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2002 DIGILAW 34 (HP)

SURESH SHARMA v. VEERAN BALI

2002-02-28

K.C.SOOD

body2002
JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J. - This revision petition under Section 24(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, "Rent Act" for short, is filed by Suresh Sharma, tenant, against the orders of eviction from the demised premises, passed by the learned Rent Controller (2), Solan, in Rent Petition No. 14/2 of 1988 dated March 28, 2000, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, Solan, in Rent Appeal No. 7-S-14 of 2000 dated May 2, 2001. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy, relevant facts may be noticed: 3. Veeran Bali respondent herein, is owner of the House No., 44/9, Eali Niwas, Gandhi Mohalla, Solan, comprised in KhasraNo. 387 in Mauza Jawahar Park, Solan. Petitioners, Suresh Sharma, is the tenant of the demised premises consisting of one room, a kitchen and a common bath room and toilet with other tenant, located in the ground floor of the house of landlord Veeran Bali at a monthly rental of rupees 385/- excluding the electricity and water charges. The owner of the house along with family members lives in the upper portion, i.e., first floor of the house. 4. The owner, Veeran Bali, (land lady for short) filed a petition, under Section 14(3)(a)(l) of the Rent Act for the eviction of the tenant Suresh Sharma on the ground that she bona fide requires the demised premises for her own use and occupation. She maintained that she was an old lady of 73 years of age. She is suffering from chronic asthma for long which has now precipitated. Her condition is deteriorating and she is not in a position to climb or descened the stairs from the first storey where she lives. Similarly, her husband Shri Ram Sawroop Bali was 78 years of age. He is also suffering from hypertension, diabetes and cardiac disorder. He too is unable to ascend or descend the stairs to first floor. It is the case of the landlady that she and her husband are unable to negotiate the stair case leading to first floor. In these circumstances, the landlady requires the premises, in occupation of the tenant, for her own occupation which is in the ground floor. 5. The tenant resisted the claim of the landlady. The allegations were controverted. It is the case of the landlady that she and her husband are unable to negotiate the stair case leading to first floor. In these circumstances, the landlady requires the premises, in occupation of the tenant, for her own occupation which is in the ground floor. 5. The tenant resisted the claim of the landlady. The allegations were controverted. The case of the tenant was that the demised premises were let out to him in the year 1987 by an oral agreement at a monthly rental of rupees 250/- which was later on raised to rupees 300/- and then again enhanced to rupees 385/- per month on January 25, 1997 when a formal lease agreement was executed between the landlady and the tenant on January 25, 1997. The tenant disputed the assertion of the landlady that she or her landlady suffers from any aliment as claimed by her. According to the tenant, the petition has been filed with a mala fide intention to compel the tenant to enhance the rent further. It is also the case of the tenant that several tenants vacated the premises and new tenants were inducted in the ground floor during the period of five years before the filing of the petition and, therefore, the requirement of the landlady is not bonafide. 6. Learned Rent Controller vide orders dated March 28, 2000, after appraising the evidenced and other material on record, found that landlady requires the demised premises bonafide for her own use and occupation due to her illness and heart ailment of her husband. The learned Rent Controller also found that the age of the landlady and her husband is another factor which shows that it is more convenient for the landlady and her husband to live in the ground floor. The case of the tenant that the premises in the ground floor were not suitable to the landlady was repelled. Learned Rent Controller took a view that it was the landlady who is the best judge of her needs and suitability of the accommodation, if the requirement is found to be genuine. Learned Rent Controller held that there was preponderance of evidence on record that the landlady nad her husband were suffering from various diseases and it was very difficult and painful for them to climb the stairs to first floor. Learned Rent Controller held that there was preponderance of evidence on record that the landlady nad her husband were suffering from various diseases and it was very difficult and painful for them to climb the stairs to first floor. The plea of the tenant that there was another vacant room adjoining the demised premises, which could be occupied by the landlady, did not find favour with the Rent Controller. Learned Rent Controller also found that the rooms which were rented out by the landlady within five years preceding the filing of the petition were not suitable as they were damp having been constructed along with Danga (retaining wall). 