JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. - It is proposed to dispose of these three writ petitions by this common judgment as there are identical questions of law and fact involved in these petitions. However, facts of each case are being briefly and separately noted. CWP No. 466 of 2002 2. Petitioner Kiran Kumari is the elected Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Bhawai in District Sirmaur, H.P. She was elected Pradhan on 15.12.2000. On this date Himachal Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 200Q (Act No. 18 of 2000) was admittedly applicable. By virtue of the amending Act number of provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 were amended. For4he purpose of present writ petition we are concerned with Section 19 of the amending Act supra whereby clause (o) was also added to existing Section 122(1) of the HP. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 1994 Act). For ready reference this clause is extracted herein below :-xxx xxx xxx xxx (o) if he has more than two living children : Provided that the disqualification under clause (o) shall not apply to a person who has more than two living children on the date of commencement of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 2000, or, as the case may be, within a period of one year of such commencement, unless he begests an additional child after the said period of one year." 3. So far petitioner having given birth to the third child after coming, into force sub-clause (o) as well as after expiry of period mentioned in the proviso supra is concerned; it was not disputed at the time of hearing. It may also be noted that above amending Act No. 18 of 2000 came into force with effect from 8.6.2000. 4. When information regarding petitioner having given birth to the third child on 31.8.2001 was brought to the notice of Authorities, show cause notice was issued to her. In fact petitioner appeared before the Deputy Commissioner and admitted that she has given birth to additional child (son on 31.8.2001). Her statement is at page 22 of the file of District Panchayat Officer, Sirmaur No. PC NSMR (Section 122/01 (Part I) on the subject cases under Section 122 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. In fact petitioner appeared before the Deputy Commissioner and admitted that she has given birth to additional child (son on 31.8.2001). Her statement is at page 22 of the file of District Panchayat Officer, Sirmaur No. PC NSMR (Section 122/01 (Part I) on the subject cases under Section 122 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. It appears that vide order dated 5.3.2002 Annexure P-1 petitioner was declared to be disqualified and the office of Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Bhawai was declared to be vacant. This order has been challenged in this writ petition. Respondents when put to notice, they justified passing of the said order. This Court on 10.4.2002 issued notice to the respondents, when operation of impugned order Annexure P-1 was stayed. According to respondents their action is in accordance with law and it does not violate any of the rights, muchless fundamental rights of the petitioner, thus they have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. CWP No. 536 of 2002 5. In this case Kulbir Singh was member of Panchayat Samiti, Ward No. 13, Dini Khas, Tehsil Indora, District Kangra. Since third child had been born to him and its entry was recorded on 5.7.2001, show cause notice Annexure P1 was issued to him. He submitted his reply Annexure P-2. His stand was that third child was born on 1.7.2001 whereas he was elected as Member of the Panchayat Samiti in December, 2000. At that time he was not debarred or disqualified to be a member of Panchayat Samiti, as he was father of two children. Per him child was already in the womb when he filed his nomination paper, therefore amended provision (supra) is not applicable in his case. In these circumstances vide Annexure P3 impugned order was issued by Deputy. Commissioner, Kangra thereby Kulbir Singh was declared as disqualified to be member of Panchayat Samiti from Indora and thus it was declared to be vacant. Stand of the respondents in this case is that Annexure P3 deserves to be upheld as it is in consonance with provisions of law. In this case interim order was passed on 30.4.2002, whereby Annexure P3 was stayed. CWP No. 1289 of 2002 6. In this writ petition, petitioner was elected as Up Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Deothi-Majhgaon, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Sirmaur. Third child was born to him after 8.6.2001 therefore, he was issued a show cause notice. In this case interim order was passed on 30.4.2002, whereby Annexure P3 was stayed. CWP No. 1289 of 2002 6. In this writ petition, petitioner was elected as Up Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Deothi-Majhgaon, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Sirmaur. Third child was born to him after 8.6.2001 therefore, he was issued a show cause notice. His stand in the writ petition is that date of birth of third child shown as 25.6.2001 is .incorrect, as child was in fact born on 25.5.2001 i.e. before 8.6.2001 in terms of proviso supra. Therefore, he has incurred no disqualification as such show cause notice Annexure P7 was not sustainable. After having examined the matter, Deputy Commissioner passed the order Annexure P-9 on 26.7.2002 declaring the petitioner Gian Singh Verma disqualified from holding office of Up Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Deothi