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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 344 (MP)

SATISH UPADHYAY v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

2002-03-26

DIPAK MISRA

body2002
DIPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) BY the Court. Both the writ petitions arise from a common foundation and pertain to the grievance of the petitioner at two different stages and, therefore, they were heard analogously and the disposed of by this common order. At the outset it is apposite to mention that I will state the facts in W. P. No. 1448/2000 and, thereafter, the necessary facts in other writ petition shall be adumbrated so that the grievance of the petitioner at different counts comes to the forefront and there is proper delineation in that regard. ( 2 ) BY this writ petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has called in question the defensibility of the order dated 1. 10. 1999. Annexure P-18, passed by the Managing Director and order dated 1. 10,1999. Annexure P- 19, the letter/intimation sent by the respondent No. 9 and for quashing of resolution dated 29. 9. 1999, Annexure P-20, and the order dated 22. 1,2000 passed by the M. P. State Co-operative Tribunal, annexure P-22, ( 3 ) THE facts as have been unfurled are that the petitioner was elected as the Chairman of the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Hathkargha Bunkar Sahakari samiti Maryadit, Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as "the Society" ). The registrar on 20. 1. 1999 issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner and to the Managing Director of the Society under Section 53-B of the Madhya pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') directing therein to the Society to remove the petitioner from the office of the chairman and disqualify him from holding the said post for a period of three years. On receipt of the said order the Managing Director Issued similar show-cause notice to the petitioner. A show-cause notice was also issued by the Registrar to the petitioner. As it appears, subsequently, the Registrar by order dated 19. 2. 1999 cancelled the show-cause notice. The Board of Revenue as per order dated 22. 3. 1999 contained in Annexure P~6 passed In Revision no. 185-Panch/1999 filed by the petitioner held that the allegations and the report of one Mr. Bhatti had been cancelled. Thereafter, the Registrar issued a letter dated 16. 4. 1999 on the basis of same show-cause notice which was withdrawn by him. This letter was assailed in Writ Petition No. 1897/1999. 3. 1999 contained in Annexure P~6 passed In Revision no. 185-Panch/1999 filed by the petitioner held that the allegations and the report of one Mr. Bhatti had been cancelled. Thereafter, the Registrar issued a letter dated 16. 4. 1999 on the basis of same show-cause notice which was withdrawn by him. This letter was assailed in Writ Petition No. 1897/1999. This Court dismissed the said writ petition. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner preferred a Letters Patent Appeal No. 214/1999 and this Court while dismissing the said appeal directed the Registrar to convene a fresh meeting which would be presided over by him or an officer not less than the rank of joint Registrar to be nominated by him. The petitioner assailed the said order in Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court and the Apex Court while dismissing the SLP observed that the Committee when it would meet for considering the question of removing the petitioner, should decide the matter independently uninfluenced by any observations made by the Additional registrar in his order dated 16. 4. 1999. It is pleaded after the said order of the apex Court the respondents continued to proceed against the petitioner under section 53-B (l) of the Act to remove him from his office. An intimation was issued on 1. 9. 1999 for holding a meeting on 9. 9. 1999. Agenda of the meeting has been brought on record as Annexure P-12. The said agenda was for removing the petitioner from the post of Chairman and to debar him for three years from holding office. A copy of the minutes of the meeting have been brought on record as Annexure P- 13. It is putforth that in the said meeting certain ineligible persons were permitted to take part and in the said meeting the Commission of Hath Kargha authorised his nominee to attend the meeting. It is setforth that such nominations and their participation in the proceedings are per se illegal. It is also setforth that the Commissioner of Hath Kargha issued a letter dated 27. 9. 1999 nominating Shri Mahesh Gulati and Shri V. B. Dhakata, the respondents Nos. 6 and 7, respectively herein as nominees to take part in the meeting of the Society which was scheduled to be held on 29. 9. 1999 at Bhopal. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Gramodyog Vibhag also issued a letter dated 25. 9. 1999 to this effect. 9. 1999 nominating Shri Mahesh Gulati and Shri V. B. Dhakata, the respondents Nos. 6 and 7, respectively herein as nominees to take part in the meeting of the Society which was scheduled to be held on 29. 9. 1999 at Bhopal. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Gramodyog Vibhag also issued a letter dated 25. 9. 1999 to this effect. The Commissioner, Hath Kargha also issued a letter authorising Shri P. Sharma, Deputy Director to take part in the meeting. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioner the respondent No. 8, the Managing director of the Society vide letter dated 1. 10. 1999, Annexure P-18, informed the petitioner that the Board of Directors in its meeting dated 29. 9. 