7. Dissatisfied, the tenant filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority which was dismissed by the impugned orders. Learned Appellate Authority found that both landlady and her husband were old. The husband was 79 years of age on October 1, 1999 and the landlady was about 75 years of age when she was examined in the Court. Both of them suffers from several diseases. The landlady suffers from chronic asthma with respiratory problems. Learned Appellate Authority observed, "she is not in a position to climb or descend down the stairs meant for reaching the first floor of her house where both of them are living". Learned Rent Controller as well as learned First Appellate Court has referred to the evidence on record including the opinion of the Doctors under whom the landlady and her husband are under treatment. Learned Appellate Authority concurred with the findings of the learned Rent Controller that the landlady requires bonafide the demised premises for own use and occupation and held that the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller were fully supported by the evidence on record and no other view was possible in the face of the pleadings and evidence on record. 8. Still aggrieved, the tenant has approached this court in its revisional jurisdiction. 9. I have heard Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior counsel instructed by Mr. Romesh Verma, Advocate, teamed counsel for the tenant- petitioner and Mr. Virender Verma, learned counsel for the respondent. I also reappraised the evidence with the assistance of the learned Counsel to find out if any illegality or impropriety has been committed by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in passing the orders of eviction against the tenant-petitioner. 10. Several contentions were raised by Mr. Virender Verma, learned counsel for the respondent. I also reappraised the evidence with the assistance of the learned Counsel to find out if any illegality or impropriety has been committed by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in passing the orders of eviction against the tenant-petitioner. 10. Several contentions were raised by Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. His first contention was that the petition filed by the landlady lacks material particulars as envisaged under Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act. He contended that it was necessary for the landlady to have pleaded that the accommodation, which was rented out within five years preceding the filing of the petition, was not suitable for her requirement. Section 14(3)(a)(i), relevant for our purposes, may be reproduced for convenience : "14(1) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession; (a) in the case of residential building; if (i) he requires it for his own occupation; Provided that he is not occupying another residential building owned by him, in the urban area concerned: Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban area; or xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 11. It may be seen that under proviso to sub-section 3(1) (i) of Section 14, a landlord is entitled to the eviction of a tenant of the tenanted premises if he requires the same for his own occupation provided that such landlord was not occupying another residential building owned by him in the urban area concerned and that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application in the said urban area. The landlady in her eviction petition in para 18(a) has specifically pleaded that she does not own or possess any other building in Solan town and that the demised premises were required by her bonafide for own use and occupation and she had not vacated any such building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the petition. Thus, it cannot be said that the petition filed by the landlady lacks particulars as envisaged under proviso to Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act. 12. Mr. Thus, it cannot be said that the petition filed by the landlady lacks particulars as envisaged under proviso to Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act. 12. Mr. Verma relying upon Smt. Mehrunnisa and others v. Smt. Visham Kumari and another, AIR 1998 Supreme Court 427, contended that it was necessary for the landlord to have pleaded that she had not rented out any accommodation within five years preceding the filing of the petition. 13. In Mehrunnisa, landlady became owner of the premises on March 31, 1975. On July 12, 1976, the landlady issued a notice to the tenant terminating the tenancy informing the tenant that the premises in dispute being non-residential, were required by her for using it as an Office for her husband, a practicing lawyer, and that the tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent. Another ground taken was that the tenant had sub-let the premises without written consent: of the landlady. The landlady did not further pursue the matter. However, she issued a second notice on July 9, 1977 stating that the suit premises were required for running cloth business, which she intended to start. No further action was taken by the landlady pursuant to her second notice. A third notice was issued on October 12, 1979 repeating the same allegations [hat she required the premises in dispute for running cloths business. However, pursuant to this notice, she filed an eviction suit on the grounds that she required the premises in dispute for starling cloths business and that the tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent. The tenant disputed the requirement of the landlady for starting cloth business. The learned trial Court found that the requirement of the landlady for starting cloths business was bonafide and she was not in possession of any other vacant shop of her own to fulfill such requirement. The plea of the landlady that the tenant had sub- let the premises and had defaulted in the payment of rent was negatived. The suit was decreed on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlady. The