a financial year. We do not find in this Rule or anywhere else, any restriction in regard to the re-grouping of vends. If, for any reason, the bids at an auction cannot be accepted, the Financial Commissioner can decide to resort to negotiations instead. He can do so provided the bids at the auction have not been confirmed. The Financial Commissioner would then be entitled to negotiate for one vend or two vends combined, the objective being to get the maximum revenue for the State. A clause that relates to auctions and permits the Presiding Officer threat to regroup vends does not imply that the power to so does not exist in the Financial Commissioner. 32. The Financial Commissioner would then be entitled to negotiate for one vend or two vends combined, the objective being to get the maximum revenue for the State. A clause that relates to auctions and permits the Presiding Officer threat to regroup vends does not imply that the power to so does not exist in the Financial Commissioner. 32. To similar effect is the decision of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Swaraj Suri v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. Civil Writ Petition No. 118 of 1995, decided on 9.4.1985. 33. We may notice in this writ petition that grievance of the Petitioner regarding Sarahan unit of Sirmaur District is covered by what has been stated in Civil Writ Petition No. 491 of 2002. Thus, his grievance survives qua Shimla and Kinnaur Districts which precisely is that he was never informed regarding the negotiations. Suffice it to say that after Annexure P-2 and Annexure P-3, it was for him to have followed the matter. There was no requirement of law that at all stages he had to be kept informed about what is happening. As a prudent businessman, he should have kept a track of what is happening and how. There was nothing that prevented him to have given in writing before 31.3.2002 to the authorities concerned. It is not his case that he made an attempt but could not get through to the authorities. It may also be pointed out here that Annexure P-2 primarily relates to vends for which no bids were received. At the same time, it speaks of the bids given in auctions being held under consideration and allowing such bidders to make bids in terms of the said Annexure. 34. Keeping in view the nature of the transaction in both these cases, the matter has to be dealt with judicial restraint so far administrative action of Respondents No. 1 and 2 is concerned. Unless the action was shown to be arbitrary, unjust, biased or mala fide and unreasonable on the touch-stone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, this Court will be slow to act. Because it does not exercise appellate authority on such action of Respondents No. 1 and 2. Reason being that it will tantamount to substituting its own opinion over the administrative decisions of the appropriate authority without the Court having expertise to determine the same. Because it does not exercise appellate authority on such action of Respondents No. 1 and 2. Reason being that it will tantamount to substituting its own opinion over the administrative decisions of the appropriate authority without the Court having expertise to determine the same. Unless it is shown that Government largesse has been arbitrarily distributed, the matter being purely in the realm of contract has to be left to the wisdom and discretion of the administrative authorities who are the masters in their field. Simply because this Court will take Anr. view and thus quash the impugned action of the administrative authorities, that too without coming to the conclusion that the action is either arbitrary or is actuated by bias or mala fide is bound to result in administrative complications and unwanted expenditure. 35. With a view to further advance case of both the Petitioners, Mr. Chandel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Ram and Shyam Company Vs. State of Haryana and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 267 , According to him, Respondents No. 1 and 2 by allotment of vends in question were dealing with property which is the State largesse. Thus, according to him, both these Respondents have failed to protect the interest of the State. He specifically placed reliance on paras 11 and 15 of this judgment. For ready reference, these paras are extracted hereinbelow: 11. It was never disputed nor could it have been disputed that minerals vest in the State. The minor minerals vest in the State where the land from which they are to be extracted is situated and minerals other than minor minerals vest in the Union. 'Minor mineral' have been defined in The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, to mean "building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral". Minor minerals vest in the State in which the land is situated. The first Respondent State of Haryana notified that an auction would be held for mineral quarries of Faridabad District. The Appellant gave his bid at the auction so notified. It is an admitted position that his was the highest bid. Minor minerals vest in the State in which the land is situated. The first Respondent State of Haryana notified that an auction would be held for mineral quarries of Faridabad District. The Appellant gave his bid at the auction so notified. It is an admitted position that his was the highest bid. Anyone conversant with auction would not be naive enough to believe that one can go on raising his own bid. His was the highest bid in the amount of Rs. 3, 87, 000 p. a. Though the Presiding Officer accepted the bid of the Appellant, being the highest bid at the auction, yet the State Government in exercise of the power conferred by clause (4) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 30 declined to confirm the same presumably under the belief that the highest bid did not represent the adequate lease rent which the State Government was entitled to the Court frankly stating that he does not wish any contention to be raised on behalf of the State of Haryana. Apprehension voiced by the Constitution Bench has literally come true in this case. This view of the Constitution Bench was reaffirmed in Nand Kishore Saraf v. State of Rajasthan, the only distinguishing feature of the case being that the highest bid of the Appellant was rejected and the contract was given to Dharti Dan Shramik Theka Sahkari Samiti Ltd., a co-operative society of the workmen. Though the Court did not so specifically state, it upheld the rejection of the highest bid of the Appellant on the ground that the benefit of the concession was given to a co-operative society formed by the weaker section of the society and thereby it serves the public purpose as set out in Article 41 of the Directive Principles of the State Policy. