I. M. QUDDUSI, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions have been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 7-12-2001 passed by the Additional District Judge-II, Faizabad in S. C. C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, by which the application 13 (C-2) moved by the plaintiff, who is respondent in these revisions for striking off the defence of the revisionist under Order 15, Rule 5 has been allowed and the amendment application 17 (A), which was moved by the defendant revisionist for amendment in the written statement, has been rejected. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff respondent had filed a caveat on behalf of opposite party No. 1, therefore, Shri Vijay Bahadur Verma appeared for him. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist defendant, Shri Hari Prakash Srivastava and for the respondent-plaintiff, Shri Vijay Bahadur Verma at quite length. ( 4 ) SINCE the order has been passed on the same date i. e. 7-12-2001 and one formal order has been prepared on these applications, therefore, these revisions are being decided by this common order. ( 5 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiff has filed a suit before the Judge, Small Causes Court for arrears of rent, damages and eviction of the revisionist defendant from the premises in question situate at National Highway Mohalla Amanigunj, district Faizabad. The revisionist defendant has filed a copy of the agreement between the parties according to which the premises in question was rent out for running the Educational Institution and the rent of the same was due. The monthly rent of the house was Rs. 10,000. 00. The premises in question was rent out on 22-3-1999 initially on an oral agreement which was later on written on 1-6-1999. The rent was to be paid on 16th day of each calendar month. There were other conditions also mentioned in the agreement but the same are not relevant for these revisions. This fact has been mentioned in the plaint that the rate of rent was 10,000/ -. The premises in question was rent out on 22-3-1999 orally and the written agreement was made latter on. It was also one of the conditions according to the plaint that in case of non-payment of rent 12% interest would also be liable to be paid by the defendant-revisionist. The premises in question was rent out on 22-3-1999 orally and the written agreement was made latter on. It was also one of the conditions according to the plaint that in case of non-payment of rent 12% interest would also be liable to be paid by the defendant-revisionist. The notice was also sent to the tenant by the landlord -plaintiff on 7-12-1999 for payment of arrears of rent w. e. f. August 199 9/11/1999 alongwith the amount of interest on which the revisionist defendant had paid the rent but has not paid the amount of interest which was Rs. 1000. 00. Thereafter again when the amount of rent became due, another notice dated 3-6-2000 for recovery of arrears of rent w. e. f. February 2000 to May 2000 amounting to Rs. 40,000. 00 and Rs. 1000/- as interest thereon which was already due to be paid and also regarding termination of tenancy under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, was also sent. After service of notice, the defendant-tenant paid the arrears of rent from February to April 2000 and for June 2000 and also Rs. 1400. 00 as interest, which was refused by the landlord-plaintiff under protest. A months rent was not paid by the tenant on the allegation that he would spend a months rent in white washing of the house but the tenant did not do so from june 199 9/05/2000. In the prayer only a months rent for the month of May 2000 i. e. 10,000/- and further damages for house and occupation at the rate of Rs. 10,000. 00 with 12% interest till the ejectment of the defendant-tenant along with the prayer for a decree of eviction, from the premises in question has been claimed. ( 6 ) IN the written statement it has been mentioned that the defendant had invested a months rent in new construction i. e. flush, toilet, safety tank, urinal and water tank have been constructed and pump has already been installed after getting the boring of the tubewell done and one room was also constructed, for which the defendant spent about 2. 5 Lacs and the rent for the month of May 2000 has been adjusted towards white washing and painting. The plea has also been taken in the written statement that the defendant tenant cannot be evicted and no notice was received. 5 Lacs and the rent for the month of May 2000 has been adjusted towards white washing and painting. The plea has also been taken in the written statement that the defendant tenant cannot be evicted and no notice was received. ( 7 ) THE rent for the months of September, October, November, December 2000 and January 2001 was refused to receive, hence the same was deposited in the court. ( 8 ) FIRST of all, the order by which the application of the plaintiff 13 (C-2) has been allowed and the defence has been struck off under Order 15, Rule 5 is liable to be considered. ( 9 ) IT has been held by the learned court below in its impugned order that it is not disputed that the rent has been deposited but the defendant revisionist had deposited the rent of two months together. He has not deposited the rent month to month basis. The rent for the month of May 2000 has not been deposited and the rent for the months of September to December 2000 was deposited and for the month of January 2001 was also deposited. ( 10 ) FROM a perusal of the application No. 13 (C-2) moved by the plaintiff respondent for striking of the defence of the tenant-defendant under Order 15, Rule 5, C. P. C. it appears that the amount of Rs. 43,600. 