plea of the landlady that the tenant had sub- let the premises and had defaulted in the payment of rent was negatived. The suit was decreed on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlady. In first appeal, the lower Appellate Court reappraising the evidence concluded that the requirement of the landlady for starting cloths business was not bonafide on the ground that the First notice issued by the landlady on July 12, 1976 gave entirely a different ground for eviction, namely, that she required the premises for the use of her husband as lawyers office. The landlady changed her stand and put forward entirely new ground for eviction for the reason that under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, such ground was not available to the landlady. The landlady approached the High Court in second appeal. The High Court took a view that the lower appellate Court failed to appreciate that the notice dated July 9, 1977 and October 12, 1979 took a consistent stand regarding the bonafide requirement of the, clarified Mr. Verma, landlady for starting cloth business. The High Court also held that undue importance was given to the first notice ignoring the subsequent notices by the lower appellate Court and, accordingly, set aside the orders of the First Appellate Court and restored the orders of the trial Court. The matter was taken to the Apex court by a Special Leave Petition. A plea was raised by the tenant that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. by reappaising the evidence in reversing the conclusion of the lower appellate Court on the question of fact. In this context, the Apex Court observed that the lower Appellate Authority failed to give due importance to the fact that the landlady has not taken any steps to file suit for eviction pursuant to the notice issued on two earlier occasions and the ground stated in the notice preceding the suit was relevant for the purpose of deciding the issues. The Apex Court up-held the findings of the High Court in interfering with the reversal judgment of the lower appellate Court. The ratio of this case does not help the petitioner- tenant in any manner. It goes against the tenant. 14. The Apex Court up-held the findings of the High Court in interfering with the reversal judgment of the lower appellate Court. The ratio of this case does not help the petitioner- tenant in any manner. It goes against the tenant. 14. The respondent in his reply to the eviction petition took a plea that "number of tenants have vacated the premises and new tenants have been inducted in the ground floor". Shri Ram Swaroop Bali (PW1), husband of the petitioner and her general power of attorney admitted in his cross-examination that a room and a kitchen was rented out to an army personnel in the ground floor but, clarified Mr. Bali, this particular room was also along side the Danga (retaining wall) which caused dampness in the room. That room was also not adjacent to the room lying vacant, which the landlady intends to occupy after the demised premises are vacated by the tenant. He also admitted that one of the rooms was rented out to two girls about three years back but that room too, explained the witness, is adjacent to the retaining wall and is full of dampness. It is equally true that the landlady did not plead in her petition that she had rented out these two rooms within five years preceding to the filing of the petition, as they were not suitable to her requirement. However, by no stretch, it can be said that the petition is not in conformity with the requirement of Section 14(3) of the Rent Act or that the petition lacked material particulars. The requirement of law that the landlord required the premises for his own occupation and he is not in occupation of any other residential building owned by him in the urban area concerned and further, that he had not vacated such premises without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the petition has been specifically pleaded, as noticed earlier, in the petition in the following words : "Petitioner does not own and possess any other building in the Solan Town. The building is required bonafide for own use and occupation and she has not vacated any such building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the present petition.": 15. Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel then referred to Amro Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sood, 1994(2) Shimla Law Cases, 177. The building is required bonafide for own use and occupation and she has not vacated any such building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the present petition.": 15. Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel then referred to Amro Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sood, 1994(2) Shimla Law Cases, 177. In that case, the eviction of the tenant from the disputed premises was sought on the ground that the premises were required by the landlady "for rebuilding/construction in view of the notices of the Municipal Committee under Section 110 and 111 of the H.P. Municipal Act." The relevant provision of the Rent Act in terms of Section 14(3)(c) provides that eviction of a building or rented land can be sought on the ground if it is required to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme and also if it has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation or the landlord required the premises bona fide for purpose of re-building. The landlord in his petition did not plead and prove the statutory requirement that rebuilding of the