Per T. S. Doabia, Judge (Oral): The circumstances under which this Letters Patent Appeal has come to be filed, be noticed: Mohmmed Maqbool Rather met with an accident. He sought remedies under the Workmens Compensation Act 1923 (hereinafter -referred to be as Act). The Commissioner under the Act found justification in the claim lodged by Mohmmad Maqbool Rather (hereinafter to be referred as `Workman). Compensation of Rs 75,348/- was allowed and order to this effect was Passed on 3.12.1991. The amount was to be deposited within a period of thirty days. This was not done. The Workman received the compensation on 05-05-1994 This led the Workman to prefer another Petition. He sought assistance of Section 4-A(3) of the Act. The argument put across was that as the compensation was not paid within thirty days as directed vide order dated 03-12-1991, therefore, the penal provisions of Section 4-A would be attracted. This plea found favour with the Commissioner under the Act. A sum of Rs.55,757/- has been allowed. This represents 50% of the amount of compensation and also interest at the rate of 6% per annum. This order was challenged in this Court. The learned Single Judge of the Court came to the conclusion that no question of law arises. Appeal was dismissed. The employer has come with this LPA. 2. The short question which is required to be governed is as to whether the provisions of Section 4-A(3) are available once a decision is given under Section 4-A. This would necessarily require examination as to what is meant by the terms, "Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act." These are the words used in Section 4-A(3) of the Act. For facility of reference it would be apt to notice this statutory provision which is reproduced below :-- "4-A (3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date if fell due, the Commissioner Shall -- (a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification in the official Gazette on the amount due; and (b) if, in his opinion, there is no justification for the delays, direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears and interest thereon, pay a further slum not exceeding fifty percent of such amount by way of penalty: Provided that an order for the payment of penalty shall not be passed under clause (b) without giving a reasonable opportunity to the employer to show cause why it should not be passed." The legal proposition is well settled. Compensation falls due as soon as accident take place causing death or loss or disablement to the employer. The liability of the employer arises as soon as an injury is caused and not on a subsequent occassion. This is apparent from the plain reading of Section 4-A(3) of the Act. The judicial precedent in this regard can be cited. In Janatha Modern Rice Mills v. Satyanarayana, 1995 Labour Industrial Cases 677, the Commissioner under the Act allowed interest at the rate of 16% per annum. However, penalty was not allowed. The argument put across was that penalty should also have been allowed. The Andhra Pradesh High Court was of the opinion that the Commissioner cannot allow interest at the rate of 16%, as under the Act, simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum can be allowed and as penalty was not allowed, therefore, question of allowing penalty would not arise. The fact that the compensation becomes due as soon as accident takes place and when injury is caused and not on any subsequent occassion is no longer res integra . Other decisions on the point are quoted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in para 9 of the aforesaid judgement. These are as:-- 1. The fact that the compensation becomes due as soon as accident takes place and when injury is caused and not on any subsequent occassion is no longer res integra . Other decisions on the point are quoted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in para 9 of the aforesaid judgement. These are as:-- 1. Pratap Narain Singh v. Sri Nivas, AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 222; 2. Margarida Gomes v. M.Mackenzie and Co., AIR 1968 Bombay 328:1968 Lab IC 1197; 3. Saraswati Press v. Nand Ram, 1971 ACJ 316: 1971 Lab IC 1341; 4. Smt. Vimlaben Vashrambhai v. The Gujrat Housing Board, 1975 ACJ 84; 5. Jayamma v. Executive Engineer, PWD, 1982 Lab IC NOC 61 : 1982 ACJ 361; 6. Ramlal v. Regional Manager Food Corportaion of India, Jaipur, 1981 Lab IC 1281; 7. Vijay Ram v. Janak Raj 1981 Lab IC 143:1981 ACJ 84; 8. Ram Dulari Kalia v. H.P.S.E Board, Shimla, 1987 Lab IC 748; 9. U.P. State Transport Corporation v. Abdul Hameed, 1985 (50) FLR 92. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that once the petition was decided under Section 4 of the Act and penalty and interest was not allowed, then better course was to challenge the order but when it was not challenged second petition would not he maintainable . Cause of action accrued when accident took place and not when order was passed by the commissioner. In view of the above, second petition, preferred under Section 4-A(3) of the Act, was totally misconceived. It cannot be adjudicated upon. We uphold the argument put across by the appellant that when the original petition was filed and decided, the second petition would not lie as the same would be hit by the principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The respondent is held not entitled to seek assistance of Section 4-A(3) of the Act. The amount deposited be refunded to the employer. The amount, if deposited in the interest bearing account, the interest too would be refunded to the employer. We, however, direct that the workman would be entitled to the costs of litigation. These are fixed as Rs 1,000/-. Disposed of.