JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This revision is directed against the order dated 10.10.2001, passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Solan in case No. 8/10 of 1999. Petitioner is the landlady and is being referred hereinafter as such. Respondent was inducted as a tenant and is also being referred to herein-after as such. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this case are that premises described as shop No. 1, detailed in agreement dated 1.3.1992 (entered into between the parties) was let out for a period of seven years. Agreement to this effect was entered into between the parties, a copy whereof is on the file as Annexure PI A. After entering into this agreement, petitioner filed an application before the Rent Controller for taking his permission for letting out the said premises to the respondent. This resulted in passing of the order dated 6.3.1992 by the Rent Controller below. Copies of the application for permission, statement of the parties and order of the Rent Controller are annexed as Annexures PIB, PIC and PID respectively. 3. It appears that after some time tenant started carrying on vegetable business in the premises in question, as such landlady filed a suit for declaration and injunction. This was registered as case No. 142/1 of 93 and copy of the plaint is Ex. P2/A. It seems that during the pendency of the suit parties entered into a memorandum of agreement vide Annexure P2/B, which was followed by statements of the counsel for the parties vide Annexure P2/ C. In terms of this memorandum of agreement and statement of learned Counsel for the parties recorded vide Annexure P2C, trial court decreed the suit. 4. This memorandum of agreement was referred to as compromise in the judgment as Ex. PI. It was to form part of the decree. Terms of this agreement, Annexure (Ex. P-l) are as under: This memorandum witnesses as under: 1. That 2nd party has no objection if suit is decreed as prayed for except that decree will not be executed /or will be executable before 28.2.1999 and tenancy is declared illegal. 2. That 2nd party will hand over vacant possession of the premises on 28.2.1999, all persons, successors or any person whosoever steps under 2nd party will be bound by this agreement and so first party. 3. That 2nd party will continue to pay Rs. 2. That 2nd party will hand over vacant possession of the premises on 28.2.1999, all persons, successors or any person whosoever steps under 2nd party will be bound by this agreement and so first party. 3. That 2nd party will continue to pay Rs. 1,000 p.m. for use and occupation of the premises till the same is vacated, as mesne profit. 4. That 2nd party and 1st party agree that order dated 6.3.1992 is wrong and illegal and pray for setting aside the same. The possession of 2nd party will be in accordance with this memorandum of this agreement. 5. After 28.2.1999 landlady sued out execution which was registered as case No. 8/10 of 1999. When put to notice tenant filed objections under Section 47 of the CPC which have been allowed by the learned trial Court and thus execution has been dismissed by means of impugned order. 6. In these circumstances, Mr. Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the landlady submitted that trial court could not have entertained the objections what to talk of allowing those. It was submitted that tenant after having , availed the benefit of the terms of memorandum of agreement followed by judgment and decree in terms thereof, vide Annexure P2/D was precluded to raise any objection against executability of the decree. With a view to take advantage of the compromise, Mr. Thakur placed reliance on a number of decisions to which a reference will be made hereinafter. 7. All these pleas have been controverted by Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant. He submitted that looking to the relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties, his client only objected to the enforcement of the order passed in terms of the memorandum of agreement supra after 28.2.1999. He stated that its result would be as if no fixed terms tenancy under Section 17 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 was created. Even by raising the objection under Section 47 CPC taking shelter under Section 14(1) of the Act tenant not only admitted, but also conceded that there exists relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. As also the fact that his clients eviction if can be ordered, is only in terms of Section 14(2) onwards of the Act supra. 8. Even by raising the objection under Section 47 CPC taking shelter under Section 14(1) of the Act tenant not only admitted, but also conceded that there exists relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. As also the fact that his clients eviction if can be ordered, is only in terms of Section 14(2) onwards of the Act supra. 8. For ready reference Section 14(1) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 relied upon by the Trial Court as well as pressed into service at the time of hearing by learned Counsel for the tenant is extracted here-in-below: Section 14(1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise, whether before or after the termination of tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Thus he has prayed for dismissal of this revision petition with costs through out. 9. In Krishna Kashinath Patil v. S. Mohandas Kamath, 2002 All India High Court Cases 578, Bombay High Court was dealing with a compromise decree and its execution that was entered into between the parties where premises were governed by provisions of the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. It was during the pendency of the case that the compromise was arrived at. This decision is wholly inapplicable as in the revision under consideration parties had got the order dated 6.3.1992 set aside. 