ORDER : The present litigation has a chequered history, possibly due to adamantine obstinacy and indefatigable proclivity for finding concavity by the authorities, which shall unfold and unroll layer by layer when there shall be expose of facts. 2. The petitioner, Avas Rahat Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Maryadit, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') is a cooperative society registered under the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for brevity 'the Act') having its registered office at Bhopal. The object of the society was to secure land from the State Government for the purpose of construction of residential houses for its members. It was formed in the year 1981 and one K. L. Sahu is its president. The society filed an application for allotment of land before the State Government on 22-12-1981. The State Government processed the application and after being satisfied passed the order reserving 13 acres of land bearing Khasra No. 299/82/2, Rakba No. 85 situated at Char Imili, Shahpura, Bhopal (capital project area). The aforesaid order inter alia, stipulates that the land in question was reserved for allotment in favour of the petitioner on the conditions mentioned in the Revenue Book Circular (in short 'the RBC') and the conditions mentioned in the order of reservation. The conditions were that the petitioner shall get the map and layout sanctioned from the competent authority. The said order is dated 11-8-1982 and has been brought on record as Annexure P-2. The petitioner complied with the conditions and intimated the competent authority. 3. According to the writ petitioner, after the conditions were complied with on 22-9-1982 the State Government was pleased to allot/grant the aforesaid land in favour of the petitioner, on the basis of prevailing market rate applicable for the year 1981-1982, i.e. Rs. 11.20 sq. ft. Thus the total valuation of the land came to Rs. 18,72,120.80/- and the rent was fixed at Rs. 93,606.05/-. The petitioner was required to pay the said amount. The dead line was fixed for depositing the sum within sixty days failing which the allotment was to be treated as cancelled. The other conditions mentioned in the order were that the possession of the land would be handed over on fulfilment of the conditions engrafted therein. Clause 8 of the said order provides that in case if any difference in rent/premium is found the petitioner would have to bear the same. The other conditions mentioned in the order were that the possession of the land would be handed over on fulfilment of the conditions engrafted therein. Clause 8 of the said order provides that in case if any difference in rent/premium is found the petitioner would have to bear the same. The aforesaid order has been brought on record as Annexure P-3. In pursuance of the aforesaid order the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 19,65,726.85/- on 11-10-1982 with the competent authority of the State Government. After depositing the sum the petitioner prayed for delivery of possession of the land. The possession was handedover to the petitioner-society. An application was made for approval of the land allotted to the petitioner. The Director Town and Country Planning, by order dated 28-12-1982, Annexure P-6, allowed the application and approved the layout of the society. When the matter stood thus on 7-2-1983 the petitioner was utterly surprised to receive an order from the State Government by which the order giving the possession to the petitioner was cancelled. By the said order the petitioner was restrained from making any construction over the land in question. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner preferred Miscellaneous Application No. 1296/1983. This Court allowed the writ application on 4-7-1984 and quashed the order passed by the State Government. After the writ application was allowed the State Government on 16-1-1986 issued the order cancelling the allotment. The petitioner was asked to surrender the possession of the land forthwith. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred M. P. No. 326/1986. The said petition was disposed of on 3-2-1994 wherein this Court imposed certain conditions for the purpose of implementation of the entire scheme. The said order dated 3-2-1994 has been brought on record as Annexure P-12. As certain mistakes had occurred in the order the petitioner moved an application for review/clarification of the order which was done by order dated 4-4-1994, Annexure P-13. The State of Madhya Pradesh assailed the order of this Court in SLP No. 9110/1994 which faced dismissal. 4. It is setforth in the petition as per order of this Court the Registrar was to verify the eligibility of the members of the petitioner society for obtaining the land of the society. The State of Madhya Pradesh assailed the order of this Court in SLP No. 9110/1994 which faced dismissal. 4. It is setforth in the petition as per order of this Court the Registrar was to verify the eligibility of the members of the petitioner society for obtaining the land of the society. It is putforth that in its purported compliance the Registrar has done some sort of ex parte enquiry and concluded that none of the member of the society was eligible and hence, no allotment can be made in favour of the members of the society. The report of the enquiry by the Registrar gave rise to filing of a contempt petition before this Court forming the subject matter of MCC No. 636/1994 wherein this Court on 13-3-1995 came to hold that the order passed by the authority was bad in law and accordingly set it aside. Thereafter the petitioner applied for further directions in the matter and for that purpose filed another application forming the subject matter of M.C.C. No. 135/1995 which was allowed by order dated 18-4-1995 whereby this Court directed the District Judge, Bhopal to hold the enquiry. The legality of the said order was called in question in SLP NO. 3996/1995 which was dismissed. While dismissing the SLP the Supreme Court directed the District Judge to send the report to the High Court and then asked to decide the matter. An application was filed for seeking clarification of the aforesaid order by the State Government but it did not meet with the success. At that juncture an application for review was filed seeking review of the original order passed in the M. P. No. 326/86 and this review application was dismissed on 27-6-1996 vide Annexure P-19. Against the order of aforesaid dismissal a SLP was preferred which was dismissed by the Apex Court by order dated 20-12-1996. 