Judgment B.S. Chauhan, J.-The instant writ petition has been filed against the impugned award dated 26.5.2000 passed by the Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar, allowing the claim of the respondent workman and directing the petitioner Municipal Board to reinstate him with 50% of back wages from the date of reference till the date of Award. 2. Thefacts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that respondent-workman filed an application on 15.1990 (Ann. Exhibit-P- 1) before the Chairman of the Board that he was qualified to be appointed on the post of Tax Assessor: post was lying vacant; thus he should be appointed. He was appointed on temporary basis, vide order dated 23.1991 (Ann. Exhibit-P-2), as a Tax Assessor by the Chairman of petitioner Municipal Board (for short, “the Board”) for a period of one year, or till regularly selected candidate was made available. When the period of one year was likely to expire, the workman approached the Civil Court by filing Suit No. 5/1992 and vide order dated 25.1992(AnnExhibit-P-3), application filed by the workman under Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was allowed and the Board was directed not to remove the workman. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the Board filed an appeal, which was allowed vide order dated 28.1993 (AnnExhibit-P-4). However, the Appellate Court directed not to remove the workman without following the procedure established by law. Services of the workman were terminated vide order dated 111.1994 (AnnExhibit-P- 5). As in between the Labour Court, Bikaner had passed certain orders, it was directed that payment in accordance with law should be made to him he was paid a sum of Rs. 34,571/-which included one month’s salary to (he tune of Rs. 4106/-in lieu of notice; Rs. 7363/-as required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act, 1947”) and Rs. 31,668/-as-directed by the Labour Court on his application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 and also a sum of Rs. 2903/-as interest as directed by the Labour Court. Suit filed by the workman was dismissed by the Court vide judgment and order dated 26.5.1995 (AnnExhibit-P-9) as not maintainable. Workman raised an industrial dispute and vide order dated 8.95, the appropriate Government made a reference as to whether termination of his services w.e.f 111.94 was justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled for. Suit filed by the workman was dismissed by the Court vide judgment and order dated 26.5.1995 (AnnExhibit-P-9) as not maintainable. Workman raised an industrial dispute and vide order dated 8.95, the appropriate Government made a reference as to whether termination of his services w.e.f 111.94 was justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled for. In pursuance of the said reference, workman filed the claim petition contending that he had been appointed in the Board vide order dated 23.199 1 and inspite of the fact that he had completed more than 240 days in a calendar year counting backward from the date of termination, his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of the Act, 1947. The Board filed the reply contending that the workman had been appointed by the Chairman, who had no competence and a person appointed dehors the Statutory Rules cannot claim any relief The Chairman, who had appointed the workman, had been removed subsequently by the State Government after holding an inquiry under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter called “the Act, 1959”) on various charges including the charge of appointing the workman illegally. Criminal cases had also been lodged against him. Moreso, under Rule 27 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Rules, 1963 (for short, “the Rules, 1963”), appointment cannot be made on ad-hoc basis for a period of more than one year and the post of Tax Assessor under Section 114 of the Act, 1959 can be filled up only with previous sanction of the State Government and as the said post had never been sanctioned in the Board, workman’s appointment was illegal; an Assessor cannot be a “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947; and, thus, he was not entitled for any relief 3. The parties led evidence before the Labour Court and vide impugned award dated 26.5.2000, the Court allowed the claim of the respondent-workman directing his reinstatement with 50% of back wages from the date of reference till the date of Award. Hence this petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Board and State-Respondent No.3 have raised the same questions of facts and law which had been raised before the Labour Court, including the competence of the Chairman to appoint the respondent-workman and also that he was not a “workman” being an Assessor and getting the salary of Rs. 4 106/-per month. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Board and State-Respondent No.3 have raised the same questions of facts and law which had been raised before the Labour Court, including the competence of the Chairman to appoint the respondent-workman and also that he was not a “workman” being an Assessor and getting the salary of Rs. 4 106/-per month. Land and Building Tax Department of the Board is not an industry. Appointment on ad-hoc basis could not be continued beyond a period of one year. Hence, the award is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, it has been canvassed on behalf of the workman that this Court, in a limited jurisdiction of judicial review, should not interfere with the tindings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and the petition is liable to be rejected. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the written submissions filed on behalf of the employee. Scope of Judicial Review 6. In a case like instant, the Court can review only the “decision making procedure” and not the “decision” of the Labour Court/Tribunal. This Court, not being a Court of Appeal, should not substitute its view on factual aspects of the case. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest Injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in “exceptional circumstances”. (Vide Union of India vs. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 ; State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow, 1994(2) SCC 537 ; State of Punjab vs. Surjit Singh, 1996(8) SCC 350 ; State of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar Singh & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 736 ; State of U.P. vs. Nand Kishore Shukla & Anr., 1996 SC 1561; Transport Commissioner, Madras vs. Thiru ARK Moorthy 1995(1) SCC 332 ;Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Bhola Nath Singh & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1908 ; State of Punjab vs. Bakhshish Singh AIR 1997 SC 2696 ; Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 1999(7) SCC 739 ; Union of India vs. Lt. Gen. R.S. Kadyan & Anr. 2000(6) SCC 698 ; Food Corporation of India vs. A. Prahalada Rao & Anr. 2001(1) SCC 165 ; Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant & Ors. 1999(7) SCC 739 ; Union of India vs. Lt. Gen. R.S. Kadyan & Anr. 2000(6) SCC 698 ; Food Corporation of India vs. A. Prahalada Rao & Anr. 2001(1) SCC 165 ; Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant & Ors. 2001(1) SCC 182 ; N.R. Nair vs. Union of India & Ors. 2001(6) SCC 84 ; Union of India & Ors. vs. Ashotosh Kumar Srivastava, 2002(1) SCC 188 and Quseph Mathai & Ors. vs. M. Abdul Khadir, 2002(1) SCC 319 . 7. In State of Tamil Nadu vs. S. Subramaniam, AIR 1996 SC 1232 , the Apex Court held that the Court, in exercise of its powers of judicial review, is to consider whether the conclusion reached by the Authority is based on the evidence on record and support the findings, or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. 8. In General Court Martial & Ors. vs. Col. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal, AIR 1998 SC 983 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its limited power of judicial review, may interfere by appreciating the evidence only if there is an omission on the part of the Authority to consider the relevant evidence. Similarly, in Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration 1984(4) SCC 635 , the Apex Court observed as under:- “It is equally well settled that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal or Arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated Viewed from either angle, the conclusions are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of and the High Court ought not to have short-circuited the writ petition.” 9. In Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board vs. Suresh & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1160 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court cannot be interferred by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution unless the “same is otherwise perverse or there is an existing error apparent on the face of the record.” 10. Undoubtedly, the scope of interference by this Court is very limited. Undoubtedly, the scope of interference by this Court is very limited. As the instant case involves important questions of law and fact having far-reaching effect, as to whether an Assessor is a “workman” as defined in Section 2(s) and whether Land and Building Tax Section of the Municipality is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act, 1947 and the Labour Court has not dealt with the issues, the case requires consideration. Appointment Dehors the Rules 11. Admittedly, respondent-workman had been appointed without following any procedure prescribed under the Act or the Rules by the Chairman of the Board, who had no competence to appoint an Assessor; nor the post had been sanctioned by the State Government. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that even if his appointment was not in accordance with law, the provisions of the Act, 1947 are attracted as Section 25-J provides that provisions contained in Chapter V-A of the Act, 1947 would have over-riding effect on other Labour Laws. This view stands fortified by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.B. Bansilal Abeerchand Mills vs. Labour Court 1972(1) SCC 154 ; Krishna District Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. vs. N.V. Puranchandra Rao & Ors., 1987(4) SCC 99 ; P. Virudhachalam & Ors. vs. Management of Lotus Mills & Anr., 1998(1) SCC 650 ; Vikramaditya Pandey vs. Industrial Tribunal & Anr. AIR 2001 SCW 310 ; and Harmohinder Singh vs. Kharga Canteen Ambala Cantt AIR 2001 SCW 2520 . 12. This Court, in Prabhu Dayal Jat vs. Alwar Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank, 1991 Lab. & 1C 944, considered the case of an employee, whose services stood terminated on the ground that he had been appointed without any authorisation of law and held that even in that eventuality, provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947 were attracted. 13. On the contrary, in Sita Ram Mali vs. State of Rajasthan, 1994(2) WLC 177, this Court held as under: “Making appointment on daily wages without the availability of the post and without following the provisions of Articles Hand 16 suffers from patent illegality. Apparently for the reasons which are only extraneous, the Officers of the Department have given appointments on daily wages to few favoured. Those who have waited in queue at the employment exchange have been altogether ignored. Apparently for the reasons which are only extraneous, the Officers of the Department have given appointments on daily wages to few favoured. Those who have waited in queue at the employment exchange have been altogether ignored. In fact, while the length of the queue continuously increased, the back-door entrants got the entry in service as daily wages employee and got the order of appointment on salary in the regular pay scale and ultimately the order of regularisation on the service.” 14. TheCourt depricated the practice of making appointments on daily wages and held that even the appointment on daily wages without advertising the vacancy or calling the names from Employment Exchange violated the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence, was violative of fundamental rights of other eligible persons and, thus, the relief of regularisation could not be accorded. 