10. Similarly in Carona Sahu and Co. Ltd. v. S. Anandavadivelu and others, (2002) 5 SCC 351, time was sought after revision petition was dismissed by High Court to vacate the premises. After availing advantage of the time granted on the prayer of the petitioner-tenant in the case, Supreme Court did not allow the tenant to file the SLR 11. 10. Similarly in Carona Sahu and Co. Ltd. v. S. Anandavadivelu and others, (2002) 5 SCC 351, time was sought after revision petition was dismissed by High Court to vacate the premises. After availing advantage of the time granted on the prayer of the petitioner-tenant in the case, Supreme Court did not allow the tenant to file the SLR 11. In J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. and others v. M.R. Murali and another, (2002) 3 SCC 98, while dealing with a case of denial of title under T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 it was observed that where the denial of title or claim for permanent tenancy of the tenant was not bonafide, order of eviction of the tenant was to be passed, but if he found otherwise, he was to reject the application of the landlord and in such a situation bar of civil Courts jurisdiction would stand lifted and landlord could approach the said court. 12. In Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad and another, (2002) 1 SCC 90, it was held that since Rent Controller had limited jurisdiction to try suits specified in the rent statute, as such, it could not pass a decree on any ground other than one specified in the statute concerned. 13. In J.P. Anand v. D.G. Baffna, (2002) 1 SCC 482, while dealing with a case of limited tenancy under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) it was held that relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was condition precedent for entertaining petition under Section 14 of the Act. In Roshan Lai and another v. Madan Lal and others, (1975) 2 SCC 785, it was held that an eviction decree passed on compromise between the parties if made out on the basis of the pleadings and compromise, then the same being lawful, decree could follow. 14. Again in Suleman Noormohamed and others v. Umarbhai Jannbhai, (1978) 2 SCC 179, where decree was passed on compromise looking to the facts of the case under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 supra, it was held that the decree was not a nullity and was thus executable. 15. A reference to the aforesaid decisions clearly indicates that the orders were passed by the authorities under rent legislation of different States. 15. A reference to the aforesaid decisions clearly indicates that the orders were passed by the authorities under rent legislation of different States. It was during the course of proceedings under those Acts that compromise decree/orders were passed, and the Supreme Court dealt with the matter in that context except the first cause of Bombay High Court. In this case also it was in the course of proceedings under the Rent Act that compromise was arrived at. As such none of these decisions are applicable so far present case is concerned. Reason being that when compromise was arrived at it was during the course of the proceedings under the special statute i.e. the Rent Act. None of these decisions are attracted to the facts of the present case. 16. Proceedings in this revision were initiated initially under Section 17 of the H.R Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 seeking permission of the Court. Such permission was granted by the Rent Controller to create fixed term tenancy for seven years i.e. upto 28.2.1999. This was preceded by an agreement between the parties as noted hereinabove. Both the agreement as well as order of the Rent Controller were got declared null and void. In terms of the memorandum of agreement in suit as extracted here-in-above parties agreed that the order dated 6.3.1992 was wrong and illegal and had prayed for setting aside the same. This was confirmed by the statement of learned Counsel for the parties and decree followed in terms thereof. It was declared illegal. 17. While objecting to the execution proceedings launched by the landlady, tenant took shelter under Section 14(1) supra. In these circumstances, decisions relied upon by Mr. Thakur as referred to here-in-above do not in any manner advance the case of the landlady. Once this conclusion is arrived, then it cannot be said that trial court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. Resultantly stand of the respondent that he can only be evicted as per provisions of Section 14(2) onwards of the H.R Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 is upheld. No other point is urged. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no merit in this revision petition, which is accordingly dismissed after it was formally admitted and heard at the joint prayer of the learned Counsel for the parties. No costs. Revision dismissed.-