premises in dispute cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated as envisaged under Section 14(3)(c) of the Rent Act. The relevant provisions read: "14(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession:- (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) In the case of any building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme or if it has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation or is required bona fide by him for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated or that the building or rented land is required bonafide by him for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or re-building or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated." 16. It is in this context that this Court took a view that the landlord having failed to plead and prove statutory requirement that re-building of the premises in dispute cannot be carried out without these premises being vacated, cannot succeeded. The ratio of this case is of no assistance to the tenant. 17. Mr. Verma also relied upon Mastu Devi v. Harish Chander, 1980(2) Rent Control Reporter 488. In Mastu Devi, it was observed that before a landlord can get the premises vacated for the residence of his married son, the landlord must prove two things :- (a) the son is not in occupation of any other building or residence in the urban area; and (b) the son has not vacated any such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act in the urban area concerned. 18. It was further observed that both these conditions must be satisfied before a tenant can be asked to vacate the premises. Therefore, the landlord must plead these facts in the application for eviction and if necessary, prove them. The ratio of this case again is of no assistance to the tenant. The landlady had alleged in her petition that she is not in occupation of any other residential building in the urban area concerned and that she has not vacated any such building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the petition in the urban area concerned. 19. So far the question of non-disclosure of the accommodation which was available to (he landlady within five years preceding the filling of the petition and the landlady having not occupied that accommodation on the ground that it was not suitable to the landladys requirement is concerned, such omission from the pleadings will not be fatal particularly when both the parties understood what the case pleaded was and placed material before the Court and neither party was prejudiced. Shri Ram Swaroop Bali (PW1), landlady and general attorney of the landlady is categorical in his statement that one room was rented out to Army Personnel in the ground floor in the year 1998 but that was not suitable because of dampness in the room due to its construction on the side of the retaining wall. Shri Ram Swaroop Bali (PW1), landlady and general attorney of the landlady is categorical in his statement that one room was rented out to Army Personnel in the ground floor in the year 1998 but that was not suitable because of dampness in the room due to its construction on the side of the retaining wall. Similarly, another room which let out two or three years prior to the filing of the petition was rented out to two girls as the same was also on the side of the retaining wall and remain damp. 20. The view I have taken is fortified by the ratio in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and others, 1999(1) S.C.C. 141. In Ram Narain Arora, landlord filed a petition under Section 14(1 )(e) read with Section 25(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his bona fide requirement of the house. The appellant in his written statement asserted that the landlord had alternate accommodation in the urban area concerned and he had deliberately shifted to the disputed premises with an ulterior motive to make out a case for eviction of the respondent and this fact of availability of the said premises in Subzi Mandi, Delhi had not been disclosed in the petition. The Rent Controller recorded a finding that accommodation in occupation of the landlord was too short and if he had no other suitable residential accommodation, he should be entitled to an eviction order. It was found that allegations of the tenant in the written statement in respect of accommodation available to the landlord in Subzi Mandi stood proved. The Rent Controller concluded that the landlord having not come with clean hands, is not entitled to the order of eviction. The High Court agreed with the findings of Rent Controller that landlord required the premises in dispute bona fide. So far the question of non- mentioning of availability of accommodation in Subzi Mandi and non-disclosure of true facts, the High Court examined the matter and found that accommodation in Subzi Mandi was not reasonable and suitable accommodation for the landlord and his family. The High Court concluded that the respondent could not be said to have other reasonable suitable accommodation and, therefore, non- disclosure of the fact cannot be fatal to the petitioner and, accordingly, allowed the petition. The High Court concluded that the respondent could not be said to have other reasonable suitable accommodation and, therefore, non- disclosure of the fact cannot be fatal to the petitioner and, accordingly, allowed the petition. The matter was carried to the Apex Court. Section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Act reads :- "14.