00 was tendered on 7-12-2000 which was allegedly the rent for the months of August to November 2000 and according to the application the defendant -tenant has not deposited the rent of December 2000 within time. ( 11 ) IN the objections the defendant-revisionist has mentioned that since the rent of one month was already paid in advance with the plaintiff, the same would be adjusted towards the month of August 2000 and in the tender the rent was mentioned for the months August 2000 to November 2000 was in fact for the months of September 2000 to December 2000. ( 12 ) THE rent of January 2001 was also tendered within time and according to the agreement the rent was to be deposited on 16th day of each calendar month. ( 13 ) IN the impugned order the learned court below has not mentioned the dates on which the rent of the concerned months have been deposited. ( 12 ) THE rent of January 2001 was also tendered within time and according to the agreement the rent was to be deposited on 16th day of each calendar month. ( 13 ) IN the impugned order the learned court below has not mentioned the dates on which the rent of the concerned months have been deposited. It has also not discussed the objections filed against two applications, in which it was mentioned that the rent of one month was already kept in advance with the plaintiff respondent. Besides this, it has also been mentioned in the grounds of revision that the representation made by the revisionist has also not been considered while striking of the defence of the revisionist. Learned Court below has also not considered the fact whether there was an agreement or not and whether the parties were bound by the agreement or not and whether the conditions of deposit were given in the agreement or not. ( 14 ) THIS is the fact that the tender of Rs. 43,600. 00 was submitted. The rate of rent is Rs. 10,000. 00, and if any, interest was liable to be paid, that was in accordance with the alleged agreement but when the lower Court has not discussed about the agreement as indicated above, nothing can be seen with regard to the deposit of amount as interest. The court below had to see the amount tendered by the revisionist and the dates when the amount of rent were tendered. The learned court had to see also the delay in tendering the amount and his rent separately but nothing has been found in the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order passed by the learned court below is a speaking order. Striking of the defence of a party is a serious thing as he would not able to be put his case before the court and he will be deprived of considering his defence in that case. Therefore, the court below should have taken the serious repercussions of the order passed by him and should have decided the same after seeing every aspect and the plea as well as representation made by the tenant. Therefore, the court below should have taken the serious repercussions of the order passed by him and should have decided the same after seeing every aspect and the plea as well as representation made by the tenant. ( 15 ) IN the matter of Bimal Chand Jain v. Gopal Agarwal reported in AIR 1981 SC 1657 , the Apex Court has held that there is a reserve of discretion vested in the Court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record it finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgment of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under sub-rule (2), the defence should or should not be struck off. Further, the Apex Court has held that the word "may" in sub-rule (1) merely vests power in the Court to strike off defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. Sub-rule (2) obliges the court before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred there is good reason for it. But it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event it cannot be said that sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence. It must be remembered that an order under sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. In that event it cannot be said that sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence. It must be remembered that an order under sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. ( 16 ) THE purpose of enacting Order 15, Rule 5 C. P. C. has been elaborately explained in the case of Shiv Prasad v. Special Judge, Allahabad reported in (1996)1 All Rent Cas 110 : (1996 All LJ 1007) in paragraph 9 of the report in the following words :-"the purpose of enacting the provisions of Rule 5 in Order XV was not go given lever to the landlord to get a tenant punished for insignificant lapses. The purpose was merely to ensure that the dues of the landlord are properly secured and he can get his rent regularly even though the litigation may continue. " ( 17 ) IN the case of Smt. Leela Devi v. Smt. Shanti Devi Jaiswal, (1985)2 All Rent Cas 144 : (AIR 1986 Allahabad 90) it has been held that the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 CPC are not mandatory but discretionary and in every case of default the court is not obliged to strike off the defence. In other words even if there is a default the Court in its discretion may refuse to strike off the defence. ( 18 ) THE facts and circumstances of the case in hand are liable to be considered before making any order striking of the defence by the Court. ( 19 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances discussed above the impugned order striking of the defence of the revisionist is liable to be set aside. Now, the