JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - This Second Appeal is preferred by the Defendants challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned the then Subordinate Judge, Bhubaneswar in Original Suit No. 132 of 1979 which was confirmed by the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Bhubaneswar in Title Appeal No. 13/28 of 1997/93. The litigation relates back to the year 1979. The Plaintiff-Respondents entered appearance by filing a caveat. Taking into consideration the long pendency of the litigation, with the consent of both the parties, the Second Appeal was admitted on the substantial grounds framed in the appeal memo and was heard on merits. 2. The facts which are very much necessary to appreciate the case are: The Respondents as Plaintiffs filed Original Suit No. 132 of 1979 (I), inter aha, praying for confirmation of possession, permanent injunction and for mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to remove the temporary shed constructed by them over the suit land. In alternative, it was prayed that if it is found that the Plaintiffs have been dispossessed, then a decree for recovery of possession be passed by declaring that the Defendants have no manner of right, title and interest on the suit land. According to the Plaintiffs, Mohan Sahu, Dhadi Sahu and Bhramar Sahu purchased the land way back on March 30, 1960 by means of a registered sale deed from one Hadu Baliarsingh who happened to be the husband of Defendant No. 1 and father of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It was also asserted in the plaint that the Plaintiffs on July 10, 1979 purchased a portion of the suit land from Lokanath Sahu apart from the portion purchased by them from Dhadi Sahu apart from the portion purchased by them from Dhadi Sahu and Bhramar Sahu. The suit land which was not fit for agricultural purpose was lying vacant all through. The Plaintiffs had a hotel close to the suit land and they were also possessing the suit land. In the year 1979, the Plaintiffs wanted to raisa construction over the suit land which was objected by the Defendants resulting in initiation of a proceeding under Sec, 144, Code of Criminal Procedure In spite of the restraint order, the Defendants, it is alleged in the plaint, forcibly constructed a temporary shed on the suit land on November 8, 1979 which necessitated filing of the suit. At the other hand, the Defendants took the stand in their written statement that the suit land belonged to Hadu Baliarsingh and Maheswar Baliarsingh. On March 30, 1960 the aforesaid two original owners agreed to sell the land to Dhadi Sahu, Bhramar Sahu and Maheswar Sahu, but only a portion of the consideration amount was paid and the balance was not paid. Thus, neither the sale materialised nor the possession was delivered to the Plaintiffs and the Defendants continued to remain in possession. It was pleaded that the Plaintiffs have acquired no title as no title passed to their vendors. It was also alternatively pleaded that assuming that title had passed to the Plaintiffs on the strength of the sale deed dated March 30, 1960, yet the Defendants have prescribed title by adverse possession by remaining in possession exclusively to the knowledge of all the persons concerned claiming to be the rightful owners thereof. They supplemented their claim by asserting that in 1962 and 1970 settlements, their names were recorded in the record of rights, they have received patta and are paying rent regularly. It was also averred that when dissension cropped up in family, Defendants and 3 shifted to the suit land in the year 1979 and after constructing a room, stayed there as absolute owners. They have also construed a shed for keeping their bullocks rind to store stones for construction of their house. 3. The trial Court on the basis of the pleadings and evidence adduced before it, recorded the following findings: (i) Full consideration had been paid and therefore, title had passed in favour of the Plaintiffs, vendors. (ii) Plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property and the Defendants have not perfected their title by adverse possession. 4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the Defendants preferred First Appeal No. 267 of 1981 before this Court. The said First Appeal was disposed of on August 26, 1991. Relevant portion of paragraph-8 of the judgment reads as follows: On perusal of the record, I find that D.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have categorically stated about user of the suit land as thrashing floor. It was open to the learned Subordinate Judge to discuss the evidence and discard it as not credible and not acceptable. Relevant portion of paragraph-8 of the judgment reads as follows: On perusal of the record, I find that D.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have categorically stated about user of the suit land as thrashing floor. It was open to the learned Subordinate Judge to discuss the evidence and discard it as not credible and not acceptable. But the abrupt conclusion that there was no material to show that the land in question was being used as thrashing floor does not appear to be defensible. No reference has been made to certain discrepancies in the evidence of P.Ws. xx xx xx In the fitness of things, therefore, the learned Subordinate-Judge should re-adjudicate the matter. He shall not be influenced by any of the observations made herein, and shall decide the matter afresh. The judgment and decree ace set aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned Subordinate Judge for re-adjudication. After remand, the case was once again heard by the trial Court. The learned the then Subordinate Judge, disposed of Original Suit No. 132 of 1979 by his judgment dated August 20, 1993. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment, the trial Court has discussed the oral evidence adduced by the Defendants and the Plaintiffs. He has also discussed the evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 7 vis-a-vis the Plaintiffs' evidence and came to the conclusion that the D.Ws. gave contradictory evidence about the boundary of the suit land. After taking into consideration the documentary evidence, the trial Court held as follows: xx xx xx This being the position, when the things are considered with reference to the documentary evidence read with the oral evidence of P.Ws. and D.Ws., the net conclusion falls that the Plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land and that the Defendants have not perfected any adverse possession thereof. 5. When matter stood thus, by amendment, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge was enhanced and accordingly, Title Appeal No. 13/28 of 1997/93 was filed before the District Judge, Bhubaneswar. The appeal was heard and disposed of by the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Bhubaneswar. The lower appellate Court discussed the evidence in the light of the observations made by this Court in First Appeal No. 267 of 1981. In paragraph-9 of the judgment, the lower appellate Court has observed as follows: xx xx xx I find that all the D.Ws. The appeal was heard and disposed of by the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Bhubaneswar. The lower appellate Court discussed the evidence in the light of the observations made by this Court in First Appeal No. 267 of 1981. In paragraph-9 of the judgment, the lower appellate Court has observed as follows: xx xx xx I find that all the D.Ws. i.e. D.Ws. 1 to 5 have in a parrot like manner stated that the Appellants are in possession of the suit schedule land and D.W. 4 Sunakar Baliarsingh, son of Hadubandhu Baliarsingh by constructing a room over the suit land in possessing and also using the same as a thrashing floor. But such evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 5 has been falsified by the evidence of P.W.6 who has stated on oath that D.W.4 is possessing the suit land for the last 2 to 3 years, xx xx. The lower appellate Court treating the statement of D.W.5 to be an admission and after discussing the evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 5, came to a categorical finding that the boundary of the case land given by them did not tally with each other and held as follows: xx xx xx Therefore the sum total of evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 5 read with the evidence of D.W.6, i do not hesitate to come to a conclusion that the Appellants have miserably failed to discharge their burden of proving the adverse possession over the suit schedule land. On the basis of such conclusion the lower appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. Hence this Second Appeal. 6. it is no more res integra that a finding on the question of adverse possession is purely a finding of fact. The scope of Section 100 of the CPC has been explained in a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as other Courts and has been held that where a Court of First Appeal is competent to enter into a question of fact and decide for itself whether the findings of fact arrived at by the lower Court are or are not erroneous, a Court of Second Appeal was not and is not competent to entertain the question as to the soundness of a finding of fact arrived at by the Court below. A Second Appeal accordingly, could lie only on or the other grounds specified in the Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure. The scope of Section 100 CPC even before amendment of the Section in 1976 permitted the Second Appellate Court to interfere only on very limited grounds. The question about the limit of the powers conferred on the High Court, in dealing with Second Appeals has been considered also by the Privy Council on several occasions. One of the earliest pronouncements of the Privy Council on this point is to be found in the case of Durga Choudharni v. Jawahar Singh 1890 (1) Ind App. 122. It was held by the Privy Council: There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of facts, however gross in error they may seem to be. The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases and it was held that no doubt a Second Appeal lay only where there was a substantial error or defect in procedure, but an erroneous finding of fact is distinct from an error or defect in procedure Accordingly, where there was no error or defect in procedure, the finding of the first appellate Court upon a question of fact had to be regarded as final, if that Court had before it proper evidence for its consideration in support of the finding. The mere fact that the High Court would have upon documents and evidence placed before the Court of first appeal can come to a different conclusion is no ground for a Second Appeal. In the case of Madamanchi Ramappa and Another Vs. Muthalur Bojjappa speaking for the three Member Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as follows: Notwithstanding such clear and authoritative pronouncements on the scope of the provisions of Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of Second Appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces, apart from, the-fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. 7. This introduces, apart from, the-fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. 