Majhgaon, Development Block, Rajgarh and consequently declared the said office vacant. Petitioner has challenged this order in this writ petition. Record shows that petitioner applied for the correction of date of birth in the relevant record so far birth of third child was concerned. As according to him correct date of birth was 25.5.2001 and not 26.6.2001. Respondents have justified their action in passing the impugned order Annexure P-9. Case of this petitioner is dealt with in file referred to in C.W.P. No. 466 of 2002 and its reference number is 37/02. Perusal of the original record shows that notice was issued to the petitioner for 23.7.2002 to show cause, as also to the G.P.V.A. of the Gram Panchayat to produce the record. Since petitioner did not turn up on this date, he was set ex parte. In this behalf it may also be noticed that there is a written complaint on the record against the petitioner. Since petitioner did not appear, statement of Sushil Kumar, GPVA was recorded. He produced copies of the extract from the Panchayat records, at the end of one of such documents, i.e. family register there is a note. This note when translated into English reads as under:- Note Sh. Gian Singh Verma, Up Pardhan, Gram Panchayat, Deothi Majhgaon Third son to Gian Singh as per register of births was born on 24.6.2001. This entry was certified by the Gram Panchayat and Development (illegible), Deothi Majhgaon." 7. Statement of Sushil Kumar was also recorded on 23.7.2002, which then translated into English reads as under:- Statement of Sh. Gian Singh Verma, Up Pardhan, Gram Panchayat, Deothi Majhgaon Third son to Gian Singh as per register of births was born on 24.6.2001. This entry was certified by the Gram Panchayat and Development (illegible), Deothi Majhgaon." 7. Statement of Sushil Kumar was also recorded on 23.7.2002, which then translated into English reads as under:- Statement of Sh. Sushil Kumar, Gram Panchayat and Development Officer, Gram Panchayat, Deothi Majhgaon Development Block, Rajgarh. 23.7.2002 Statement that I am working as Gram Panchayat and Vikas Adhikari in Gram Panchayat, Deothi Majhgaon since 2001. Today I have brought with me a Register of Births as well as Family Register, Smt. Vidya Devi wife of Gian Singh, Up Pardhan gave birth to third male child on 24.6.2001. Gian Singh UP Pardhan has himself got this registration done and entry was made by him in the family register. Entry regarding this child is made at page 33. True copy of the concerned page from the Births Register. I produce it along with my statement. 8. Mr. Kulbir Singh, learned senior Counsel appearing for Kiran Devi as well as Smt. Abhilasha Kumari for Gian Singh and on behalf of learned Counsel for Kulbir Singh, submitted that the impugned action of the concerned Deputy Commissioner in declaring the petitioners in all these, three petitions disqualified is not only illegal but is also contrary to the provisions of 1994 Act as well. As Constitution of India. 9. Reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners on Article 243-F of the Constitution of India. For ready reference Article 243-F of the Constitution of India is also extracted here-in-below: 243-F. Disqualifications for membership - (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a Panchayat - (a) if he is, so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State concerned : provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years; (b) If he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State. (2) if any question arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide." 10. It was forcefully urged on behalf of the petitioners the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to have taken cognizance of the matter in the facts and circumstances in the absence of reference to him under Article 243-F(2) supra. Further because there is no procedure prescribed either under 1994 Act or the rules framed there under and at the same time, provision of Article 243-F too having i been violated, impugned orders being ultra vires of the constitution | may be declared to be so. 11. With a view to support to this argument, learned senior Counsel made reference to other provisions of law in general, with special emphasis on Land Acquisition Act, as well as Industrial Disputes Act. His submission then was that in view of clause (2) of Article 243-F, unless there was a reference made to him, the Deputy Commissioner, could not assume jurisdiction. Thus from very beginning the action is unwarranted, and as such all consequential actions must fail. 12. Ms. Abhilasha Kumari, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in other two writ petitions while adopting the submissions made by Mr. Kanwar, submitted that the provision of Section 122(1)(o) supra is ultra vires of Article .14. As there is hostile discrimination between the same classes of persons i.e. duly elected representatives to the Gram Panchayat, Members of Legislature Assembly and Council, as well as Members of Parliament and Rajya Sabha. In case small family norm is to be applied, then according to her it should be informally applied to all the elected representatives. She further stated that her client Gian Singh Verma had applied for correction of date of birth of the third child. According to her third child was born on 25.5.2001 i.e. being before coming into of HP. Act No. 18 of 2000, supra. Therefore the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 13. All these pleas have been controverted by Mr. Karol, learned Advocate General who stated that in the face of