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2002 DIGILAW 377 (KAR)

Vimalamma v. N. Hanumantha Reddy

2002-06-14

V.GOPALA GOWDA

body2002
ORDER V. Gopala Gowda, J.--This is a classic case for example the way in which the minor mineral is being exploited by miscreants by taking undue advantage of the loop-holes in the system, the connivance of officers in Mines and Geology Department and misuse of process of law, thereby huge loss is being caused to the State exchequer and public interest is divested to private interest for their enrichness at the cost of the public. 2. First Respondent was first Plaintiff, second Respondent was second Plaintiff, Respondents 3 to 5 were Defendants 1 to 3 and the Petitioner was the 4th Defendant in the trial Court. The Plaintiffs are brothers. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred as per their rank in the trial Court. 3. The brief facts of the case are, quarrying lease was granted in favour of the first Plaintiff for an extent of 2-00 acres in Sy. No. 107 of Mailasandra in Bangalore South Taluk in the year 1994 for a period of five years. Out of that, the 2nd Plaintiff claims to have been given 1-00 acre of land by the first Plaintiff, which is the suit schedule property. It is stated that even before the expiry of the lease in favour of first Plaintiff, the 2nd Plaintiff filed application for grant of lease in his favour in respect of the suit land. It is asserted that even after the expiry of lease in favour of first Plaintiff, the 2nd Plaintiff continued in possession of the suit land. The 2nd Plaintiff was informed by the 3rd Defendant that his application for grant of lease had been rejected as the lease in favour of first Plaintiff was subsisting when the 2nd Plaintiff filed the application. Despite expiry of lease in favour of first Plaintiff and rejection of the application of 2nd Plaintiff, the Defendants No. 1-3 allowed him to quarry the mineral. In the meanwhile, lease was granted in favour of the 4th Defendant in respect of the suit land. It is alleged that when the Defendants attempted to dispossess, the Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to (1) restrain the Defendants from interfering with Plaintiffs' possession and quarrying work without due process of law, (2) restrain Defendants 1 to 3 from executing any lease deed in favour of 4th Defendant and to consider the application of the Plaintiff for grant of lease. 4. 4. In the suit, the trial Court passed order on I. As. II and III directing the parties to maintain status quo till the disposal of the suit. The 4th Defendant filed M.A. Nos. 81 and 82 of 2001 questioning the said order. The appellate Court dismissed those appeals and confirmed the order passed by the trial Court on I. As. II and III. Questioning the legality, validity and correctness of the said order, the 4th Defendant has filed these two revision petitions. 5. When the Plaintiffs sought clarification of the order passed on I. As. II and III by filing I.A. XI, the trial Court passed order on 11.7.2001 allowing the said application restraining the Defendant from interfering with the possession and quarry work of the Plaintiffs. 6. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the orders of the Courts below. While the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs sought to justify the order under challenge, Counsel for the 4th Defendant and the Government Advocate submits that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant of interim order is not justifiable. Let me consider the merits of the case. 7. It is an admitted fact that quarry lease was granted in favour of the first Plaintiff and not in favour of the 2nd Plaintiff. It is also an admitted fact that the lease in favour of the first Plaintiff expired on the expiry of five years and thereafter there was no renewal of the same. In the written statement filed on behalf of Defendants 1 to 3 at paragraph 3 it is stated that the lease in favour of the first Plaintiff was granted on 28.10.1985 for a period of five years but the same was determined on 20.8.1988 for violation of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1969 and thereafter the 2nd Plaintiff is in illegal possession of one acre of land in question. But the lease stated in the plaint was granted in the year 1994. Both relates to Lease No. 4723. In the list of documents filed by 4th Respondent herein, it is seen that the first Plaintiff surrendered his lease vide letter dated 22.4.1985 and the same had been accepted by the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology as per letter dated 8.5.1985. In the surrender letter the lease period is stated to be for 10 years from 8.11.1979. In the list of documents filed by 4th Respondent herein, it is seen that the first Plaintiff surrendered his lease vide letter dated 22.4.1985 and the same had been accepted by the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology as per letter dated 8.5.1985. In the surrender letter the lease period is stated to be for 10 years from 8.11.1979. All these pertains to the 2.00 acres of land in question. Thus, there is conflicting versions of the first Plaintiff so far as the commencement and duration of lease. However, one thing is clear that the lease of the first Plaintiff was either surrendered or expired by efflux of time and there was no lease in favour of 2nd Plaintiff in respect of the land in question. 8. Without there being a lease in favour of the Plaintiffs, they filed the suit claiming that they are in lawful possession. Ex-facie, the suit of the Plaintiffs was not maintainable as they have no right whatsoever on the land in question. When the Plaintiffs were not at all entitled to the main relief sought in the suit, the trial Court ought not to have granted interim order of status-quo in their favour and the appellate Court should not have confirmed the same. Grant of interim relief in favour of the Plaintiffs is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the decision reported in ILR 2002 Kar 1803 (Divisional Commissioner KSRTC Vs. G.P. Raghavendra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the 4th Defendant. On this ground alone the orders of the Courts below are liable to be set aside. 