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2002 DIGILAW 353 (GAU)

Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Ors.

2002-08-21

D.BISWAS

body2002
D. BISWAS, J. — Heard Mr. B. N. Dutta learned counsel for the writ petitioner and also Mr. S. C. Shyam, learned Addl. C.G. S.C. 2. This petition has been filed for issue of an appropriate writ for quashing the order dated 22.7.2002 passed by the respondent follows: "DESTINATION OF ELECTRICITY ADVANCE NOTICE 1. Due to acute shortage of power the temporary connection given to you are being disconnected after 10 days for the date of record of this letter. 2. You are therefore advised to make your own arrangement. Sd- Aseem Kumar AEE AGEEM For CE Shillong" 3. Petitioner's case is that he was given temporary connection by the Army Authority on request after due enquiry on certain terms and conditions which are reflected in the affidavit sworn by him on 17.10.2000. The impugned order has been challenged on the ground that the respondent authority cannot terminate the power connection to his residence since he has not violated any of the conditions incorporated therein. Mr. B. N. Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioner argued at length to show that the Army Authority as licensee has extended connection for supply of power to the residence of the writ petitioner and, as such, they are now estopped from taking any decision to disconnect the supply, particularly when there is no violation of the conditions mentioned in the affidavit. The learned counsel further submitted that the Army Authority had taken the decision to supply power to the private Electricity Board. It is further pointed by the learned counsel that the petitioner has not consumed more than 1 KW load as per order dated 12th October, 2000 and, as such, there is no cause of action for them to act in deviation of the agreement for supply of power. 4. Mr. S.C. Shyam, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Army Authority is not a licensee within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, hereinafter referred to as the Act and, as such, is not entitled to extend supply of power to the members of the public. The was without authority of law and it cannot bind the Army in perpetuity. According to the learned counsel, the connection given was purely temporary without specifying the time limit and this is violative of the Rules relating to service connection to the non-military buildings. The was without authority of law and it cannot bind the Army in perpetuity. According to the learned counsel, the connection given was purely temporary without specifying the time limit and this is violative of the Rules relating to service connection to the non-military buildings. The petitioner is an ex-serviceman and is no longer in the service of the Army. 5. It would appear that Rule 6 permits for temporary electric and water connection uses on social and medical grounds for a period not exceeding 15 days. The connection given by the order dated 31.10.2000 specifically mentions that permission was accorded for temporary electric connection and it has to be limited to 15 days as provided in Rule 6. Temporary connection for an indefinite period as has been done in the instant case, is undoubtedly beyond the provisions of Rule 6 and, as such, no writ can be issued by this Court to enforce supply of power to the private building of the writ petitioner in perpetuity. 6.1 have carefully examined the provisions referred to in Section 2 (c), 3 (f), Section 28 and 29 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I am of the considered view that under no circumstance the Army can be said to be a licensee for the purpose of supply of power to the consumers. Although it is not specifically mentioned in the affidavit in . opposition that Army is not a licensee within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act, yet it goes without saying that Army is not supposed to engage itself in the business of supply of power and cannot be compelled to extend power connection to the private building residing nearby cantonment area. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it can safely be concluded that the initial order for supply of power by the Commandant was in violation of the provisions of law and it does not vest the petitioner with any legal right enforceable in the Court of law. The controversy raised in the petition as well as in the rejoinder about bulk supply of power received by the Army and the availability of surplus thereof are matters for consideration on factual evaluation. This Court in writ jurisdiction will not embark upon such an in-depth study of factual matters. The controversy raised in the petition as well as in the rejoinder about bulk supply of power received by the Army and the availability of surplus thereof are matters for consideration on factual evaluation. This Court in writ jurisdiction will not embark upon such an in-depth study of factual matters. That apart, even if the Army has enough power in their possession to part with for consumption by the members of the public, yet it would be inconceivable to think of the Army engaging itself in supply of power the members of the public. The very foundation for issuance of a writ under Article 226 is the infringement of legal right which is very much absent in the case at hand. 8. In the writ petition is devoid of merit and, hence, dismissed.