admitted facts even requirement of issuing of show cause notice was not necessary. Act No. 18 of 2000, supra. Therefore the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 13. All these pleas have been controverted by Mr. Karol, learned Advocate General who stated that in the face of admitted facts even requirement of issuing of show cause notice was not necessary. However, with a view to ensure that provisions of 1994 Act as well as of H.P. Act No. 18 of 2000 are complied with and principles of equity, fair play and natural justice are followed as well as also complied with, show cause notice was issued to all the petitioners. So far cases of Kiran Kumari and Kulbir Singh petitioners are concerned, on the admitted facts nothing more was required to be done. In these cases he urged that even if it be assumed for the sake of argument without being conceded that references was required to be made, it is not understood as to how the petitioners could have improved their cases after needful had been done. Per him 1994 Act as well as its amendment was within the Legislative competence of the State legislature, therefore no exception can be to the impugned orders. As according to him the H.P. Act 18 of 2000, supra was a law made by legislature of the State prescribing additional disqualifications to those which were already there in Section 122 of 1994 Act. As such Article 14 of Constitution of India is not violated. Regarding discrimination, he submitted that it is not within the competence of State legislature to prescribe disqualification in case of members of Legislative Assembly/Council, Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha. As those are prescribed under a Central Legislation, i.e. Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. 14. So far pleas urged by Mr. Kulbir Singh, learned senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioners based upon Article 243-F(2) of the Constitution of India is concerned, Mr. Karol urged that as per 122(2) of 1994 Act, the question of disqualification when it arises after election process was over, is to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner. He further submitted that there is a presumption in favour of constitutional validity of a legislation like 1994 Act and also H.P. Act No. 18. Per him, 1994 Act together with its amendment is a self contained Code. Therefore, no benefit can be derived by the petitioners on the plea that reference having not been made. 15. He further submitted that there is a presumption in favour of constitutional validity of a legislation like 1994 Act and also H.P. Act No. 18. Per him, 1994 Act together with its amendment is a self contained Code. Therefore, no benefit can be derived by the petitioners on the plea that reference having not been made. 15. After having heard learned Counsel for the parties, in our view sole question to be determined in these three writs is, whether | reference envisaged under Article 243-F(2) is in the nature of a ! reference envisaged under other statutes (to which reference was/ made by Mr. Kanwar), like Land Acquisition Act and Industrial Disputes Act. If answer is in the affirmative, writ petitions have to be allowed, otherwise consequences are obvious. 16. In case argument based upon Article 243-F(2) is taken to its logical end the result will be disastrous. Reason being, that in case that no reference is made and birth of third child is admitted (as in these cases), which is a prescribed disqualification under 1994 Act as amended by HP. Act No. 18 of 2002 and also in view of Article 243-F, then what follows from the submission is that no action can be taken and Members of Panchayat Raj Institution Like Gram Panchayat, Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samiti etc. can go on producing any number of children. It will be against the spirit of prescribing this disqualification. 17. It was not disputed at the time of hearing that Deputy Commissioner is the authority prescribed under Section 122(2) of 1.994* Act, who has to deal with the matter whether a person had incurred, any disqualification under law or not. In these circumstances, it is not understood as to what differences it would have made in case reference was made, as position would remain the same, particularly, when facts are admitted. As such reference and reliance to other statutes like Land Acquisition Act and Industrial Disputes Act on behalf of the petitioners is concerned, no benefit can be derived. Therefore reference to Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, 1979(2) SCC 572, Mohammed Ibrahim Sahib and others v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bhimavaram, AIR 1958 AP 226, Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Anantpur v. Kodandaramacharlu, AIR 1965 AP 25, Sher Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana 107 is of no consequence so far petitioners are concerned. Therefore reference to Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, 1979(2) SCC 572, Mohammed Ibrahim Sahib and others v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bhimavaram, AIR 1958 AP 226, Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Anantpur v. Kodandaramacharlu, AIR 1965 AP 25, Sher Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana 107 is of no consequence so far petitioners are concerned. As no benefit can be derived from these decisions on behalf of the petitioners. 