K. M. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) ). This Revision Application was filed by Maheshbhai Mansukhbhai Mistry and Madhuben Mansukhbhai Mistry somewhere in November 2001. The arguments were heard in December 2001. However, at the end of the arguments learned advocate for the petitioner has indicated that the parties may try to settle the matter and therefore, the court may not pronounce the judgment. In view of the same, the judgment was not pronounced through arguments were already heard and concluded. ( 2 ) ). On reopening of the court after winter holidays both Mr. M. B. Gandhi learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. J. T. Trivedi learned advocate for the respondents indicated that as the parties could not settle the matter, the court may pronounce the judgment. That is how, I am now pronouncing the judgment. ( 3 ) ). Maheshbhai Mansukhbhai Mistri and others the petitioners-original defendants tenants have filed this revision application challenging the judgment and decree dated 3. 10. 2001 passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1999. The Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad , has by its impugned judgment dismissed the appeal of the original defendants-petitioners and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 15. 3. 1999 passed by the Judge, Court of Small Causes, Court No. 9, Ahmedabad in HRP Suit No. 1478 of 1991 filed by the original plaintiffs-Damodarbhai Valjibhai Mistry and others. ( 4 ) ). The facts giving rise to this revision application are as under:4. 1 There is a premises situated at Ahmedabad in the city of Ahmedabad in Khadia Ward No. 1 bearing survey No. 2479 and Municipal Census No. 1564 of Sidi pole (hereinafter referred to as the suit premises ). 4. 2 Damodar Valjibhai Mistry, plaintiff no. 1, Prabhubhai Valjibhai Mistri, the plaintiff no. 2, Vasudev Valjibhai Mistri, plaintiff no. 3 and Mahesh Narandas Mistri plaintiff no. 4 had filed a suit against Maheshbhai Mansukhlal Mistry defendant no. 1 and Madhuben Mansukhbhai Mistri defendant no. 2 the heirs of Mansukhbhai Karshandas Mistry who recently died. In the said suit it was stated that the plaintiff are the owners of the suit premises in question and originally Mansukhbhai Narandas Mistri was a tenant of the suit premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 25. 00. . 1 and Madhuben Mansukhbhai Mistri defendant no. 2 the heirs of Mansukhbhai Karshandas Mistry who recently died. In the said suit it was stated that the plaintiff are the owners of the suit premises in question and originally Mansukhbhai Narandas Mistri was a tenant of the suit premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 25. 00. . As the defendants failed and neglected to pay the rent for last 6 months and the defendants have not paid the rent from 1. 1. 1991, the defendants are in arrears of rent and therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises. The plaintiffs are also staying in the premises situated at Khadia ward no. 1 bearing survey no. 2527 which is a very small premises and as the defendants are staying not in the suit premises they have already vacated and started staying in the premises at Isanpur, Ahmedabad. Therefore, the plaintiffs prayed that the suit premises may be ordered to be vacated and possession may be ordered to be handed over to the plaintiffs and in that case no hardship will be caused to the defendants because the defendants have already vacated the suit premises in question. The said suit was filed somewhere on 18. 7. 1991. 4. 3 The defendants filed reply contesting the suit and stated that the standard rent of the suit premises is Rs. 13. 00 p. m. The defendants denied the written statement that they are keeping the suit premises closed. It was stated that the closure of the suit premises was only casual. The plaintiffs have not demanded any rent in arrears and the plaintiffs have not given any notice and therefore, the suit may be dismissed. ( 5 ) ). Both the parties thereafter led evidence both oral and documentary before the Court and ultimately the Trial Court framed as many as 16 issues in this behalf. However, the Trial Court has held that the plaintiffs proved that the suit premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of 6 months immediately proceeding the date of the suit. The learned Trial Judge has also held that the plaintiffs proved that the defendants have acquired alternative and suitable premises. The learned Trial Judge has also held that the plaintiffs proved that the defendants have acquired alternative and suitable premises. The learned Trial Judge has also held that the suit is not barred by the period of limitation. The learned Trial Judge also rejected the contention of the defendants that the closure of the premises was only casual which they have raised in para 12 of the written statement and thereby the Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the suit premises in this behalf and ultimately, the Trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record was pleased to pass the judgment on 15. 3. 1999 and decreed the suit of the plaintiff and also ordered that the defendants shall hand over the vacant and peaaceful physical possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs-landlord in this behalf. ( 6 ) ). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the defendants-tenants filed Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1999 before the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad somewhere on 13. 4. 1999. ( 7 ) ). The Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes by its judgment and decree dated 3. 10. 2001 considered all the contentions of the tenant and confirmed the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge. The Appellate Bench has held that the learned Trial Judge has not committed any error in holding that the suit premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of six months immediately preceeding the date of the suit. The Appellate Bench also held that the learned Trial Judge has not committed any error in coming to the conclusion that the defendants have acquired vacant possession of the suitable residence as contended by the l;andlord in the plaint. The Appellate Bench has further held that the learned Trial Judge has not erred in passing a decree for eviction inspite of the fact that the property is sold by the original plaintiffs nos 1,2 and 3 to plaintiff no. 4 during the pendency of the suit. ( 8 ) ). Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes the petitioners-tenants have filed the present revision application before this court somewhere in November 2001. 4 during the pendency of the suit. ( 8 ) ). Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes the petitioners-tenants have filed the present revision application before this court somewhere in November 2001. Mr. M. B. Gandhilearned advocate for the petitioners has raised the following contentions in this behalf:a) That Damodar Valjibhai Mistri, Prabhubhhai Valjibhai Mistri and Vasudev Valjibhai Mistri were the original owners of the suit premises. Said property was sold to Mahesh Narandas Mistri and pursuant to the said sale deed original landlord Mahesh Narandas Mistry cannot file a suit for eviction against the tenant because the right to sue has not been assigned by respondents nos 1 to 3 in favour of the respondent no. 4. B) That respondents nos 1 to 3 original landlord must assign the right to sue in favour of the respondent no. 4 then and then only present suit is maintainable at law. In support of the aforesaid contentions he has relied upon the judgment of Masdhya Peradesh High Court reported in 1997 (2) RCJ 487 in the case of Smt. Manju Tiwari vs. Harprasad Rasgai. ( 9 ) ). Learned advocate for the petitioner further stated that in this case Maheshbhai Mansukhlal Mistri died ion 2. 7. 1991 and present suit has been filed on 18. 7. 1991. The suit was filed against the widow of the deceased and sons of the deceased without any application being filed under section 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act and therefore, also the suit is not maintainable at law. In support of the aforesaid contention the learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of this court reported in 1984 GLH (UJ) 64. ( 10 ) ). He further submitted that in the present case before filing the suit the landlord has not addressed any notice for arrears of rent or terminating the tenancy as contemplated by section 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act and therefor the suit is not maintainable. In support of the above contention he has relied upon the judgment of this court reported in 2001 (2) GLH 1615 in the case of Shantaben Harilal Brahmbhatt vs. Hasmukhlal Maneklal Chokshi. ( 11 ) ). In support of the above contention he has relied upon the judgment of this court reported in 2001 (2) GLH 1615 in the case of Shantaben Harilal Brahmbhatt vs. Hasmukhlal Maneklal Chokshi. ( 11 ) ). As regards notice point is concerned, this court after considering the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal reported in AIR 1979 SC 1745 has observed in its judgment in the case of Shantaben Harilal Brahmbhatt (supra) has observed in para 12. 2 as under:" In my opinion, the sum and substance of the decision is that the determination of the lease is unnecessary, (since it is considered to be superfluous by the Supreme Court) in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, if terminated according to the State Act. The crucial distinction in the instant case is that Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act does not contemplate determination of the lease in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It merely contemplates that the notice issued under Sec. 12 (2) must be served in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion therefore, this decision cannot be read so as to mean that the statutory notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act does not contemplate the termination of tenancy under any law, or even under the Rent Act. It also requires to be noted that the Transfer of Property Act is a Central Act, whereas the Bombay Rent Act is a State ACt. In any concurrent filed of legislation the provisions of a State Act cannot override the provisions of a Central Act, in case of conflict or inconsistency. Thus, the termination of tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act can only be considered superfluous if such termination of tenancy is necessary under any State ACt. This presupposes that the State