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, Krishna Iyer,. speaking for himself and Bhawati, J. observed as under : (SCC p. 584, para 35) A pragmatic approach to social justice compels us to interpret constitutional provisions, including those like Articles 32 and 226 with a view to see that effective policing of the corridors of power is carried out by the court until other ombudsman arrangements a problem with which Parliament has been wrestling for too long--emerges. I have dwelt at a little length on this police aspect and the court process because the learned Attorney General challenged the Petitioner's locus standi either qua workers or qua citizen to question in court the wrongdoings of the public sector although he maintained that what had been done by the Corporation was both bona fide and correct. We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in our Montesquien system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the Directorate of a Government company has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the court cannot, as a super-auditor, take the Board of Directors to takes. This function of limited to testing get. The right of the State Government not to confirm the bid as also its auction of not confirming the highest bid of the Appellant is not questioned. Therefore, various decisions laying down that the Government is not bound to accept the highest bid, to which our attention was drawn by Mr. P.P. Rao, learned Counsel for the forth Respondent are of no relevance in this case. This Court in Trilochan Mishra v. State of Orissa State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh and State of Orissa v. Harinarayan jaiswal, held that the Government is under no obligation to accept the highest bid and that no right accrue to the bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest. The Court also observed that the Government had the right, for good and sufficient reason, not to accept the highest bid but even to prefer a tenderer other than the highest bidder. In Vijay Bahadur Singh case, the Court further observed that the power conferred on the Government by the Act to refuse to accept the highest bid, cannot be confined to inadequacy of bid only. There may be variety of other good and sufficient reasons to reject the same. The Appellant has no grievance that even though his was the highest bid, the same was not accepted nor Mr. Sorabjee on his behalf contends that the highest bid of the Appellant was rejected on the grounds which are either irrelevant or extraneous. This aspect therefore need not detain us any more. 12. * 13. * * 14. * * * 15. Sorabjee on his behalf contends that the highest bid of the Appellant was rejected on the grounds which are either irrelevant or extraneous. This aspect therefore need not detain us any more. 12. * 13. * * 14. * * * 15. Facts of no two case are alike, but if one attempts to compare the situation, the conclusion is inescapable. Appellant's bid was the highest bid. It was in the amount of Rs. 3,87,000 p. a. Respondent 4 approached the Chief Minister with a slightly higher bid of Rs. 4,50,000 per year. This was granted without any reference to the Appellant to raise his bid. Such a thing, if allowed to pass once is bound to be repeated because this method is open to the abuse of favouritism and repotism and the loss of revenue in this case to the State is enormous. What happened in the Court staggered everyone. Learned Attorney-General Shri L.N. Sinha, who questioned the competence of the Court to deal with the matter when he witnessed the rising crescendo of the auction in the Court and the bid reached Rs. 12 lacks per year, he quietly left whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration. In a concurring opinion, Chandrachud, C.J. observed that sales of public property, when the intention is to get the best price, ought to take place publicly. 36. Mr. Chandel further submitted that the Respondents have dealt with this matter by ignoring the mandate of law issued by the Apex Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , and other subsequent decisions. 37. So far the propositions of law laid down in these decisions of the Supreme Court are concerned, there cannot be any dispute with these. But, in the present case on the basis of materials on record, the law laid down by the Apex Court in these decisions, is wholly inapplicable so far present petitions are concerned. 38. The next decision relied on by Mr. Chandel is the case of Sterling Computers Limited and Others Vs. M and N Publications Limited and Others, (1993) 1 SCC 445 , particularly its following paras: 14. 38. The next decision relied on by Mr. Chandel is the case of Sterling Computers Limited and Others Vs. M and N Publications Limited and Others, (1993) 1 SCC 445 , particularly its following paras: 14. The action or the procedure adopted by the authorities which can be held to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, while awarding contracts in respect of properties belonging to the State can be judged and tested in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution, is settled by the judgment of this Court in the cases of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, (1979) 3 SCC 489 v. International Airport Authority of India; Kasturi. Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J. and K. Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri v. Union of India; Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana; Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corporation; Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation and Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. It has been said by this Court in Kasturi Lal : (SCC p. 13, para 14) It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or lease out its property from a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained from it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. 15. * 16. * 17. * 18. * * * 19. * * 20. * * * 21. * 22. * * 23. * * * 24. * * * 25. * * 26. * 27. 15. * 16. * 17. * 18. * * * 19. * * 20. * * * 21. * 22. * * 23. * * * 24. * * * 25. * * 26. * 27. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it has to be held that the MTNL has applied the "irrelevant considerations" doctrine while granting a fresh contract for a period of five years through the supplemental agreement dated September 26, 1991, because it has failed to take into account considerations which were necessarily relevant i.e. following the rule of inviting tenders while granting the contract for a further period of five years on fresh terms and conditions and has taken into account irrelevant considerations that (i) if the contract is terminated and a decision is taken for a fresh tender, the UIP/UDI may put legal obstacles in retendering (ii) the response for printing free of cost and also paying the royalty may be poor (iii) the concept of the yellow pages may suffer a big set back and may make it unattractive to the advertisers because of the loss of confidence. MTNL should have been conscious of the fact that admittedly the UIP/UDI had miserably failed in performing their part of the contract for a period of five years, inasmuch as they were required to publish between the period 1987-1991 one issue of the main directory every year for Delhi and Bombay apart from supplementary. Instead of that they published for the year 1987 directories for Delhi and Bombay after a delay of seven months and six months respectively. The Delhi issue of directory for the year 1988 was published only in August, 1990. So far Bombay is concerned there was no publication for the years 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 The MTNL also overlooked the fact that the period of contract had already expired and as such the MTNL was in error in treating the supplemental agreement as only an extension of the original agreement. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants did not dispute and contest that by the supplemental agreement the period of contract which had expired in 1991 was extended up to 1997/1998 for printing the directories for Delhi and Bombay, and that the terms and conditions were different. For the period 1991-1997 additional royalty which had been agreed to be paid by the UDI/UIP/Sterling was only Rs. For the period 1991-1997 additional royalty which had been agreed to be paid by the UDI/UIP/Sterling was only Rs. 10 crores whereas the period 1987-1991 it was Rs. 20.16 crores. 28. Philanthropy is no part of the management of an undertaking while dealing with a contractor entrusted with the execution of a contract. The supply of the directories to public in time, was a public service which was being affected by the liberal attitude of the MTNL and due to the condonation of delay on the part of the UIP/UDI. There was no justification on the part of the MTNL to become benevolent by entering into the supplemental agreement with no apparent benefit to the MTNL, without inviting fresh tenders from intending persons to perform the same job for the next five years. Public authorities are essentially different from those of private persons. Even while taking decision in respect of commercial transactions a public authority must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant ones. If such decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which is ought not to have taken into account the ultimate decision is bound to be vitiated, even if it is established that such decision had been taken without bias. The contract awarded for the publication of the directories had not only a commercial object but had a public element at the same time i.e. to supply the directories to lakhs of subscribers of telephones in Delhi and Bombay, every year within the stipulated time free of cost. In such a situation MTNL could not exercise an unfettered discretion after the repeated breaches committed by UIP/UDI, by entering into a supplemental agreement with the Sterling for a fresh period of more than five years on terms which were only beneficial to UIP/UDI Sterling with corresponding no benefit to MTNL, which they have realised only after the High Court went into the matter in detail in its judgment under appeal. 29. The supplemental agreement is really a fresh agreement with fresh terms and conditions which has been entered by MTNL without inviting any tender for the same. 29. The supplemental agreement is really a fresh agreement with fresh terms and conditions which has been entered by MTNL without inviting any tender for the same. The supplemental agreement has been entered to benefit the parties who are admittedly defaulters by not publishing directories for Bombay for the years 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 and for Delhi for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991 although they had collected several crores of rupees for the advertisements for the directories to be published in the aforesaid years. We fail to understand as to how a fresh contract for a period upto 1997/1998 was awarded to UIP/UDI/Sterling in the garb of an agreement for extension of the period of the original agreement taking into account irrelevant factors as already enumerated above. If the supplemental agreement has been executed without following the procedures which are essential in view of the repeated pronouncements of this Court and taking into consideration irrelevant factors, then can it be said that "decision-making process before the supplemental agreement was entered into was consistent with the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution? In such a situation there is no scope for argument that any interference by Court shall amount to an intervention like a court of appeal. Once the process through which the supplemental agreement was executed is held to be against the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution, the supplemental agreement shall be deemed to be void. 39. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has also cited West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. and Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 451 , to advance the case of the Petitioners. 40. When a reference is made to both these decisions, it cannot be said that action of the Respondents was in any manner arbitrary or unjust calling for interference. 41. Reference is being now made to some other decisions of the Supreme Court. 