JUDGMENT Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay, J.: This petitioner company carries on business of clearing, shipping and forwarding of goods within the area of Calcutta Port Trust and Haldia Dock Complex. For the purpose of effectively running its aforesaid activities in coordination with the Haldia Dock Complex authorities, the petitioner company made a written request on 5th June, 1979 to the General Manager, Haldia Dock Complex for providing an accommodation in two "D" type flats. 2. In response to the said request, Manager (I & CF) Haldia Dock Complex informed the petitioner by a letter dated 24th August, 1979, that licence of one unit of "D" type flat in the Calcutta Port Trust's building at Haldia can be given to the petitioner on the following terms and conditions: I. You will be required to pay a licence fee of Rs. 1,320.00 per unit per month. You will also pay necessary service charges and other fees as may be levied in future. II. The licence will revoked on seven days' notice on either side and you will have no claim for compensation whatsoever, for such revocation of licence. III. You will not share use of the above flat or any part thereof with anybody or any organisation. IV. No addition or alteration to the existing structure will be allowed. V. You will be required to utilise the above flat exclusively for the purpose for which it is allotted to you. VI. You will have to make your own arrangement for conservancy of the flat and keep same neat and clean and in proper sanitary condition. VII. You will not cause any damage to the Port Trust's properties, if, however, any damage is caused you will be liable to make good the damages to the entire satisfaction of the undersigned. VIII. The monthly licence fee will be charged in your name from the date of your occupying the above flat till the licence is revoked as per terms mentioned in Clause (II) above and the bill for licence fee will be sent to you in due course. IX. In addition to monthly licence fee, you will be required to pay the electricity charges for the current consumed and other charges on this account as may be assessed by the Calcutta Port Trust's Manager (P & E) or fication. IX. In addition to monthly licence fee, you will be required to pay the electricity charges for the current consumed and other charges on this account as may be assessed by the Calcutta Port Trust's Manager (P & E) or fication. If you are in urgent need of occupying the above flat, you may do the internal clarification work as per our specification and estimate and your own cost. It may please be noted that such cost will not be adjusted against the licence fee. X. You will be required to deposit in advance a sum of Rs. 3,960.00/being the equivalent of three months' licence fee as security against the payment of licence fee. XI. In case of default in payment of bills within the due date interest @ 15% per annum would be charged on the outstanding rent dues, provided that no interest shall be charged if the rent is paid within one month from the due date of payment or the amount of rent due does not exceed Rs. 3,000.00/-. The petitioner company accepted the aforesaid terms and conditions as mentioned by the Calcutta Port Trust authorities by the written statement dated 16th October, 1979. 3. By a notice dated 29.11.82, Manager (I & CF) Haldia Dock Complex cancelled, revoked and withdrew the leave and licence granted to the petitioner company in respect of the flat in question with effect from 31st March, 1983. In spite of serving the aforesaid notice neither the petitioner company handed over the vacant possession of the flat in question nor the respondent Calcutta Port Trust authorities took any further steps in terms of the said notice and on the contrary the Port Trust authorities accepted payments towards the licence fees from the petitioner company. Thereafter, by another notice dated 9th January, 1986, the Manager (I & CF) Haldia Dock Complex informed the petitioner company that leave and licence granted to the petitioner company in respect of the flat in question shall stand cancelled, revoked and withdrawn with effect from 1st February, 1986, as the said flat is required by the Calcutta Port Trust authorities for providing residential accommodation to its employees. 4. The petitioner company through its Advocate sent a reply to the aforesaid notice of the Port Trust authorities and requested the Calcutta Port Trust authorities for not taking any further steps as threatened in the notice dated 09.01.86. 4. The petitioner company through its Advocate sent a reply to the aforesaid notice of the Port Trust authorities and requested the Calcutta Port Trust authorities for not taking any further steps as threatened in the notice dated 09.01.86. Since the Writ Petitioner refused to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the flat in question even after receiving the notice dated 9th January, 1986, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner company by the Estate Officer under section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The petitioner company instead of showing any cause in response to the said show-cause notice forwarded a copy of the letter of its Advocate dated 30th January, 1986, which was submitted earlier by the said Advocate of the petitioner company in reply to the notice of revocation and cancellation of licence dated 9th January, 1986 issued by the Calcutta Port Trust authorities. 5. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Estate Officer on 05.06.87 passed an order under section 5(1) of the said Act and directed the petitioner company to vacate the premises within 15 days of the publication of the said order. The petitioner company preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge at Alipore, under section 9 of the said Act against the aforesaid order of the Estate Officer dated 5th June, 1987, passed under section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The said appeal was ultimately dismissed on contest. 6. The petitioner company, thereafter, filed the present Writ Petition challenging the notice issued by the Estate Officer under section 4 of the said Act and also the order passed by the said Estate Officer on 5th June, 1987, under section 5(1) of the said Act and also challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, Midnapore, dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner company section 9 of the said Act. 7. 