ACt contemplates termination of tenancy, otherwise there is no redundancy. As already observed hereinabove Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act does not contemplate a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act but only services in the manner laid down in Sec. 106. This presupposes that the State ACt contemplates termination of tenancy, otherwise there is no redundancy. As already observed hereinabove Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act does not contemplate a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act but only services in the manner laid down in Sec. 106. If this interpretation of the landlord in respect of this decision were to be accepted it would mean that no termination of tenancy is necessary, neither under the Transfer of Property Act nor under the Bombay Rent Act. Such an interpretation of this decision is just not possible. " ( 12 ) ). Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that in this case the tenants have acquired suitable alternative accommodation somewhere in the year 1978; whereas the present suit has been filed in the year 1991 and therefore, the suit is bad on account of delay, laches and also on the ground of waiver. ( 13 ) ). As against this Mr. J. T. Trivedi learned advocate for the respondents submitted that in this case it is not true that the respondents - landlord Damodarbhai Valjibhai Mistry, Prabhubhai Damodarbhai Valjibhai Mistry and Vasudevbhai Damodarbhai Valjibhai Mistry were not the owners of the premises in question. However, all the three have sold the premises on 23. 5. 1995 in question to Maheshbhai Naranbhai Mistry. Originally the suit was filed by the three respondents-plaintiffs and thereafter the name of respondent-plaintiff no. 4 was added and thus all the four respondents have continued the proceedings in this behalf. ( 14 ) ). Mr. Trivedi learned advocate for the respondents submitted that on 7. 9. 1995 an application was filed by the original plaintiffs in which original respondents nos 1 to 3 stated that they have sold this premises to Maheshbhai Naranbhai Mistri with all rights by a sale deed in this behalf. The sale deed is dated 23. 5. 1995 and therefore, Maheshbhai Naranbhai may be included as plaintiff no. 4 in this behalf. Copy of the said application was served on the defendant-tenant and thereafter the learned Judge has passed an order on 25. 10. 1996 allowing the said application which is at exh. 28. In view of the aforesaid factual position it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner-tenants to say that the respondents landlords cannot institute the suit in this behalf. 10. 1996 allowing the said application which is at exh. 28. In view of the aforesaid factual position it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner-tenants to say that the respondents landlords cannot institute the suit in this behalf. In view of the aforesaid position the first contention of the defendants that the present suit is not maintainable by the plaintiffs cannot be accepted in this behalf. ( 15 ) ). As regards the second contention of application under section 5 (11) (c)) of the Act is concerned learned advocate for the landlord has invited my attention to the recent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Chintaman Juker and ors. vs. Kishore Pandurang Mantri and anor. reported in AIR 2001 SC 2251 and in para 10 of its judgment the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:"10. In sub-section (11) of Section 5 of the Act the expression tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and include (a) such sub-tenants and otherpersons as have derived title under a tenant before the coming into operation of this Act; (b) any person remaining after the determination of the lease in possession with or without the assent of the landlord, of the premises leased to such person or his predecessor who has derived title before coming into operation of this Act; (c) any member of the tenants family residing with him at the time of his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court. The language of the provision indicates that the definition of the term is an inclusive one and wide in its amplitude. In the present case we are concerned with Clause (c) of sub section (11) of Section 5 which provides that tenant includes any member of the tenants family residing with him at the time of his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court. There are two requisites which must be fulfilled before a person is entitled to be called tenant under sub-clause (c) first he must be a member of the tenants family and secondly he must have been residing with the tenant at the time of his death. There are two requisites which must be fulfilled before a person is entitled to be called tenant under sub-clause (c) first he must be a member of the tenants family and secondly he must have been residing with the tenant at the time of his death. Besides fulfilling these conditions he must have been agreed upon to be a tenant by the members of the tenants family; in default of such agreement the decision of the Court shall be binding on such members. The further question that arises of consideration is whether a member of the family of the original tenant who claims to have been residing with