S. P. KHARE, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT-RAMESH Patil has been convicted under S. 306, I. P. C. for abetting the commission of suicide by his wife and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to a fine of Rs. 5000/ -. ( 2 ) IT is not in dispute that deceased-Aruna whose parents had died earlier was married to accused-Ramesh Patil in the year 1991 after the death of his first wife. They had a son aged about 11/2 years. On 28-11-1994 Aruna sustained extensive burn injuries. There were 55% burns on her body. She died on 4-12-1994 in Burhanpur Government Hospital. ( 3 ) THE prosecution case is that the accused was treating his wife Aruna with cruelty. He used to beat hear. On the date of incident he assaulted her with a stick. She wanted to go to the house of her brother in village Bhita and the accused did not allow her to go there. She was so much terrified that she brought an end to her life by pouring kerosene on her and setting her on fire. Thus the accused abetted the commission of suicide by her. ( 4 ) THE accused pleaded not guilty. His defence is that Aruna was a "mentally ill" person and she sustained burn injuries while cooking food. ( 5 ) THE trial Court mainly relying upon the dying declaration Ex. P/5 recorded by Shri T. R. Verma (P. W. 10) Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate on 2-12-1994 in the presence of Dr. K. M. Gupta (P. W. 9) held that the accused was treating his wife with cruelty and thus committed the offence of abetment to commit suicide. ( 6 ) IN this appeal it has been argued that even from the dying declaration of the deceased and the prosecution evidence it is borne out that Aruna was a "mentally ill" person and she was treated for that ailment in the Mental Hospital, Surat and, therefore, she must have set herself on fire in a state of insanity. It is submitted that the accused never treated her with cruelty and, therefore, his conviction is not sustainable. ( 7 ) THE evidence on record has been scanned by this Court. It is submitted that the accused never treated her with cruelty and, therefore, his conviction is not sustainable. ( 7 ) THE evidence on record has been scanned by this Court. T. R. Verma (P. W. 10) has deposed that on 2-12-1994 he was Naib Tehsildar and Executive Magistrate at Burhanpur and he recorded the statement of Aruna in Nehru Hospital, Burhanpur between 1. 05 p. m. and 1. 45 p. m. in the presence of Dr. K. M. Gupta (P. W. 9) who certified at the beginning and close of the statement that she was "mentally fit and fully conscious to give her statement. " That statement was recorded in questions and answers form. That statement is Ex. P/5. According to the dying declaration of Aruna made in this statement she was badly beaten by her husband with a stick on 28-11-1994 because she wanted to go to the house of her brother in village Bhita and for that reason she set herself on fire after putting kerosene on her. She further stated that her husband used to beat her earlier also and she does not want to live with him. According to her statement she was treated for her mental ailment in Mental Hospital at Surat in the year 1992. She was saved by Gajanand who is brother of the accused, her husband was not at home at the time of the incident. She is very much afraid of her husband. Dr. K. M. Gupta (P. W. 9) has fully corroborated the testimony of the Executive Magistrate. It is found from the evidence of these two witnesses that Aruna was in a fit state of mind and she was fully conscious when she made the statement. She has given cogent, coherent and direct answers to all questions put by the Magistrate. She was not having any confusion or hallucination at the time she made her declaration. Her statement was true and voluntary. It was not the product of any imagination. There was no tutoring or prompting by anyone. It is beyond reproach. "truth sits on the lips of a dying person. " ( 8 ) TWO recent decisions of the Supreme Court can be cited which make the legal position crystal clear. Her statement was true and voluntary. It was not the product of any imagination. There was no tutoring or prompting by anyone. It is beyond reproach. "truth sits on the lips of a dying person. " ( 8 ) TWO recent decisions of the Supreme Court can be cited which make the legal position crystal clear. In Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 1814 : (2001 Cri LJ 1821) it has been observed that the admissibility of the dying declaration rests upon the principle that a sense of impending death produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath Nemo moriturus praesumuntur mentiri. Such statements are admitted, upon consideration that they are declarations made in extremity, when the maker is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. The principle on which the dying declarations are admitted in evidence, is based upon the legal maxim "nemo moriturus prae-sumitur