15. The question of appointment dehors the Rules has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court time and again and the Court held that such appointments are unenforceable and inexecutable. It is settled legal proposition that any appointment made dehors the Rules violates the Public Policy enshrined in the rules and, thus, being void, cannot be enforced (Vide Smt. Ravinder Sharma & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors., 1995(1) SCC 138 ; Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director, Punjab Instructions 1995 (Suppl.) 4 SCC 706; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shyama Pardhi, 1996(7) SCC 118 ; State of Rajasthan vs. Hitendra Kumar Bhatt 1997(6) SCC 574 ;Patna University vs. Dr. Amita Tiwari, AIR 1997 SC 3456 ;Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs. S.S. Modh & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3464 ; Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors., 1999(9) SCC 573 ; and Chancellor vs. Shanker Rao & Ors., 1999(6) SCC 255 . 16. Appointment dehors the Rules violates the mandate of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1992 SC 789 ; and State of Haryana & Ors. 16. Appointment dehors the Rules violates the mandate of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1992 SC 789 ; and State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Piara Singh, AIR 1992 SC 2130 ; In Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 101 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised the public employment as public property and held that all persons similarly situated have a right to share it though its enjoyment is subject to the recruitment rules which must be in consonance with the Scheme of the Constitution of India. .17. In Dr. M.A. Haque & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 1993(2) SCC 213 , the Supreme Court observed as under: - ."We cannot lose sight of the fact that the recruitment rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution have to be followed strictly and not in breach. If a disregard of the rules and by passing of the Public Service commissions are permitted, it will open a backdoor for illegal recruitment without limit. In fact this Court has, of late, been witnessing a constant violation of the recruitment rules and a scant respect for the Constitutional provisions requiring recruitment to the services through the Public Service Commissions. It appears that since this Court has in some cases permitted regularisation of the irregularly recruited employees, some governments and authorities have been increasingly resorted to irregular recruitments. The result had been that the recruitment rules and the Public Service Commissions have been kept in cold storage and candidate dictated by various considerations are being recruited as a matter of course.” .18. Depricating the practice of making appointment dehors the Rules by the State or its instrumentalies in Dr. Arundhati A. Pargoankar vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 962 , the Court rejected the claim of the petitioner therein for regularisation on the ground of long continuous service observing as under:- .“Nor the claim of the appellant, that she having worked as Lecturer without break for 9 years’ on the date the advertisement was issued, she should be deemed to have been regularised appears to be well founded. Eligibility and continuous working for howsoever long period should not be permitted to over-reach the law. Eligibility and continuous working for howsoever long period should not be permitted to over-reach the law. Requirement of rules of selection cannot be substituted by humane considerations. Law must take its course.” .19. TheHon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. & Ors. vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1654 observed as under:- .“This being so those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who come by the back door have to go by the same door The tact that they are made by public bodies cannot vest them with additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public office, howsoever made, is not necessarily vested with public sanctity. There is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving all appointments irrespective of their mode. From the inception some engagements and contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoiled system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them.” .20. Even if there are no Statutory rules providing for the mode of appointment, the Executive Instructions/Policy decision must be there providing precisely for a mode of appointment. Even if no such Executive Instructions/Policy/Guidelines/Circular etc. is in existence, a fair procedure for appointment has to be adopted in consonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 6 of the Constitution. (Vide Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Yadaorao Jagannath Kumbhare 1999(8) SCC 99 . In Ramesh Kumar Sharma & Anr. vs. Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal & Ors., AIR 2000 SCW 4206, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “expression ‘Service Rules’ cannot be given a restrictive meaning in the absence of the definition of the said .term and, therefore, it would include within its sweep, the necessary Government Order providing the method of recruitment.” 21. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in B.R. Kapoor vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2001(7) SCC 231 (Jayalalitha case) observed that it is the duty of the Court to examine whether the incumbent possesses qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or the procedure adopted was fair, just and reasonable. 22. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Ajit Singh (II) vs. State of Punjab and Ors., 1999(7) SCC 209 , held that Articles 14 and 16(1) are basic features of the Constitution. 22. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Ajit Singh (II) vs. State of Punjab and Ors., 1999(7) SCC 209 , held that Articles 14 and 16(1) are basic features of the Constitution. The same view has been reiterated in Ashok Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 1997(5) SCC 201 ; and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India & Ors., 2000(1) SCC 168 . Thus, strict adherence to the said provisions is required. 23. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1991 SC 537 ; and A.P. Aggarwal v. Government (NCT) of Delhi & Ors., 2000(1) SCC 600 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that every State action, in order to survive, must not be succeptible to vice of arbitrariness which is a crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basis of the Rule of Law. 24. Therefore, any appointment made by a Authority, which is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, if found to have been made by a person without any competence or without following the procedure prescribed by law and in case the procedure is not prescribed and the procedure adopted by the Authority is not in consonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the incumbent cannot claim any benefit as in such a case the contract of service becomes unenforceable and inexecutable. 25. If the view contrary to the above is accepted or it is accepted that by virtue of provisions of Section 25-J, provisions contained in Chapter V-A of the Act, 1947 would over-ride the mandate of the Constitution also, it will take away the powers of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto, wherein the appointment of an incumbent can be challenged not only by an aggrieved person but a stranger also. Invalidity of an appointment may arise not only from want of qualification, but also from the violation of such legal conditions or procedure for appointment as mandatory and as a result of which the appointment becomes void. (Vide M. Pantiah & Ors. vs. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107 ; University of Mysore vs. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 ; and P.N. Lakhanpal vs. A.N. Roy, AIR 1975 Del. 66 . (Vide M. Pantiah & Ors. vs. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107 ; University of Mysore vs. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 ; and P.N. Lakhanpal vs. A.N. Roy, AIR 1975 Del. 66 . There can be no quarrel to the issue that the Board is an Authority, which is a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus, question of saving such an illegal appointment did not arise. .26. The instant case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Factory Manager, Cinimco Wagon Factory vs. Virendra Kumar Sharma & Anr., 2000(6) SCC 554 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deciding a similar case, held as under: - .“Assuming that the respondent was asked to work in a factory in anticipation of securing appointment, that too by an officer who was not competent to give appointment, that did not make the respondent a workman or regular employee of the appellant company.” 9.27. In view of the above, appointment of workman at the initial stage was in flagrant violation of provisions of the Act, 1959 as there had been no sanctioned post of Tax Assessor, nor the appointment was by following any procedure for selection and even if appointment had been made under the provisions of Rule 27 of the Rules, 1963, it had to lapse automatically after one year. Therefore, respondent - workman had no right to continue on the post, as his appointment had never been approved by the State Government as required under Section 114 of the Act, 1959. Moreso, the Chairman of the Board, who had appointed the workman illegally, had been removed after holding the inquiry on various charges including the charge of making illegal appointment of respondent-workman. 10.28. Thus, in view of the above, it may be held that petitioner may not be entitled for any relief on this count alone. Whether Land & Building Tax Department is an Industry 129. Thefurther question for consideration does arise as to whether Land and Building Tax Section of the Municipal Board is an ‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act, 1947. 130. Every Municipal Board has large number of Departments/Sections. There may be some departments which may be-doing regal and sovereign functions of the State as delegated by the State to it by Statutes. 130. Every Municipal Board has large number of Departments/Sections. There may be some departments which may be-doing regal and sovereign functions of the State as delegated by the State to it by Statutes. Therefore, the question does arise whether Land & Building Tax Department of a Municipal Board is an ‘industry’ and if not, the respondent working in it cannot claim any relief under the Act, 1947. 31. There can be no dispute to the settled legal position that imposition of tax on land and building is not a fee as sine qua non for the services rendered to the land/building owner/assessee. It is a tax. Imposition and collection of tax is a regal and sovereign function inalienable to any private person. Article 265 of the Constitution of India puts an embargo to impose tax save by the authority of law. State Legislature is competent to impose property tax as it falls within the ambit of Entry 49 List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. (Vide Asstt. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras (supra); D.G. Gouse & Co. (Agent) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 271 ; and Indian Cement Ltd. etc. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 85 . The State has delegated the power to levy and collect the obligatory tax to Municipalities by virtue of the provision of Section 104 of the Act, 1959, on annual letting value of the buiiding or land like octroi. By Section 105, Municipalities have been conferred powers of levying and collecting other optional taxes. Difference in both the provisions is that under Section 104, it is compulsory while in later it is optional. (Vide Ami Chand & Ors. vs. Slate of Rajasthan & Ors., 1984 WLN (UC) 115. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that Municipali