(1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation (Emphasis supplied) 21. It may be seen that one of the statutory requirements for the landlord to allege and prove, in order to get order of eviction for bonafide personal occupation as a residence is to allege and prove that the landlord has no other suitable residential accommodation. Such, it may be emphasized, is not the requirement under Section 3(a)(i) of the Rent Act under which the eviction petition was filed by the landlady. However, even in this context, Their Lordships in Ram Narain Arora took a view that there should not be a pedantic or a dogmatic approach in the matter of analysis of pleadings or of the evidence adduced thereto. Their Lordships observed that if pleadings are clearly set out and if both the parties understood what the case was pleaded and put forth with reference to the requirement of law and placed such material before the Court, neither party is prejudiced. Their Lordships in para 11 observed:- "11. There cannot be a pedantic or a dogmatic approach in the matter of analysis of pleadings or of the evidence adduced thereto. It is no doubt true that if the pleadings are clearly set out, it would be easy for the Court to decide the matter. But if the pleadings are lacking or vague and if both parties have understood what was the case pleaded and put forth with reference to requirement of law and placed such material before the Court, neither party is prejudiced. If we analyze from this angle, we do not think that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order made by the Rent Controller." 22. If we analyze from this angle, we do not think that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order made by the Rent Controller." 22. The ratio in Ram Narain Arora was reiterated by the Apex Court in M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal, 2001(2) Supreme Court Cases 355. In M.L. Prabhakar, the landlord filed a eviction petition against the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. A contention was raised by the tenant that the landlord had not disclosed the fact that he had two other residential premises, in the urban area concerned, available to him. On behalf of landlord, it was contended that there was a duty to disclose only if the alternative accommodation was suitable for the residence of the landlord. The plea of the tenant was rejected by the Supreme Court. Relying upon Ram Narain Arora, Their Lordships observed in para 5 of the judgment: "5. It has been urged that there was suppression on the part of the landlord inasmuch as he did not disclose the premises which were available at No. 16/57, Gali No. 1, Joshi Road as well as the premises which are available at Basant Road, Pahar Ganj. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, Dr. Singhvi has submitted that the only requirement is to disclose such accommodation as is suitable for residence of the landlord. Dr. Singhvi submitted that if there is no other residential accommodation which is suitable then there is no duty to disclose. Dr. Singhvi relied upon the authority in the case of Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani wherein it has been held that the question whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a question which is intermixed with the question regarding bonafide requirement. It is held that whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a defense for the tenant. It is held that whether the other accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would not solely depend upon pleadings and non- disclosure by the landlord. It was held that the landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. It was held that the landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. In this case even though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material in respect of the other two premises was placed before the rent controller as well as before the High Court, thus no prejudice has been caused. The parties have squarely dealt with this question. 23. The next contention of Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the tenant is that bona fide requirement of the landlady is not proved on record and finding recorded by both the learned rent controller and the appellate Authority are dehors of the evidence on record. 24. So far the merits are concerned, it is the case of the landlady who was about 74 years of age at the time of filing of the eviction petition, that she and her husband suffer from various ailments. She particularly suffers from chronic asthama with respiratory problems and her husband, 78 years of age at the time of filing of the eviction petition, suffers from hypertension, diabetes and cardiac disorder and therefore, it is difficult and painful for them to negotiate the stairs leading to first, floor where they presently live along with other members of the family. Both of them have been medically advised to avoid physical strain and climbing of the stairs. It is the further case of the landlady that climbing and negotiating the stairs cause great physical stress and strain on the petitioner and her husband and, therefore, they want to shift to the demises premises so that they live their remaining life in some comfort. 