the tenant at the time of his death can resist execution of a decree passed against a member of the tenants family who indisputably was accepted by the landlord as a tenant on the death of the original tenant" ( 16 ) ). He has also relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this court in the case of Babubhai @ Jayantilal Kalyanbhai and ors. vs Shah Bharatkumar Ratilal and ors. reported in 1980 (21) GLR 103. In this judgment the Full Bench has considered section 5 (11) (c) and various English authorities in this behalf. In para 26 ( on page 129) of its judgment , this Court has observed as under:"in our opinion, the course prescribed by the Division Bench is Nanumals case is not only unwarranted under the Act and the Rules but would be detrimental to the interest of the causes of the landlords as well as tenants. In that view of the matter, therefore, the view of the Division Bench of this Court in Nanumals case that all the proceedings under the Rent Act would be premature till the question about who is the rightful successor tenant is determined by the appropriate proceedings is not correct and the course of action which we have set out above commands itself to us as appropriate and legal course which Courts should adopt when a question as to who is a rightful successor tenant arises before them in the proceedings under the Rent Act. " ( 17 ) ). Mr. " ( 17 ) ). Mr. Trivedi learned advocate for the respondents stated that the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise this contention of validity of Notice at this stage because the tenant has not raised any contention regarding the validity and legality of the suit notice before the Trial Court and no issue has been raised in this behalf by the learned Trial Court and there is no finding by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes in this behalf. Over and above he further submitted that in the present case the landlord has filed the suit on the ground of section 13 (1) (k) and (l) i. e. the premises have not been used by the defendants without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the suit and also on the ground that the tenant has acquired vacant suitable alternative residence. In support of this contention Mr. Trivedi learned advocate for the respondents has also relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Babubhai @ Jayantilal Kalyanbhai and ors. vs. Shah Bharatkumar Ratilal and ors. reported in 21 GLR page 103 and particularly page 128 of the judgment in which it has been observed as under:". . . A further question is likely to arise as to what procedure should be followed if there is a default of agreement amongst the qualified members as prescribed in sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act. The Division Bench of this Court in Nanumals case (supra) has ruled that if such qualified members fail to agree or communicate their agreed decision, it would be open to the landlord to ask them to suggest the name to whom he should transmit the tenancy. If they fail to communicate their decision within reasonable time, the landlord has to move the Court for declaration as to who should be treated as transmitted tenant. But before this decision is made by the Court, no further action can be taken by the landlord and any action before taking proper proceedings as contemplated by sec. If they fail to communicate their decision within reasonable time, the landlord has to move the Court for declaration as to who should be treated as transmitted tenant. But before this decision is made by the Court, no further action can be taken by the landlord and any action before taking proper proceedings as contemplated by sec. 5 (11) (c) (i) would be prematured and must fail, and unless the Court determines as to who is a transmitted tenant, no liability to payment rent would arise and consequently, therefore, a statutory notice as contemplated under sec. 12 which is a condition precedent to initiate the eviction proceedings on the ground of arrears of rent can be served since it is the primary duty of the landlord to get this question of transmission of tenancy determined one way or the other. We are afraid that there is no warrant for the above view which the Division Bench of this Court in Nanumals case has taken. The support which the Division Bench in Nanumals case has found for its view for the requirement of a statutory notice under sec. 12 as a condition precedent to the initiation of eviction proceedings, with respect not well founded. The obligation of determination of the question of successor tenant is not only on the landlord. It may be in a given case on a person claiming the tenanted rights as successor tenant arises and is determined before the initiation of the eviction suit or any other proceedings, it would be in the interest of a landlord or a tenant, as the case may be since this decision at a late stage in a proceedings or a suit under the Rent Act may require in ai given case to support the proceedings afresh if the plaintiff or the applicant is ultimately held to be not a successor tenant. " ( 18 ) ). As regards the contention regarding limitation and waiver the learned advocate for the respondent landlord has invited my attention to the discussion made by the Trial Court as regards the issue of