JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.: In this writ application the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs:- "(a) Writ of or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No.1 Calcutta Municipal Corporation or its men, agents and subordinates to take immediate steps for stoppage of construction work on the land of the petitioner being 7 cottahs 14 chittacks in Block 'L' in C.LT. Scheme-VIIM formed out of old Premises No. 92, Bagmari Road, Kolkata presently premises No.92/2/1C. Bagmari Road, Kolkata; (b) Writ of or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Calcutta Municipal Corporation being respondent Nos. 1 to 4 or its men, agents and subordinates to cancel the sanctioned plan, if there is any, with immediate effect in respect of the land of the petitioner being 7 Cottahs 14 Chittacks in Block 'L' in C.I.T. Scheme-VIIM formed out of old Premises No. 92, Bagmari Road, Kolkata presently Premises No. 92/2/1C. Bagmari Road, Kolkata; (c) Writ of or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No.8 being the Police authority as also the respondents No.1 to 4 being the Corporation authorities to take immediate steps for stoppage of construction work which is going on in the plot of the land of the petitioner being 7 Cottahs 14 Chittacks in Block 'L' in C.I.T. Scheme-VIIM formed out of old Premises No. 92, Bagmari Road, Kolkata presently Premises No. 92/2/1C, Bagmari Road, Kolkata." 2. The case made out by the petitioner may be epitomized thus: The land in dispute originally belonged to a Debottar Estate but the same was acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after giving compensation to the said Debottar Estate. After such acquisition, the Government transferred the land to the Calcutta Improvement Trust ("CIT"). CIT in its term agreed to lease out the land for 99 years to the petitioner and the petitioner paid the premium to the CIT and took possession of the same. Recently, on or about March 14, 2002, the employees of the petitioner noticed that some unknown persons were busy digging up earth at the disputed land and had also dismantled a portion of the boundary wall. The petitioner came to know that the respondent No.9 on the basis of an alleged purchase from one Debidas Mukhopadhay, a professed shebait of the Debottar Estate is trying to make construction on the land. The petitioner came to know that the respondent No.9 on the basis of an alleged purchase from one Debidas Mukhopadhay, a professed shebait of the Debottar Estate is trying to make construction on the land. Although the petitioner approached the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the local police station to stop the illegal construction, they were reluctant in the matter of taking any step for discontinuation of the construction on the land of the petitioner. Hence this application. 3. Mr. De, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent No.9 has taken a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ application itself. Objections of Mr. De are twofold. 4. First, he contends that even on the basis of averments made in the writ application, no deed of lease having been executed between CIT and the petitioner, simply be mere payment of premium to a prospective lessor, an intended lessee cannot acquire any interest in the land and thus the petitioner, in the absence of any interest in the land in question, cannot maintain this writ application. 5. Secondly, according to Mr. De, his client has purchased the property after taking permission from the learned District Judge from the shebait of the Deity whose name stood recorded in the assessment register of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and thereafter has mutated his name and obtained sanctioned plan for construction of the building. Mr. De complains that CIT at no point of time mutated its name in the record of Calcutta Municipal Corporation on the basis of the alleged acquisition and all along the name of the Debottar Estate remained in the assessment register till the name of the private respondent No.9 incorporated in its place. Mr. De seriously disputes the assertion that the land in question was ever acquired as alleged or that any compensation was paid to the Debottar Estate. At any rate, Mr. De contends that this type of disputed question of title cannot be adjudicated in this writ application and it is for CIT to file a civil suit if it intends to dispute the title and possession of his client. Mr. De submits that even any civil suit at the instance of the petitioner will not be maintainable since it has acquired no interest in the land on its own showing. 6. Mr. Mr. De submits that even any civil suit at the instance of the petitioner will not be maintainable since it has acquired no interest in the land on its own showing. 6. Mr. Mitra, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has laboriously disputed the aforesaid preliminary objections raised by Mr. De. According to Mr. Mitra, even a person who has entered into agreement for acquiring right in the property is entitled to maintain a writ application for protecting his future interest in the land although at the time of filing of writ application no deed conferring any interest in the property has been executed. In support of such proposition of law he relies upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of Jayanta Kumar Banerjee vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in AIR 1981 Calcutta page 138. 7. Mr. Mitra next asserts that his client having been put into possession of the land pursuant to an agreement of lease, it is entitled to maintain its possession notwithstanding the fact that no formal deed of lease has been executed. Thus, taking aid of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, Mr. Mitra proceeds, his client is entitled to resist CIT in getting back possession even if CIT refuses to execute the lease deed. Therefore, according to Mr. Mitra, on the basis of right flowing from section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act his client is entitled to maintain this writ application for protecting its lawful possession. Mr. Mitra in this connection relies upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dayal Prosad Sanyal vs. Nripendra Chandra Chakraborty, reported in 1986(1) CHN page 68, in support of his contention that in certain circumstances although no formal deed conferring title has been executed in favour of a person, such person can be treated as 'owner' if he has full control over the property. 