mentire" i. e. a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. It has always to be kept in mind that though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight yet it is worthwhile to note that as the maker of the statement is not subjected to cross-examination, it is essential for the Court to insist that dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court is obliged to rule out the possibility of the statement being the result of either tutoring, prompting or vindictive or product of imagination. Before relying upon a dying declaration, the Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. Once the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration was true, voluntary and not influenced by any extraneous consideration, it can base its conviction, without any further corroboration as rule requiring corroboration is not a rule of law but only a rule of prudence. Once the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration was true, voluntary and not influenced by any extraneous consideration, it can base its conviction, without any further corroboration as rule requiring corroboration is not a rule of law but only a rule of prudence. ( 9 ) IN Laxmi v. Om Prakash, AIR 2001 SC 2383 : (2001 Cri LJ 3302) the Supreme Court again held that a dying declaration, as a piece of evidence, stands on the same footing as any other piece of evidence. It has to be judged and appreciated in the light of the surrounding circumstances and its weight determined by reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence. It is, as if the maker of the dying declaration was present in the Court, making a statement, stating the facts contained in the declaration, with the difference that the declaration, is not a statement on oath and the maker thereof be subjected to cross-examination. ( 10 ) GAJANAND (P. W. 2), Madhukar (P. W. 3) and Raju (P. W. 5) are brothers of the accused, Sunanda (P. W. 4) is wife of Madhukar, Sharad (P. W. 6) is their neighbour. They have stated that Aruna caught fire when she was cooking food and at that time she was also under the influence of insanity. The testimony of these witnesses though examined by the prosecution is of interested and partisan character and they are interested in defending the accused. So is the case with Ravindra (D. W. 1 ). It is true that Aruna was treated in the Mental Hospital for mental ailment but at the time of the commission of suicide she was not of "unsound mind" so as to be incapable of knowing the nature of her act within the meaning of S. 84 of the Indian Penal Code. She was not labouring under any defect of reason at the time she caused burns to herself. It was on account of physical torture caused to her by the accused that she took the extreme step. She might have been of "weak intellect" or feeble mind" as she could not face with boldness the treatment meted out to her by her husband. She acted impulsively because of the cruel conduct of her husband. Her cognitive faculty was not affected by any disease of the mind at that time. She might have been of "weak intellect" or feeble mind" as she could not face with boldness the treatment meted out to her by her husband. She acted impulsively because of the cruel conduct of her husband. Her cognitive faculty was not affected by any disease of the mind at that time. She was not suffering from any legal insanity. She was only under mental stress or agitation after she was beaten by her husband. ( 11 ) THE burn injuries sustained by Aruna were not accidental. She committed suicide within 31/2 years of her marriage because of the cruel treatment by her husband. Therefore, S. 113-A of the Evidence Act springs into action. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case it must be held that the accused abetted the commission of suicide by his wife. There was not an astray act of assault on her but as her dying declaration shows there was a persistent course of cruel conduct on the part of the husband. He is, therefore, guilty of the offence punishable under S. 306, I. P. C. and the trial Court has rightly convicted him. ( 12 ) KEEPING in view all the facts and circumstances of the case the sentence deserves to be reduced. Aruna was treated in the Mental Hospital at Surat in the year 1992. That is her own statement in the dying declaration. It appears that she was of weak intellect and feeble mind as discussed above. Her mental condition was a contributory factor in bringing an end to her life. She was timid and not bold and that is the reason she committed suicide. Though the accused is guilty of abetting the commission of suicide by his wife her mental imbalance because of her earlier mental ailment is an extenuating circumstances. The substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment imposed by the trial Court on the appellant is reduced from seven years to three years and the sentence of fine is set aside. The appeal is allowed to this extent. Order accordingly. .