7. The true legal position in regard to the powers of the Second Appellate Court u/s 100, CPC has been examined time and again and it has been, unambiguously held that the High Court-should bear in mind the caution and warning pronounced by the Privy Council in the case of Mst. Durga Choudharni and should not interfere with the finding of facts. The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which Courts of fact have acted was admissible and are relevant, it is not open to a party feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the Courts of facts to contend before the High Court in Second Appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the Court of facts and cannot be agitated in a Second Appeal. It has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramanuja Naidu Vs. V. Kanniah Naidu and anothers, that, may be in some cases, the High Court while dealing with a Second Appeal, is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of facts recorded by Courts of fact; but on such occasions, it is necessary to remember that what is administered in Courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in Second Appeals the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid. Law is also well settled that High Court cannot set aside concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below and come to a different conclusion on re-appraisal of evidence. Law is also well settled that High Court cannot set aside concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below and come to a different conclusion on re-appraisal of evidence. In the case of Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521 , the apex Court held as follows: This Court, time without number pointed out that interference with the concurrent findings of the Courts below by the High Court u/s 100, CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower Courts. In the case of Pandu Ho v. Mandi Bewa and Ors. 67 (1989) CLT 65, this Court has held that the question of nature of possession would be a question of fact and normally there would be no scope for interference with the same in Second Appeal. But then, if the finding of fact would be rendered without consideration of materials on record, the same would not be binding in Second Appeal and a substantial question of law would arise if on consideration of the materials or circumstances, the finding can be sustained. In the case of Gouri Shankar Misra and Another Vs. Fakir Mohan Dash and Others this Court relying upon a catena of decisions held that when two Courts of fact have fully appreciated the evidence on record and have come to the conclusion, the said conclusion cannot be interfered with by the Second Appellate Court. In a recent decision in the case of Hamida and Others Vs. Md. Kahlil the Supreme Court while examining the scope of interference with the findings recorded by the Courts of fact, held that if the findings are neither perverse nor based on no evidence, it would not be proper for the second appellate Court to upset the findings by taking a different view on appreciation of evidence. In the case of Pakeerappa Rai Vs. Seethamma (Dead) by LRs and Others the Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone to the extent of observing that erroneous finding of fact, however gross error they may be, cannot be interfered in a Second Appeal. 8. In the touch-stone of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions, I considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties in extenso. Mr. 8. In the touch-stone of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions, I considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties in extenso. Mr. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the Appellants strenuously and forcefully submitted that the Courts below have not sacrosanctly complied with the directions issued by this Court in First Appeal No. 267 of 1981 while remanding the same for reconsideration and the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below should be set aside on that ground alone. Mr. B. Routray, at the other hand, strenuously contended that both the Courts below have sacrosanctly referred to and examined the evidence both oral and documentary and have arrived at concurrent findings which are findings on facts. It is also submitted that in absence of any substantial question of law the second appeal cannot be entertained. In support of his case, Mr. Routray relied upon the decisions in Ramanuja Naidu Vs. V. Kanniah Naidu and anothers R. Ramachandran Ayyar Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar and in Gouri Shankar Mishra v. Fakir Mohan Dash and Ors. 67 (1989) CLT 607 which have been dealt with-in extenso in the preceding paragraphs. Relevant portion of the directions issued by this Court in First Appeal No. 267 of 1981 has also been quoted above. 9. After going through the judgments of both the Courts below, I am not persuaded to accept the argument advanced by Mr. Mohanty. Both the Courts below have examined the evidence, oral and documentary, as would be evident from different paragraphs of the judgment and have reached at categorical conclusion that the Defendants have got no manner of right, title or interest over the suit land and that the Plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land, and that the Defendants have not perfected their right by adverse possession. The said finding does not suffer from any perversity nor based on no evidence. Finding on possession being a pure question of fact and having been arrived at after taking into consideration the evidence, both oral and documentary, available on record, as a Second Appellate Court, I refrain from interfering with the same. Accordingly, I find no merit in this Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. The judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are affirmed. Parties to bear their respective costs. Final Result : Dismissed