Judgment 1. Heard Mr. Y. V. Giri, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. Ram Janam Ojha for the respondents. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 10.7.2000 (Annexure-4), passed by the revisional authority under section 27-C of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), whereby he has dismissed the petitioners revision application and has upheld the order dated 2.6.98 (Annexure-2), and the demand notice dt. 27.7.99 (Annexure-3) passed by the appellate authority in terms of section 27-A (7) of the Act. The appellate order, in its turn, had upheld the order of assessment-cum-penalty dt. .20.9.97 (Annexure-1), whereby the petitioner has been assessed and the consequent demand for Rs. 17,61,397.00 P. has been raised against the petitioner. 2. The petitioner is an existing company within the meaning of Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Marcantile Building 9/12, Lal Bazar Street, Kolkata, and is engaged in the manufacture of sugar, having its factory at Sasamusa within district of Gopalganj. The petitioner company was subjected to assessment proceeding for realisation of market fee under the Act for 1996-97, and the aforesaid order of assessment dated 2.9.97 (Annexure-1) was passed under the Act by the Assessment Sub-Committee, whereby the petitioner was assessed to a sum of Rs. 17,19,017.00 P and a further sum of Rs. 42,379.70 P was added towards fine, totalling Rs. 17,61,397.00 P. The petitioner preferred appeal in terms of section 27-B of the Act before the Regional Director who dismissed the appeal and up-held the aforesaid order dt. 2.9.97 (Annexure-1), vide order dt. 2.6.98 (Annexure-2), passed in Appeal case no. 1 of 1998. The demand notice is dt. 27.7.1999 (Annexure-3). It is relevant to state that the petitioner has not deposited the amount in question, and preferred Revision Application no. 6 of 1999 under section 27-C of the Act. In the meanwhile, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment on 10.8.99 in the case of Belsund Sugar Company Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar and ors. reported in (1999)9 SCC 620 : 1999(3) PLJR (SC) 93, wherein it has been held that the manufacturers engaged in the manufacture of sugar and molasses as well as the sale & purchase of sugar-cane are not liable to pay market fee under the Act. reported in (1999)9 SCC 620 : 1999(3) PLJR (SC) 93, wherein it has been held that the manufacturers engaged in the manufacture of sugar and molasses as well as the sale & purchase of sugar-cane are not liable to pay market fee under the Act. It has further been held in paragraphs 112, 13, 204 to 207 of the judgment that the amount of market fee already realised shall not be refunded to the manufacturers. The judgment of the Supreme Court was directed against a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1977 Pat-136 : 1976 BBCJ 453 : 1977 PLJR 8 (Belsund Sugar Company Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar and ors.) The Supreme Court disagreed with the judgment of this Court and set aside the same. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that law is well settled by the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court that the manufacturers of sugar and molasses are not liable to pay market fee on these two items of production and on the transactions relating to sugarcane. The impugned order in question relates to market fee payable on sale and purchase of sugarcane and, therefore, the petitioner is not liable to pay market fee on such transactions. He submits that the assessment amount of Rs. 17,61,397.00 P cannot be realised, inter alia, for the reason that this amount has not till date been deposited. He also relies on a Division Bench judgment of this Court. 4. Mr. Ram Janam Ojha, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the Supreme Court has observed in its judgment that the same shall apply prospectively. In so far as the past transactions are concerned, the Market Committee shall be entitled to realise as per the assessments already made but the payments could not be realised on account of stay orders passed by the court. 5. Having considered the submissions, I am of the view that the controversy between the parties can be resolved from a plain reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court. In so far as the present case is concerned, two directions in the judgment are relevant. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the manufacturers of sugar are not liable to pay market fee under the Act with regard to sale and purchase of sugarcane, sugar and molasses. In so far as the present case is concerned, two directions in the judgment are relevant. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the manufacturers of sugar are not liable to pay market fee under the Act with regard to sale and purchase of sugarcane, sugar and molasses. The Supreme Court has further held in paragraphs 112 and 113 that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case namely, the possibility of uncontrolled and avoidable litigations in future regarding the amount of refund, all past transactions up to the date of this judgment which have suffered the levy of market fee will not be covered by this judgment and the collected market fees on these past transactions prior to the date of this judgment will not be required to be refunded to any of the sugar mills which might have paid these market fees. Similarly market fees not collected in the past shall also not be collected hereafter. The