5. It is apposite to mention here that in the meantime the petitioner filed an M. A. which was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court and it was directed to the respondents to comply with the directions in the order dated 3-2-1994 passed in MP No. 326/1986. A time of six months was allowed to the respondents. The petitioner sent a series of reminders which has been brought on record. As it was not paid heed to a contempt proceeding bearing Cont. Pet. A time of six months was allowed to the respondents. The petitioner sent a series of reminders which has been brought on record. As it was not paid heed to a contempt proceeding bearing Cont. Pet. No. 3/1998 was filed. During the pendency of the contempt petition the order dated 13-2-1998 was served on the petitioner which compelled the petitioner to file another contempt petition No. 45/1998. Both the contempt petitions came up for hearing before this Court and it was observed that if the legality or correctness of the order dated 13-2-1998 has to be challenged the same should be done in an appropriate proceeding. Because of this both the contempt petitions were withdrawn by the petitioner and the Bench granted the permission for withdrawal. 6. It is averred that by the impugned order dated 13-2-1998, (Annexure P-36), the respondents have asked the petitioner to pay a premium of Rs. 5,94,59,400/- as against Rs. 18,72,120.80 already fixed by the State Government vide order dated 22-9-1982 and the respondents have also asked the petitioner to pay Nazul rent at the Rs. 29,72,970/- yearly from 1982-1983 till the date making of a sum of Rs. 4,76,67,520/ as against Rs. 93,606.05/- which is fixed by the State Government in its allotment order dated 22-9-1982. It was also mentioned in the order that the petitioner should surrender the land to the State Government in case if some plots remain surplus after allotment to the 103 members. 7. It is urged in the petition that the impugned order suffers from apparent error inasmuch as it smacks of arbitrariness having been passed in total disregard of various circulars issued by the State Government from time to time. It is putforth that the State is bound by the conditions mentioned in the allotment order dated 11-8-1982, 22-9-1982 and the orders of this Court dated 3-2-1994 and 4-4-1994 and the State can not travel beyond the conditions incorporated therein. It is setforth that a concluded contract has come into existence and the State can not unilaterally change the terms and conditions and impose such conditions which are not only arbitrary but unreasonable and irrational. It is setforth that a concluded contract has come into existence and the State can not unilaterally change the terms and conditions and impose such conditions which are not only arbitrary but unreasonable and irrational. It is averred that the order passed by the respondents is contrary to the writ issued by this Court and the only action which was required to be taken by the respondents was to execute the lease deed in favour of the members of the society. It is highlighted that when the entire sum which was required to be deposited by the petitioner had already been deposited within the stipulated time the respondents should have executed the lease deed in place of enhancing the premium and rent. It has also been pleaded that increase of rate of premium and Nazul by 500 times and 30 times respectively clearly shows that respondents are bent upon to frustrate the order of this Court by their fanciful action. It is also urged that the action taken by the respondents is contrary to the circular dated 6-11-1985 as contained in Annexure P-37. It is putforth that as per the said circular in a case where the State has given advance possession of any land to any person the premium and rent payable in respect of that land is to be determined on the basis of prevailing market price of previous year, from the date of delivery of the possession. The said circular further stipulates that the person in possession would have to pay interest at the rate of 14% on the balance amount from the date of delivery of possession till the date of allotment. According to the writ petitioner the impugned order virtually is in the shape of fresh allotment as it has created liabilities which were not conceived of and runs counter to the directions given by this Court as well as by the Apex Court. Reference has been made to clause 8 of the allotment order to highlight that the State is bound by its own order which is clear from the order dated 19-4-1991 issued by the Secretary, Department of Revenue which shall be referred to at a latter stage. The said order has been brought on record as Annexure P-38. It is putforth that the same was approved by the Cabinet sub-committee (IDC) on 29-7-1997. The said order has been brought on record as Annexure P-38. It is putforth that the same was approved by the Cabinet sub-committee (IDC) on 29-7-1997. It is also canvassed in the petition that the stipulation that the petitioner should surrender the land after a lapse of twenty years is totally unreasonable and unwarranted. It is also setforth that the order is illegal as it contravenes clause 26(1) and 26(1) (a) of Revenue Book Circular which lay down that the person would be required to pay the premium on the basis of prevailing market price of the land of the preceding year from the date of delivery of possession. It is also highlighted that the respondents have changed the terms and conditions of the original allotment order which is impermissible in law. It is also urged that while passing the order the respondents have not kept in view the various orders of this Court passed from time to time and that alone vitiates the impugned order. With these averments prayers have been made to issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the order dated 13-2-1998 contained in Annexure P-36 and further to issue a writ of prohibition against the respondents restraining them from interfering in possession of the petitioner in respect of the land in question and to direct the respondents to execute the lease deed in respect of the members of the society as directed by this Court by order dated 23-1-1997 passed in MCC No. 135/1995. 8. A return has been filed by the respondents 1 and 2 contending, inter alia, that the order passed on 13-2-1998 by the State Government does not suffer from any infirmity as this Court had never directed to lease out the land in favour of the petitioner for a nominal or throw away price. The question of price of land was never the subject matter of earlier litigations but the petitioner has laboured hard to misread the orders of this Court. Reference has been made to various orders of this Court will shall be adverted to at a latter stage. It has also been putforth that the President of the society is a public servant and most of the members of the society are influential persons who have become members of the society. Reference has been made to various orders of this Court will shall be adverted to at a latter stage. It has also been putforth that the President of the society is a public servant and most of the members of the society are influential persons who have become members of the society. It has also been putforth that the order passed by the State Government is neither irrational nor arbitrary. In fact, on the contrary, the State Government has acted in fair and responsible manner. It is setforth that the land in question is in the Arera Colony, Bhopal which is the centre of the new Bhopal were price is Rs. 500/- per sq. ft. It is putforth that the initial fixation of premium and rent was tentative in nature and it was to be finally fixed while passing the final order and such order has been passed in the year 1998 and the prevalent rate was followed. It is putforth that the petitioner was not entitled for the advance possession but was hurriedly given advance possession on the same day. According to the respondents orders passed by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court from time to time do not make out any case in favour of the petitioner that he is entitled to pay the premium at the rate which was prevalent at the time of allotment. Reference has been made to contempt petition No. 3/1998 and 45/1998 and it is putforth that as the same have been withdrawn in the present writ petition the similar grievance can not be agitated. It has also been categorically asserted that the premium and the rent fixed on 22-9-1982 was tentative in nature and the petitioner can not take advantage of the said order as the same was not final in nature. It is highlighted that the petitioner could not have taken advance possession as per the prevalent circular and, therefore, he can not claim benefit any of the circular. It is putforth that the reliance placed on the Annexure P-38 is of no avail to the petitioner as that was neither approved by the Principal Secretary nor by the Finance Minister. Reliance on the Revenue Book Service has been categorically controverted. It is exposited that the litigations were initiated assailing the cancellation and the petitioner can not claim reliefs relating to premium and rent. 9. Reliance on the Revenue Book Service has been categorically controverted. It is exposited that the litigations were initiated assailing the cancellation and the petitioner can not claim reliefs relating to premium and rent. 9. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner wherein it has been stated that the contempt petitions were not disposed of on merits but they were withdrawn. It has also been putforth that in contempt petitions the propriety of the order impugned could not have been assailed and hence, they were withdrawn to challenge the same in the independent writ petition. According to the writ petitioner various circulars issued by the State for determining the price of land and premium are binding on the State and its officers. It has also been accentuated that the delay in implementing the scheme would not adversely affect the petitioner's right to get the land in respect of the order dated 22-9-1982 and if there was and delay, as pleaded in the rejoinder affidavit, it was due to illegal action of the State Government. It is further putforth that the petitioner is a housing cooperative society and has been following the provisions of the Cooperative societies Act strictly. According to the petitioner the reliance on the condition enjoined in clause 8 by the respondents is totally misconceived as the said condition does not in any manner confer any right to the State to re-determine the premium and the rent. The said condition does not give any right to the State Government to claim more amount than what is determined. Reference has been made to Rule 26 of the Revenue Book Circular to show that the possession had been taken over before the cut off date 6-11-1985 and the circulars would govern the field. It is also putforth that in the case of the other societies, namely, Police Housing Society, Alkapuri Housing Society and SC and ST Society the State has not taken any such action as has been taken against the petitioner-society. 