Judgment : 1. Aggrieved by the proceedings of the second respondent dated 29.01.1996, rejecting petition dated 04.12.1995 and calling upon the petitioner to handover possession of the property in question in terms of Order dated 16.08.1993 issued under Section 19(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 immediately to the District Collector, Thanjavur or to the Officer authorized by him to take possession of the property, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition. 2. During the pendency of the writ petition, on the death of the sole petitioner, his legal representatives were substituted as petitioners 2 to 6 as per order of this Court dated 20.06.1997 in W.M.P. No.13434 of 1997. 3. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder: According to the petitioner, he was detained under COFEPOSA Act, 1973 from 13.07.1975 to 23.03.1977. After his release, a notice under Section 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (in short SAFEMFOPA Act), was sent by the second respondent, wherein it was mentioned by the Competent Authority that he has reason to believe that the properties mentioned in the said notice have been acquired illegally and thus action was initiated. After considering his explanation, the Competent Authority ordered forfeiture of the house property situated at Madukkur village, on the ground that the petitioner had not explained the source of investment in the said property to the extent of Rs.19,000.00 The said house property was purchased by a sale deed dated 16.12.1963 for a sum of Rs.27,505.00. Aggrieved by the order of the Competent Authority dated 30.10.1981, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal for forfeited property. The Tribunal also confirmed the order of the Competent Authority, by its order dated 29.10.1983. Thereafter, he filed a Writ Petition No.349 of 1984 before this Court, challenging the said order. This Court dismissed the said writ petition on 26.07.1993 and an appeal filed thereafter in Writ Appeal No.1023 of 1993 was also dismissed on 05.07.1995. He preferred Special Leave Petition in S.L.P. No.19934 of 1995 before the Supreme Court. Thereafter, he filed a Writ Petition No.349 of 1984 before this Court, challenging the said order. This Court dismissed the said writ petition on 26.07.1993 and an appeal filed thereafter in Writ Appeal No.1023 of 1993 was also dismissed on 05.07.1995. He preferred Special Leave Petition in S.L.P. No.19934 of 1995 before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also dismissed the Special Leave Petition on 15.09.195 and pursuant to the request made by his counsel, liberty was given to approach the Government for seeking option to pay fine in leave of forfeiture of the property ordered by the Competent Authority under Section 9(1) of the SAFEMFOPA Act. Thereafter, representations were filed before the second respondent seeking permission to pay fine in lieu of forfeiture after enclosing the order of the Supreme Court. The second respondent without giving an opportunity, rejected the said petition on wrong assumption of facts and by misconstruing Section 9(1) of SAFEMFOPA Act. The order of the second respondent was challenged on appeal before the first respondent. Though the first respondent entertained the appeal, subsequently, rejected the same stating that the appeal filed is not maintainable under Section 12 of the SAFEMFOPA Act. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred the present writ petition. 4. The Deputy Director, Office of the Competent Authority, SAFEMFOPA & NDPS Act, Chennai-17 has filed a counter affidavit disputing various averments made by the petitioner. The orders passed by this Court as well as the Supreme Court rejecting the claim of the petitioner has not been disputed. It is further stated that the Competent Authority, second respondent in this case, issued a clarificatory leter dated 29.01.1996 to the petitioner informing him of the position in law that Section 9 (1) of the Act will be applicable only in cases where less than 50% of the sources with which the property was acquired has not been proved to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority. In this case, as the quantum of illicit income determined to have gone into the acquisition of the property worked out to Rs.19,000.00 out of the total cost of Rs.27,505.00, the petitioner was informed that the option to pay fine will not arise in this case and that the property forfeited be surrendered in full to the Central Government in terms of the order under Section 19(1) of the Act. As this letter dated 29.01.1996 of the second respondent is not in order under Sections 7(1), 9(1) or 10 of the Act, the Tribunal and first respondent in their letter dated 22.01.1997, returned the appeal papers filed by the petitioner with remarks to that effect. In view of this, there was no question of giving an opportunity of being heard. Hence, the first and second respondent were right in issuing the letters dated 22.01.1997 and 29.01.1996 respectively denying the petitioner of the option to pay fine in lieu of forfeiture. Further, the guidelines issued by the Ministry are at best only of a clarificatory and discretionary nature. More so, the said house property forfeited was acquired at a cost of Rs.27,505.00 as early as on 16.12.1993, the market value of which at the present rates will at any cost exceed Rs.1 lakh. In view of this, the guidelines of the Ministry are not applicable in this case. 5. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioners and learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel and learned Government Advocate for respondents. 6. Mr. G. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised the following contentions: (i) The impugned order of the second respondent dated 29.01.1996 is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. (ii) The first respondent ought to have granted an opportunity of hearing before returning the appeal papers; and (iii) The respondents ought to have taken note of the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance and granted appropriate relief. 7. On the other hand, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 would contend that, as the petitioners have not satisfied the conditions of provisions contained in SAFEMFOPA Act, the second respondent has rightly rejected the request, which is sustainable in law. The second respondent after due consideration of the request of the petitioner and the applicability of Section 9(1) of the Act, finally rejected the claim of the petitioner. He also contended that, inasmuch as the appeal was returned as not maintainable and no decision on merits, the question of following principles of natural justice does not arise. The second respondent after due consideration of the request of the petitioner and the applicability of Section 9(1) of the Act, finally rejected the claim of the petitioner. He also contended that, inasmuch as the appeal was returned as not maintainable and no decision on merits, the question of following principles of natural justice does not arise. He also contended that the guidelines issued by the Ministry are only of the clarificatory and discretionary nature and even otherwise, the guidelines referred to by the petitioners has been subsequently modified. Accordingly, the said contention is liable to be rejected. 