JUDGMENT M.L. Singhal, J. - M/s Bharat Rice and General Missl, Budhladha, through its partner Jagjit Singh son of Wazir Singh, resident of Budhladha filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against : (1) The Punjab State Civil Supplies and Marketing Federation Limited, (2) District Manager, Markfed, Mansa, (3) J.B. Chandran, Internal Auditor, Markfed House, Sector 35-B, Chandigarh, whereby order passed by defendant No. 1 appointing defendant No. 3 as Arbitrator was challenged and further that defendant No. 3 had no right or jurisdiction to give any award as reference made to him was null and void and arbitrary and had no effect on the claim of the plaintiff against defendant No. 1 and that the order appointing defendant No. 3 as Arbitrator was illegal, null and void and that he had no jurisdiction or right to enter upon the reference and summon the plaintiff to join the arbitration proceedings and that he had no jurisdiction to enter upon the claim of defendant No. 1. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff made an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC read with Section 151 CPC restraining defendant No. 3 from passing any award on the basis of the letter dated 3.4.1997 constituting him as Arbitrator. It was alleged that the plaintiff-firm is running a rice mill at Bhdhladha. It is maintaining a three bahi account. In the ordinary course of business, defendant-Markfed stored 54662 bags of paddy with the plaintiff for milling in the year 1994-95. Plaintiff was to supply rice to the Markfed after shelling paddy in accordance with the norms fixed by it. In the year 1994-95, there was a bumper paddy crop in Punjab. Defendants had no godown to store paddy. Plaintiff was ready to shell paddy as per agreement with the defendant. At that time neither the defendants nor Food Corporation of India, Budhladha had any space for the storage of paddy crop. Plaintiff requested the defendants several times to provide space for storage of paddy/rice. Defendants did not provide any space to the plaintiff for storing paddy/rice. Plaintiff became thus unable to shell paddy and convert it into rice. Plaintiff supplied 8304 quintals 9 kilograms of rice to the defendants against 19457 bags of paddy. Remaining bags of paddy were purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant at the rate of Rs. 423/- per quintal fixed by the defendant. Plaintiff became thus unable to shell paddy and convert it into rice. Plaintiff supplied 8304 quintals 9 kilograms of rice to the defendants against 19457 bags of paddy. Remaining bags of paddy were purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant at the rate of Rs. 423/- per quintal fixed by the defendant. In this matter, there was nothing due to the plaintiff so far as 54662 bags of paddy supplied to the plaintiff for being shelled is concerned. Defendant No. 2 also issued "no due certificate" to the plaintiff on 5.10.1995 after getting it verified from Markfed Branch, Budhladha on 2.9.1995. It was alleged that Markfed illegally appointed and constituted defendant No. 3 as Arbitrator through letter No. LO/Supdt./ARB/R 94-95/97 dated 3.4.1997. Defendant No. 3 summoned the plaintiff vide letter dated 8.4.1997 as defendants 1, 2 had filed claim before the Arbitrator i.e. defendant No. 3 for 25.4.1997. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 had wrongly referred the matter to the Arbitrator when in fact there was no dispute between the parties at all and the transaction of 1994-95 between the parties was settled with regard to the entire paddy supplied to the plaintiff-firm for shelling. Plaintiff also contended that in fact, there was no agreement at all dated 19.10.1994 with regard to the said Arbitration clause and if any agreement was there, that was the result of fraud and misrepresentation as the defendants had obtained his signatures on blank papers. It was also contended that defendants had already issued "no due certificate" and another certificate of payment in favour of plaintiff and "no due certificate" was existing between the parties and as such the question of referring the matter to the Arbitration did not arise. 2. Vide order dated 13.11.1998 Civil Judge Junior Division Mansa allowed temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining defendant No. 3 from passing any award against the plaintiff-firm as an "Arbitrator" till the disposal of the suit. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 i.e. Markfed and District Manager, Markfed Mansa went in appeal against the order of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mansa, dated 13.11.1998 which was allowed. Temporary injunction granted by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff was vacated. Plaintiff has come up in revision to this Court against the order of Additional District Judge, Mansa, dated 4.11.1999. 