25. The husband of the landlady Shri Ram Saroop Bali appearing as PW1 stated that the landlady is 74 years of the and he himself is about 79 years of age. The landlady, his wife, suffers from chronic asthma, her breathing is shallow and for her to climb stairs is very painful and difficult. He further deposited that he suffers from high blood pressure and cardiac illness and, therefore, he also find it very difficult to climb the stairs of first floor where they presently live. The landlady, his wife, suffers from chronic asthma, her breathing is shallow and for her to climb stairs is very painful and difficult. He further deposited that he suffers from high blood pressure and cardiac illness and, therefore, he also find it very difficult to climb the stairs of first floor where they presently live. It is his evidence that they require the premises in occupation of the tenant located in the ground floor for their own residence. These facts are not disputed in the cross-examination. Landlady Veeran Bali is under treatment of Dr. H.C. Gupta, Medical Officer of the Sanatorium Hospital, Dharampur (PW2). It is the evidence of Dr. Gupta that he had examined the landlady and issued the medical certificate Exhibit PW2/A. He deposed that taking into consideration the illness of the landlady and her age, it is difficult for her to climb the stairs and it would be better if she lives in the premises where she does not have to climb the stairs. Husband of the petitioner Mr. Ram Saroop Bali is under treatment of Dr. A.K. Arora, Medical Officer of District Hospital, Solan. It is his evidence that Mr. Bali suffers from blood pressure, diabetes and cardiac illness and because of the diseases with which Mr. Bali is afflicted, he should avoid physical strain which includes climbing of the stairs. He had also issued medical certificate Exhibit PW3/A. Dr. H.C. Gupta (PW2) in his certificate Exhibit PW2/A has recorded that the landlady suffers from chronic asthma since long and any physical strain can precipitate the attack of asthma. She is advised to avoid any activities. Similarly, Dr. Arora in his certificate Exhibit PW3/A certified that Mr. Bali suffers from hypertension and diabetes and cardiac disorder. He has been advised to avoid mental and physical strain. Their continued living cannot but be at the risk of their lives. Thus, the requirement of the landlady to shift to the ground floor cannot be said to be fanciful or not bonafide. 26. It also cannot be said that the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority regarding the bonafide requirement of the landlady are dehors the evidence on record. 27. It is true that requirement of the residential premises by a landlord for his own use and occupation, under sub-section (3)(a)(I), is not indeed a mere desire. 26. It also cannot be said that the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority regarding the bonafide requirement of the landlady are dehors the evidence on record. 27. It is true that requirement of the residential premises by a landlord for his own use and occupation, under sub-section (3)(a)(I), is not indeed a mere desire. The requirement has to be sincere and honest. It cannot be used as a pretext to get rid of a tenant. 28. As observed by the Apex Court, in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chanel Gupta, 1999(6) Supreme Court Cases 222, the Judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the questions from himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. 29. In the present case, the evidence on record as appreciated both by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and discussed above, clearly shows that the need of the landlady to occupy the demises premises is natural, \ real and sincere. Her requirement is neither fanciful nor a pretence. 30. So far the question of availability of the accommodation which was rented out by the landlady preceding five years of the filing of the petition is concerned, it is now settled position of law that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement of residential or business purposes (See : Prativa Devi v. T. V. Krishnan, 1996(5) SCC 353, Ram PrasadRajak v. Nand Kumar and Bros., 1998(6) Supreme Court Cases 748 and Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co., 2000( 1) Supreme Court Cases 679. In Prativa Devi, appellant was a widow. Since the demise of her husband, she was staying as a guest with a family friend merely by sufferance. She filed a eviction petition against the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for her residence. Her petition was allowed. However, order was reversed by the High Court on the grounds that she was an old lady aged about 70 years and there was no one to look after her and, therefore, she should continue to live with the family friend. Her petition was allowed. However, order was reversed by the High Court on the grounds that she was an old lady aged about 70 years and there was no one to look after her and, therefore, she should continue to live with the family friend. In this context, their Lordships observed :- "The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own." (Emphasis supplied) 31. In Ram Prasad Rajak, the Apex Court held that question regarding bona fide requirement is entirely a matter to be decided on appreciation of evidence and findings on the bona fide requirement after due appreciation of evidence is a question of fact which should not be easily disturbed. In Babu Lai v. Vinod Kumar and another, 2000(8) S.C.C. 557, 2001 (1) Current Law Journal (C.C.R.) 241 a petition for eviction was filed against the tenant on several grounds. One of the ground was that the landlord bona fide required the premises for the use and occupation of himself and family members. The eviction of the tenant was directed by the trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court. However, the decree was set-aside by the High Court in second appeal on the ground that another house was available for the residence of the landlord