10. It is also putforth that in the case of the other societies, namely, Police Housing Society, Alkapuri Housing Society and SC and ST Society the State has not taken any such action as has been taken against the petitioner-society. 10. An additional return has been filed by the respondents wherein it has been putforth that the Annexure P-3 dated 22-9-1982 was not an allotment order but only a permission granted to the petitioner society to obtain the advance possession of the land in question and, therefore, the said order did not create any legal right, interest or title of the land in question in favour of the petitioner society. It is putforth that on the basis of the said order only a licence was created in favour of the petitioner-society to retain the advance possession otherwise there was no need to insert the condition as per condition No. 8. It is further putforth that if the condition was not agreeable to the petitioner-society then the petitioner was free to refuse to take the delivery of possession. Having taken over the possession the petitioner can not take a somersault and putforth a plea that the order impugned is bad in law. There is asseveration that the order dated 22-9-1982 is not an allotment order and hence, the concept of delay is not attracted. Reference has been made to the order dated 3-2-1994 passed in M. P. No. 326/86 to point out that intention of the order that the present land can not be given at the throw away price. It has also been putforth that the premium has been calculated on the basis of prevalent rate in the year 1993-1994 and not on the market rate prevailing on the date of the order. It is putforth that the order impugned would reveal that the petitioner society has been asked only to pay premium to the extent of 60% of the total area of the land which has been allotted to the society and though the petitioner society has received a huge area of prime land but does not want to pay premium in question. It is the stand of the respondents that the decision has been taken at the highest level and hence, its bona fide can not be called in question. It is the stand of the respondents that the decision has been taken at the highest level and hence, its bona fide can not be called in question. It is also puforth by the action of the respondents that petitioner's right had not been crystallized and, it can not advance a claim in the routine manner. 11. I have heard Mr. R. N. Singh, learned senior counsel along with Mr. Akhilesh Singh for the petitioner and Mr. P. D. Gupta, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State. 12. The seminal question that arises for determination in this writ petition is whether the premium and the rent fixed by the State Government by the impugned order contained in Annexure P-36 is just, proper, reasonable, rational and in accordance with law. To appreciate the factual scenario it is apposite to mention here that on a perusal of the order dated 13-2-1998 which is a communication from the Deputy Secretary, Department of Revenue to the Collector, Bhopal it is perceptible that the petitioner was handedover 13 acres of land for a premium of Rs. 5,94,59,400.00/-. It is mentioned therein that the advance possession was delivered on 11-10-1982. In the said order a reference has been made to the order passed in MCC No. 135/1995 dated 29-1-1997 and the order dated 3-2-1994 passed in M. P. No. 326/1986 and certain aspects of the revenue book circular and thereafter it has been held that the market rate of 1993-1994 would be made applicable and not of the year 1997-1998. To arrive at this rate reliance has been placed on clause 8 of the order dated 22-9-1982. It has been further stipulated therein that only those 183 members who were found fit could be given the land in question and annual rent shall be paid from the year 1982-1983 till the date of order. To find out the real import of various orders of this Court it is apposite to refer to them in detail. Prior to that it is also appropriate to have a X-ray of the order dated 22-9-1982. On a perusal of the said order it transpires that the premium was fixed at Rs. 18,72,120.80 paise on the basis of the market rate and Rs. 93,606,05/- towards yearly rent in question. Certain conditions were incorporated in the said order. Clause 8 is the clause which has been placed immense emphasis upon. On a perusal of the said order it transpires that the premium was fixed at Rs. 18,72,120.80 paise on the basis of the market rate and Rs. 93,606,05/- towards yearly rent in question. Certain conditions were incorporated in the said order. Clause 8 is the clause which has been placed immense emphasis upon. The said clause when translated in English conveys the sense that at the time of final decision taken by the State Government the relevant premium and rent would be determined and that would be accepted by the society and the society will be liable to pay the differential sum. Reference has been made to the order dated 22-9-1982 wherefrom it is apparent that the society was intimated that the petitioner had deposited the rent and premium in total amounting to Rs. 19,65,726.85/-. In the meantime the society had done the lay out and distributed the plots to its members but the respondent State had not executed the lease