7. The petitioner raised the following points in the present Writ Petition for consideration: 1) Whether the formation of opinion as mentioned in the notice under section 4 of the Act and the satisfaction of the Estate Officer as mentioned in the Order passed under section 5(1) of the Act regarding unauthorised occupation of the flat by the petitioner company has been vitiated due to non-consideration of the representation dated 30th January, 1986, made by the learned Advocate on behalf of the petitioner company. 2) Whether the learned District Judge while deciding the appeal has failed to take into consideration that there was no satisfaction of the concerned Estate Officer as contemplated under section 5 of the said Act and whether such non-consideration of pre-requisite of section 5 by the learned District Judge rendered the order perverse. 3) Whether the licence granted by the Port Trust authorities is not a licence simpliciter but the same is coupled with interest and could not be revoked in the manner as has been done by the Port Trust authorities and whether the Estate Officer and the learned District Judge while dealing with the appeal failed to consider the aforesaid aspect while dealing with the matter. 4) Whether the learned District Judge while deciding the appeal though referred to the impugned order under appeal, namely, the order dated 5th June, 1987, passed by the Estate Officer under section 5 of the said Act furnished any reason and/or ground for affirming the said order of the Estate Officer. 8. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, appearing on behalf of the Port Trust authorities submits that the petitioner was granted licence under specific terms and conditions as mentioned in the letter dated 5th June, 1979, and the petitioner company accepted those terms and conditions and thereafter occupied the flat in question. Referring to Clause II of the said terms and conditions Mr. Roy Chowdhury also submitted that licence was liable to be revoked by 7 days notice on either side and in the present case more than 7 days notice was served upon the petitioner company. 9. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further contended that no reason was required to be given in the notice for revoking the licence nor this Court in its Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction can assess the sufficiency of such notice. Mr. 9. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further contended that no reason was required to be given in the notice for revoking the licence nor this Court in its Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction can assess the sufficiency of such notice. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also contended that the petitioner herein never challenged the decision of the Estate Officer in respect of the unauthorised occupation of the flat by the petitioner company. Referring to a decision of the Special Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1968 Call (Standard Literature Co. vs. Union of India), Mr. Roy Chowdhury submitted that if the notice to quit has been validly served and the period specified therein has expired then the person served is in unauthorised occupation under the said Act. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also referred to another decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1996 (1) CHN Pg. 407. Wherein this Court specifically held that the Writ Court should not go into sufficiency of reasons in respect of formation of opinion by the appropriate authority under section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. 10. Referring to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1994(Supp.) (3) SCC 694 (Jiwan Dass vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr.), Mr. Roy Chowdhury submitted that powers of public authorities to initiate action under section 5(1) of the said Eviction Act of 1971 without even assigning any reasons therefor cannot be said to be violative of Article 14. 11. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further referred to a decision of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court reported in AIR 1986 Karnataka 258 [The Indian Company, Bangalore vs. Messrs. Blaze and Central (P) Ltd. and Ors.] and submitted that since the petitioner company never contended that it was not in unauthorised occupation, the Estate Officer has done nothing wrong by issuing an order of eviction under section 5 of the said Act. The relevant paragraph 6 of the judgment in The Indian Company (supra) is quoted herein below: "Para6................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................If the person to whom notice is issued were to plead that he was not in unauthorised occupation, then it becomes necessary for the Estate Officer to inquire as to whether such a plea is well founded. The relevant paragraph 6 of the judgment in The Indian Company (supra) is quoted herein below: "Para6................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................If the person to whom notice is issued were to plead that he was not in unauthorised occupation, then it becomes necessary for the Estate Officer to inquire as to whether such a plea is well founded. If the person concerned does not dispute that he had become an unauthorised occupant or disputes but fails to prove that he was not an unauthorised occupant, the Estate Officer is empowered to pass an order of eviction under section 5 of the Act ....................................................................................... ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................." 12. Learned Advocate of the petitioner submitted that in the present case licence granted by the respondent authorities is not a licence simpliciter as the licence herein is coupled with interest. Learned Advocate of the respondent authorities however, submitted that if a licence is coupled with interest then same amounts to transfer of interest in the property and in that event instead of licence the same should be regarded as lease and in view of the provision of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease from month to month is terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee upon serving of 15 days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy which has already been done in the instant case. Mr. Roy Chowdhury also cited a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 610 Para. 12 (M.N. Clubwala and Anr. vs. Fida Hussain Saheb) in support of his aforesaid contention. 