1999 decided to remove him from the Office of the Chairman and to disqualify him for a period of three years for holding any office/post in the Society. The respondent No. 9, the Vice-President of the Society, also issued an Intimation to all concerned on 1. 10. 1999 that pursuant to the removal of the petitioner from the Office of the Chairman he had become the Officiating Chairman and all correspondences should, be made in his name. The said letter has been brought on record as Annexure P-19. The minutes of the meeting have also been brought on record as Annexure P-20. Feeling aggrieved against the said direction the petitioner preferred a Revision No. 620/1999 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated 22. 1. 2000 partly allowed the revision by holding that disqualifying the petitioner from holding the post of Chairman for a period of three years is legal and justified but the second part with regard to disqualifying him from holding any other post in the Bunkar Sangh is Illegal and without jurisdiction. It is urged in the petition that the order passed vide annexures P-18, P-19, P-20 and P-22 are illegal, erroneous, and contrary to the provisions of the Act, It is putforth that the Tribunal should have held that once it was found that the three Directors were not appointed by the State government in accordance with Section 52 of the Act, their appointments cannot be, by any stretch of imagination, said to be in accordance with the bye- laws of the Society and, therefore, they could not have participated in the meeting. It is also putforth that the Tribunal has erred in law by holding that the Director of Handlooms could nominate any two persons as per bye-law 12 (2) of the Bye-laws and the persons who were incurred the disqualification as enunciated in Clause 14 of the Bye-laws cannot be appointed as Director of the Society. It is putforth that the respondents Nos. 6 and 7 were permitted to vote in the meeting who were ineligible and could not have been allowed to exercise the voting right and, therefore, their votes could not have been counted. It is urged in the petition that the Tribunal should have held that the representative of the Registrar who was deputed to attend the meeting was elected by the members present in the Committee to preside over the meeting but such a person could only exercise his voting right in a case of tie. It is also putforth that in any case a person presiding over the meeting cannot exercise his voting right and a right to vote is available to him only in the event of tie, but in the present case he exercised his right to vote though there was not tie. ( 5 ) IT is averred in the writ petition that the Tribunal failed to see that certain persons were appointed purposely and with mala fide motive so that a resolution is. passed against the petitioner. The stand of the petitioner is that as the appointment of two Directors nominated by the Directors of Handlooms is itself illegal their votes are not to be counted for the purpose of passing of resolution and that makes the resolution vitiated. It is further putforth in the petition that the Tribunal has grossly erred in its interpretation of the bye- law 12 (3) of the Bye-laws and that makes the order passed by it vulnerable. It is highlighted in the petition that the Committee was to consider the matter independently without getting influenced by any order as per the observations of the Apex Court but the said observation was not kept in view while passing the resolution and as it appears the resolution was being influenced by the order of the Registrar. It is also setforth that nothing is stated in the resolution dated 29. 9. It is also setforth that nothing is stated in the resolution dated 29. 9. 1999 how the charges have been proved, and in absence of the same the petitioner would not have been unseated from his office and should not have been allowed to suffer. It is also urged in the petition that the petitioner had made request time and again for supply for relevant documents but the same were not provided to him and, therefore, there has been violation of principals of natural justice, but the Tribunal has not dealt with this aspect in proper perspective and that makes the order unsustainable in law. It is also setforth that the inquiry into the matter was conducted behind the back of the petitioner and, therefore, such an inquiry could not have been relied upon by the Committee and the Tribunal should have lanceted the order on that score. According to the writ petitioner the Tribunal has not scrutinised whether the nominated persons were nominated in accordance with law or there was any legal fallacy, and as it failed to scan the same the order is totally susceptible. It is also putforth that counting of vote of one Shri Sanjay shrivastava was illegal inasmuchas Burhanpur Soot Mill was put under liquidation as per the order of the Registrar dated 10. 9. 1999. Annexure P-23, but the Tribunal has not paid any attention to the same and that makes the order totally pregnable. ( 6 ) A return has been filed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 contending, inter alia, that the nominees of the Registrar have the right to vote and the same has been upheld in the order passed by this Court in W. P. No. 1897/ 1999,and hence, no fault can be found on that score. The allegations of ulterior motive by the State Government are refuted. Reliance has been placed on the order of the Tribunal to highlight that everything has been discussed in the order passed by the Tribunal and the same is totally infallible. It is also putforth that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are based on cogent material available on record and the conclusions arrived at by it are based on proper reasonings, and hence no fault can be found with it. ( 7 ) A return has been filed by