8. Mr. Mitra has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamzabi & Ors. vs. Syeed Karimuddin & Ors., reported in 2001(1) SCC page 414, in support of his contention that the benefits of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act are available to his client. Mr. 8. Mr. Mitra has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamzabi & Ors. vs. Syeed Karimuddin & Ors., reported in 2001(1) SCC page 414, in support of his contention that the benefits of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act are available to his client. Mr. Mitra lastly relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M.S. Joyraj vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala & Ors., reported in 2000(7) SCC page 552, for the proposition that of late, Supreme Court has shifted from the earlier strict interpretation regarding locus standi of a writ petitioner. 9. Mr. Roychowdhury, appearing on behalf of the Corporation after taking instruction from his clients fairly informed this Court that in the records of Corporation the name of the Debottar Estate appeared as owner and after purchase, the respondent No.9 has mutated his name and on his application a building plan has been sanctioned in his favour. It is further stated that on the basis of a complaint lodged by the petitioner, a 'stop construction' order has been passed which is the subject-matter of a different writ application filed by the respondent No.9. He admits that neither the CIT nor the petitioner has ever approached the Corporation for mutation on the basis of their alleged title. 10. The learned counsel appearing for CIT has supported the case of the petitioner. 11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the averments made in this application including its annexures I find that the petitioner has made out disparate types of cases as regards its status in the disputed land in different places. In its letters dated March 14, 2002 and April 26, 2002 addressed to the Commissioner, Kolkata Municipal Corporation complaining unauthorized construction by the private respondent No.9, the Deputy Director of the petitioner made an outrageous false statement claiming that the petitioner purchased the land from CIT in 1980 at the "total costs of Rs. 2,40,000/-" In paragraph 4 of this application the petitioner asseverated its title as a lessee for 99 years with option for renewal at a premium of Rs. 448.51 p. per square metre. In paragraph 5 the petitioner reiterated its case "that the said land was given on the basis of lease". 2,40,000/-" In paragraph 4 of this application the petitioner asseverated its title as a lessee for 99 years with option for renewal at a premium of Rs. 448.51 p. per square metre. In paragraph 5 the petitioner reiterated its case "that the said land was given on the basis of lease". In paragraph 6 however the petitioner admitted that only a draft deed of lease was sent to the petitioner and the petitioner returned the said draft with certain modification and amendments. Although such draft deed of lease with modification was sent back to CIT in the year 1984, why in course of last 18 years no deed has been executed has not been mentioned in the writ application. Ultimately, in paragraph 15 of the application the petitioner justified its alleged possession not on the basis of any deed of lease but on the ground that "the petitioner is entitled to possess the said land legally since the said land is in possession of the petitioner, who constructed boundary walls surrounding the said land." The petitioner in paragraph 17 has made out a case of acquisition of the disputed land by Land Acquisition Collector after payment of compensation to the owner of the land and has disputed the ownership of the respondent No.9 in paragraph 18. However Annexure "J" to the present application shows that only an area of 5 cottahs 15 chittacks being a portion of premises No, 92, Bagmari Road was acquired whereas the petitioner itself has stated that the disputed land is of an area of 7 cottahs 14 chittacks being premises No. 92/2/1C, Bagmari Road. I have already pointed out that it is nobody's case that 92/2/1C was ever mutated in the name of CIT or the petitioner in the assessment register of Corporation; nor is it the case of the petitioner that it ever paid any tax to the Corporation after recording its name on the basis of its alleged possession. 12. The law relating to locus standi of a person to move an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is now well settled. The existence of a right and infringement thereof are the foundation of the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Such right may either be a fundamental right or an ordinary legal right. The existence of a right and infringement thereof are the foundation of the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Such right may either be a fundamental right or an ordinary legal right. When a person complains of violation of a non-fundamental right, such legal right must either be a statutory one or other right or interest recognized by law. However, the rights that can be enforced under Article 226 must ordinarily be the rights of the petitioner himself except in the case of habeas corpus, quo warranto or public interest litigation. The case before us does not fall in any of the aforesaid three categories. The petitioner in the present case intends to protect his alleged interest in the land. By mere agreement of a lease with CIT the petitioner cannot acquire any interest in the land even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that CIT is the lawful owner of the land. Since no lease deed has yet been executed between the petitioner and the CIT, the petitioner has not acquired any right in the property even through CIT. Although Mr. Mitra strenuously tried to convince this Court that his client is entitled to get benefit of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, I am not at all impressed by such submission. No material has been placed before court indicating that there was a written agreement between the parties for execution of deed of lease for 99 years and pursuant to terms of such written agreement the petitioner has been put into possession. A draft deed of lease returned by the petitioner after amendment cannot be termed as a written agreement for lease and there is not even any provision in the draft deed for putting the petitioner in possession of the land before execution of a formal deed of lease. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamzabi & Ors. (supra) relied upon by Mr. Mitra cannot help his client as the basic ingredients of section 53A has not been fulfilled. Moreover, it is now a too old proposition of law that section 53A is available only as a defense and cannot be invoked for enforcing any right under the contract (See Delhi Motor Co. & Ors, vs. U.A. Basrurkar & Ors., reported in AIR 1968 SC page 794). 13. Moreover, it is now a too old proposition of law that section 53A is available only as a defense and cannot be invoked for enforcing any right under the contract (See Delhi Motor Co. & Ors, vs. U.A. Basrurkar & Ors., reported in AIR 1968 SC page 794). 13. In the case of Jayanta Kumar Banerjee vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., strongly relied upon by Mr. Mitra, the question was whether a person who has entered into agreement for purchase of a land with the owner can challenge a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Such question was answered in affirmative by a learned Single Judge of this Court. While arriving at such conclusion His Lordship failed to take note of the following definition of the expression "person interested" appearing in section 3(b) (West Bengal Amendment) and the provision contained in section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act giving right to raise objection against a notification:- "Section 3(b).––The expression 'person interested' includes all person claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land or cultivates the land or any portion of it as bargadar. Explanation.––A bargadar is a person who, under the system generally known as adhi, barga or bhag, cultivates the land of another person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that person." 14. Therefore, a person who has simply entered into an agreement for sale with the owner cannot be described as a person interested in compensation to be made on account of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; such a person cannot thus challenge a notification under section 4 of the Act by filing a writ application when he has not been conferred with any right to raise objection under section 5A of the Act. 15. I am therefore unable to treat the said decision in the case of Jayanta Kumar Banerjee (supra) as a precedent as His Lordship failed to take notice of the sections 3(b) and 5A of the said Act. 16. 15. I am therefore unable to treat the said decision in the case of Jayanta Kumar Banerjee (supra) as a precedent as His Lordship failed to take notice of the sections 3(b) and 5A of the said Act. 16. In the case of Dayal Prosad Sanyal vs. Nripendra Chandra Chakraborty (supra) it was held that an allottee of a co-operative society who has constructed a building on the allotted land should be treated to be owner within the meaning of section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for the purpose of evicting his tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement notwithstanding the fact that formal deed of transfer was yet to be executed by the cooperative society. In my view, the principle laid down in the said case cannot have any application to our case inasmuch as it is now settled by the Apex Court that the word "owner" appearing in section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act should not be given strict construction and even a thika tenant is also an owner for that purpose. Thus by taking aid of that decision, the petitioners can derive title to the disputed land through CIT. 17. In the other decision cited by Mr. Mitra viz. M.S. Joyraj vs. Commissioner of Excise (supra), a Bench consisting of two Judges of the Apex Court held that the Supreme Court has changed from the earlier strict interpretation regarding locus standi as adopted in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills vs. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros., AIR 1971 SC 246 and in Jasbhi Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 , and in the light of the expanded concept of locus standi and in view of the finding of the Division Bench of the High Court which was the subject-matter of the appeal that the order of the Excise Commissioner was passed in clear violation of law, the Apex Court decided not to interfere on the ground of locus standi of the respondent therein. It may be mentioned here that the writ petitioner in the counter-affidavit before Supreme Court maintained that her objection against the order of the Excise Commissioner was as a citizen of Karukachal Panchayat and that she was entitled to raise such objection. 18. It may be mentioned here that the writ petitioner in the counter-affidavit before Supreme Court maintained that her objection against the order of the Excise Commissioner was as a citizen of Karukachal Panchayat and that she was entitled to raise such objection. 18. In my view, the aforesaid decision is no authority in support of a proposition of law that a sanction granted by Municipality or the title of such sanction holder in the disputed land can be challenged in a writ application by a person who according to his own version has merely entered in to agreement to get a lease. In the case of J.M. Desai vs. Roshan Kumar (supra), a Bench consisting of four Judges followed the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagar Rice and Flour Mills (supra) and in paragraph 38 laid down the following tests to ascertain whether a writ petitioner has locus standi:- 1) Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? 2) Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognized by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? 3) Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something? 4) Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? 5) Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? 6) Is the statute in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standard of conduct for the community? 7) Is it a statute dealing with private rights of a particular individual? 19. 6) Is the statute in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standard of conduct for the community? 7) Is it a statute dealing with private rights of a particular individual? 19. Applying the aforesaid tests to the facts of the present case I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to maintain this application as he intends to safeguard the alleged right of CIT in the land and the CIT itself has not come forward to protect its alleged right. I thus dismiss this application only on the ground that the petitioner having no interest in the land is not entitled to maintain this application. I make it clear that I have not gone into the disputed question of fact whether the CIT has at all any title over the property. 20. No costs. Appeal dismissed.