limitation in para 8 of the judgment of the TrialCourt. He has relied upon the judgment of this court reported in (1998) 39 GLR 1650 in the case of Suryakant Kanji Bheda vs. Hemlataben Indukumar Rajania and particularly para 5 of the judgment (on page 1655) which reads as under:"5. He has relied upon the judgment of this court reported in (1998) 39 GLR 1650 in the case of Suryakant Kanji Bheda vs. Hemlataben Indukumar Rajania and particularly para 5 of the judgment (on page 1655) which reads as under:"5. It may be mentioned that formerly in such suits the cause of action was considered to be the termination of tenancy as made clear by the High Court of Bombay in Zainab Bai wife of Hussainbhai Ebrahim and ors. vs. Navayug Chitrapat Co. Ltd. AIR 1969 Bombay 194; but after the Supreme Court made the law clear in V. Dhanpal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal AIR 1979 SC 1745 cause of action will not be the termination of tenancy. As the law made clear by the Supreme Court, notice terminating the tenancy as per sec. 106 of Transfer of Property Act is not required to be given because the tenant is protected by the Rent Legislations of different States. When in law notice terminating the tenancy is not required to be given the cause of action in such suits arises from the day when the incident attracting any of the grounds available to the landlord to seek decree of eviction against the tenant in the Bombay Rent Act and forfeiting tenants right to be in possession occurs. Such position of law emerging because of the law made clear in V. Dhanpals case (supra) is also clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari vs. Hem Chand M. Singhania AIR 1987 SC 1823 holding that because of the Rent Acts in different States the tenancy is not required to be terminated giving the notice and hence the termination of the tenancy would not provide the cause of action but the grounds provided in the Bombay Rent Act or the concerned Rent Act would provide the cause of action because the landlord would be entitled to the decree of eviction not by terminating of the tenancy but by any of the grounds in the Rent Act is available to him or the tenants commit the breach of any of the provisions of the rent Act applicable. Thereafter discussing Secs. 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act it is made clear that for the suits to recover the possession of the premises let to the tenant Art. . Thereafter discussing Secs. 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act it is made clear that for the suits to recover the possession of the premises let to the tenant Art. . 67 or 66 of the Limitation Act as the case may be will apply and not Art. 113 of the Limitation Act because there is no scope to apply Art. 113. As per Art. 67 if the landlord has to recover the possession from the tenant, the suit has to be filed within a period of 12 years from the day the tenancy is terminated. In the suit to recover possession of the rented premises as made clear by the Supreme Court in the case of V. Dhanpal Chettiar (supra) notice terminating the tenancy is not necessary The question is therefore, raised how the period of 12 years to be reckoned for the purpose of preferring the suits to recover the possession of the rented premises from the tenant? The Supreme Court in the just referred case of Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari (supra)) has made clear that Art. 66 will also apply which provides that the suit has to be filed within the period of 12 years to be reckoned from the day when the forfeiture is incurred or the condition is not observed or fulfilled by the tenant. The forfeiture comes into being when the incident attracting any of the grounds on which the landlord becomes entitled to claim possession occurs. In the case on hand as alleged the petitioner acquired the residential quarter at Mandvi in 1984 and since then he is not using the suit premises. The respondent has therefore comeforward with the case that in the year 1984 AD the incident covered by both the grounds available for seeking the decree of eviction occurred. The period of 12 years limitation in this case therefore, began to run from 1984 AD. The suit was therefore, required to be filed latest by 1966 AD, instead that the suit is filed in 1990 AD. It, therefore, follows that the suit is filed within the period of limitation, the same is not barred by the period of limitation. On the ground of limitation, therefore the suit does not fail. " ( 19 ) ). The suit was therefore, required to be filed latest by 1966 AD, instead that the suit is filed in 1990 AD. It, therefore, follows that the suit is filed within the period of limitation, the same is not barred by the period of limitation. On the ground of limitation, therefore the suit does not fail. " ( 19 ) ). As regards the issue of limitation the learned advocate for the respondents submitted that the petitioners-defendants have obtained vacant possession of the suitable residence has been obtained somewhere in 1982 and therefore, the present suit which is filed in the year 1991 is maintainable at law. There is a clear finding of fact arrived at by the Trial Court which has not been assailed before the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes by the tenants in this behalf