application 17 (A) is to considered. ( 20 ) THE amendment application 17-A which has been rejected by the Court below on the ground that the fact which has already been admitted in the written statement, cannot be denied later on. This is, no doubt, well settled law that once in the written statement a fact has been admitted, the same cannot be denied subsequently by making amendment or in case the same is denied at any stage subsequently, the same is not permissible under the law. This is, no doubt, well settled law that once in the written statement a fact has been admitted, the same cannot be denied subsequently by making amendment or in case the same is denied at any stage subsequently, the same is not permissible under the law. Now it is to be seen as to what amendment was sought in the written statement by revisionist-defendant. The learned court below has mentioned that by way of amendment the defendant wants to add that only the rent for the month of September, October and November 2000 was due and on the date of filing of the written statement no rent remained due. From the side of the plaintiff-respondent it was urged that in paragraph 25 of the written statement defendant has admitted that he had gone to pay the rent for the month of August, September, October, November and December 2000 and January 2001 but the plaintiff did not received the same, therefore, the same was being deposited in the court. Hence at the later stage, the defendant cannot take a plea that the rent for the month of September, October and November 2000 only was due. The revisionist has filed a copy of the written statement with the statement in paragraph 25 of the written statement. It was stated between the parties that the rent would be payable on 16th day of each calendar month and the defendant had gone to pay the rent for the month of September, October, November and December 2000 and January 2001. The plaintiff did not accept the same, hence the same is also being deposited in the court. The rent for the month of May 2000 has been adjusted towards painting and white washing and the amount of one month is already in deposit with the plaintiff in advance. By way of amendment, the revisionist wanted to add the words in paragraph 25 to the effect that the rent for the month of August 2000 has been accommodated towards advance deposited. On the date of first hearing of the suit, the rent for the month of September, October and November 2000 was due. On the date of filing of written statement, no rent remained due. ( 21 ) IN paragraph 25 of the written statement, the revisionist defendant has already mentioned the fact that the rent of one month is already in deposit with the plaintiff. On the date of filing of written statement, no rent remained due. ( 21 ) IN paragraph 25 of the written statement, the revisionist defendant has already mentioned the fact that the rent of one month is already in deposit with the plaintiff. Whatever amount has been deposited in the court on or before the date of filing the written statement is before the court and the court can very well see the plea of the defendant which is already mentioned in the written statement to the effect that one months rent is already in deposit with the landlord in advance. Therefore, in case the written statement is not amended even then it is not a hidden fact that how much amount has been deposited in the court on or before the date of filing of written statement. This is also to be determined by the court whether a months rent was already in deposit with the landlord or not. There is no need to get the written statement amended by the defendant. However, it was not proper, at this stage, to give any finding by the court below to the effect that once a fact has been admitted in paragraph 25 of the written statement, the same was being denied by way of amendment. At this stage, whether the fact mentioned by way of proposed amendment is contrary to the written statement or not is to be seen by the court below at the time of final arguments of the case. ( 22 ) THEREFORE, the impugned order of the court below rejecting the amendment application is not liable to be interfered as the amendment was not necessary in the written statement but the findings given by the court below as discussed above in his order dated 7-12-2001 in rejecting the amendment application 17-A are liable to be set aside. ( 23 ) IN the result, the S. C. C. revision No. 42 of 2002 is allowed. The order dated 7-12-2001 passed on the application 13 (C-2) of the respondent plaintiff striking of the defence of the revisionist under Order 15, Rule 5 is set aside. The learned court below may consider the application afresh in the light of the observation made above, considering the representation of the revisionist also. The order dated 7-12-2001 passed on the application 13 (C-2) of the respondent plaintiff striking of the defence of the revisionist under Order 15, Rule 5 is set aside. The learned court below may consider the application afresh in the light of the observation made above, considering the representation of the revisionist also. The S. C. C. Revision No. 44 of 2002 is allowed in part to the extent that the finding given by the learned court below to the effect that by way of proposed amendment the revisionist-defendant has denied the fact that it was admitted earlier in the written statement, is set aside. However, the part of the order by which the amendment application has been rejected is upheld only on the ground that the amendment was not necessary in the written statement. No order as to costs. Order accordingly.