the respondents Nos. It is also putforth that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are based on cogent material available on record and the conclusions arrived at by it are based on proper reasonings, and hence no fault can be found with it. ( 7 ) A return has been filed by the respondents Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 contending, inter alia, that the contentions raised by the petitioner, namely, that the resolution passed by the Board of Directors was illegal as there was no adequate quoram; that certain nominated members had no voting right and that the enquiry held by the Registrar was without authority of law are sans substance as certain aspects have already been dealt with on an earlier occasion and the same have been dealt with by the Tribunal in proper perspective. It is also putforth that the appointments were not in violation of, section 52 of the Act. It is also pleaded that there is no material on record to arrive at the conclusion that the Directors were purposefully appointed to oust the petitioner. It is also urged that the points which had already been dealt with by this Court in its decision cannot be canvassed at this stage. ( 8 ) AN application was filed by the petitioner for permission to file certain documents. In the said application a reference has been made to clause 37. 8 of the bye-laws of the Society. It is putforth that in exercise of said power the state Government has empowered the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Handlooms) to nominate two directors. In the said application a notification dated 26. 12. 1983, Annexure P-24, has been sought to be brought on record. ( 9 ) I have heard Mr. N. S. Kale, learned senior counsel along with Mr. Greeshm Jain for the petitioner, Mr. A,s. Raizada, learned counsel for respondent no. 1, and Mr. P. N. Dubey, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 2 to 13. ( 10 ) IT is submitted by Mr. N. S. Kale, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, that the appointments of the nominated membere, namely, Shri mahesh Gulati, Shri V. B, Dhakata and Shri P. Sharma being illegal they could not have been permitted to participate in the meeting of the Committee. 2 to 13. ( 10 ) IT is submitted by Mr. N. S. Kale, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, that the appointments of the nominated membere, namely, Shri mahesh Gulati, Shri V. B, Dhakata and Shri P. Sharma being illegal they could not have been permitted to participate in the meeting of the Committee. It is also putforth by him that the Tribunal has misconstrued the provisions of bye- law 12 (3} of the bye-laws and that alone vitiates the order of Tribunal. It is also urged by him that the Director (Handlooms) is defined under Clause 37. 8 of the bye-laws and as per said bye- law the Joint Registrar, Co-operative societies (Handlooms) is the Director of Handlooms for the purpose of bye-laws, the Commissioner of Handlooms cannot exercise the power under the said bye-law. It is further canvassed by him that the power which has been exercised under Section 53-B of the Act is without any basis as the negligence was at the behest of the Managing Director and for the negligence of the Managing Director the Chairman cannot be removed. Learned counsel has also argued that the Presiding Officer was appointed who had no right to vote but by doing so he has vitiated the sacrosanctity of the meeting. It is also putforth by him that the allegations against the petitioner have not been proved and, therefore, the resolution to that extent could not have been passed and the Tribunal would have done well to axe-down the resolution. It is also highlighted by Mr. Kale that the competent body to remove the Chairman is the society and not the Committee and body which is not competent to pass the resolution cannot pass the same and get the Chairman removed. ( 11 ) MR. P. N. Dubey, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 13, per contra, has submitted that during the tenure of the petitioner as a chairman he had committed serious financial loss to the Federation and his misconduct was reported to the Registrar who got this complaint investigated through his agency and prima facie came to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed gross irregularities. 2 to 13, per contra, has submitted that during the tenure of the petitioner as a chairman he had committed serious financial loss to the Federation and his misconduct was reported to the Registrar who got this complaint investigated through his agency and prima facie came to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed gross irregularities. It is also putforth by him that on the basis of power vested in the Registrar under Section 53-B of the Act he directed the managing Director of the Federation to take steps to remove the petitioner and to disqualify him. It is urged by him that the resolution was passed as per law. It is his further submission that in the meeting 31 directors including the nominated directors participated and the 13 voters voted in favour of the petitioner and 16 voters voted against him. It is urged by him that the nominated members were properly nominated and there was no illegality in the same and the order passed by the Tribunal on his issue is absolutely justified. ( 12 ) TO appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar I have carefully perused the order passed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has come to hold that the nominees of the Government were properly nominated as per bye-laws and the stand taken in that regard was absolutely misconceived. The Tribunal has further come to hold that if it is accepted that the nominated directors were not appointed by