18. In the absence of anything to the contrary having been brought to our notice under law, reference can be taken under Section 243-F (2) by way of complaints as in these cases. It may also be noted at the risk of repetition, that disqualification was incurred the moment third child was born after 8.6.2001 in view of Article 243-F (1)(b). 19. How question relating to declaring a provision ultra vires has been attending the attention of Supreme Court. To some of these decisions reference is being made hereinafter. 20. In A.C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Delhi and another v. Mast Ram Kali etc., AIR 1968 SC 1, while examining Section 18 of the Suppression of Immoral tRaffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 which provided for difference procedure, it was child that this section was not discriminatory and thus not ultra vires offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Relevant para for the purpose of present writ petitions is extracted below : "5. The inhibition of Article 14 that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws was designed to protect all persons against discrimination by the State amongst persons from being singled out as a special subject for discrimination and hostile treatment. If law deals equally with all of a certain well-defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons, for the class for whom the law has been made is different from other persons and, therefore, there is no discrimination amongst equals. Every clarification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality but mere production of inequality is not all by itself enough. The inequality produced in order to .encounter the challenge of the Constitution must be the result of some arbitrary step taken by the State. Every clarification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality but mere production of inequality is not all by itself enough. The inequality produced in order to .encounter the challenge of the Constitution must be the result of some arbitrary step taken by the State. Reasonable classification is permitted but such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the thing in respect of which such classification is made. The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, and its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds." 21. In State of A.P. and others v. Mcdowell & Co. and others, 1996(3) SCC 709 it was held as under :- "43. Shri Rohinton Nariman submitted that inasmuch as a large number of persons falling within the exempted categories are allowed to consume intoxicating liquors in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the total prohibition of manufacture and production of these liquors is arbitrary and the amending Act is liable to be struck down on this ground alone. Support for this proposition is sought from a judgment of this court in State of T.N. v. Ananthi Ammal. Before, however, we refer to the holding in the said decision, it would be appropriate to remind ourselves of certain basic propositions in this behalf. In the United Kingdom, Parliament is Supreme. There is no limitations upon the power of Parliament. No court in the United Kingdom can strike down an Act made by Parliament on any ground. As against this, the United States of America has a Federal Constitution where the. power of the Congress and the State Legislatures to make laws is limited in two ways, viz., the division of legislative powers between the States and the Federal g and the fundamental rights (Bill of the Rights) incorporated in the Constitution. In India the position is similar to the United States f America. The power of Parliament or for that matter, the State Legislatures is restricted in two ways. In India the position is similar to the United States f America. The power of Parliament or for that matter, the State Legislatures is restricted in two ways. A law made by Parliament, or the legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz., (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. We do not wish to enter into a discussion of the concepts of procedural unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness concepts inspired by the decisions of United States Supreme Court. Even in U.S.A., these concepts and in particular the concept of substantive due process have proved to be of unending controversy, the latest thinking tending towards a severe curtailment of this ground (substantive due process). The main criticism against the ground of substantive due process being that it seeks to set up the courts as arbiters of the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the particular piece of legislation. It is enough for us to say that by whatever name it is characterised, the ground of invalidation must fall within the four corners of the two grounds mentioned above. In other words, say, if an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) to (g) of Article 1.9(1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judicial review is limited to three grounds, viz., (i) (unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii) illegality and (iii) procedural impropriety (see Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service which decision has been accepted by this Court as well). The applicability of doctrine of proportionality even in administrative law sphere is yet a debatable issue (See the opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. v. Secy, of State for Home Deptt., ex p. Brind Ac at 766-67 and 762). It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled. It is one thing to say that a restriction imposed upon a fundamental right can be struck down if it is disproportionate, excessive of unreasonable