( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Public Prosecutor. This is an appeal filed against the conviction and sentence in sessions Case No. 210 of 1997 on the file of the II-Add1. Sessions Judge, Nalgonda. A1 has been convicted of the offence under section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of rs. 500/- in default he has to suffer imprisonment for six months. A2 was acquitted. ( 2 ) APPELLANT/a1 was charged with an offence under Section 302 of I. P. C. for having committed the murder of his wife mamidi Jayamma by pouring kerosene over her body and set tire to her on 7. 11. 1996 at 19. 30 hours at Thallagadda, Suryapet. She died while undergoing treatment in Osmania general Hospital at Hyderabad. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and was tried. Prosecution examined 14 witnesses and exhibited 12 documents. ( 3 ) IT is conceded at the bar that there is no direct evidence and the witnesses who were projected as eye-witnesses being the children of the couple (P. Ws. 2 and 3) turned hostile. The conviction has been solely based on two dying declarations purported to have been made by the deceased before her death. One of the dying declarations being Ex. P1 was recorded by the Magistrate (P. W. 1) on 7. 11. 1996 at 9. 40 p. m. , whereas the second dying declaration being Ex. P9 was recorded by Police Officer (P. W. 12 ). As a matter of fact, this dying declaration was recorded by police as a statement under section 161 Cr. P. C. These two dying declarations have been attacked by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant on various grounds. The first dying declaration which was recorded by the magistrate is challenged additionally on the ground that the doctor has not certified that the deceased was is a fit condition to make a statement when the dying declaration was recorded. We have seen the dying declaration and also the statement made by the magistrate who was examined as P. W. 1. The doctor while giving certificate has stated, "at the time of recording dying declaration the patient is conscious and alert to give statement". We have seen the dying declaration and also the statement made by the magistrate who was examined as P. W. 1. The doctor while giving certificate has stated, "at the time of recording dying declaration the patient is conscious and alert to give statement". The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that it is settled law that the doctor should certify that the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement, but he has only stated that the patient was conscious and alert to give the statement. In view of the reasons we would be giving shortly for accepting the other arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant, we do not intend lo decide as to whether the alertness would mean the fitness . ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant further submits that the two dying declarations are contradictory with respect to the material facts. In the first dying declaration (Ex. Pl) recorded by the magistrate the deceased stated that one leelamma had illegal intimacy with her husband and she came along with her husband on the date of occurrence to her house, her husband abused her as harlot and beat her and took 5 litres tin of kerosene, poured on her body and lit fire to her. She also stated that the main cause for burning was her husband. She also stated that after setting her on fire, he took her to hospital, whereas in the second dying declaration (Ex. P9) she stated that whenever Leelamma came to her house, there was an altercation between her and husband. On 7. 11. 1996 at about 7. 30 p. m. , while she was sleeping in her house, her husband brought 5 litres tin of kerosene, poured it on her body and lit fire by a matchstick. She was burning and he did not allow anybody to help her. Aftersome time, he took her to the government Hospital. The reason given for burning was that, "she stated that, due to not talking with Mamidi Leelamma, with that angry with intention to kill me he burnt me. " Considering both these dying declarations, following discrepancies are found. In the first dying declaration the deceased did not say that she was sleeping, whereas in the second dying declaration she stated that she was sleeping when the occurrence took place. " Considering both these dying declarations, following discrepancies are found. In the first dying declaration the deceased did not say that she was sleeping, whereas in the second dying declaration she stated that she was sleeping when the occurrence took place. In the second dying declaration she was also not clear whether leelamma had accompanied her husband at the time of occurrence or not, whereas in the first dying declaration she was emphatically clear that Leelamma had accompanied the accused. In the first one she stated that her husband accused her of being harlot, but in the second one there was no such accusation. In the second one the reason given for burning her was that she was not on talking terms with Leelamma. First one is silent in this regard. These are the material discrepancies between the two dying declarations and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dandu lakhsmi Reddy v. State of A. P. , AIR 1999 sc 3255 , these dying declarations do not inspire confidence in the Court. In the judgment of the Supreme Court there was a discrepancy in two dying declarations with respect to occasion for launching murderous attack. In one of the dying declarations she stated that while she was working in the kitchen, she was burnt. In the other dying declaration she stated that while she was sleeping, she had been attacked and burnt. The Supreme Court has not approved the high Court s acceptance of dying declarations and has observed in para-16:"thus the High Court has sidelined such a noticeable discrepancy looming large as between the two different statements made by the same person. When the sphere of scrutiny of dying declaration is a restricted area, the Court cannot afford to sideline such a material divergence relating to the very occasion of the crime. Either the context spoken to one was wrong or that in the other was wrong. Both could be reconciled with each other only with much strain as it relates to the opportunity for the culprit to commit the offence. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible course. " ( 5 ) THE other reasons for not accepting these dying declarations (Exs. Both could be reconciled with each other only with much strain as it relates to the opportunity for the culprit to commit the offence. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible course. " ( 5 ) THE other reasons for not accepting these dying declarations (Exs. Pl and P9) are, P. W. 4 who is an independent witness stated in his examination that he heard some cries from the house of the appellant and he thought that A1 might be quarrelling with his wife. He came out of his house and went there. He found the sons of Al crying and the deceased had fallen down with burn injuries. He saw Al coming from outside and he shifted her to the Government hospital. The children being P. Ws. 2 and 3 who have been declared hostile have also supported the version given by P. W. 4. They stated that their father was not in the house, when the deceased caught fire while cooking in the kitchen. ( 6 ) FOR the reasons given hereinabove, we feel that the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. Therefore, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit the appellant. He shall be released forthwith from custody, if not needed in any other cases.