the State Government as per Section 52 of the Act, but they were nominated as per the bye-laws, then also the bye-laws did not debar them from voting. The further findings recorded by the Tribunal relates to the managing Director of Burhanpur Soot Mill who could not have participated in representing the Society and accordingly the vote cast by the said Managing director is Illegal and should be separated. While so holding the Tribunal did not declare the resolution to be had in law. The Tribunal further made a distinction between the working sphere of Sections 53-B and 19-C of the Act came to hold that Section 19-C does not come into play in the case at hand. While so holding the Tribunal did not declare the resolution to be had in law. The Tribunal further made a distinction between the working sphere of Sections 53-B and 19-C of the Act came to hold that Section 19-C does not come into play in the case at hand. The Tribunal while dealing with the factum that the meeting could not have been convened on the basis of show-cause notice issued earlier on was of no substance as a fresh meeting was directed to be held by the High Court as well as by the Apex Court. The Tribunal has also opined that the contention that the omission and commissions are by the Managing Director and, therefore, the Chairman cannot be held responsible was sans substance as the Committee has carefully scrutinised the charges and allegations against the petitioner and taken a decision. With regard to the contention that the members were not aware about the proceeding the Tribunal has categorically held that the explanation was read out and the whole thing was debated and after considering the reply the Committee passed the resolution. The Tribunal also addressed itself to the inquiry report and has came to hold that the allegations were based on factual data provided by the Society and the circumstances clearly showed that the Chairman had passed the order, and hence there is no justification for passing of the responsibility to the Managing director. The Tribunal has repeatedly stated that the entire control and administration as per the order was taken by the petitioner in his hand. The tribunal has also negatived the plea of bias which was pleaded by the petitioner. The Tribunal has further held that the petitioner had participated in the meeting and had raised no objection about the supply of any document or list of witnesses, and hence he cannot avail this plea for the purpose of nullifying the effect of this meeting. It is apposite to mention here that the basis of majority by raising hands in accordance with the bye-law No. 18 (3} of the bye-laws. In view of this conclusion the Tribunal has modified the order and directed that the petitioner shall stand removed from the post of Chairman and should be disqualified for holding the said post for three years. As far as disqualifying him from holding any other post the same was held to be illegal. In view of this conclusion the Tribunal has modified the order and directed that the petitioner shall stand removed from the post of Chairman and should be disqualified for holding the said post for three years. As far as disqualifying him from holding any other post the same was held to be illegal. ( 13 ) TO find out whether the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal are just and proper, it is apposite to refer to earlier round of litigation which was initiated by the petitioner. On an earlier occasion this Court dealt with the concept of bias at length and came to hold that the petitioner could not have presided over the meeting. With regard to voting of nominated members this court in W. P. No. 1897/1999 (since reported in 1999 (2) MPLJ 669 ) in paragraph 15 held as under :"it is pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the nominated directors were not appointed by the State Government as per Section 52 (1) of the Act but they have been nominated as per bye-laws. Assuming it to be so the bye-laws do not debar them from voting. They are the members of the Committee and therefore they have a right to vote. They are to participate in the deliberations and express their views. They have a right to vote. They are not more show-pieces. Silent spectators or watch-keepers in the meeting. They were prevented from voting in the meeting. That can be spelt out from the minutes. That is also the ground on which the proceedings of the meeting held on 19. 3. 1999 are rendered invalid. "in paragraph 17 of the said decision this Court further held as under :"the impugned order dated 16. 4. 1999 is continuation of the original order dated 19. 2. 1999. The proceedings dated 19. 3. 1999 are null and void and so these cannot be said to have been annulled by the impugned order. The Additional Registrar had the power to issue the impugned order under Section 53-B of the Act. Merely because the Joint Registrar has been entrusted with the work of looking after Handloom Societies, that does not take the right of the Additional Registrar under the law to issue the impugned order. The Additional Registrar had the power to issue the impugned order under Section 53-B of the Act. Merely because the Joint Registrar has been entrusted with the work of looking after Handloom Societies, that does not take the right of the Additional Registrar under the law to issue the impugned order. " ( 14 ) THE said decision was challenged in LPA and in the appeal this Court in paragraph 5 directed as under :"we have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. We need not to go into the other details of the matter as after hearing Shri A. D. Deoras learned counsel for the appellant and the other side at length, we find that the meeting presided over by the appellant