deed in favour of the society. At that juncture the State Government directed the society to maintain status quo. The membership of the members of society was called in question. As the disputes arose the petitioner approached this Court in M. P. No. 1296/1983. During the pendency of the writ petition the respondents vide order dated 6-2-1983 revoked the order of allotment. This Court considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case in paragraphs 23, 25, and 26 held as under :- "23. Applying these principles, we had definitely reached to the conclusion that the Government, while revoking the order of grant by order dated 2-6-1983 (Annexure 17), has not given any opportunity to the petitioner society in any manner whatsoever and for want of proper and adequate opportunity before revoking all allotment order, the revocation order dated 2-6-1983 can not be sustained. We, therefore, quash the order dated 2-6-1983 contained in Annexure 17, for non-observance of principles of natural justice. XX XX XX 25. We, therefore, quash the order dated 2-6-1983 contained in Annexure 17, for non-observance of principles of natural justice. XX XX XX 25. Before parting with the case, we must observe that the Government is not like a private individual who can pick and choose the person with whom it will deal, but the Government still remains a Government when it enters in even administrative largess and it cannot without adequate reason, exclude any person from dealing with it or take away the rights of the citizens arbitrarily as has been done in the instant case. The democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in any of the functions of Government may be quasi-judicial or administrative function of the Government. The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. In the instant case, for the reasons best known to the Government, it has completely acted arbitrarily departing from the standard norms and, therefore, we must, in the interest of not only the petitioner society, but in the interest of public at large, say that such arbitrary action of the Government is not appreciable. 26. From the discussion aforesaid, we allow the petition, thereby quashing the impugned order dated 2-6-1983 (Annexure 17). However, we make it clear that in enquiry, if the petitioner society is found guilty in violating the terms and conditions of the allotment order, i.e. allotting the land in favour of members who are having plots or houses in their names or in the names of their near relatives, the Government shall be free to cancel the allotment order dated 22-9-1982 contained in Annexure 2 after giving full opportunity to the petitioner Society as indicated above." 13. After the judgment was delivered by the Division Bench the State Government vide order dated 16-1-1986 cancelled the order of allotment in public interest and the petitioner society was asked to surrender the land in question. The said order came to be challenged in M. P. No. 326/1986 which was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court. In paragraphs 4 and 5 the Division Bench held as under :- "4. The more important aspect is whether the Society intends to allot land to those among the members who are not eligible to obtain the land. In paragraphs 4 and 5 the Division Bench held as under :- "4. The more important aspect is whether the Society intends to allot land to those among the members who are not eligible to obtain the land. The eligibility criteria is strict namely, intending members shall not have either site or building any where in the State. Public interest demands that while landless persons must be helped in their desire to obtain small piece of land for house construction, persons who have no need for such a construction should not be allowed to share the facility which the government is extending to such Cooperative Societies. Learned Additional Advocate General is justified in stating that the society, which has admitted ineligible members, can not be entrusted to discharge the function of allotting the house sites. This objection can certainly be met by issuing appropriate directions members for allotment shall be chosen by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies personally. We record the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the society is agreeable to adopt this Course. Assuming that many members are ineligible to be members and further assuming that they are also not eligible to obtain and from the society, the decision of the Government to cancel the entire allotment appears to be unduly harsh and therefore unreasonable. In these circumstances, we are inclined to set aside the order though conditionally as we propose to indicate herebelow after thorough discussion at the bar. 5. The impugned order Annexure U dated 16-1-1986 is set aside subject to the following conditions : (i) The Registrar of Co-operative Societies shall personally verify the eligibility of the members of the petitioner society for obtaining allotment of the land from the society and prepare a list of members who are eligible and furnish the list to the society. (ii) The society shall allot land to those members who are found eligible by the Registrar. (iii) The members who are found to be ineligible by the Registrar shall be entitled to make representation to the Registrar within one month from the date on which copy of the list of eligible members is furnished to the society and thereupon; the Registrar shall given an opportunity of hearing to them and take final decision in the matter. (iii) The members who are found to be ineligible by the Registrar shall be entitled to make representation to the Registrar within one month from the date on which copy of the list of eligible members is furnished