and quite another thing to say that the court can strike down enactment if it thinks it unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. Now, coming to the decision in Ananthi Ammal, we are of the opinion that it does not lay down a different proposition. It was an appeal from the decision of the Madras High Court striking down the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 as. Violative of Articles 14, 19 and 300-A of the Constitution. On a review of the^ provisions of the Act, this Court fond that it provided a procedure which was substantially unfair to the owners of the land as compared to the procedure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, insofar as Section 11 of the Act provided for payment of compensation in instalments if it exceeded rupees two thousand. After noticing the several features of the Act including the one mentioned . Above, this Court observed (SCC p. 526, para 7). . "7. After noticing the several features of the Act including the one mentioned . Above, this Court observed (SCC p. 526, para 7). . "7. When a statute is impugned under Article 14 what the court has to decide is whether the statute is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it must be struck down. At best, a statute upon a similar subject which derives its authority from another source can be referred to, if its provisions have been held to be reasonable or have stood the test of time, only for the purpose of indicating what may be said to be reasonable in the context. We proceed to examine the provisions of the said Act upon this basis." 44. It is this paragraph which is strongly relied upon by Shri Nariman. We are, however, of the opinion that the observations in the said paragraph must be understood in the totality of the decision. The use of the word arbitrary in para 7 was used in the sense of being discriminatory, as the reading of the very paragraph in its entirety discloses. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act were contrasted with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and ultimately it was found that Section 11 insofar as it provided for payment of compensation in instalments was invalid. The ground of invalidation is clearly one of discrimination. It must be remembered that an Act which is discriminatory is liable to be labelled as arbitrary. It is in this sense that the expression arbitrary was used in para 7." 22. Legislative incompetence is not the ground pleaded to prescribe disqualifications including those added by H.P.N Act No. 18 of 2000 to 1994 Act. Only ground urged was violation of Article 14 and was only pressed into service by Mrs. Abhilasha. Kumar as noted hereinabove. We may observe in this behalf that this argument does not hold good in the face of legislative competence to have enacted Section 122(1)(o) supra. There is neither procedural nor substantival unreasonableness involved in this case. On the other hand, we feel that with a view to adopt the small family norm, H.P. Act No. 18 of! 2000 was enacted at the grass root level of democracy i.e. the Panchayati Raj System. For Legislatures of State Assembly or M.Ps. disqualifications could only be prescribed as noted hereunder. 23. On the other hand, we feel that with a view to adopt the small family norm, H.P. Act No. 18 of! 2000 was enacted at the grass root level of democracy i.e. the Panchayati Raj System. For Legislatures of State Assembly or M.Ps. disqualifications could only be prescribed as noted hereunder. 23. In this view of the matter plea urged on behalf of Gian Singh | Verma challenging the constitutional validity of Section 122(1) (o) hasi no merit and is thus rejected. 24. For taking this view we also place reliance on the decision of constitutional bench in (1) Hamdard Dawakhana and another (2) Kalipada Deb and another (3) Lakshman Shripati Impure Lakshman Shripati Impore and (4) A.B. Choudhri and another v. The Union of India and others, AIR 1960 SC 554. Relevant paragraphs from this judgment which squarely cover the writ petition so far constitutional validity of Section 122(1 )(o) is concerned are as under :- "(8) Therefore when the constitutionality of an enactment is challenged on the ground of violation of any of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, the ascertainment of its true nature and character becomes necessary i.e. its subject matter, the area in which it is intended to operate, its purport and intent have to be determined. In order to do so it is legitimate to take into consideration all the factors such as history of the legislation, the purpose thereof, the surrounding circumstances and conditions, the mischief which it intended to suppress, the remedy for the disease which the legislature resolved to cure and the true reason for the remedy; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1955(2) SCR 603 at pp. 632, 633; (S) AIR 1955 SC 661 at pp. 674) : R.M.D. Chamarbaughwala v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930 at p. 936 (S) AIR 1957 SC 623 at p. 631) Mahant Moti Dass v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942 at p. 948. (9) Another principle which has to be borne in mind in examining the constitutionality of a statute is that it must be assumed that the legislature understands and appreciates the need of the people and the laws it enacts are directed for problems which are made manifest by experience and that the elected representatives, assembled in a legislature enact laws which they consider to be reasonable for the purpose for which they are enacted. Presumption