13. Though it was contended by the learned Advocate of the petitioner that the learned District Judge never furnished any reasons while affirming the impugned order under appeal passed under section 5 by the Estate Officer but Mr. Roy Chowdhury referring to the grounds of appeal filed before the learned District Judge by the petitioner herein submitted that the learned District Judge dealt with all the objections as were raised against the order of the Estate Officer under section 5 of the said Act as mentioned in the Memorandum of Appeal while disposing of the appeal. 14. Considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the respective parties, I find no merit in the present Writ Petition. 14. Considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the respective parties, I find no merit in the present Writ Petition. Petitioner Company had no other option but to handover vacant possession of the flat in question to the respondent authorities after service of the required notice by the Port Trust Authorities as per Clause II of the agreed terms and conditions. 15. The statute herein has admittedly given wide powers to the public authorities under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 to determine the tenancy and it has already been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Jiwan Dass (supra) that it was not permissible to cut down the width of the powers by reading into it the reasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating action for terminating the tenancy. Authorities under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 are empowered to act in the public interest and are entitled to determine the tenancy or leave or licence before taking action under section 5 of the Act which has been specifically held by the Supreme Court in the case of Jiwan Dass (supra). 16. Mr. R.N. Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that there had been no valid formation of opinion by the Estate Officer by reason of the fact that the representation dated 30th January, 1986 made by the learned Advocate of the petitioner Company was never considered by the Estate Officer before issuing the notice under section 4 of the Act. It is not understood how it can be said particularly when the Estate Officer neither mentioned about the list of documents considered by him before the formation of opinion nor the said Estate Officer is obliged to do so. Furthermore, in the instant case the petitioner company never asserted that it is not in unauthorised occupation of the premises in question and as a matter of fact no proper reply to the show-cause notice under section 4 of the Act was submitted by the said Company to the Estate Officer. However, the Estate Officer even after non-submission of the proper reply to the show-cause notice considered the objections as was recorded in the letter of the learned Advocate of the petitioner company dated 30th January, 1986, before passing order under section 5 of the Act. 17. Another point raised by Mr. However, the Estate Officer even after non-submission of the proper reply to the show-cause notice considered the objections as was recorded in the letter of the learned Advocate of the petitioner company dated 30th January, 1986, before passing order under section 5 of the Act. 17. Another point raised by Mr. R. N. Das is that the learned District Judge while deciding the appeal never furnished any reason for affirming the order of the Estate Officer. The learned Counsel of the petitioners also contended that the grievances of the petitioners raised before the learned District Judge were not taken into consideration at all and the specific objections raised before the said learned District Judge were virtually not taken into consideration and accordingly no decisions were taken thereon. In my opinion, aforesaid submissions of the learned Advocate of the petitioners are not based on proper appreciation of the materials on record. From paragraph 6 of the judgment of the learned District Judge it would appear that the learned District Judge while deciding the appeal considered all the objections as were raised on behalf of the petitioner company in Memorandum of Appeal and passed a detailed reasoned order while deciding the appeal finally. I do not find any illegality and/or irregularity in the matter of serving of notice under section 4 of the Act and also in the order passed by the Estate Officer under section 5 of the Act. 18. Mr. R. N. Das, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners though submitted that the formation of the opinion under section 4 and satisfaction recorded under section 5 of the Act by the Estate Officer has been vitiated due to non-consideration of the representation made by the learned Advocate on behalf of the petitioner company but I am unable to accept such contention for the reasons stated above. As a matter of fact the Writ Court cannot assess the sufficiency of the reasons for the purpose of formation of the opinion by the Estate Officer. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel of the respondent authorities in this regard are very much applicable in the instant case. In any event, the Estate Officer while passing the order under section 5 of the Act duly considered the representation made by the learned Advocate of the petitioner company. 19. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel of the respondent authorities in this regard are very much applicable in the instant case. In any event, the Estate Officer while passing the order under section 5 of the Act duly considered the representation made by the learned Advocate of the petitioner company. 19. The learned District Judge while deciding the appeal preferred by the petitioner company under section 9 of the Act properly considered all the points raised in the said appeal and rightly affirmed the order of the Estate Officer. I do not find any scope to interfere with the findings of the learned District Judge in this regard. In my opinion, the instant Writ Petition is totally misconceived. For the aforementioned reasons, this Writ Petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs which I assess at 500 G.Ms to be paid by the petitioner company within four weeks from date to the respondent No. 1. Later: After pronouncement of the judgement learned Advocate of the petitioner prays for stay of the operation of the said judgment. Such prayer for stay is considered and refused. Let urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment be given to the learned Advocate for the parties. Writ application dismissed.