42. In the case of Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, Represented by its Partner Shri Kasturi Lal, Jammu and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Another, (1980) 4 SCC 1 , It was held as under: 14. Where any Government action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest discussed above and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableness or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. Where any Government action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest discussed above and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableness or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. Such considerations may be that some directive principle is sought to be advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view to earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying out a welfare scheme for the benefit of a particular group or section of people deserving it or that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not otherwise fit to be given the contract or the property. We have referred to these considerations only illustratively, for there may be an infinite variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the could would have to decide whether the action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest. But one basic principle which must guide the court in arriving at its determination this question is that there is always a presumption that the Governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public interest. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the court by proper and adequate material. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the court by proper and adequate material. The court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is unreasonable or without public interest because, as we said above, there are a large number of public considerations which must necessarily weigh with the Government in taking action and therefore the court would not strike down Governmental action as invalid on this ground, unless it is clearly satisfied that the action is unreasonable or not in public interest. But where it is so satisfied, it would be the plainest duty of the court under the Constitution to invalidate the Governmental action. This is one of the most important functions of the court and also one of the most essential for preservation of the rule of law. It is imperative in a democracy governed by the rule of law that Governmental action must be kept within the limits of the law and if there is any transgression, the court must be ready to condemn it. It is a matter of historical experience that there is a tendency in every Government to assume more and more powers and since it is not an uncommon phenomenon in some countries that the legislative check is getting diluted, it is left to the court as the only other reviewing authority under the Constitution to be increasingly vigilant to ensure observance with the rule of law and in this task, the court must not flinch or falter. It may be pointed out that this ground of invalidity, namely, that the Governmental action is unreasonable or lacking in the quality of public interest, is different from that of mala fides though it may, in a given case, furnish evidence of mala fides. 15. The second limitation on the discretion of the Government in grant of largess is in regard to the persons to whom such largess may be granted. It is now well settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Ramana D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, that the Government is not free, like an ordinary individual, in selecting the recipients for its largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it pleases in its absolute and unfettered discretion. It is now well settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Ramana D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, that the Government is not free, like an ordinary individual, in selecting the recipients for its largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it pleases in its absolute and unfettered discretion. The law is now well established that the Government need not deal with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. Where the Government is dealing with the public whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with some standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The Government action must not be arbitrary or capricious, but must be based on some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. This rule was enunciated by the court as a rule of administrative law and it was also validated by the Court as an emanation following directly from the doctrine of equality embodies in Article 14. The court referred to the activist magnitude of Article 14 as evolved in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Maneka Gandhi case and observed that it must follow: as a necessary corollary from the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 that though the State is entitled to refuse to enter into relationship with anyone, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard or principle which meets that test of reasonableness and non-discrimination and any departure from such standard or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on some rational and non-discriminatory ground. (SCC p. 512, para 21). This decision has reaffirmed the principle of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in Governmental action which lies at the core of our entire constitutional scheme and structure. 43. In Tata Cellular Vs. (SCC p. 512, para 21). This decision has reaffirmed the principle of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in Governmental action which lies at the core of our entire constitutional scheme and structure. 43. In Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , while dealing with the scope of judicial review in the matter of Government contracts, vis-a-vis Article 14 of the Constitution of India, examined the matter in the light of its earlier decisions what is held and is relevant for the purpose of these writ petitions is as under: 69. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated, the following are the requisites of a valid tender: 1. It must be unconditional. 2. Must be made at the proper place. 3. Must conform to the terms of obligation. 4. Must be made at the proper time. 5. Must be made in the proper form. 6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations. 7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection. 8. Tender must be made to the proper person. 9. It must be of full amount. 70. It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review, Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. 71. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. 71. Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review. 