was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice. When the allegations were levelled against the appellant himself being the President of the Society relating to omissions and commissions on his part, then in that case, he had no right to preside over the meeting because his own actions were under challenge. It is a cardinal principle of natural justice that one cannot be a Judge of his own cause. The proper course for the appellant, when there were allegations of omissions and commissions against him, was to refrain from presiding over the meeting and he should have permitted the Vice- President to preside over the same. In the minutes of the meeting, it is also pointed out that this objection was raised. Specific attention was invited of the Chairman that the meeting could not be presided over by him as it would be in serious breach of principle of natural justice, but the Chairman seems to have not taken any serious note of it and overruling this objection, he presided over the meeting. This itself shows his impertinent attitude and his total disregard for principles of natural justice and further that he was hell bent to preside over the meeting. This conduct of the appellant was itself in a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore, no further probe into the matter is necessary. We need not, therefore, go into the other facts of the argument. This conduct of the appellant was itself in a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore, no further probe into the matter is necessary. We need not, therefore, go into the other facts of the argument. We are satisfied on the first question that the meeting presided over by the person against whom there were serious allegations of omissions and commissions, in which his own removal from the office was under consideration, vitiated the meeting and that ground by itself was sufficient for the Additional Registrar to direct fresh convening of the meeting and to take up the matter in accordance with law. Therefore, we are satisfied that the approach of the additional Registrar was correct as the Resolution dated 19. 3. 1999 passed in the meeting presided over by the appellant stood vitiated. The fresh meeting as directed by the Additional Registrar may be convened and since there are serious allegations against the Chairman and there is likelihood of conflict between the Vice-Chairman and Chairman, therefore, we deem it just and proper to direct that the meeting be convened in accordance with law and it shall be presided over by a person of the rank of Joint Registrar nominated by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, m. P. This appeal is dismissed with above direction. " ( 15 ) THE matter travelled to the Apex Court and the Apex Court held as under :"it is, however, clarified that the Committee, when it meets for considering the question of removing the petitioner, shall decide the matter independently and uninfluenced by any observations made by the additional Registrar in his order dated 16. 4. 1999. " ( 16 ) ON a perusal of the aforesaid decisions it becomes crystal clear that the nominated members as per bye-laws were entitled to vote and, therefore, any contention raised on that score is absolutely untenable and the Tribunal has rightly so held. As far as second meeting is concerned the same has been put to rest by paragraph 17 of the decision of the learned Single Judge which was affirmed and, therefore, contention raised in this regard is of no assistance. The contention relating to nomination of members has been dealt with by the Tribunal in paragraph 11 of its order. As far as second meeting is concerned the same has been put to rest by paragraph 17 of the decision of the learned Single Judge which was affirmed and, therefore, contention raised in this regard is of no assistance. The contention relating to nomination of members has been dealt with by the Tribunal in paragraph 11 of its order. The Tribunal has referred to bye-law 12 of the bye-laws and has interpreted that the State government could have nominated as it has done. The Tribunal has given its reasonings in paragraph 12 of the order. The interpretation of Tribunal is that if the bye-law 12 is read in proper perspective three nominees of the government as have been mentioned in clause (i), (ii) and (iii) of bye-law 12 could have been nominated. On a reading of bye-law 12 I am of the considered view that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is totally impeccable. ( 17 ) IT is apposite to mention here that before the Tribunal certain contentions were raised which were put to rest in the earlier round of litigation and, therefore, I need not advert to the same in detail as I have already indicated in the preceding paragraphs. ( 18 ) IT is submitted by Mr. Kale, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of hearing as contemplated under Section 53-B of the Act. To appreciate the aforesaid submission it is apposite to reproduce Section 53-B :"53-B. Power of the Registrar to remove an Officer of a society in certain circumstances. (1) If in the opinion of the Registrar, any officer of the co-operative society has been grossly negligent in the discharge of his duties imposed on him by or under this Act the rules made thereunder or bye-laws or has, by a fraudulent act, caused financial loss to the society the Registrar may without prejudice to any other action that may or can be taken against him, call upon the society to remove within a specified period such officer from the office held by him and where necessary also to disqualify him from holding any office under that society for a period not exceeding three years, whereupon the society, shall, after affording opportunity to the officer