P.G. AGARWAL, J.: Heard Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel being assisted by Mr. R. Debnath, learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent Shri Jiban Kr. Dasgupta in person. 2. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22.2.2002, passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 515 of 1996. 3. The writ petitioner, respondent herein while serving as Ranger under Tripura Forest Development and Plantation Corporation (for short the Corporation) was subjected to a departmental proceeding for alleged misappropriation and for failure to maintain devotion to duty and utility. The amount alleged to have been misappropriated was to the tune of Rs. 38,262.98P. The petitioner was found guilty and on the report of the Inquiring Officer, the competent authority imposed the punishment of reduction of pay to the lowest stage in his scale of pay for a period of three years with cumulative effect and the punishment was made effective from the date of the order. The petitioner preferred an appeal as provided under the Rules but the said appeal was also dismissed. Hence the writ petition. 4. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the appellant has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition No. Civil Rule 515 of 1996 on the ground that the respondent Shri Jiban Kr. Dasgupta (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner") had earlier instituted Civil Rule No. 103 of 1989 and the said Civil Rule was withdrawn by him without seeking any liberty or permission for filing a fresh writ petition and hence the subsequent writ petition was not maintainable. Mr. Bhattacharjee has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "Sarguja Transport Service, petitioner Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others, respondents, reported in AIR 1987 SC 88 ", wherein it was held in case of withdrawal of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without permission to institute fresh petition, fresh petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of a same cause of action is not maintainable. 5. In the present case, there is no dispute at the Bar that the subsequent writ petition was also filed on the same cause of action. The order whereby the earlier writ petition No. Civil Rule 103 of 1989 was disposed of reads as follows : "5.7.94 ORDER Heard Mr. 5. In the present case, there is no dispute at the Bar that the subsequent writ petition was also filed on the same cause of action. The order whereby the earlier writ petition No. Civil Rule 103 of 1989 was disposed of reads as follows : "5.7.94 ORDER Heard Mr. B. Das, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner has already been assured by the respondents that his grievances would be redressed soon and on getting this assurance he is no longer interested to proceed with the case. In view of the submission recorded above, the writ petition is disposed of with no costs." 6. The case of the petitioner as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner was given an assurance that necessary reliefs would be granted to him in case he withdraws the writ petition. The said claim has been refuted by the appellant by stating that no such assurance was given to the petitioner. Besides the oral assurance the petitioner also claims that a letter dated 30th June, 1994 was addressed to him by the Managing Director of the Corporation and acting upon the said letter, the writ petition was withdrawn. The letter dated 30th June, 1994 (Annexure-J) reads as follows: "To Shri Jibon Kr. Dasgupta Corporation Ranger Pathalia RFC. Through DM, Sadar, Agartala. Subject: Selection for S.F.S. Training. You are being sponsored for undergoing S.F.S. Training to be commenced from 1st July, 1994 at S.F.S. College, Coimbatore during &e training session 94-'96 on the following conditions: You are required to withdraw the Court case instituted by you against TFDPC Ltd. vide Civil Rule No. 103 of 1989 in the Hon'ble High Court, Tripura, Agartala Bench. You are also required to execute an agreement with T.F.D.P.C. Ltd. for rendering service after completion training as per rule. If you are willing for the training as stated above you must report to this office by 1.7.94 (1st July 94) positively. Sd/- (D. Nag) Managing Director, T.F.D.P.C. Corporation Ltd. Agartala." 7. The issuance of the above letter is not in dispute. It was further contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the appellants that this letter was written for the purpose of deputing the petitioner for training only and there was no assurance regarding the disposal of the matter or giving other reliefs to the petitioner. The issuance of the above letter is not in dispute. It was further contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the appellants that this letter was written for the purpose of deputing the petitioner for training only and there was no assurance regarding the disposal of the matter or giving other reliefs to the petitioner. The petitioner after the withdrawal of the said writ petition, was, in fact deputed for training and he underwent training also. We, therefore, find that this is not a case of withdrawal of the writ petition simplicitor but the writ petition was withdrawn on being asked by the appellant Corporation and the petitioner might have legitimate expectation that if the writ petition was withdrawn his grievances would be redressed. Although after the withdrawal of the writ petition, the petitioner was deputed for training, but no other relief was granted to him which compelled him to file the subsequent writ petition. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we think that there are justifiable reasons to permit the petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. 8. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it is seen that the writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge on the following counts : (I) That the provision of Rule 14(12) of the CCS (CCA) Rules has not been followed, as a result, the delinquent-petitioner was made handicapped to prove his innocence having not brought on record the documentary proof he sought for. The Inquiring authority refused to issue requisition for production of as many as 20 numbers of documents as had been prayed for by the delinquent in exercise of his right under Rule 14( 12) of the CCS(CCA) Rules and the Inquiring authority without passing any reasoned order as to why he refused to issue requisition for such documents and this way, the petitioner's statutory right to prove his innocence has been denied and it amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity of being effectively defended. (II) The Inquiring authority allowed the presenting officer to produce and prove one document Exbt.P/11 without having followed the mandatory procedure laid down under Rule 14(15) of the CCS(CCA) Rules. (II) The Inquiring authority allowed the presenting officer to produce and prove one document Exbt.P/11 without having followed the mandatory procedure laid down under Rule 14(15) of the CCS(CCA) Rules. The list of that documents was never supplied to the petitioner 3 clear days prior to the date of production nor the petitioner was allowed inspection of the said documents and as a result, the petitioner could not make an attempt to refute the truthfulness of such documents and was made unable to produce any contra document as permissible under the aforesaid sub rule (15) of Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules. (III) The petitioner was undoubtedly influenced by insuitable allurement to withdraw his earlier case which also adversely affected the petitioner." 