R. B. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) BY this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 11. 2. 1991 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition ). Heard Sri S. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel for the respondents. ( 2 ) THE brief facts necessary for adjudication of the writ petition are that before creation of the corporation of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation with effect from 1. 6. 1972, the transport services in the State of U. P. were being controlled by the erstwhile U. P. Government Roadways, a department of the State Government and the employees working therein were governed by the rules and regulations applicable to the Government servants. The erstwhile U. P. Government roadways consisted of three major branches for Operational Branch, (b) Maintenance and construction Branch and (c) Store Branch. The Central Workshop, Kanpur, was started at the creation of the Roadways Organisation in 1948 and its employees were Government servants. In 1965, the certified standing orders were framed in respect of technical staff not holding the supervisory post in the Central Workshop and the rest of the categories were governed by the government Servants Rules. A Junior Foreman and Senior Foreman were discharging the supervisory and managerial functions as such they were governed by the Government Servants rules in view of Clause II of the certified standing orders which reads as under : "these standing orders shall apply to all workmen governed by Fundamental Rules and supplementary Rules, Civil Service, (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules or any other rules that may be notified by the State Government in this behalf in the official gazette. " ( 3 ) THE central workshop was registered by the U. P. Factories Act, 1948 (herein called the act)under Chapter VI of the Act, overtime was allowed under Section 68 (1) of the Act. The State government had the power of exemption under Section 64 of the act read with Rule 79 [1) and rule 80 of U. P. Factories Rules. 1950 (called rules 1950 ). The State Government had exempted Junior Foreman, Senior Foreman Gr. I and Gr, II and as such the provisions of Chapter vi of the Factories Act were not applicable to that category and the Junior Foreman and Senior foreman were not entitled to overtime allowance. 1950 (called rules 1950 ). The State Government had exempted Junior Foreman, Senior Foreman Gr. I and Gr, II and as such the provisions of Chapter vi of the Factories Act were not applicable to that category and the Junior Foreman and Senior foreman were not entitled to overtime allowance. Further Rule 79 (1) rule 1950 framed under section 64 (1) of the Factories Act enumerated the persons in factories, who shall be deemed to hold the position of Supervision or Management or are employed in a confidential position in a factory and the provisions of Chapter VI of the Factories Act which relates to overtime allowance are not applicable to them. The said list Includes Foreman and Assistant Foreman, thus, the Foreman, senior and junior are exempt by law from the provisions relating to the payment of overtime allowance. Furthermore, Junior Foreman and Senior Foreman have been taking benefits of leave under Fundamental Rules, Supplementary Rules and Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules as in the case of other Government servants and they are not granted leave under the certified standing orders. ( 4 ) THE respondent No. 3 Mahesh Chandra Goel was appointed as Junior Foreman in the Alien forest Workshop of the Corporation at Kanpur. The respondent No. 3 filed an application before the Labour Court (3) U. P. Kanpur under Section 33c (2) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947, claiming overtime allowance amounting to Rs. 4,446. 90 paise for the period 20. 2. 1984 to 31. 12. 1984. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No. 04 of 1986 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition ). A reply on behalf of the corporation as well as rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged. In the objection filed by the petitioner corporation contended that the respondent No. 3 had been paid project allowance at the rate of Rs. 50 per month in lieu of overtime allowance and has further contended that the overtime allowance was not payable to the post of Junior foreman and Senior Foreman as the State Government had exempted the employees working on the said post from the said benefit under Section 64 read with Rule 79 (1 ). It had also been contended by the petitioner corporation that the respondent No. 3 was earning wages more than rs. It had also been contended by the petitioner corporation that the respondent No. 3 was earning wages more than rs. 500 per month and was discharging duties of supervisory/administrative nature, hence he is not a workman and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable in his case. The labour court by its award dated 11. 2. 1991 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) had decreed the entire claim of respondent No. 3. ( 5 ) IT has been contended on behalf of the petitioner, (a) Corporation filed the award in adjudication Case No. 185 of 1978 before the concerned labour court wherein it was held that the employees of junior foreman and senior foreman were not entitled to any overtime allowance, (b) The labour court has erred in relying upon the earlier award in Adjudication Case no. 51 of 1974 where it was held that although Junior Foreman was not entitled to project allowance, they should be paid the same, (c) The labour court has failed to appreciate that the status of respondent No. 3 was highly disputed as to where he was a workman or not and hence the same could not be adjudicated under Section 33c (2) of the act and (d) A dispute and complicated question of fact could be adjudicated upon under a proper reference by the State government under Section 4-K of the Act. (e) The labour court had failed to appreciate that the junior Foreman in the workshops of the corporation were taking benefit of leave, etc. under fundamental Rules/ C. C. A. and not under certified standing orders. Moreover, the post of Junior foreman was a pensionable post, hence it was evident that the employees working on the said post were not workmen. (f) The respondent No. 3 has relied upon the award in Adjudication case No. 158 of 1983 and the same cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case as it was not clear that whether any evidence was led to show that the Foreman were doing supervisory/ managerial jobs. (f) The respondent No. 3 has relied upon the award in Adjudication case No. 158 of 1983 and the same cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case as it was not clear that whether any evidence was led to show that the Foreman were doing supervisory/ managerial jobs. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that such right to receive overtime allowance was under Section 59 of the Factories Act in as much as the unit was a factory and the State Government had no power to amend the act by executive Instructions pertinent to exempt the grant of overtime allowance and the limit of Rs. 500 has been raised to rs. 1,600 per month. The respondent has placed reliance on Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajgopalan, AIR 1964 (3) SCR 140 : 1964 SC 743. where it was held that an application under section 33c (2) was maintainable to determine the incidental question. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondent that in Writ Petition No. 34673 of 1994, U. P. S. R. T. C. v. B. K. Mathur and Co. , it was found that similar questions already decided as also affirmed by Supreme Court an application under Section 33c (2) was maintainable. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner-corporation, it was submitted that the labour court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmens entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33c (3)of the Act and for this purpose learned counsel for the petitioner-corporation has referred the verdict of Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another, JT 1994 (7) 476, where it was held : "it is clear that there has been no earlier adjudication by any forum of the claim of these workmen of their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate at which the regular workmen of the establishment are being paid and there is no award or settlement to that effect. In short, this claim of the workmen has neither been adjudicated nor recognised by the employer in any award or settlement. In short, this claim of the workmen has neither been adjudicated nor recognised by the employer in any award or settlement. The real question therefore is : Whether in these circumstances, without a prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen to be paid at the same rate as the regular employees, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages claimed by them on that basis are maintainable under Section 33c (2) of the Act? in our opinion, the question for decision is no longer res interga being long settled by earlier decisions of this Court. Some of the decisions have been referred by the High Court in the Impugned judgment, but the application of the settled principle made by the High Court is erroneous. (Paras 4 and 5 ). This decision itself indicates that the power of the labour court under Section 33c (2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement of which the workmans right rests, like the Executing courts power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referable to the award or settlement, but it does not extend to determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim if there be no prior adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. This decision negatives instead of supporting the submission of learned counsel for the respondents. (Para 8)The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true Import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not Incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33c (2) of the act. The labour court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmens entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under section 33c (2) of the Act. The labour court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmens entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under section 33c (2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the labour courts power under Section 33c (2) like that of the Executing Courts power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. (Para 12)The workmens claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of equal pay for equal work being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33c (2 ). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement of the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petition filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters ( have, therefore, be held that the labour court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made under Section 33c (2) of the Act by these respondents. " (Para 13) ( 8 ) IT is pertinent to mention here that the Judgment of Central Bank of India (supra) was considered in the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Supra ). " (Para 13) ( 8 ) IT is pertinent to mention here that the Judgment of Central Bank of India (supra) was considered in the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Supra ). Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment in State Bank of india v. Ram Chandra Dubey and others, 2000 (87) FLR 849 , in which Supreme Court has held that the benefit sought by the respondent to be enforced under Section 33c (2) of the Act, would be necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. ( 9 ) IN view of the foregoing facts and circumstances of the case, I find that the labour court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of the respondent No. 3 for overtime allowance as labour court was to first decide the workmens claim and entitlement of respondent No. 3, then to proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it was only after the entitlement has been adjudicated upon or recognised by the petitioner corporation, then thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof, if some ambiguity remains to be interpreted, then it was to be treated as incidental to be dealt by labour courts under Section 33c (2) in same way as the executing court exercises its power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. In the present case, the labour court in the impugned award has ignored the true merits and aspect of section 33c (2) of the act, therefore, it is liable to be set aside and the present writ petition preferred by the petitioner corporation is allowed in the light of the observation made above.