and his family members and this aspect was not considered by the trial Court. The High Court remanded the case for fresh decision directing the trial Court to allow the tenant to amend the written statement to prove on record subsequent event of the construction of house and the same being available to the landlord and his family members. The trial Court on consideration of the matter afresh, held that the landlord had 27 members in his family and only 13 rooms were available to them and they require the premises in dispute in good faith for their residential use. The plea of the tenant that after the construction of the new house by the mother of the landlord, there was no bonafide requirement, was negatived. The plea of the tenant that after the construction of the new house by the mother of the landlord, there was no bonafide requirement, was negatived. The issue of comparative hardship was also decided in favour of the landlord holding that the tenant was not likely to suffer any hardship if the disputed premises is got vacated from him whereas the landlord shall suffer greater hardship in comparison to the tenant if the premises is not vacated by the tenant. The findings were affirmed by the First Appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal. The matter was carried to the Apex Court. The Apex Court did not find any merit in the case of the tenant. 32. In Harnarain Daga v. Heeralal and others, 2000( 1) S.C.C. 41, the landlord was residing on the first floor whereas the ground floor was tenanted. Landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that the room in his occupation was required by him for his bonafide personal necessity under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 for the construction of the stair case to the first floor of the building. The trial Court dismissed the claim of the landlord. However, it accepted the plea of bonafide personal necessity and accordingly, directed the eviction of the tenant. The Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court. The second appeal before the High Court was also dismissed. The matter was carried to the Apex Court and a contention was raised on behalf of the tenant that this was not a bonafide necessity but a mere wish of the landlord to get the tenant evicted from the shop in question. It was contended that the Courts below failed to consider the question from the view of comparative hardship which was mandatory under Section 14 of the Rajasthan Act. In this context, the Apex Court observed :- "The question of bonafide personal necessity is essentially a question of fact on which all the three Courts have concurrently held against the appellant. The case of-the respondent that he needs the room on the ground floor for use by himself and his four growing children (sons) has been accepted by the Courts below. The case of-the respondent that he needs the room on the ground floor for use by himself and his four growing children (sons) has been accepted by the Courts below. The Courts have also accepted the case that the respondent who is an Assistant Teacher in a Government Middle School is often approached by the students for giving private coaching, for the purpose of which he needs the room on the ground floor. In view of the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, the High Court was justified in not interfering with the findings in the second appeal." 33. The availability of two rooms which were rented out by the landlady within five years of the filing of the eviction petition, therefore, will have to be considered from the view point of its suitability to the landlady. It has to be considered on the touch stone of convenience of the landlady and her husband and other attending circumstances. It is true that these two rooms were available in the ground floor but it has come in the evidence that these two rooms were not suitable for the residence of the landlady and her husband as the rooms remain damp because of their construction on the side of Danga (retaining wall). In M.L. Prabhakar (supra), the defence of the tenant was the landlord had another suitable residential accommodation at Joshi Road, New Delhi and Basant Road, Pahar Ganj and that the daughters did not stay with the landlord as they were married and they stayed with their husbands and that the landlord had four bed rooms in his possession. In this context, their Lordships in para 8 of the judgment observed : "8. It is thus to be seen that the suitability has to. be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the totality of the circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background." 34. In the facts of this case, the accommodation which was available to landlady within five years preceding filing of the eviction petition cannot be said to be suitable in view of her and her husbands illness which constrained them from climbing the stairs. 35. The next contention of Mr. In the facts of this case, the accommodation which was available to landlady within five years preceding filing of the eviction petition cannot be said to be suitable in view of her and her husbands illness which constrained them from climbing the stairs. 35. The next contention of Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the tenant is that the landlady did not step into the witness box and, therefore, presumption has to be raised against her that her requirement is not bonafide. It is true that the landlady did not step into the witness box. Instead, her husband and general attorney appeared as PW1 to prove the case of the landlady. 