9. As regards the non-furnishing of the documents sought for by the petitioner, it is submitted that there are some factual error in the impugned judgment as because the petitioner had sought to inspect 29 numbers of additional documents and out of them, the petitioner was allowed to inspect 22 numbers of documents and prayer for the balance numbers of documents was rejected. The learned senior counsel for the appellants has produced the relevant record which shows that as many as 22 numbers of documents were allowed to be inspected by the petitioner and the prayer in respect of only seven numbers of documents was rejected. Further, out of the aforesaid seven documents, one document was produced by the department and exhibited as ExbtP/ 11. At no point of time, the petitioner made any grievance regarding non-production of other six documents and he has failed to show how the other documents were relevant for the purpose of the departmental proceeding. 10. As regards the proving of document Exbt.P/11 without following the alleged mandatory procedure, we find that document was called for by the petitioner employee himself, but the prayer was rejected by the Inquiring Officer as stated above. However, during the inquiry, the authority produced the document and marked it as Exbt.P/11. The document was made available to us and we find that this is a copy of the memorandum dated 2.12.1981 regarding maintaining Measurement Book for work on cattle-proof trench/wall. The genuineness of this document is not disputed though it is submitted that a copy of the said memorandum was not marked to the petitioner. The document was made available to us and we find that this is a copy of the memorandum dated 2.12.1981 regarding maintaining Measurement Book for work on cattle-proof trench/wall. The genuineness of this document is not disputed though it is submitted that a copy of the said memorandum was not marked to the petitioner. This Exbt.P/11 was not relied on by the Inquiry Officer for determining the guilt in the departmental proceeding and as such we hold that non-production and marking of this document Exbt.P/11 has not affected the petitioner adversely. The learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that there is no finding by the learned Single Judge that by producing Exbt.P/11 any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. In the case of State of U.P. and others, appellants Vs. Ramesh Chandra Mangatik, respondent, reported in AIR 2002 SC1241, the Hon*ble Apex Court in para 12 of the judgment observed - "12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no material or document has been relied upon by the Inquiry Officer, copy of which or inspection thereof may not have been allowed to the respondent. No material has been obtained after the date of hearing nor any such material has been made use of by the Inquiring Officer. It is further submitted that in the judgment of the High Court it has nowhere been indicated that any material or document, copy of which has not been supplied to the respondent, was used much less any prejudice, if caused to the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent could not pinpoint any particular document which may have been made use of by the Inquiring Officer for establishing the charges levelled against the respondent, copies of which or inspection thereof may not have been allowed to the delinquent by the Department. No submission has been advanced on behalf of the respondent on the point of prejudice which may have been caused to the respondent by non-supply of document, if any. The High Court has also not gone into the question of the relevance of the documents copies of which are said to have not been supplied to the respondent and consequent prejudice, if caused. We therefore find that the finding of the High Court that principles of natural justice have been violated for non-supply of documents to the respondent is not sustainable. We therefore find that the finding of the High Court that principles of natural justice have been violated for non-supply of documents to the respondent is not sustainable. The cross examination of a witness which was sought for, had unfortunately died which fact was also brought to the notice of the respondent" 11. In the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has also stated that D/4 and D/5, two documents submitted by the petitioner were not properly appreciated by the Inquiry authority. The law is well settled that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order of punishment is not an appeal, but only judicial review and thus the scope for interference is limited. The Court is to appreciate the materials only to find out whether the proceeding has been conducted in proper manner and the principles of natural justice have been followed or not. However, we have perused D/4 and D/5 and find that these are not at all relevant for the purpose as these contain certain allegations made by the petitioner against his higher ups. 12. As regards the ground No. 3 as quoted above, we are of the view that the issuance of Annexure-J and the withdrawal of the writ petition happened subsequently after the punishment was awarded to the petitioner and as such the matter was no way relevant to hold that the departmental proceeding was bad in law or it was not conducted in proper manner. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussions and findings, we hold that so far the finding of guilt is concerned, no interference is called for. However, considering the nature' of the case etc., we are of the view that the punishment meted out to the petitioner is shocking and disproportionate to the nature of the guilt. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of cases, we do not want to interfere with the matter of punishment, but leave it to the concerned authority to examine the matter afresh and award whatever punishment they deem fit and proper in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. 14. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of cases, we do not want to interfere with the matter of punishment, but leave it to the concerned authority to examine the matter afresh and award whatever punishment they deem fit and proper in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. 14. It is submitted that the present Managing Director was the presenting officer in the departmental proceeding and as such the matter be placed before the Chairman of the Corporation to examine the matter afresh in the light of the observations made by us and thereafter, take decision and impose punishment in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. We hope that the authority concerned will take a compassionate view in the matter considering that the petitioner is serving in the same post for last 25 years although he has successfully undergone the S.F.S. training. 15. The impugned judgment and order stands set aside and the appeal stands allowed