72. Lord Scarman in Nottingshamshire County Council v. Secretary of State, for the Environment proclaimed: Judicial review' is a great weapon in the hands of the judges' but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power. Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say: If anyone were prompted to dismiss this stage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore, to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal In Butcher v. Pctrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18.3.1991. 73. Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has to contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restrains bear the halmarks of judicial control over administrative action. 74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself. 75. * * * * 76. * * * * 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its power? 2. committed an error of law, 3. 75. * * * * 76. * * * * 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its power? 2. committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its power. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly, but, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State, for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention." 78. What is this charming principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness? Is it a magical formula? In R. v. Askey, Lord Mansfield considered the question whether mandamus should be granted against the College of Physicians. He expressed the relevant principles in two eloquent sentences. They gained greater value two centries later: It is true, that the judgment and discretion of determining upon this skill, ability, learning and sufficiency to exercise and practise this profession is trusted to the College of Physicians and this Court will not take it from then, nor interrupt them in the due and proper exercise of it. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair, candid and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biased; much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike. 79. * * * * 80. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair, candid and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biased; much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike. 79. * * * * 80. At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. 1 pp. 849-850, may be quoted: 4. Wednesbury principle.--A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, per Lord Greene, M.R.). 81. * * * 82. * * * 83. * * * 84. * * * 85. * * * 86. * * * 87. * * * 88. We may now look at some of the pronouncements of this Court including the authorities cited by Mr. Ashoke Sen. Fasih Chaudhary v. Director General, Doordarshan, was a case in which the Court was concerned with the award of a contract for show of sponsored TV serial. At p. 92 in paragraphs 5 and 6 it was held thus: It is well settled that there should be fair play in action in a situation like the present one, as was observed by this Court in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana. It is also well settled that the authorities like Doordarshan should act fairly and their action should be legitimate and fair and transaction should be without any aversion, malice or affection. Nothing should be done which gives the impression of favouritism or nepotism. See the observations of this Court in Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corporation. While, as mentioned hereinbefore, fair play in action in matters like the present one is an essential requirement, similarly, however, free play in the joints is also a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere as the present one. Judged from that standpoint of view, though all the proposals might not have been considered strictly in accordance with order of predence, it appears that these were considered fairly, reasonably, objectively and without any malice or ill-will. 89. Judged from that standpoint of view, though all the proposals might not have been considered strictly in accordance with order of predence, it appears that these were considered fairly, reasonably, objectively and without any malice or ill-will. 89. In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, the concept of reasonableness in administrative law came to be dealt with elaborately by one of us, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was). In paragraphs 37 to 41 the Court observed thus: It was urged that the basic concept of the manner of the development of the real estate and disposal of occupancy rights were vitiated by unreasonableness. It is a truism, doctrinally, that powers must be exercised reasonably. But as Prof. Wade points out: The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the court's function to look further into its merits. With the question whether a particular policy is wise or foolish the court is not concerned; it can only interfere if to pursue it is beyond the powers of the authority.... In the arguments there is some general misapprehension of the scope of the reasonableness' test in administrative law. By whose standards of reasonableness that a matter is to be decided? Some phrases which pass from one branch of law to Anr. --as did the expression 'void' and 'voidable' from private law areas to public law situations--carry over with them meanings that may be in apposite in the changed context. Some such thing has happened to the words 'reasonable', 'reasonableness' etc. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail Road Co. Some phrases which pass from one branch of law to Anr. --as did the expression 'void' and 'voidable' from private law areas to public law situations--carry over with them meanings that may be in apposite in the changed context. Some such thing has happened to the words 'reasonable', 'reasonableness' etc. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail Road Co. Justice Frankfurter said: A phrase beings life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition' and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, indiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas. Different contexts in which the operation of 'reasonableness' as test of validity operates must be kept distinguished. For instance as the arguments in the present case invoke, the administrative law test of 'reasonableness' as the touchstone of validity of the impugned resolutions is different from the test of the 'reasonable man' familiar to the law of torts, whom English law figuratively identifies as the 'man on the Clapham omnibus'. In the latter case the standards of the 'reasonable man', to the extent such a 'reasonable man' is court's creation, is in a manner of saying, a mere transferred epithet. Lord Radcliffe observed: (All ER p. 160) By this time, it might seem that the parties themselves have become so far disembodied spirits that their actual persons should be allowed to rest in peace. In their place there rises the figure of the fair and reasonable man. And the spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who represents after all no more than the anthropomorphic conception of justice, is, and must be, the court itself.... (Emphasis supplied) See Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. Yet Anr. area of reasonableness which must be distinguished is the constitutional standards of 'reasonableness' of the restrictions on the fundamental rights of which the court of judicial review is the arbiter. The administrative law test of reasonableness is not by the standards of the 'reasonable man' of the torts law. Prof. Wade says: This is not therefore the standard of "the man on the Clapham omnibus." It is the standard indicated by a true construction of the Act which distinguishes between what the statutory authority may or may not be authorised to do. It distinguishes between proper use and improper abuse of power. Prof. Wade says: This is not therefore the standard of "the man on the Clapham omnibus." It is the standard indicated by a true construction of the Act which distinguishes between what the statutory authority may or may not be authorised to do. It distinguishes between proper use and improper abuse of power. It is often expressed by saying that the decision is unlawful if it is one to which no reasonable authority could have come. This is the essence of what is now commonly called "Wednesbury unreasonableness", after the now famous case in which Lord Grene, M.R. expounded it. (Emphasis supplied) 90. Referring to the doctrine of unreasonableness, Prof. Wade says in Administrative Law (supra): The point to note is that a thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because the court thinks it is unwise. 91. * * * 92. In Sterling Computers Limited v. M. and N. Publications Ltd., this Court observed thus : (SCC p. 455, para 12) In contracts having commercial element, some more discretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter into contracts with persons, keeping an eye on the augmentation of the revenue. But even in such matters they have to follow the norms recognised by courts while dealing with public property. It is not possible for courts to question and adjudicate every decision taken by an authority, because many of the Government Undertakings which in due course have acquired the monopolist position in matters of sale and purchase of products and with so many ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always possible to act like a quasi-judicial authority while awarding contracts. Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measure of freedom of 'play in the joints' to the executive. 93. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measure of freedom of 'play in the joints' to the executive. 93. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, this Court held thus : (SCC p. 515, para 9). ...The Government had the right to either accept or reject the lowest offer but that of course, if done on a policy, should be or. some rational and reasonable grounds. In Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 75, para 17) When the Government is trading with the public, "the democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions." The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. 94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. 44. Applying the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove, we are satisfied that no illegality muchless impropriety has been committed by Respondents No. 1 and 2 while allotting the vends in question in favour of Respondents No. 3 and 4 after negotiations as discussed hereinabove. 45. At the time of hearing in both these writ petitions, Mr. Chandel was asked that in the event of both these writ petitions being allowed, what relief can possibly be given to the Petitioners. Hesitantly, he stated that for the rest of the period i.e. from the date of decision of the writ petitions till 31.3.2002, all the vends which are the subject matter of these writ petitions, may be ordered to be transferred in favour of his clients on payment of proportionate licence fee which was offered by Respondents No. 3 and 4. This, according to Mr. Chandel would vindicate the stand of his clients and will also give justice to them. 46. In case the Petitioners were serious about the grievances as made by them in both these writ petitions, first and foremost thing they should have done, was to have given a better offer than what was offered by Respondents No. 3 and 4 alongwith with the petitions. Admittedly, no such offer was made. Thereafter, in both these writ petitions, least the Petitioners could do was to make their offer before this Court from the date of first hearing till the matter concluded, and to show their seriousness as well as bona fide. Mr. Chandel was also called upon to say what is the offer of his clients at this stage. He was unable to say anything in this behalf. 47. Mr. Chandel was also called upon to say what is the offer of his clients at this stage. He was unable to say anything in this behalf. 47. The acts of omission and commission coupled with the withdrawal/adjustments of the deposits made by the Petitioners, we are satisfied that these writ petitions have been filed without meaning anything serious. In case vends of the private Respondents are to be cancelled and are to be allotted to the Petitioners as was urged by Mr. Chandel, in no way public interest and/or interest of revenue will be served. Father it will mean that when at the price offered by the Respondents, Petitioners are allowed to run the vends, there is no illegality or arbitrariness, otherwise both these vices are there. 48. No other point is urged. 49. For the foregoing reasons and keeping in view the facts in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that both these writ petitions are without any substance. Consequently, these are dismissed with no order as to costs. Record produced by learned Advocate General has been returned to him. Registry is directed to place an authenticated copy of this judgment on the file of Civil Writ Petition No. 522 of 2002.