36. It is also true that if the party does not enter the witness box to make a statement on oath in support of the pleadings and his general power of attorney appears, then appearance of general attorney cannot be regarded as appearance of the party. However, evidence of such general attorney cannot be discarded on this ground. This can be considered as the evidence in his personal capacity. In the present case, the general attorney is none other | than the husband of the landlady and was fully conversant with the facts of the case. He had been dealing with the demised premises. Mr. Ram Saroop Bali, husband and general attorney of the landlady, appearing as PW1 has disclosed all the material particulars and deposed about the illness of his wife and himself. The other facts stated by him regarding the tenancy of the premises are not disputed by the tenant. In the circumstances, it cannot be j said that the bona fide requirement of the landlady for occupation of the premises in dispute is not proved. 37. Lastly, Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the tenant contended that the tenant filed an application for amendment of his reply before the Appellate Authority which was unjustly rejected. 38. It appears, the tenant filed an application before the Appellate Court for amending para 7 of the reply to add an assertion that the back wall of the accommodation in occupation of the respondent has been constructed upon the retaining wall having two steps. The rain water and waste water of the building seeps through this retaining wall which "causes dampness in the room and the kitchen occupied by the petitioner". The rain water and waste water of the building seeps through this retaining wall which "causes dampness in the room and the kitchen occupied by the petitioner". Further, there is no source of sun light available to the accommodation. "There is no window provided in the said accommodation except the small ventilator above the door of the room". This accommodation is not suitable to the petitioner and her family members keeping in view the ailment mentioned by the petitioner. This application was rejected by the learned lower Appellate Authority on the ground that this kind of evidence has been led by the tenant that the premises were not suitable for the residence of the landlady and that the PWs examined were specifically cross-examined in this behalf. Learned Appellate Authority observed : "The proposed amendment has already been put to trial to the knowledge of the parties by the Rent Controller. He has also given findings in the ejectment order impugned that the plea taken by the tenant was not sustainable in view of the evidence brought on record." 39. In the circumstances, learned Appellate Authority took a view that the proposed amendment was not necessary for the determination of the real question in controversy. Aggrieved, the tenant filed a revision petition before this Court. The revision petition was withdrawn by the tenant on 9th January, 2001 and the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. It is noticed that the petition was withdrawn without reserving any right to urge this point in revision petition arising out of the evidence order if any before this Court. The tenant, therefore, cannot raise this point in this revision petition. In any event of the matter, I find no infirmity with the order recorded by the Appellate Authority. The fact remains that the tenant had led evidence to show that the demised premises in his occupation are not suitable for the requirement of the landlady. Learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority repelled this contention. This Court has no reason to differ with the finding of fact. There is no merit in the submission which is rejected. 40. Before parting, to be fair to Mr. Learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority repelled this contention. This Court has no reason to differ with the finding of fact. There is no merit in the submission which is rejected. 40. Before parting, to be fair to Mr. Virender Verma, learned Counsel for the landlady, it may be recorded that he vehemently urged that the scope in revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the Rent Act is limited and this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority to the effect that the demised premises are required by the landlady for her personal use and occupation. It is true that the powers of this court while exercising revisional jurisdiction are limited as pointed out by this Court in, Jagir Sing v. Roshan Lai and others, Latest HLJ 2000 (HP) 730 and Smt. Kamla Sharma v. Radhe Shyam and another, Latest HLJ 2000 (HP) 1062, yet power of the High Court under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act are wider in scope compared to the revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court can interfere, after reappraising the evidence if the conclusions arrived at by the Appellate Authority are based on misreading of evidence or otherwise not based on material on record. There-fore the evidence on record can be examined by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction to see if the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority are not contrary to law or perverse or result of misreading of evidence or a case of no evidence resulting in miscarriage of justice. It is in this context, the evidence has been reappraised. 41. No other point is urged before me. To conclude, there is no merit in this revision petition which fails and is dismissed. 42. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.