to the society and thereupon; the Registrar shall given an opportunity of hearing to them and take final decision in the matter. (iv) After finalising the matter as aforesaid, the extent of land necessary for allotment to eligible members shall be reckoned and the land necessary for development activities and for surrender to the Government for allotment to weaker sections of the population shall be calculated and the excess land shall be surrendered to the Government and the Govt. shall refund proportionate premium paid by the society. (v) After the finalisation of the list of eligible members and subject of the terms and conditions of the earlier orders of the Government, the parties shall enter into a lease deed. The matter shall be finalised by the Registrar within six months from today. The first list of eligible members shall be supplied by the Registrar to the society within three months from today. Representations of members who are found the ineligible shall be disposed of by the Registrar within one month from the date of receipt of the representations." 14. An application was filed forming the subject matter of MCC No. 320/1994 wherein the condition No. 5A was inserted. The same reads as under :- "It is pointed out that the condition relating to surrender of 10% land for weaker sections has been subsequently deleted and the requirement of 50 members relates only for registration of the society. Assuming this to be correct, it is hereby clarified that if the condition relating to surrender of land has actually been deleted, the direction in para 5(iv) in the order will not be enforced." 15. The matter travelled to the Supreme Court and it was dismissed. Thereafter the MCC No. 636/1994 was filed by the society which was treated as a contempt petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. This Court after narrating the facts in detail in paragraphs 16 and 17 held as under :- "16. Now the question is whether the Registrar has committed contempt of the orders of this Court. Thereafter the MCC No. 636/1994 was filed by the society which was treated as a contempt petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. This Court after narrating the facts in detail in paragraphs 16 and 17 held as under :- "16. Now the question is whether the Registrar has committed contempt of the orders of this Court. In view of the facts stated above, it has already been held that the scope of enquiry entrusted to the Registrar by this Court was limited one and the Registrar has unduly entered into an enquiry into the legality of the membership of the members in a collateral manner. The Registrar ought to have at least considered that these very members were found to be eligible by the State Government upon a scrutiny of their affidavits and other relevant records as per the precis prepared by the Secretary of the State Government filed by the petitioners along with the rejoinder. The rejection of sixteen affidavits submitted by the members in the prescribed format of the Registrar clearly indicates that he did it with an pre-conceived mind reject them. It is also noteworthy that in spite of clear observations of this Court in the order, dated 20-7-1994, the Registrar did not issue notices personally to all the members who were to be declared ineligible. I, therefore, find substance in the contention of the petitioner/society that the actions of the registrar have not been in accordance with the letter and spirit of the order of this Court. However, the breach of the order to be punishable must be wilful act by the Registrar. It appears that the Registrar has acted according to his own peculiar notions about the meaning and scope of the orders of this Court. May be that the actions of the Registrar borders on the side of contempt, I think he deserves the benefit of doubt. 17. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Registrar dated 8-11-1994, declaring that none of the members of the society are eligible for obtaining allotment of the land is neither a legal nor proper order, having been passed with closed mind. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be a fresh enquiry to ascertain the eligibility of the members of the society. Since, the order was passed in Misc. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be a fresh enquiry to ascertain the eligibility of the members of the society. Since, the order was passed in Misc. Petition by a Division Bench, it is necessary that the petitioner/society may approach the regular Bench for further directions in the matter." 16. The said order was passed on 13-3-1995. Thereafter another MCC No. 135/1995 was filed wherein this Court directed as under :- "In an earlier petition, this Court had directed the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal to hold an enquiry regarding the eligibility for allotment of plots. The Registrar made some inquiries. The petitioners before this Court filed certain applications alleging that the Registrar is not acting fairly and also filed application for initiating proceedings against him for contempt of Courts. The matter came up before this Court in hearing in MCC No. 636/1994. This Court found that though the Registrar has not made inquiry as desired by this Court, he was not guilty of contempt. However, it was expressed that they may move a regular writ jurisdiction for further direction. Now, the petition has come for further direction before this Court. In the interest of justice, it is directed that inquiry be made by the District Judge, Bhopal. Let all the papers may be available to him. The petitioner shall also file all his documents which are necessary in the case. The District Judge, Bhopal after noticing the parties shall dispose of the enquiry within two months from today strictly according to law, keeping in view the guidelines in M. P. No. 326/1986. The Registrar or the other respondent shall not interfere with the subject matter of the enquiry the report is submitted. The parties shall appear before the District Judge, Bhopal on 1-5-1995." 