Supreme Court further added that if any of the Market Committees has been restrained from recovering market fee from the writ petitioners in the High Court or if any of the writ petitioners in the High Court has, as an appellant before the Supreme Court, obtained stay of the payment of the market fee, then for the period during which such stay has operated and consequently market fee was not paid on the transactions covered by such stay orders, there will remain no occasion for the Market Committee concerned to recover such market fee from the sugar mill concerned after the date of this judgment even for such past transactions. I have no manner of doubt that the amount already paid by the assessee and collected by the authorities under the Act till 10.8.99 (the date of judgment) shall not be required to be refunded. In so far as those of the amounts are concerned which may have been assessed but not deposited by the manufacturers, shall now not required to be paid. This position admits of no doubt on a plain reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Belsund Sugar Company Ltd. (supra). 6. Similar issues have come up before this Court on earlier occasions also, for example, C.W.J.C. No. 9578 of 1999. This position admits of no doubt on a plain reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Belsund Sugar Company Ltd. (supra). 6. Similar issues have come up before this Court on earlier occasions also, for example, C.W.J.C. No. 9578 of 1999. Having realised the mistake of misappreciation and misapplication of the judgment of the Supreme Court (supra) regarding collection of the assessed amount is concerned, the Managing Director had filed his affidavits, paragraph 5 of one affidavit, and paragraph 3 of another affidavit, are set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "5. That the matter was discussed with the Chairman and it has been decided that the controversy has been resolved by the Apex Court and the Board is duty bound to abide by the order of the Apex Court as well as the decision of this Hon ble Court. In other words, the Board is not empowered to collect market fee which has not been collected after the decision of Apex Court in Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1999) SCC 620. XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 3. That the deponent states that this matter is fully covered by the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Belsund Sugar case and the Board is duty bound to abide by the order of the Hon ble Supreme Court and it cannot collect Market fee after the pronouncement of the order of the Hon ble Supreme Court which has not been collected." Taking note of the aforesaid affidavit, a Division Bench of this Court allowed C.W.J.C. No. 9578 of 1999 by order dt. 29.6.2001 (Annexure-7) and held that : "In these circumstances, as the respondents acknowledge that market fee is not leviable, the petition succeeds. Sd/- Ravi S. Dhavan, C.J. Sd/- Aftab Alam, J." 7. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Soon after the Supreme Court handed down the judgment, the authorities under the Act preferred review petition no. 1249-63/99 before the Supreme Court for review of the judgment. Sd/- Ravi S. Dhavan, C.J. Sd/- Aftab Alam, J." 7. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Soon after the Supreme Court handed down the judgment, the authorities under the Act preferred review petition no. 1249-63/99 before the Supreme Court for review of the judgment. Paragraph 6 (f) of the review petition is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "(f) That the Hon ble Court failed to appreciate that though it has provided that the judgment shall have prospective effect and the market fee for past transactions which has already been paid need not be refunded, no provision has been made for payment of market fee which has been collected by the Appellants, till the date of the judgment under review, but has not been paid to the Market Committee." The review petition was dismissed by order dt. 7.10.99 (Annexure-8A), which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: "We have carefully gone through the review petitions and connected papers. According to us no case is made out for interference in review proceedings. The grounds raised in the review petitions seek to re-argue the matter on merits. This is not within the scope of the review proceedings. The review petitions are accordingly dismissed." It is thus manifest that the respondents are needlessly pursuing this matter. 8 In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders dated 2.9.97 (Annexure-1), dated 21.6.98 (Annexure-2), the demand notice dated 27.7.99 (Annexure-3), and the order dated 10.7.2000 (Annexure-4), are hereby set aside. I have no manner of doubt that the authorities under the Act are needlessly pursuing the matter with inexorable obduracy which should have stopped with the judgment of the Supreme Court burdening this Court with most unwanted litigations. I express my strong sense of displeasure and allow this writ petition with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by the Secretary, Gopalganj Agricultural Produce Market Committee (respondent no. 3), which I would have normally directed to be paid to the petitioner. However, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the same instead be paid to the Bihar State Legal Services Authority. Let the said amount be accordingly deposited within four weeks from today. This Court appreciates the gesture shown by Mr. Y. V. Giri.