1 and 2 i.e. Markfed and District Manager, Markfed Mansa went in appeal against the order of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mansa, dated 13.11.1998 which was allowed. Temporary injunction granted by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff was vacated. Plaintiff has come up in revision to this Court against the order of Additional District Judge, Mansa, dated 4.11.1999. Defendants case before the trial Court was that they had handed over 54662 bags of paddy to the plaintiff for being shelled and converted into rice. Plaintiff was to restore rice after the shelling paddy upto 28.2.1995. Plaintiff failed to deliver them rice after milling paddy upto 28.2.1995. Due to non-supply of rice to the Markfed by the plaintiff-firm upto 28.2.1995, the Markfed suffered loss. Defendants contention was that as per the agreement defendant was entitled to claim compensation and interest at the rate of 2% per annum from the plaintiff on the loss suffered due to the fault of the plaintiff. The Markfed had to sell paddy in open market at a lower rate on the plaintiffs failure to deliver rice after milling paddy upto 28.2.1995. Its contention was that "Arbitrator" was appointed as per the agreement clause mentioned in agreement dated 19.10.1994 executed between the plaintiff-firm and the defendant-Markfed. Plaintiffs contention was that the defendant-Markfed had failed to provide adequate space for storage of paddy to the plaintiff. Punjab Government extended the date from 28.2.1995 to June, 1995, for the delivery of rice after milling paddy. Plaintiff supplied 8304 quintals 8 kilograms of rice to the defendant for shelling 19547 bags of paddy. Remaining bags of paddy were purchased by the plaintiff-firm itself at the rate of Rs. 423/- per quintal as fixed by the Punjab Government. There was nothing left with the plaintiff- firm which it was required to supply to the defendant-Markfed. It was for this reason that "no due certificate" was issued to the plaintiff by the Markfed on 5.10.1995 after verification from the Markfed Branch, Budhladha. Plaintiffs contention was that there was absolutely no dispute between the parties. When there was no dispute between the parties, the appointment of Arbitrator was misconceived. There was nothing to be adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. Plaintiffs contention was that the existence of a dispute was a condition precedent for reference to the Arbitrator. Plaintiffs contention was that there was absolutely no dispute between the parties. When there was no dispute between the parties, the appointment of Arbitrator was misconceived. There was nothing to be adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. Plaintiffs contention was that the existence of a dispute was a condition precedent for reference to the Arbitrator. The dispute arose when one party asserts a right and the other party repudiates the existence of that right. The repudiation may be either express or implied. It may be by words or by conduct. Plaintiffs contention was that when District Manager, Mansa, had himself issued a "no due certificate" to the plaintiff-firm with regard to 1994-95 paddy crop where was any dispute then left which was required to be adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mansa, gave temporary injunction to the plaintiff as he felt that prima facie it seems that there was no dispute between the parties which the Arbitrator could be called upon to adjudicate. 3. Additional District Judge vacated the temporary injunction granted to the plaintiff by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mansa, as he left that as per clause 18 of the Arbitration Agreement which was entered into between the parties, if any dispute arose between the parties that has to be referred to the Arbitrator for adjudication. Additional District Judge felt that the plaintiff-firm was to mill paddy and convert it into rice and deliver rice to the Markfed latest by 28.2.1995. Plaintiff-firm failed to deliver rice to the Markfed by 28.2.1995. Due to the delayed delivery of rice by the plaintiff- firm to the Markfed, the Markfed alleged that it suffered loss and as to whether the Markfed did or did not suffer any loss, and as to what was the extent of that loss, that could be adjudicated upon only by the Arbitrator. Additional District Judge also felt that when reference was made to the Arbitrator vide letter dated 3.4.1997, the matter was covered by the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. According to Section 5 of this Act, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to thwart the arbitration proceedings. According to sub-clause (iii) of Section 8 of this Act, even if some judicial proceedings are pending between the parties, arbitration can be commenced and continued and Arbitrators award can be passed. On this premise, Additional District Judge vacated the temporary injunction. 4. According to Section 5 of this Act, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to thwart the arbitration proceedings. According to sub-clause (iii) of Section 8 of this Act, even if some judicial proceedings are pending between the parties, arbitration can be commenced and continued and Arbitrators award can be passed. On this premise, Additional District Judge vacated the temporary injunction. 4. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that with the issuance of no due certificate on 5.10.1995 by the Markfed to the plaintiff- firm, there was no contract/agreement subsisting between the parties. It was submitted that the agreement entered into by the plaintiff-firm with the Markfed with regard to paddy crop of the year 1994-95 was no longer subsisting when no due certificate was issued. It was submitted that reference could be made to the Arbitrator only if some dispute subsisted between the parties which was to be adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that after the Arbitrator and Conciliation Act, 1996, had come into force, Arbitration Act, 1940 will cease to be applicable. It was submitted that no proceedings for arbitration were pending on the date of commencement of 1996 Act, therefore, the proceedings would be covered by 1996 Act. It was submitted that the arbitration proceedings were initiated while appointing the Arbitrator vide letter dated 3.4.1997 and then arbitration proceedings were covered under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which came into force with effect from 25.1.1996. It was submitted that under the provisions of this Act, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to stay arbitration proceedings before the Arbitrator. Only an application to the Arbitrator is competent in this regard and even his decision could not be challenged except by way of an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. In support of this submission, he drew my attention to M/s Harike Rice Mills, Mehalkalan, District Sangrur v. State of Punjab & Others, 1998(1) PLR 395. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner submitted that in this case, the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, would apply. He placed reliance on M/s Shettys Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Konkan Railway Construction and another, AIR 1999 SC 1535 . On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner submitted that in this case, the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, would apply. He placed reliance on M/s Shettys Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Konkan Railway Construction and another, AIR 1999 SC 1535 . It was submitted that since the plaintiff had failed to raise objection regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the Civil Suit filed by the plaintiff and the defendants had joined the proceedings, the defendants were debarred from referring the matter to the Arbitrator and that being so, the proceedings before the Arbitrator were liable to be stayed. 6. 1996 Act came into force with effect from 25.1.1996 whereby 1940 Act stood repealed. Since no proceedings under the 1940 Act were pending in this case at the time when 1996 Act came into force, there would be no question of the provisions of 1940 Act being applicable to the facts of this case. The provisions of 1940 Act would have applied to this case only if any claim regarding Arbitration had been made by either side prior to 25.1.1996, the date on which the 1996 Act came into force. There is nothing to show that either side had made any claim for arbitration before 25.1.1996. There would be thus no question of 1940 Act being applicable to the present case. Mere filing of civil suit by the plaintiff prior to 25.1.1996 would be of no relevance unless it is shown that any reference to the Arbitrator was made by either side prior to 25.1.1996. 7. In Section 5 of the 1996 Act is provided that in the matters covered by the said Act, no judicial authority shall intervene. Section 8(b) of the 1996 Act provides that even where the issue is pending before the judicial authority (Courts), an arbitration may be commenced or continued and the arbitration award made. Section 16 provides that the "arbitral tribunal" may rule on its own jurisdiction including the ruling of any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement and a party is competent to raise a plea before the Arbitral Tribunal that he did not have jurisdiction or was exceeding the scope of its authority and where the arbitral tribunal takes a decision rejecting any such plea, it would continue with the arbitral proceedings and make the arbitral award. It is further provided therein that the party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for setting aside such arbitral award in accordance with Section 34 of the said Act. 8. In M/s Harikes case (supra) it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that even if the appointment of an Arbitrator was invalid, the same will have to be decided by the Court before which the validity of award would be challenged and an unsuccessful party cannot challenge the order of the Arbitrator rejecting the challenge to his appointment even before the Civil Court before the award is made and even a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Arbitrator would not lie when the award is yet to be made. In Olympic Super Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khaitan & Others, AIR 1999 SC 2102 it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, arbitral award may be set aside by the Court when the award deals with the dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to Arbitration or if it contains decision on merits beyond the scope of the submission to Arbitration. In this case, the Managing Director of the Markfed had already appointed Mr. J.B. Chandran, Internal Auditor as Arbitrator in respect of the dispute between the parties. The Arbitrator had already issued notice to the parties in the arbitral proceedings pending before him. Plaintiff would be competent to raise pleas regarding jurisdiction of the Arbitrator by making necessary application in this regard before the arbitral tribunal and it would be competent to decide the questions of its own jurisdiction and where it rejects the plea of the objector regarding jurisdiction, the arbitral tribunal would be competent to proceed with the case and to give its award and the aggrieved party would be competent to challenge award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Thus, remedy is available to the plaintiff under the provisions of the 1996 Act. Civil Court would, thus, be not competent to restrain the arbitrator from continuing with the arbitration proceedings in view of the provisions of Section 5 of the 1996 Act. 9. Thus, remedy is available to the plaintiff under the provisions of the 1996 Act. Civil Court would, thus, be not competent to restrain the arbitrator from continuing with the arbitration proceedings in view of the provisions of Section 5 of the 1996 Act. 9. In view of the law laid down in M/s Harikes case (supra) if the appointment of Arbitrator is to be challenged, it will have to be challenged before the Court before which the validity of the award is questioned. 10. For the reasons given above, this revision fails and is dismissed. Revision dismissed.