concerned of being heard, pass such orders as it deems fit. (2) On the failure of the society to take action under sub-section (1), Registrar may after affording opportunity to the officer of being heard and for reasons to be recorded, and communicated to the officer and the society concerned, remove or remove and disqualify for a period not exceeding three years, the officer from holding any office under that society for the period specified in the order. (3) An officer removed under the sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall with effect from the date of communication of the order, cease to hold that office and if disqualified shall not be eligible to hold any office under that society for the period specified in the order. "on a reading to the aforesaid provision it is crystal clear that Section 53-B (l) provides that a decision has to be taken after affording an opportunity of being heard to the officer concerned. The Tribunal has discussed this aspect in paragraphs 36 to 39 of its order. The Tribunal has referred to various decisions which need not be referred to at this juncture. The Tribunal has addressed itself whether the prejudice has been caused or the petitioner has really been given the opportunity or not. The Tribunal has held that the petitioner was issued notice for the first time on 20. 1. 1999 and he was well aware of the allegations and charges made against him. He had ample time to prepare his defence and submit the same before the Committee. The tribunal has also opined the petitioner could have inspected the record of the society as the same was under his control. It has also opined that the petitioner had not raised any objection in regard to non-supply of any document or list of witnesses before the Committee in its meeting held on 19,3. 1999. The tribunal has expressed the view that all the relevant documents were under the control of the petitioner, and hence It cannot be said that there has been violation of principles of natural justice. In addition to that the Tribunal has expressed the view in relation to meeting held on 29. 9. 1999 as under :"in the meeting of the committee dated 29. 9. 1999 there was a free deliberation and discussions on each item and the petitioner was also granted full opportunity to submit his case and of hearing. In addition to that the Tribunal has expressed the view in relation to meeting held on 29. 9. 1999 as under :"in the meeting of the committee dated 29. 9. 1999 there was a free deliberation and discussions on each item and the petitioner was also granted full opportunity to submit his case and of hearing. After having a detailed discussions, considering the matter in its entirety, the committee of the society has passed the impugned resolution. In this way there has been no denial of justice and violation of principles of natural justice. On the other hand the petitioner has been provided proper and full opportunity of hearing which is the only requirement of this section 53 (b ). For these reasons it can not be said that the Directors or nominated Directors had any bias in their mind against the petitioner. Bias and malice can be inferred only if any person in interested against the interest of the petitioner and no any animus could be pointed out against any of the directors. Thus there is no question of any malice or bias against any of the directors. Simply they happened to be government nominee, conclusion of bias cannot be drawn. They are also responsible officers holding responsible post in the government. Besides this there were as many as 27 elected directors present in the meeting. All of them could not have had any bias against the petitioner. As observed earlier, the allegation of bias or prejudice are very easy to be levelled against any director or authority. But considering the entire facts and circumstances of the matter, question of bias or prejudice cannot be inferred in favour of the petitioner, who also failed to establish the same. Resolution of the committee has been passed on the basis of majority by raising hands in accordance with the terms of provisions of bye-law No. 18 (3 ). "in view of the aforesaid analysis of the Tribunal I do not find that there has been non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. ( 19 ) IT is next contended by Mr. Kale that it is the General Body of the society which has to pass the resolution and not the Committee. He has referred to Section 48 of the Act. Sections 48 (1) and (2) are relevant for the present purpose. They are reproduced below :"48, Final authority in society. ( 19 ) IT is next contended by Mr. Kale that it is the General Body of the society which has to pass the resolution and not the Committee. He has referred to Section 48 of the Act. Sections 48 (1) and (2) are relevant for the present purpose. They are reproduced below :"48, Final authority in society. (1) The final authority in a society shall vest in the general body of members : provided that the bye-laws of a society may provide for the constitution of a smaller body consisting of delegates elected in accordance with such bye-laws to exercise powers of the general body or as may be specified in the bye-laws of the society. (2) Subject to sub-section (1), the management of every society shall vest in a committee constituted in accordance with this Act or rules made thereunder or bye-laws of the society and it shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be conferred or imposed respectively by the Act or rules made thereunder or bye-laws of the society. "section 2 (d) of the Act defines "committee". The said provision reads as under :" "committee" means the Board of a management by whatever name called constituted under Section 48. ' if both the