9. It is pertinent to note that the prayers in the plaint have been restricted only for 1-00 acre of land alleged to be in possession of 2nd Plaintiff. Admittedly he was not the lessee nor he got any kind of right whatsoever over the said land. Such being the position, the trial Court committed an error in law in granting the interim order in favour of the Plaintiffs and further committed a grave illegality by restraining the Defendants from interfering with the quarrying work of the Plaintiffs when it has passed order on I.A.XI. Such being the position, the trial Court committed an error in law in granting the interim order in favour of the Plaintiffs and further committed a grave illegality by restraining the Defendants from interfering with the quarrying work of the Plaintiffs when it has passed order on I.A.XI. Neither the trial Court nor the appellate Court applied their mind to find out the nature of right of the Plaintiffs claim and whether they have got such a right upon the suit schedule land for exploiting the minor mineral. The relief has been granted mechanically by the trial Court and the same has been confirmed in a casual manner by the appellate Court. The whole process is nothing but abuse of process of the law by the Plaintiffs, for which the Courts below without application of mind have acted and granted interim order in favour of the Plaintiffs. 10. Rule 6(4) of K.M.M.C. Rules, 1994 declares that any minor mineral extracted from a quarry and not removed by the lessee or licensee before the termination or determination or expiry of the quarrying lease or license, shall be the property of the State Government. Despite this clear provision, the officers of Mines and Geology Department allowed the 2nd Plaintiff to continue his quarrying operations for the reasons best known to them. The 2nd Plaintiff claimed right of quarry through the first Plaintiff. But, Section 31-P of 1994 Rules stipulates that the lessee shall not assign, sublet, mortgage or in any manner transfer the quarrying lease or any right, title or interest therein, enter into any agreement, contract or any understanding with any person. Inspite of this clear bar, the assertion of 2nd Plaintiff should not have been recognised by the officers of the Department, that too, when there is no lease or license in favour of the first Plaintiff himself. 11. Except issuing notices, Defendants 1 to 3 have not taken action against the second Plaintiff even after the lease in favour of first Plaintiff came to an end long back to preserve and protect the public interest. On the other hand, they called upon the 2nd Plaintiff to pay royalty and penalty despite the lease in favour of first Plaintiff was either surrendered or expired by passage of time and knowing full-well that the 2nd Plaintiff has no right whatsoever over the suit schedule property. On the other hand, they called upon the 2nd Plaintiff to pay royalty and penalty despite the lease in favour of first Plaintiff was either surrendered or expired by passage of time and knowing full-well that the 2nd Plaintiff has no right whatsoever over the suit schedule property. Despite the trial Court granted interim relief in the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs, Defendants 1 to 3 have not taken any steps to get it vacated nor they challenged in appeal, as has been done by the 4th Defendant. They not only assisted and helped the 2nd Plaintiff to continue his quarrying operations upon the suit schedule land eventhough he has no right whatsoever but kept quiet without taking legal action to challenge the interim order passed against them. This clearly prima facie prove their connivance with the 2nd Plaintiff. They are hand-in-glove with the 2nd Plaintiff for extraneous reasons. As a result of it, the State has been subjected to huge loss to its exchequer. Hence, it is a fit case to take disciplinary action against them. 12. The Presiding Officers of the trial Court and the appellate Court have utterly failed in their duties by entertaining the suit in the absence of any enforceable right by the Plaintiffs. The grant of interim relief and confirmation of the same are contrary to law, the provisions of Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1994 and the provisions of Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure. Both the Courts did not consider the nature of right of the Plaintiffs asserted and whether they are entitled to the relief or not. Hence, it is a fit case to direct the Registrar General of this Court for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Presiding Officers also after obtaining necessary orders in the Administrative side. 13. Accordingly, these revision petitions are allowed and the common order under revision is set aside.M.A. Nos. 81 and 82 of 2001 are allowed and the order of the trial Court on I. As. II and III and I.A. XI are set aside and those applications are dismissed. 14. 13. Accordingly, these revision petitions are allowed and the common order under revision is set aside.M.A. Nos. 81 and 82 of 2001 are allowed and the order of the trial Court on I. As. II and III and I.A. XI are set aside and those applications are dismissed. 14. Communicate a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Karnataka to take note of the situation and to issue necessary directions to the concerned, with a direction to see that disciplinary proceedings are initiated against Defendants 1 to 3 within four weeks for the dereliction of duty observed in the course of this order and causing huge loss to the public exchequer. The Respondents 1 to 3 are also directed to recover the damages from the Plaintiffs for extracting minor minerals from the suit schedule property pursuant to the interim order, by initiating proceedings within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The proceedings shall be concluded and the action taken shall be reported to the Registrar General. 15. The Registrar General is directed to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for taking action against the concerned two Presiding Officers on the administrative side.