Kalyani Mukherjee v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation
2002-05-16
ALOK KUMAR BASU
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Alok Kumar Basu, J. 1. Two applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the same petitioner against the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors. and registered as C.O. No. 192 of 1996 and C.O. No. 196 of 1996 respectively may be disposed of by a common judgment and order as both the applications are directed against a common judgment passed by the Municipal Assessment Tribunal, Calcutta Municipal Corporation in M.A. Appeal No. 48 of 1993 and M.A. Appeal No. 49 of 1993 respectively. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that she purchased Premises No. 16, Panditia Place by a registered instrument sometime in the year 1989 and since her purchase, she applied before the Corporation for mutation of her name and that was allowed in due course. The petitioner submits that at the time of her purchase of the premises in question the annual valuation was increased at Rs.5,990/- (Rupees Five Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety) and accordingly, quarterly tax was fixed at Rs.299.50/- paise (Rupees Two Hundred Ninety Nine and Fifty Paise). 3. The petitioner submits that she received notice thereafter from the Corporation intimating thereby that valuation of her premises has been enhanced from Rs.5,990/- (Rupees Five Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety) to Rs. 47,250/- (Rupees Forty Seven Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty) with effect from both first quarter and second quarter 1989-90. The petitioner submits that she filed objections against such enhancement of valuation and on hearing her objection, the hearing officer of the Corporation assessed the valuation at Rs. 30,000/-(Rupees Thirty Thousand). The petitioner being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order of valuation passed by the hearing officer preferred two separate appeals registered as Appeal No. 48 of 1993 and Appeal No. 49 of 1993 respectively before the Municipal Assessment Tribunal of the Corporation. 4. The petitioner submits that after hearing the petitioner, the said Tribunal disposed of both the appeals by a common judgment and order on 30th September, 1995 and thereby the annual valuation of the premises in question was fixed at Rs. 21,060/- (Rupees Twenty One Thousand and Sixty) with effect from both first quarter and second quarter of 1989-90. 5.
4. The petitioner submits that after hearing the petitioner, the said Tribunal disposed of both the appeals by a common judgment and order on 30th September, 1995 and thereby the annual valuation of the premises in question was fixed at Rs. 21,060/- (Rupees Twenty One Thousand and Sixty) with effect from both first quarter and second quarter of 1989-90. 5. The petitioner has preferred the present applications challenging separately the judgment and order passed in M.A. Appeal No. 48 of 1993 and M.A. Appeal No. 49 of 1993 which was, however, disposed of by a common judgment by that Tribunal. 6. Appearing in support of the applications, the learned advocate for the petitioner submits at the very beginning that this Court has wide and ample scope to interfere with the judgment and order of the Tribunal impugned in the present applications when it will appear on the face of record that the Tribunal without considering relevant materials merely on the basis of confecture and surmise fixed the annual valuation. The learned advocates, in this context, has relied on a decision of the Apex Court as reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court, Page 1481. 7. The learned advocate at the time of hearing has submitted a supplementary affidavit shown by the petitioner and centends that the annual valuation of other premises in the vicinity was much below the annual valuation fixed by the Tribunal and without taking into consideration this relevant and important factor, the Tribunal without any reason or rhyme fixed the valuation when it was brought to the notice of the Tribunal that the premises in question was an old building and used purely for residential purpose. 8. The learned advocates for the petitioner finally submits that considering the age of the building, the mode of user and the fact that no noticeable improvement being effected, the Tribunal after taking into account the annual valuation of the neighbouring premises should have set aside the valuation fixed by the hearing officer with a direction for re-hearing of the matter after taking into account all relevant factors. 9.
9. The learned advocate, appearing for the opposite party-Corporation has strongly challenged the maintainability of the present applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution centending, inter alia, that there is little scope for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal when no error on the face of record appears to have been mentioned by the petitioner in her applications under consideration. 10. The learned advocate for the opposite parties submits that the decision relied on by the learned Advocate for the petitioner has got no application in the fact of the present case and it is available from the order of the Tribunal that the Tribunal after making a rational and pragmatic approach to the issue raised before it and after giving due consideration to the evidence adduced by the petitioner and considering all submissions came to the findings which cannot be discarded. 11. The learned advocate for the opposite parties finally submits that the supplementary affidavits now filed by the petitioner cannot be looked into by this Court as such evidence was never produced before the Tribunal or before the hearing officer. Thus, the learned advocate contends that there is practically no merit in the applications and those are liable to be dismissed. 12. The scope and ambit of the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has been laid down in several decisions of the Apex Court and for the present reference may be made to the decisions in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Anr. vs. Pratapsing Mohan Singh Pardeshi, reported in 1995(6) Supreme Court Cases, page 576 and in the case of Eastern Rubber vs. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2001(8) Supreme Court Cases, page 97. It is available from both the decisions that Article 227 does not confer an unlimited prerogative upon High Court to correct all wrong decisions or to prevent hardships caused thereby. Power under Article 227 can be exercised to interfere with orders of lower Courts and Tribunal only in cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where, in the absence of intervention by the High Court, grave injustice would remain unchecked and uncorrected. 13.
Power under Article 227 can be exercised to interfere with orders of lower Courts and Tribunal only in cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where, in the absence of intervention by the High Court, grave injustice would remain unchecked and uncorrected. 13. Keeping in view the above principle of law laid down by the Apex Court regarding scope of exercising power and jurisdiction under Article 227, we are required to examine the order of the Tribunal challenged in the present applications and also to consider how far the objections raised by the petitioner against that order can be entertained. 14. It is available from the judgment and order of the Tribunal that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to substantiate her case against the valuation fixed by the hearing officer after recording her objection raised against the preliminary valuation of the premises in question. It is further available that the Tribunal applying a most rational and pragmatic parameter finally made its own assessment regarding valuation of the premises in question and thereby it has modified the valuation made by the hearing officer. 15. The learned advocate for the petitioner has tried to impress upon this Court with the aid of supplementary affidavit that annual valuation of some of the neighbouring premises was much below and this point was not considered by the Tribunal but, this point of the learned advocate for the petitioner cannot be accepted because of the fact that Tribunal had no occasion to consider this point and this Court while disposing of the Revisional Application under Article 227 cannot entertain such supplementary affidavit which will tantamount to entertaining additional evidence. 16. Thus, having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and on examination of the order of the Tribunal, it appears that there was no dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of fundamental principle of law and justice so far the impugned order is concerned and hence, there is no merit in the present applications and which are liable to be dismissed. 17. Accordingly, both the Revisional Applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution are dismissed without any order as to costs. 18. Xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, may be supplied after complying all necessary formalities. Revisional applications dismissed.