17. The said order was assailed in Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court wherein the Apex Court had directed as under :- "We direct the District Judge to send the enquiry report by post along with his recommendations to the High Court. The High Court shall finally decide the matter keeping in view the report of the District Judge and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties." An application for clarification was filed which resulted in dismissal. 18. The High Court shall finally decide the matter keeping in view the report of the District Judge and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties." An application for clarification was filed which resulted in dismissal. 18. It is apposite to mention here that the State Government filed an application forming the subject matter of MCC No. 326/1996 for review of the original order dated 3-2-1994. This Court dismissed the application for review as the same was not maintainable. Challenging the said order a SLP was filed and the Apex Court came to hold that the review petition was not maintainable before the High Court and dismissed the SLP. 19. It is apposite to state here that MCC No. 135/195 was filed wherein this Court in paragraphs 10 and 11 held as under :- "10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Since the Division Bench of this Court has passed the order dated 3-2-1994 giving directions which have been confirmed by the Supreme Court, nothing remains for decision in this petition. The only consequential order needs to be passed is that the directions have to be complied with the State Government in the light of the direction which has been modified by this Court that enquiry should be conducted by the district judge of which report of the enquiry officer has already been received in which 183 members have been found to be eligible for allotment of land. Therefore, Government should now proceed on that basis and execute the deeds of the land in accordance with law. 11. Shri S. L. Saxena, learned Advocate General submitted that in fact there were only members who are entitled for allotment of land and not 183. Though this objection was nowhere raised in any of these proceedings and it is only for the first time that the learned counsel wants to raise this objection the basis of Annexure R-1 filed with the writ petition. That controversy having not been joined anywhere it will not be proper for this Court to add any post script to the earlier decisions. If there are only 50 members which was the basic condition, then the Government can proceed according to law and if there is minimum membership required for registration, then that should not come in the way of the petitioner. If there are only 50 members which was the basic condition, then the Government can proceed according to law and if there is minimum membership required for registration, then that should not come in the way of the petitioner. We do not expressed any opinion in that matter as that was not the subject matter of the petition. The State Government shall no proceed to comply with directions given on 3-2-1994 in M. P. No. 326/1986 expeditiously, as amended on 4-4-1994, as far as possible within six months." 20. As the aforesaid order was not complied with, as stated earlier, a contempt petition was filed. During the pendency of the contempt petition the impugned order was passed. As the learned counsel for the petitioner felt that no relief could be granted in the contempt proceeding he withdrew the contempt petition. 21. On a perusal of the impugned order it transpires that the premium has been fixed on the basis of the prevalent market rate of the year 1993-1994 and to do so clause 8 of the order dated 22-9-1982 has been placed reliance upon. It has also been submitted by the learned Deputy Advocate General for the State that though the order was passed on 13-2-1998 but keeping in view the decision of this Court the prevalent rate of the year 1993-1994 has been fixed and hence, there is no illegality. 22. On the contrary it is submitted by Mr. R. N. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the cancellation of the order was bad in law and, therefore, the lease deed should have been executed accepting the premium and rent which have already been paid. It is apposite to mention here that Mr. Gupta, learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted with vehemence that the letter dated 22-9-1982 is not an order of allotment but permission letter. On a perusal of the same and the orders passed by this Court from time to time it becomes crystal clear that it was an allotment order. In paragraph 26 of the order passed in M. P. No. 1296/1983 the Division Bench has clearly referred to it as an order of allotment. While referring to the said order in M. P. No. 326/1986 the Division bench in paragraph 14 has also expressed the view that the decision of the Government to cancel the entire allotment is unreasonable. In paragraph 26 of the order passed in M. P. No. 1296/1983 the Division Bench has clearly referred to it as an order of allotment. While referring to the said order in M. P. No. 326/1986 the Division bench in paragraph 14 has also expressed the view that the decision of the Government to cancel the entire allotment is unreasonable. When two decision of this Court have held that the same is an order of allotment, the submission of Mr. Gupta that it was a letter of permission does not hold water. I have no hesitation in repelling the same. 23. On a perusal of the impugned order it is manifest that the State government has fixed the premium on the basis of the prevalent rate of the year 1993-1994 on the ground that the W.P. No. 326/1986 was disposed of in the year 1994. It is canvassed by Mr. R. N. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that earlier on the order of cancellation was quashed and in any case by virtue of such cancellation the order of allotment stood revived. To appreciate the nuance of this submission it is necessary to note that the Division Bench in M. P. No. 326/1986 has already held, as has been quoted hereinbefore, that the decision to cancel the allotment was absolutely harsh and unreasonable and in that view the cancellation of the order was set aside and certain conditions were imposed. The conditions which were imposed related to verification of the membership and the extent of the land to be allotted to the eligible candidates. In clause 4 of the conditions it has been categorically stated that after finalisation of list of eligible members subject to terms and conditions of the earlier order of the State Government the party shall enter into the lease deed. It is also submitted by Mr. P. D. Gupta, learned Dy. A.G. for the State that as the order was passed on 2-3-1994, the premium has been fixed at the prevalent rate meant for that year. To bolster the said submission the learned Deputy Advocate General has placed heavy reliance on clause 8 of the Annexure P-3, the order dated 22-9-1982. Mr. Singh has placed reliance on the Revenue Book Circular to highlight that the advance possession having been given, the premium has to be calculated as per Revenue Book Circular. To bolster the said submission the learned Deputy Advocate General has placed heavy reliance on clause 8 of the Annexure P-3, the order dated 22-9-1982. Mr. Singh has placed reliance on the Revenue Book Circular to highlight that the advance possession having been given, the premium has to be calculated as per Revenue Book Circular. I need not to dialate on the same. 24. In view of the obtaining factual matrix, I am of the considered view that the approach has to be different keeping in view the earlier decisions of this Court. The order dated 22-9-1982 is an order of allotment. True it is, the amount mentioned therein is not the final one. Indubitably it was subject to the stipulation made in clause 8. The final decision was to be taken by the competent authority of the State Government. True it is, though the amount had been deposited by the petitioner, the final decision was taken on 2-6-1983 whereby the communication was made cancelling the allotment. The same was quashed on 4-7-1984 by the Division Bench on the ground that there had been violation of principles of natural justice. That may not be treated as the final order. Thus this Court remanded the matter to proceed with an enquiry and pass an order. Thereafter vide order dated 16-1-1986, (Annexure P-10), cancellation order was passed. The said order, as has been indicated hereinbefore, was quashed by the order dated 3-2-1994. The heart of the matter is whether the premium or rent should be from 3-2-1994 because this Court passed the order on that day or it should be from 16-1-1986 on which the order of cancellation was passed which was quashed. Mr. R. N. Singh, learned senior counsel would say the premium should be, as has been fixed at the time of allotment. I am not impressed by the aforesaid submission because clause 8 categorically stipulated amount was fixed and the final decision has to be taken by the State Government. The final decision was taken on 2-6-1983 cancelling the allotment. The said allotment was set aside by the High Court on technical grounds. Thereafter the order was passed on 16-1-1986. The said order was quashed as has been mentioned hereinbefore on merits as the same was totally unreasonable. The order of this Court was upheld by the Apex Court. The final decision was taken on 2-6-1983 cancelling the allotment. The said allotment was set aside by the High Court on technical grounds. Thereafter the order was passed on 16-1-1986. The said order was quashed as has been mentioned hereinbefore on merits as the same was totally unreasonable. The order of this Court was upheld by the Apex Court. Thus, the quashment of the order should relate back to the order passed on 16-1-1986. In my considered view the doctrine of relation back has to be made applicable and the order of cancellation has to be treated as per the terms of the order dated 3-2-1994 which has actually been done. What has been done thereafter is procedural. But the allotment and determination of the premium and fixation of rent have to be done from the date of the order. I think as the drastic order of cancellation by the State Government has been lanceted by this Court, the premium and rent should be fixed from 16-1-1986 and neither thereafter nor prior to that. Therefore, it is directed that the State Government shall compute the premium and rent as on 16-1-1986 and send the calculation to the petitioner. The competent authority of the State Government would do well to compute the same and send to the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the order passed today and thereafter the petitioner society should do well to pay the differential sum within three months therefrom. Though I have directed as above it would be open to the petitioner to make a representation, as far as rent is concerned to pay in instalments and if such a prayer is made the respondents shall fix easy instalments so that the members of the society can pay the rent. 25. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed in part. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.