provisions are read together there remains no trace of doubt that the Committee of the Management has the authority to pass the resolution. Nothing has been brought on record to indicate that the Committee ctj 13 has not been properly constituted. In absence of this and such a contention having not been properly raised before the Tribunal I unhesitatingly hold that the body which passed the resolution had the jurisdiction to pass the resolution. " ( 20 ) THE next contention of Mr. Kale is that the petitioner has not committed any irregularity as provided under Section 53-B of the Act. It is putforth by him that the petitioner has not caused any financial loss to the society. It is also putforth by him that he was not negligent in discharge of his duties. The tribunal has dealt with this aspect in detail. The Tribunal has opined that attempt made by the petitioner to transfer the responsibility to the Managing director is an Innovative act. In any case the resolution has indicated about the irregularities and the Tribunal has discussed in that regard. The tribunal has dealt with this aspect in detail. The Tribunal has opined that attempt made by the petitioner to transfer the responsibility to the Managing director is an Innovative act. In any case the resolution has indicated about the irregularities and the Tribunal has discussed in that regard. The Tribunal has noticed that the Committee was satisfied with regard to the allegations made against the petitioner. When the Tribunal has appreciated this fact and was satisfied, this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot reappreciate the same. In this context I may profitably refer to a decision rendered in the case of State of U. P. and others v. Maharaja Dharmander prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 , wherein it has been held as under :"28. . . . . HOWEVER, judicial review under Article 226 cannot be converted Into appeal. Judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. In chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 WLR 1155 refers to the merits legality distinction in judicial review. Lord Hailsham said : "the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court. " lord Brightman observed : ". . . . Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. " and held that it would be an error to think : ". . . . that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision-making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself. " when the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision-making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factor. " ( 21 ) IN this context I may also refer to a decision rendered in the case of shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao, (2002) 7 SCC 522 wherein a two Judge bench of the Apex Court laid down the dictum as under :"in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the high Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently Article 226 is not intended to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or order to be made. But notwithstanding the same, on a mere perusal of the order of an inferior Tribunal if the High court comes to a conclusion that such Tribunal has committed manifest error by misconstruing certain documents, or the High Court comes to the conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the inferior Tribunal or the inferior Tribunal has ignored to take into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into consideration certain materials which are not admissible, then the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the findings of the inferior Tribunal. "in view of the aforesaid enunciation of law I am of the considered view the submission of Mr. Kale in this regard is unacceptable. ( 22 ) AS all the submissions raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioner are repelled, the impugned orders do not warrant any interference by this Court. ( 23 ) NOW I shall proceed to deal with the facts in W. R No. 3191/2000. In this case the same petitioner has prayed for quashing of order dated 12. 5. 2000, Annexure P-l, passed in Revision No. 161/2000 and resolution dated 29. 9. 1999 contained in Annexure P-2. ( 24 ) AT the very outset It is apposite to state here that the resolution dated 29. 9. 1999 has been given the stamp of approval by the Tribunal and I have not found any fault with the order of the Tribunal. 9. 1999 contained in Annexure P-2. ( 24 ) AT the very outset It is apposite to state here that the resolution dated 29. 9. 1999 has been given the stamp of approval by the Tribunal and I have not found any fault with the order of the Tribunal. As far as Annexure p-l is concerned the petitioner had approached the Tribunal agitating his grievance that the order of removal passed against him was not kept in a general Body meeting, and hence the removal is bad in law. The Tribunal addressed itself to the factual scenario and referred to its order dated 22. 1. 2000 wherein it had given the stamp of approval to the resolution by which the petitioner was removed and came to hold that the revision was sans merit. The Tribunal in paragraph 7 has referred to the aspect whether such a resolution would be kept in the annual body meeting or not is the matter of bye-laws and on that ground the Tribunal has dismissed the revision. On a perusal of the ground and having heard Mr. Mohd. All, learned counsel for the petitioner, I perceive no illegality in the order passed vide Annexure P-1. Accordingly, the writ petition being sans merit, deserves dismissal, and accordingly, dismissed. ( 25 ) CONSEQUENTLY, both the writ petitions, being devoid of substance, are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ petitions dismissed. .