and therefore in any view of the matter, there is no substance in the contention raised in this behalf. substance in the contention raised in this behalf. ( 20 ) ). He has further submitted that this issue of waiver has been rightly considered by the Trial Court and the same has not been pressed before the Appellate Bench and therefore is no substance in the contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner in this behalf. He has also relied upon the book of M. C. Rayajiwala on Bombay Rent Act in which the learned author has observed on page 159 regarding Waiver and Rent Act as under:"waiver is an international relinquishment of a known right or advantage, claim benefit or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed. Such cases arise when the landlord waives his right to take possession, even after the breach of certain terms and conditions of lease deed, which provided that the tenant forfeits his right to hold the property on such breach. To quote Justice Chaglathe law with regard to waiver is to be found in S. 63 of Contract Act 1872. No agreement between the parties is necessary for the purpose of attracting the application of the section. A promisee can only dispense with the performance of the promise by a voluntary conscious Act. It must be an affirmative act on his part. A mere omission to assert his rights or insist upon his rights cannot amount to a dispensation within the meaning of the section. A promisee can only dispense with the performance of the promise by a voluntary conscious Act. It must be an affirmative act on his part. A mere omission to assert his rights or insist upon his rights cannot amount to a dispensation within the meaning of the section. Even negligence to assert his rights although it might in certain cases result in estoppel cannot amount to a dispensation within the meaning of the section. An estoppel can only come into play it by the plaintiffs conduct the deft. has changed his position in any way to his prejudice (Phoenix Mills Ltd. V M. H. Dinshaw and Co. , 48 Bom. L. R. 313)MUDHOLKAR J. speaking for the Bench in another case observed:"waiver is a matter of intention and can be either express or implied. Whether it is one or the other, it must be deliberate in the sense that the party waiving aright should after applying his mind to the matter decide to abandon the right. In order to infer waiver some positive act on the part of the party which is supposed to have waived is necessary. A mere delay in doing a particular act or in raising ai particular objection would not of itself justify an inference of waiver (Narayan Badlaji V. State of Bombay, 59 Bom. LR 532)IN one case (Girjashanker Tiwari V. Hirday Rajan Chakrabarty, AIR 1989 SC 151 ) before S. C. the facts were that Aushadhalaya was a tenant from 1946-47. Aushadhalaya was closed from 1976. Hirday Ranjan Chakrabarty, an employee of Aushadhalaya was occupying the premises to the knowledge of the landlord. Hirday used to pay rent but in the name of Aushadhalaya. Rent Controller on application for eviction filed by the landlord on 26. 4. 80, held that there is deemed vacancy and ordered eviction. High Court of Allahabad reversed that order, holding Hirday as a tenant. The S. C. reversing the judgment of the High Court and restoring that of Rent Controller, held thatan employee without the consent, though, perhaps with knowledge of landlord was occupying the premises but in that case it cannot be held that there is no deemed vacancy. . . Landlord knew that there was a change in the occupation but the landlord did not consent as there was no evidence and Hirday. . . has not said that there was a change of tenancy. . . Landlord knew that there was a change in the occupation but the landlord did not consent as there was no evidence and Hirday. . . has not said that there was a change of tenancy. The premises indubitably, was occupied by a person other than the tenant without his consent but perhaps with the knowledge of the landlordthe decision of S. C. clearly show that the right which the landlord possessed for getting vacancy possession, is not waived by mere knowledge of occupation by another, or , by forbearance on his part to take action immediately. If the waiver was involuntary or caused by mistake or misrepresentation as to facts, there was no intentional relinquishment. (P. Das Muni Reddy V. P. Appa Rao AIR 1974 SC 2089 (91 ). Waiver of notice to quit is by a voluntary action of the landlord, either by giving another notice to quit or by acceptance of rent after the period of notice. This waiver of notice may be good under T. P. Act but after the advent of Rent Restriction Acts, the tenant remains in occupation, after determination of lease, as a statutory tenant and hence mere acceptance of rent after such determination would not be a waiver of notice (Kaikhushroo V. Jerbai, AIR 1949 FC 200 (204)" . ( 21 ) ). Learned advocate for the respondents submitted that in the suit there is a specific issue before the Trial Court as to whether the suit is bad by delay, laches, acquiescence and/or estoppel which was not pressed by the tenants before the Trial Court. ( 22 ) ). My conclusions : I have considered the evidence on record, the findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court in this behalf. I have also considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned counsel for the respondents in this behalf. As regards the maintainability of the petition is concerned, originally the plaintiffs nos 1,2 and 3 have sold the property to plaintiff no. 4 and thereafter an application was filed in the court and copy of the same was served on the tenant and thereafter the Court has passed an order below the said Application allowing the said application. As regards the maintainability of the petition is concerned, originally the plaintiffs nos 1,2 and 3 have sold the property to plaintiff no. 4 and thereafter an application was filed in the court and copy of the same was served on the tenant and thereafter the Court has passed an order below the said Application allowing the said application. In view of the same, in my view there is no substance in the contention that the plaintiffs have no right to file a suit. It may be noted that in this case the plaintiffs nos 1,2 and 3 as well as plaintiff no. 4 are on record. 22. 1 As regards section 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act regarding transmission of tenancy is concerned I have considered the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Kishore Pandurang Mantri (supra) and also the Full Bench judgment of this court in Babubhai Jayantilal (supra ). The contention of the tenant regarding maintainability of section 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act cannot be entertained because in this case the tenant had already expired and his son and widow are joined as parties to the suit from the date when the suit was filed and therefore there is no question of any separate application to be filed under section 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 23 ) ). The point regarding notice is concerned, the tenant has not been able to raise this point before the Trial Court and there is no finding of the Trial Court as well as Appellate Court in this behalf. In my view, the landlord has filed the suit under section 13 (1) (k) and (l) of the Bombay Rent Act i. e. the premises have not been used by the defendants without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the suit and also on the ground that the tenant has acquired vacant suitable alternative residence. In view of the same the contention raised by the plaintiff regarding notice particularly relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Shantaben Harilal Brahmbhatt (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case because in that case the suit was filed for arrears of rent which is not the case here. In view of the same the contention raised by the plaintiff regarding notice particularly relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Shantaben Harilal Brahmbhatt (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case because in that case the suit was filed for arrears of rent which is not the case here. ( 24 ) ). As regards limitation I have considered the judgment of this Court in the case of Suryakant Kanji Bheda (supra) andalso the record of this case. Moreover, factually the defendant has obtained vacant possession of the suitable alternative premises in 1982; whereas the suit has been filed in the year 1991 and therefore, the suit is maintainable. Therefore, the defendant cannot succeed in the said point in this behalf. 24. 1 As regards waiver is concerned, I have considered the commentary on Bombay Rent Act written by Mr. M. C. Rayajiwala more particularly the decisions cited therein and therefore, there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner in this behalf and in fact it is rightly considered by the Trial Court which has not been pressed before the Appellate Court and therefore also there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner in this behalf. ( 25 ) ). I confirm the finding of the Trial Court in this behalf. In my view the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court have given cogent and convincing reasons for arriving at the said finding and therefore, I do not see any reason to interfere with the said finding in this behalf. In the circumstances the Revision Application is dismissed summarily. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1999 on 3. 10. 2001 is confirmed. No order as to costs. I have given reasons for the dismissal of this Civil Revision Application in view of the fact that the Revision Application was heard for a long time. ( 26 ) ). Mr. Gandhi learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that he may be given sometime for vacating and handing over vacant possession of the suit premises. I have given reasons for the dismissal of this Civil Revision Application in view of the fact that the Revision Application was heard for a long time. ( 26 ) ). Mr. Gandhi learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that he may be given sometime for vacating and handing over vacant possession of the suit premises. The suit has been filed in the year 1991 and the tenants have already acquired suitable alternative accommodation in the year 1982 and the present premises is remaining closed. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner-defendants tenants are given time of two months for handing over vacant and peaceful possession to the respondents-landlords. .