8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 9. There is no dispute that he first petitioner was a detenu under COFEPOSA Act, 1974, the provisions under Section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMFOPA Act are applicable to him. After notice dated 23.01.1978 under Section 6(1) of the Act, the Competent Authority in his order dated 30.10.1981 determined the quantum of illicit income that had gone into the acquisition of one of the properties of Rs.19,000.00 out of the total cost of Rs.27,505.00 and hence forfeited the property to the Central Government. It is also n ot disputed that regarding other properties the explanations offered were accepted and proceedings were dropped. The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal for foreited property, New Delhi – first respondent in this writ petition, by order dated 29.10.1988 upheld the order of the Competent Authority. There is no dispute that the writ petition filed by the petitioner before this Court as well as the writ appeal were dismissed. The petitioner, namely, Allapitchai subsequently filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed by an order dated 15.09.1995. No doubt, while dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the basis of the statement made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, liberty was given to the petitioner to approach the Central Government for seeking option and permitted him to make a representation. Their Lordships have also held that, it would be for the Government to take a decision. 10. It is further seen that, based on the observation made in the order of the Supreme Court dated 15.10.1995, the first petitioner made a representation to the Competent Authority, namely, the second respondent herein. Their Lordships have also held that, it would be for the Government to take a decision. 10. It is further seen that, based on the observation made in the order of the Supreme Court dated 15.10.1995, the first petitioner made a representation to the Competent Authority, namely, the second respondent herein. The Second respondent after carefully considering the representation and after holding that Section 9 of the SAFEMFOPA Act is applicable to a case where the source of only a part, being less than one-half of the income, earnings or assets with which the property was acquired has not been proved to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority and of the fact that the case of the property at Door No.155, Madukkur South in Madukkur village, the total cost of acquisition of the property is Rs.27,505.00 and as per the order under Section 7(1) dated 30.10.1981, the source for a sum of Rs.19,000.00 with which the said property was acquired had not been proved to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority and also after referring to the fact that the said finding has been confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property as also this Court in the writ petition and writ appeal, rejected the said petition. The perusal of the said order clearly shows that a sum of Rs.19,000.00 is more than half of Rs.27,505.00; accordingly Section 9(1) of the Act is not applicable. Against the said order of the Competent Authority and second respondent herein, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property and first respondent herein. 11. It is true that the appeal papers were received by the Registry of the Appellate Tribunal. However, by order dated 29.01.1996, after holding that the Competent Authority, Madras’s letter dated 29.01.1996 cannot be said to be an order either under Sections 7, 9(1) or 10 of the Act, returned the memorandum of appeal. Learned counsel appearing for either side invited my attention to Sections 9(1) as well as 12 of the Act. The perusal of Section 9(1) of the Act clearly shows that, it is applicable to a case wher source of only a part, being less than one half of the income, earning or assets with which such property was acquired has not been proved to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority. The perusal of Section 9(1) of the Act clearly shows that, it is applicable to a case wher source of only a part, being less than one half of the income, earning or assets with which such property was acquired has not been proved to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority. In the instant case, it is established that the property at Door No.155, Madukkur South in Madukkur village, the total cost of acquisition of the property is Rs.27,505.00 As per the order under Section 7(1) dated 30.10.1981, it was held that the source for a sum of Rs.19,000.00 with which the said property was acquired had not been proved to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority. Inasmuch as, a sum of Rs.19,000.00 is more than half of Rs.27,505.00, I hold that the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Act are not applicable to the case of the petitioners. 12. As rightly argued by the learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, the liberty given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was based on the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that there is a provision in the Act for payment of fine in lieu of forfeiture. Neither the factual position nor the applicability of the section concerned has been put forward before the Supreme Court. In such a circumstance, the contentions raised by the learned senior Counsel appearing for the p etitioners are liable to be rejected. Inasmuch as the conclusion is that the proceeding/letter dated 29.01.1996 cannot be said to be an order under Sections 7, 9(1) or 10 of the Act, the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property is perfectly right in returning the appeal. I am satisfied that there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice, as claimed by the senior counsel appearing for the petitioners. 13. Regarding the other contention that the guidelines dated 23.06.1994 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, first of all, the guidelines are based only of clarificatory. Even the consideration of the said guidelines preferred to by the petitioners cannot be applied in view of the fact that by subsequent notification dated 25.11.1994, the very same Department/Competent Authority Cell clarified the guideline dealing with small cases of forfeiture where the value is less than Rs.1 lakh. Even the consideration of the said guidelines preferred to by the petitioners cannot be applied in view of the fact that by subsequent notification dated 25.11.1994, the very same Department/Competent Authority Cell clarified the guideline dealing with small cases of forfeiture where the value is less than Rs.1 lakh. In that communication it is clarified that, “it is clarified that the value of property to be taken for deciding the ceiling of Rs.1 lakh is the “current” value of the property as on the date of finalisation of SAFEMA proceedings. As regards the doubt whether the guidelines are applicable to NDPSA cases also, it is clarified that the guidelines are not applicable to NDPSA Cases.” In view of the above factual position, the contention regarding non- consideration of guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance is also liable to be rejected. 14. In the light of what is stated above, I do not find any error or infirmity in the order impugned consequently, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. 15. In view of the dismissal of the main writ petition, connected WMPs., are also dismissed.