is, therefore, in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment. Charanjit Lai v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 : AIR 1951 SC 41; State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, 1951 SCR 682 at p. 708 : AIR 1951 SC 318 at p. 326) : AIR 1969 SC 942. (12) xxx xxx xx "Thus it is open to the court for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the Act to take all these facts into consideration and in the present case, we find that there was the evil of self medication, which both in this country and in other countries,- the medical profession and those, who were conversant with its dangers, had brought to the notice of the people at large and the Government in particular. They had also warned against the dangers of self-medication and of the consequences of unethical advertisements relating to proprietary medicines particularising those diseases which were more likely to be affected by the evil. There is reason, therefore, for us to assume that the state of facts existed at the time of the legislation which necessitated the Act. These facts we have already set out and it is not necessary to reiterate them. 25. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 at p. 297 : AIR 1958 SC 538 at p. 548, Dass CJ., observed :- "That in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation." 26. So far challenge to. The action of the respondents in the absence of the reference under Article 243-F(2) vis-à-vis other statutes is concerned, the same is also without merit. Reliance in this behalf is being placed on a three Judges bench decision of Supreme Court in State of T.N. and others v. Ananthi Ammal and others, 1995(1) SCC 519. In this case provisions of Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 and T.N. Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1961 were being referred to. As per the provisions of both these Acts it was held that there being no provision for solatium under latter Act and Act 1968 being pan materia, therefore, Ch. In this case provisions of Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 and T.N. Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1961 were being referred to. As per the provisions of both these Acts it was held that there being no provision for solatium under latter Act and Act 1968 being pan materia, therefore, Ch. VI was held to be ultra vires of Article 14 and it was also held that the absence of provision for solatium being not unreasonable. It was further held that validity of a statute cannot be challenged as being discriminatory by comparing it with another statute on similar subject (as in the present case), which derives its authority from another source. It was also observed that such a statute can be referred to only for indicating what may be said to be reasonable in the context. 27. We may observe in this behalf that so far 1994 Act is concerned, its source is State’ Legislature as per Vllth Schedule of the Constitution of India; whereas the source in case of Land Acquisitive Act as well as Industrial Disputes Act is the Parliament as both Acts are central legislations. Another reason to take this view is that legislative competence of the State Legislature being not in dispute. 28. So far matter, relating to interpretation of provisions of law is concerned, how the court has to look into it, we refer to the decision in P.N. Krishna Lai and others v. Govt, of Kerala and another, 1995 Supp.(2) SCC 187. In this behalf para 9 is relevant: "9. In determining whether the impugned Act is a law with respect to a given power, the Court has to consider whether the Act, in its pith and substance, is a law on the subject in question. If the statute relates in pith and substance to a topic assigned to a particular legislature, the Act will not be invalidated even if it incidentally trenches on topics coming within another legislative list. The fact of incidental encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. The Court has to ascertain the true nature and character of the subject of the Act or its pith and substance to find whether the impugned Act falls within the competence of the particular legislature. The fact of incidental encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. The Court has to ascertain the true nature and character of the subject of the Act or its pith and substance to find whether the impugned Act falls within the competence of the particular legislature. Blind adherence to strick interpretation which would lead to invalidation of statutes as being legislated in the forbidden sphere should be avoided, lest all beneficial legislations would be stifled at birth and many a subject entrusted to the State legislature rendered ineffectual divesting the State legislature of its powers to deal with particular subject of entry or topic." 29. Mere non-reference by itself will not negate action of the authority who in law is admittedly invested with the power to have looked into the matter. This argument if accepted will result in mutilating clause (o) as added by HP. Act No. 18 of 2000 supra. Besides defeating the legislative intent, purpose and object sought to be achieved by enacting it. 30. No other point is urged. 31. These writ petitions were finally heard after those were formally admitted on the joint request of learned Counsel for the parties on 28.12.2002. 32. In view of the aforesaid discussion all these writ petitions are dismissed being devoid of any merit and all interim orders passed in these cases from time to time shall stand vacated forthwith. Costs on the parties.